MASTER
NEGATIVE
NO. 94-82212-7

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted materials including foreign works under certain conditions. In addition, the United States extends protection to foreign works by means of various international conventions, bilateral agreements, and proclamations.

Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the photocopy or reproduction is not to be "used for any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research." If a user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or reproduction for purposes in excess of "fair use," that user may be liable for copyright infringement.

The Columbia University Libraries reserve the right to refuse to accept a copying order if, in its judgement, fulfillment of the order would involve violation of the copyright law.

Author:
U.S. Congress. House.

Title:
Mobilization of civilian manpower

Place:
Washington, D.C.

Date:
1945

94-82212-7
MASTER NEGATIVE #

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
PRESERVATION

BIBLIOGRAPHIC MICROFORM TARGET

ORIGINAL MATERIAL AS FILMED - EXISTING BIBLIOGRAPHIC RECORD

BUSINESS
264
Un3874

U. S. *Congress. House. Committee on military affairs.*

Mobilization of civilian manpower. Hearings before the Committee on military affairs, House of representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, first session, on H. R. 1119, an act amending the Selective training and service act of 1940, as amended, and for other purposes. January 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, and 18, 1945 ... Washington, U. S. Govt. print. off., 1945.

iii, 493 p. 23cm.

Andrew J. May, chairman.

1. Military service, Compulsory—U. S. 2. U. S. Army—Recruiting, enlistment, etc. 3. World war, 1939– —Manpower—U. S. I. Title.

45-35496

Library of Congress UB343.A5 1945
[5] 355.22

RESTRICTIONS ON USE:

TECHNICAL MICROFORM DATA

FILM SIZE: 35mm REDUCTION RATIO: 12x IMAGE PLACEMENT: IA (IIA) IB IIB

DATE FILMED: 9/26/94 INITIALS: W.W

TRACKING # : MSH 02435

FILMED BY PRESERVATION RESOURCES, BETHLEHEM, PA.

2.0 mm ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890

1.5 mm ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890

PM-MGP 13″x18″
METRIC GENERAL PURPOSE TARGET
PHOTOGRAPHIC

150 mm

100 mm

A4

A5

1.0 mm

1.5 mm

2.0 mm

2.5 mm

PRECISION℠ RESOLUTION TARGETS

Century

A&P

1303 Geneva Avenue
St. Paul, MN 55119

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz
1234567890

4.5 mm

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz1234567890

3.5 mm

12-1145-8 L
839-21

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H. R. 1119

AN ACT AMENDING THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

JANUARY 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, AND 18, 1945

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs

D 264 Un3874

Columbia University
in the City of New York

THE LIBRARIES

SCHOOL OF BUSINESS

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H. R. 1119

AN ACT AMENDING THE SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

JANUARY 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, AND 18, 1945

Printed for the use of the Committee on Military Affairs



68175

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1945

Business
D264
Un 3874

46-40279

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

ANDREW J. MAY, Kentucky, *Chairman*

R. EWING THOMASON, Texas
OVERTON BROOKS, Louisiana
JOHN J. SPARKMAN, Alabama
PAUL J. KILDAY, Texas
CARL T. DURHAM, North Carolina
CLIFFORD DAVIS, Tennessee
JOHN EDWARD SHERIDAN, Pennsylvania
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
PHILIP J. PHILBIN, Massachusetts
PAUL STEWART, Oklahoma
ARTHUR WINSTEAD, Mississippi
CHET HOLIFIELD, California
JAMES A. ROE, New York
MELVIN PRICE, Illinois
WALTER G. ANDREWS, New York

DEWEY SHORT, Missouri
LESLIE C. ARENDS, Illinois
CHARLES E. CLASON, Massachusetts
J. PARNELL THOMAS, New Jersey
PAUL W. SHAFER, Michigan
THOMAS E. MARTIN, Iowa
CHARLES H. ELSTON, Ohio
FOREST A. HARNESS, Indiana
IVOR D. FENTON, Pennsylvania
J. LEROY JOHNSON, California
CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, Connecticut

JOSEPH R. FARRINGTON, Hawaii
E. L. BARTLETT, Alaska
JESÚS PIÑERO, Puerto Rico

JULIA WATTERSON, *Clerk*

ARMY LIBRARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Statement of—	Page
Col. Francis V. Keesling, Jr., Selective Service System	1–3
Hon. Robert P. Patterson, Undersecretary of War	3–34
Hon. Ralph A. Bard, Undersecretary of Navy	35–37
Hon. J. A. Krug. Director, War Production Board	37–57
Hon. Charles M. Hay, Deputy Chairman, War Manpower Commission	57–78
Col. Francis V. Keesling, Jr., Selective Service System	79–130
Hon. William M. Colmer, Representative in Congress, from the State of Mississippi	130–141
Lt. Gen. William S. Knudson, Office of Undersecretary of War	143–164
Mr. Albert Hamilton, representing the Socialist Party	165–188
Mr. Lewis G. Hines, legislative representative, American Federation of Labor	188–227
Hon. Fiorello H. LaGuardia, mayor, city of New York	237–238
Mr. Philip Murray, president, Congress of Industrial Organizations	239–292
Rev. Donald Harrington, representing Workers' Defense League	292–298
Mr. John J. Mankowski, representing Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers' Union	299–307
Mr. Leo Jandreau, general vice president, United Electrical and Radio Machine Workers of America, Congress of Industrial Organizations	307–334
Mr. Irving Abramson, president, New Jersey State Industrial Union Council	334–343
Mr. Percy Llewellyn, representing United Automobile Workers of America	343–350
Hon. Francis Case, Representative in Congress from the State of South Dakota	351–353
Mr. Frederick C. Crawford, chairman, National Association of Manufacturers	353–406
Mr. Martin H. Miller, national legislative representative, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen	406–410
Col. Lewis Sanders, Field Artillery, legislative and liaison division, Office Chief of Staff	410–434
Table from records of Labor Department	436
Letter from the President of the United States, with copies of letters from General Marshall and Admiral King	436–437
Memo, Manpower shortages	437–438
Further statement of Colonel Keesling	438–463
Hon. Marvin Jones, chairman, War Food Administration	463–480
Hon. W. R. Ogg, director, Washington office, American Farm Bureau Federation	480–493

FEB 1 1946 PCR
46-40279

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee on Military Affairs met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Thomason, Brooks, Sparkman, Kilday, Durham, Sheridan, Philbin, Stewart, Andrews, Short, Arends, Clason, Thomas, Martin, Elston, Fenton, and J. Leroy Johnson of California.

Chairman MAY. The committee will please be in order.

The Chairman wishes to make a statement on behalf of the committee and for the information of the public and everyone concerned with this legislation.

As far back as March of last year, this committee, through a special subcommittee, after many months of careful study and investigation, filed a report in the House of Representatives for the information of the Congress and the agencies of Government concerned with the subject of manpower for military and industrial purposes. In that report, the committee said:

> It has been brought to the attention of the committee that while the War Department has indicated an unwillingness to adopt and place in effect the recommendations of the committee, nevertheless, the authority to do so still remains, and the committee takes the position that until it is pointed out wherein the laws which have already been enacted, as a result of the committee's legislative action, are shown to be inadequate, further legislation is not necessary.
>
> It is, however, appropriate to state that the committee is always ready and willing to consider the proposals of the War Department and Selective Service as to legislation that may be needed in the event that it is requested.
>
> So far there has been a conspicuous absence on the part of the War Department to the committee of an effort in a direction of charting the course to be followed by those capable of doing more work, so far as their placement in industry is concerned, and such an effort, it is believed, has potentialities of value.

Then the committee made seven recommendations which are as follows:

> 1. That Selective Service proceed with the reclassification of IV–F's in accordance with the committee's previous recommendation, and to so continue so long as conditions require.
>
> 2. That Selective Service, in conjunction with the War Manpower Commission, should compile a list of industries and occupations directly or indirectly contributing to the war effort, employment in which will be deemed as sufficient to merit reclassification of IV–F's as employed, into II–A–F, or II–B–F categories.
>
> 3. That those men who are so engaged in work which contributes to the war effort, and are classified II–A–F or II–B–F, should be required to notify their local draft boards, and receive a certificate of approval prior to making any change in employment.
>
> 4. That those IV–F registrants not reclassified into II–A–F or II–B–F be required to notify their local draft boards of their willingness to accept employment in any listed industry or occupation upon notification by such boards.

5. That upon the failure of a registrant, classified IV–F, to so notify his local draft board of his willingness to accept such employment, he shall be deemed subject to induction into the armed services.

6. That the Army or Navy shall accept for induction into service, such persons who, not reclassified into II–A–F or II–B–F, refuse to indicate their willingness to accept employment in a listed industry or occupation, or who fail to accept such employment when offered, such inductees to be assigned to appropriate noncombat duty, and shall be deemed to be in excess of the maximum in the strength heretofore specified by the services.

7. That in the event these procedures are not adequate to provide the manpower necessary to eliminate shortages, and to reduce turn-over, then the same procedures should be applied to those classified I–C and likewise to all registrants between the ages of 38 and 45 years.

Now, following that, the President of the United States, in his annual message on the state of the Union, found in the Congressional Record of last Saturday, January 6, on pages 93 and so forth, after quoting a joint letter which he had received from the Secretaries of War and Navy, in which they recommended the further action of the Congress and particularly with reference to national service legislation, made this statement, and I quote from the message on page 96 of the Congressional Record of January:

Pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects of national service, I recommend that the Congress immediately enact legislation which will be effective in using the services of the 4,000,000 men now classified IV–F, in whatever capacity is best for the war effort.

It seems clear to me, and I am sure clear to most everyone, that the President desires first of all to make a test of the efficiency of the pending legislation, which is set forth in a bill which I introduced at the request of the services, H. R. 1119, on January 6, 1945.

On that bill, these hearings are to be had and it is the desire of the Chair and the committee that we expedite the disposition of the matter as rapidly as we can. I have asked Col. Francis V. Keesling, Jr., of the Selective Service System, to arrange for conferences with the different Government agencies, and to ascertain whether or not there could be unity of purpose in the consideration of this legislation.

Colonel Keesling.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Chairman MAY. Have you had such a conference?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Chairman MAY. Is there a general agreement between all the agencies?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes. In accordance with your request, Mr. Chairman, I proceeded to the Office of the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, Justice Byrnes; Justice Byrnes held a conference of the appropriate Government agencies.

After full discussion with those agencies and after full discussion with the members of Justice Byrnes' Advisory Committee, there is now, I believe, full and complete accord on the part of the five Government agencies—Army, Navy, Selective Service System, W. P. B., and W. M. C.—represented here today, for the immediate enactment of this legislation.

Chairman MAY. Thank you, sir. Is Judge Patterson here?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Secretary, will you come around please, sir, and tell us about the bill H. R. 1119?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, before the Secretary starts, I would like to ask if it is the purpose of the chairman to confine the hearings

to H. R. 1119, or to explore the whole manpower problem with reference to national service at the same time. It seems to me that the two certainly will greatly overlap and I wonder if it would not be more efficient and more expedient to go into all others as one; but I am simply asking for information.

Chairman MAY. It is the purpose of the Chair, with the cooperation of the committee, to separate this legislation from the other two subjects and to deal specifically with this, with the idea that the committee has heretofore made continuous studies of the entire manpower subject, for a period of 2 or 3 years.

The committee knows a great deal about the subject and a vast store of information is available to them, and it is hoped that we can follow the recommendation of the President here, as I read from his message, by utilizing this form of legislation with the idea in mind that we may not find it necessary to use the general national service provision.

Mr. SPARKMAN. But the President, if I understood his message correctly, recommended both. What I want to know is if this is to be the substitute for national service or if later we are to consider national service in addition to this.

Chairman MAY. That is for us to determine when we get through with these hearings, whether we will go further with it or not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I see.

Chairman MAY. But I think the quotation which I have read from the President's message is particularly plain and I will repeat it.

Pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects of national service, I recommend that the Congress immediately enact legislation which will be effective in using the services of the 4,000,000 men now classified as IV–F in whatever capacity is best for the war effort.

I think that is specific and right on the point. Judge, you may proceed.

Let me first suggest to the committee that we allow the judge to complete his statement and then if you desire to question him, you may ask your quesions then.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. PATTERSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. Chairman, I will make an oral statement. The War Department endorses bill H. R. 1119 as an immediate measure. We hope that more comprehensive legislation along the lines of the President's message for national war service will also be promptly enacted.

Our view of the topic is exactly along the lines of the President's state of the Union speech, that we have urgent need for the successful prosecution of a program of national war service, along the broadest lines, and that pending the consummation of such a program by legislation, we have need of legislation of the kind included in H. R. 1119 as a partial measure.

As we see it, the manpower needs of the armed forces, and of the war industries that support the armed forces, for the first half year of 1945, will aggregate a million six hundred thousand additional persons. That is made up of nine hundred thousand for induction into the armed forces, Army and Navy, for military service, and

seven hundred thousand additional persons in war production, and war supporting activities.

In the past, as the committee knows, we have resorted to—and by "we" I mean the Government—has resorted to half-way measures, largely ineffective, not furnishing a quick solution for the impediments that we encountered, particularly in war production, and fading out after perhaps an initial impetus or spurt.

The result has been that we have had manpower crisis after manpower crisis over the last 3 years, and particularly over the last 2 years, and we have had innumerable instances where the production of munitions and war supplies, and the furnishing of them to the men of the armed forces, has been retarded, because of inadequate mobilization of the manpower of the Nation, particularly in civilian pursuits, necessary to the support of the armed forces.

As we see it, the only complete and adequate remedy is legislation of national war service of the most comprehensive character as outlined in the President's message and for the reasons stated by him. His message was in part based upon a communication from the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, stating that, in their opinion, the war would be shortened, and the cost in lives kept to a minimum, by the adoption of national war service, or total mobilization of the manpower resources of the Nation in support of the men in the armed forces. And I want to make it clear that the War Department urges the prompt passage of national war service legislation of the broadest character affecting our entire adult population, capable of assisting in the prosecution of the war, as promptly as possible.

The bill for discussion today, H. R. 1119, as I understand it, affects men from 18 to 45 years of age, and provides that as to those men, those who leave war activities that they are now engaged in, and those who decline, when requested by the local selective-service boards, to engage in war production, or in activities supporting the war effort, shall be subject to induction into the armed forces. Those physically fit will go in in the ordinary way, and those not physically fit will be put in special service units and as members of special-service units in the Army or Navy, will not be entitled to the financial emolument and benefits that Congress has provided for veterans.

I want to point out that the need is for more men in war production in a civilian capacity, and it is not a need for these special-service units that are mentioned in the bill.

I know that the Army—and I believe the Navy, likewise—do not have need for the services of men in these special service units. The aim of the bill, I take it, under that sanction, of being inducted into those special service units, is to persuade, and force, if you like, men not now engaged in war production or in support of the war, to engage in war production or become engaged in supporting the utmost prosecution of the war.

It might be that the bill could have imposed the duty squarely upon the men affected to obey the direction of the local selective service board to go into war production and could have put on penalties and sanctions of the kind in the selective service law that we are familiar with right now—fine or imprisonment in case of disobedience. I think that an amendment along those lines would be helpful, but if that does not appeal to the committee, we endorse the bill as it stands, as I have said, as a partial remedy, in the hope that legislation of a more comprehensive character, of the kind mentioned in the President's message, will be promptly passed.

The last part of the act provides for the men inducted into the special service units to be deprived of the veteran's benefits, and advantages given by Congress to soldiers while in the armed forces, and after they leave the armed forces. I regard that as an essential and vital part of the bill, because, as I have said, the Army does not need, and cannot use, large numbers of men in these special service units, and unless that service is made unattractive, the bill will, in my opinion, fail of its purpose, and it will not be made unattractive unless those provisions are retained in the bill.

You see, men who go into the special service units are practically assured of not getting any combat duty, and not running any of the hazards of war that the men of the Army and Navy run, and they are, I suppose, assured also of not leaving the United States. And if at the same time they are given all of the benefits that Congress has provided for men in the armed forces, you would run the risk of attracting a large number of men to those special service units. I take it that the aim of the bill is not that, and I hope it is not that. The aim of the bill is to make sure that men go where they are needed and not go where they are not needed and as we see it, the primary need is to get more manpower of the Nation into war production.

Viewing the bill as a bill intended to accomplish and achieve that end, pending the adoption of broader legislation, the War Department favors the enactment of this bill.

Chairman MAY. Does that complete your statement, Judge Patterson?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Chairman MAY. May I ask you this? As I understand the meaning of H. R. 1119, it is that for a man who is even now engaged in war work, in an industry, or a man who is offered employment, or asked to take employment in war work, and refuses to do so, the penalty is immediate induction into the armed forces, as this bill provides?

Mr. PATTERSON. I understand that.

Chairman MAY. So it is in the nature of what is know as a provision for "work or fight" as it is commonly referred to?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Chairman MAY. Now, what difference would there be in the powers of the services, the Army and the Navy, or the Selective Service Bureau acting through its local draft boards—what difference would there be in the power they have over a man under this provision and the power they would have under national service legislation?

Mr. PATTERSON. I regard this as national service legislation applied to men between 18 and 45. It does not apply, of course, to women, and it does not apply to men over the age of 45. But, within the group affected—men from 18 to 45 years of age—it is intended and I hope would have the effect of national service legislation for those men.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Brooks, any questions?

Mr. BROOKS. Judge——

Mr. PATTERSON. Provided, Mr. Chairman, that the provisions that I mentioned a few moments ago are retained in the act.

Chairman MAY. That is, those depriving them of the benefits under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and pensions and compensations?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir. But I don't know that it is generally understood that the Army and the Navy could not handle large numbers of men in these so-called special-service units. We have already in the armed forces, a great many men of limited service, and we have quite enough men of that category to handle all the work that we have in mind and that we can find good use for, these men who would be doing the kind of work, I think, that is outlined for special-service units. We do not need those, and we would deplore the induction of large numbers of men into the armed forces for assignment to those special-service units.

Chairman MAY. Well, Judge, with respect to those men designated by classifications of the Selective Service System as IV–F's, I think it should be said that they are not responsible for that classification, and should be subjected to no criticism whatsoever. They are merely placed there because of certain physical defects, or other things that constitute an impediment against active military duty.

Now, you will recall that I read from the House Military Affairs Committee's report of last March, that we had been urging that the Army relax some of the vigor of its regulations on physical and mental requirements and particularly we had commented frequently on the subject of illiteracy, taking the position, of course, that in the use of an ordinary Garand rifle, a man need not necessarily be highly educated to use it and that there ought to be a field of ample supply of manpower in the group commonly known as the illiterates.

Now, has the War Department made any modifications in those requirements, physical requirements?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, so far as illiteracy is concerned, we are taking them up to a certain percentage, out of each quota. I have forgotten what the percentage is now. I am told we are taking them unlimitedly now if they can pass the physical test.

Of course, the armed forces have run into a good deal of criticism on the strictness of their physical standards. I am quite aware of that. However, the Commission that was appointed, pursuant to act of Congress, about a year ago, as I understand it——

Chairman MAY. Exonerated the Department entirely.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; they confirmed the policy of the armed forces on physical standards.

I am not saying that it is not subject to abuse and that there are not mistakes and blunders made, because I am sure there are.

Chairman MAY. Well, I am thinking, at the present time, about the large number of squirrel hunters I have down in my own district, and I saw many of them during the Christmas holidays, and they had their guns. They are not in the Army, and they are better crack shots than I am, or ever was. I think they ought to be used.

Mr. PATTERSON. I agree.

Mr. BROOKS. Judge Patterson, I was going to ask you this: There is a general feeling throughout most of the country, that in preference to industrial deferments—I understand that there are four and a half million industrial deferments—and the feeling is that in 4 years of war, a great many of those men might have been replaced by trained men, educated for these positions. Would you want to say anything about that?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; the men in industry between the ages of 18 to 25, are no longer deferred. Practically all of them in industry between those ages have been inducted. I think most of the men who remain deferred between 18 and 25 in industry are in the merchant marine. Now, of course, there are still 400,000 deferred in agriculture between the ages of 18 and 25, but Justice Byrnes directed that those deferments be promptly reviewed. The others that are deferred in industry are aged 26 to 37 and mostly in the higher-aged group, and it will be necessary, this year, unquestionably, for men between the ages of 26 and 29, particularly in the next 6 months, to be inducted in large numbers, from industry. The Army and Navy need young men to reinforce the fighting forces overseas, and they have got to get those men to the greatest degree possible, from men from 18 to 30, that is, for the armed forces.

And that is one of the great needs we have of further mobilization of our manpower, because, if the armed forces are to take, in the first 6 months in 1945, 900,000 men, their places must be filled. Their places in industry, that is, must be filled, and that is one of the prime manpower requirements that faces us right today—to find the men and get them promptly to take the place of the men who are to be withdrawn from industry for military service.

Mr. BROOKS. Now, there is one other question I want to ask you. I have received a letter from a man today, writing with reference to his son. Now, he wants his son in the service regardless of these financial benefits. He places service to his Nation, in preference to the compensation his boy might be entitled to under these acts of Congress, first.

For instance, the G. I. bill; is this service that you are setting up, is it apt to be so attractive that there will be a number of men who will want to get into uniform regardless? And what measures will you take to make it unattractive?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, as I understand it, under H. R. 1119, the ones that are physically qualified, between 18 and 45, and who do not follow the direction of the local board on going into war industry, will be inducted, and inducted just like any other inductee, if they are physically qualified.

Mr. BROOKS. They will be put into uniform, will they not, Judge Patterson?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; there is no doubt of that. The ones who are not physically qualified, and who refuse to take on the work or activity directed by the local board will go into those special service units. I think that unless it is well understood, and commonly accepted, that that direction of the local selective service board is equivalent to a mandate, the act will fail of its purpose.

The duty of a man who is not qualified for active military service, by reason of some defect or ailment, who is capable of work, however, in civilian lines, his duty, it seems to me very plainly is to support the war effort by work of a civilian character, that is essential and vital. If that is not done, the supply of the armed forces will fail. And unless it is well understood that the primary thing that this act is to bring about is the placing of those men in war industry

or other war activity or essential activity, unless that is well understood, there is no good in passing this bill.

Chairman MAY. Anything further, Mr. Brooks?

Mr. BROOKS. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Any questions, Mr. Andrews?

Mr. ANDREWS. Judge Patterson, I am interested in your observations and I am in agreement with them, that H. R. 1119 is, in effect, a national service bill for men up to 45 excluding all others and all women.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. I just want to see where some of my observations agree with your opinion. It is safe to say that of the 4,000,000 IV–F's, at least a certain proportion of them will be unfit for war service or war work.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, of course a great many of them are already in war industry, no doubt of that.

Mr. ANDREWS. A certain proportion of them will be unfit for any type of service?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Possibly larger than we estimate. And it is reasonable to suppose that there are a good many IV–F's who from the highest sense of patriotism would give anything in the world to get into military service, but I understand that your interpretation is that they would be automatically excluded in that they could not meet the essential physical qualifications for military service, so that no stigma could attach to them in that they are being placed under the provisions of this act.

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am impressed with the fact that there are a great many men over 38 at the present time, and under 45, too, among them, a very large proportion of whom have left industry, or who have refrained from going to work on a farm. The impression has gotten around that if a man is over 38, he has passed out of the jurisdiction of selective service, is that right?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; of course, the selective-service law now covers him from 18 to 45, but for the last 2 years no men over 37 have actually been taken.

Mr. ANDREWS. You will find a pretty large proportion of able-bodied men in that bracket, between 38 and 45, who are not doing anything for the war on a farm, in an industrial plant, or in some coordinated activity.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is right. A lot of them you will find making things like artificial flowers, and handbags, and jewelry, handing you a towel at a hotel. You cannot reach and get the towel yourself or brush your own coat.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, it is a safe guess that this measure is going to hit the 38 to 45 group as hard as any group in the country, is that true?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am thinking of the farming situation. I have heard it said in the last few days, where a farmer has three sons or four sons, with three in the service and one very able-bodied boy of the age of 21 working on that farm. I think that is all right, the interpretation of the so-called Tydings amendment, and it is reasonable to suppose that no IV–F's would be able to take that able-bodied son's place; it is just hard to take a IV– man from the city and send him on a farm and expect him to do the work of the son of that family. I think that the farm problem demands even able-bodied, even I–A people in some cases. Do you not agree with me on that?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, I do not.

Mr. ANDREWS. In other words, you think the farmer can get enough out of the IV–F's?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think he has got to. I think if the need of the armed forces for men of that age is so urgent, if they are going to carry on the war, and get it finished as swiftly as possible, they have got to take the men most physically fit and men of the age group that are most urgently needed.

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, another thing is the educational institutions of the country, which have a lot of IV–F's. My feeling is that the best we could do for a IV– in an institution of learning would be to let him finish his current semester or term, whatever you call it. What would you say on that?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, my own feeling on the men that play football, is the same as Justice Byrnes. The same thing. If they show, in the presence of hundreds of thousands of people, the stamina and endurance and ability to take punishment that they do, there is something funny when they can do that but cannot perform military service, when many less robust men are performing the hardest kind of military service.

Mr. ANDREWS. I am glad to hear you say that. I am there in complete agreement.

That is all.

Mr. KILDAY. Judge, of course this bill would affect every man between 18 and 45?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. And I agree with you that it should not be made attractive. Of course, under the provisions of the bill as drawn——

Mr. PATTERSON. I would have preferred, personally, Mr. Kilday, to have seen, if we could, the statement made flatly in the bill, by an amendment, of the duty to obey the direction of the local Selective Service Board to take the assigned job indicated for him in war industry and of a civilian character.

Mr. BROOKS. Do you not think we still ought to put it in, Judge Patterson?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, that is the heart of the bill and that is what the bill wants to achieve. It is phrased as a condition now rather than as an obligation, as I understand it.

Mr. KILDAY. I agree that everybody ought to do what he can do to better the war effort, regardless of what his physical condition may be. Let us take the case of a man 40 years of age who has been struggling along establishing a business. He has entered into many contracts, signed leases, and what not. And his physical condition, of course, is no fault of his own. Under this bill, he would have to leave that business, if he were reclassified, or be inducted into this service corps.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, he would not be affected at all, Mr. Kilday, except by the judgment of his neighbors on the local selective-service board measuring what he was doing against what needed to be done

to win the war, and if they decided that that man, in the opinion of his own neighbors, ought to go to work in a war plant and give up the little grocery store——

Mr. KILDAY. All right.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is what would happen.

Mr. KILDAY. Let us say he had this little grocery store that he had been trying to get on its feet for a long period of time. He is drafted into this set-up, under this bill, and he goes there because of a condition over which he has no control.

Mr. PATTERSON. Goes to the war job, you mean?

Mr. KILDAY. I mean had he been physically qualified, he would have gone into the Army. Not being physically qualified he goes into this corps.

Mr. PATTERSON. No; he does not. He goes, and ought to go, to the job in the aircraft plant that his neighbors say needs his services.

Mr. KILDAY. All right, Judge Patterson.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is the first place he ought to go.

Mr. KILDAY. I understand. But the point I am getting at is the case of a perfectly conscientious and sincere man who wants to do what he can for the war effort; he steps out of this grocery store, and goes into a war plant. He has no protection then, for the lease that he has signed; maybe it runs for 5 years. He can no longer conduct the business; he can no longer take care of his lease and is still obligated for the full term of the lease. There is nothing left for him but bankruptcy when he comes out of the war effort. Whereas, if he would go into the Army, he would have the rights of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act; he could freeze the rent, cancel his mortgages, and that sort of thing. Do you not think that man ought to get some protection, that something should be done for him so as not to ruin him financially for the rest of his life?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, if we do not win the war, we are all ruined financially.

Mr. KILDAY. Well now, Judge Patterson, I agree with you on that, and I want to say this, that I believe you are the only man in the administration who has been forthright about this thing. You were here 2 years ago advocating national-service legislation, and you were the only man who did it, and at that time, we were willing to support it and a lot of people realized it was politically inexpedient and would not do a thing about it. I just feel this way, that the war situation now is no worse than it was prior to the German counteroffensive.

There are only two differences as far as I can see, that those who were overoptimistic are now pessimistic, and that there were a lot of people in Government that were unwilling to support things that were politically inexpedient, who are now willing to support these things.

Mr. PATTERSON. We now have 450,000 casualties that we didn't have a year ago. That is going to register on the people of this Nation, and that does not include those of the last 3 or 4 weeks either.

Mr. KILDAY. While the situation is serious, it is not critical. Surely those in charge of the war realized that the thing was not won. I didn't see anybody overseas that thought it was won.

Mr. ANDREWS. That is the real reason for the counterattack.

Mr. KILDAY. The real reason for the counterattack is Morgenthau's peace plan which aroused the entire German effort.

Chairman MAY. Do you have other questions, Mr. Kilday?

Mr. KILDAY. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Short, do you have any questions?

Mr. SHORT. Judge Patterson, I believe the members of this committee will concur in your opinion that we have had a series of manpower crises in the past 2 years. I am wondering whether or not these manpower crisis have been caused or produced by the lack of men or by the bungling of governmental agencies? If we had had a single agency with a responsible head, would there be necessity for this legislation now?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think there would be necessity for this legislation. But you are quite correct in saying that it has been caused by maldistribution rather than by an actual shortage. There is no shortage in this country of anything to carry on a war.

Mr. SHORT. Of course, that is the point that I want to bring out. That when you have got the Army asking one thing, the Navy asking something else, Selective Service pulling one way, and the War Manpower Commission pulling another, with an overlapping and duplication of these agencies, you have created your own war manpower crisis.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I will not admit that.

Mr. SHORT. You will not admit that?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir.

Mr. SHORT. I think you secretly feel it is so, more or less. Has not history proved, and especially experience in our own country under our democratic form of government, that free labor has always been more efficient and productive than forced labor—slave labor, that is?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, nobody is in favor of slave labor, except Hitler.

Mr. SHORT. Do you not think that free labor is really more efficient and productive than forced labor?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; this is free labor, under this bill, perfectly free labor. They draw wages of a civilian standard. It is simply a direction as to where their labor is most needed, and pointing out their duty, by law, to do the work for which they are best fitted to win the war.

Mr. SHORT. Of course, I would mention the constitutionality of this thing if the Constitution had not been torn to shreds and thrown into the ash can long ago. Certainly we can draft men for military service, but never before have we drafted or forced men to work in a civilian capacity.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, Mr. Short——

Mr. SHORT. Of course, if we do not win the war, the Constitution will not be worth anything, I admit that.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I think I said here 2 years ago, if it is all right for the Government to tap a man on the shoulder and tell him to go over and fight, and lay down his life if need be in north Africa, or Italy, or Europe, I cannot see any trouble whatsoever in just asking a man or telling a man to go and work in the next block in a war plant, at good wages, and at practically no hazard.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Secretary, I wish you would dwell a little more, for the information of the members of the committee, on the real need.

Mr. PATTERSON. I think that is the way the soldiers view it too.

Mr. SHORT. Yes. Well, as to the real need, or the urgent need for this legislation. Is war production sagging?

Mr. PATTERSON. It is behind requirements. We have our requirements on tires, cotton duck for tents, artillery ammunition, mortar ammunition, small arms ammunition, radar, a good many other items, where our production is not up to requirements, and where, to a certain extent, manpower shortage, or inability to get the supply of labor, is the controlling factor, to such a degree that we have put several thousand soldiers on furlough to work in these plants where the production is so critically needed, some of them in an Enlisted Reserve status, and some of them on a furlough basis for 90 days. Now, that is critical, when you have to do that, and I assure you we do not like to turn them away from the military duties for which they have been trained to go and work in a plant, in what is practically a civilian capacity. But our needs have been so pressing that we have been forced to do that.

Mr. SHORT. When there are thousands of men in certain plants out on strike?

Mr. PATTERSON. This work that I have been speaking of has nothing to do with any strike. There are no strikes there. There are just not enough—they have been unable to recruit and mobilize enough men and women to work in those plants. They will have, say, one shift instead of three shifts, because they cannot induce the people to go there.

Mr. DURHAM. What is that number, Judge Patterson?

Mr. PATTERSON. Around 10,000, I believe.

Mr. DURHAM. Ten thousand?

Mr. PATTERSON. I can give you the break-down of the figures, though.

Mr. SHORT. Knowing your views as I do, you certainly would not say that production has not been hampered or retarded because of strikes in certain types of war industries?

Mr. PATTERSON. They have not been very significant. I do not defend strikes for a minute. There should be none in time of war. Just none. But the no-strike pledge that the national labor leaders have given has in the main been obeyed and observed by labor, and our production has not been materially affected by strikes and work stoppages. Bear in mind I am not excusing a single one of them.

Mr. SHORT. I do not know how—when the strike was on in Detroit where they failed to manufacture the Packard motor to put in our fighting planes——

Mr. PATTERSON. That was that foreman's strike last May.

Mr. SHORT. It was a terrible thing.

Mr. PATTERSON. It was an outrageous thing.

Mr. SHORT. It was.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHORT. What guaranty or assurance would we have that this legislation, if passed, if these IV–F's possessed the skill to perform the technical duties that they are required to do in many of these plants——

Mr. PATTERSON. It is a question of training largely. One of our big troubles now has been the labor turn-over, and the amount of time and money and effort that is spent in training employees to do something, and then they fly the coop and we have got to train somebody else.

The effect of national war service on cutting down labor turnover—the people who are here today and gone tomorrow—would be a great aid in and of itself.

Mr. SHORT. What evidence do we have of shortage of implements or weapons of war on the battle fronts?

Mr. PATTERSON. There is none that I know of. There is no shortage of weapons on the actual fighting fronts. But we have to take care of increased requirements for future operations, and that is what worries us.

Mr. SHORT. Was the German break-through due to lack of weapons or lack of manpower?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir; no lack of weapons.

Mr. SHORT. Or manpower?

Mr. PATTERSON. No lack of manpower. No question of that.

Mr. SHORT. I guess I had better stay out of that field.

Chairman MAY. Is that all, Mr. Short?

Mr. SHORT. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Judge Patterson, you take away from these fellows all of the benefits. I am wondering if there ought not to be some protection under the Employees' Compensation Act.

Mr. PATTERSON. I think it provides that they shall have the same——

Mr. SPARKMAN. I did not see it there.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I am talking of the bill last spring, the Bailey-Brewster bill, which gave them the status of civilian employees so far as that goes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you not think it should be provided in this bill?

Mr. PATTERSON. I have not thought of that. I had no objection to the provision in the Bailey-Brewster bill.

Mr. SHORT. Judge Patterson, if we should pass a national-service law, would there be any need for this piece of legislation or another bill?

Mr. PATTERSON. No.

Mr. SHORT. Of for drafting of nurses?

Mr. PATTERSON. The matter of nurses is different for the reason that they are called for military service. This bill, and national-service legislation, provides for civilian service. In any event we do need, I believe, legislation for nurses, because that is military service.

Mr. SHORT. That would have to be separate?

Chairman MAY. I have a bill that I introduced yesterday which would be perfectly harmless and just and right and there would be very little objection to it.

Mr. PATTERSON. I thing some people do confuse the thing though, and think that national-service legislation would render unnecessary any legislation about nurses. That is not so. Because that is due to a failure to distinguish between military service and civilian service.

Mr. THOMAS. In that event, too, the National Service Act would cover it.

Mr. PATTERSON. You still need legislation as to your nurses, no matter what you say on national war service.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, Judge Patterson, on this particular bill, suppose a man who is classed as IV–F has made an effort to get work at a war plant and has not been successful. Would he be liable to induction in this special-service unit?

68175—45——2

Mr. PATTERSON. Why, I am sure that he would be left untouched by the local selective service board.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I do not see any protection in here for him, and I have known a great number of these IV–F's who have tried to get work at these plants and have been turned down. As a matter of fact, I have often thought that our war plants themselves have been too strict in their insistence upon sound physical conditions.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I have seen hundreds of blind people working in war plants.

Mr. SPARKMAN. So have I; but I have seen others who perhaps had an injury to a leg or side or something, who were turned down for work in war plants.

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, they would not be affected in any way though, I believe, Mr. Sparkman, because if the local selective service board does not call a man at all, he is not touched by this legislation. It is only after he has been called by them and directed to take work of a civilian character that he becomes liable for the induction described in the latter part of the act.

Also my attention is called, Mr. Sparkman, to the clause in the lower part of page 3 where it says:

> Unless such registrant is found by his selective service local board, subject to appeal—

and so on—

> to have had a just reason for not having become so employed.

I think that covers it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You say that is on page 3?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; toward the bottom of the page. A man cannot possibly get into any kind of obligation under this act, unless his own neighbors say that he ought to take the assigned job.

Mr. PARKMAN. Well, now, Judge Patterson, my attention has been called, in a number of instances, and I realize that it would be only a small number as compared to the whole, but, nevertheless, I think it is a condition that ought to be checked into carefully, of the insistence upon certain age limits in war plants. I had a letter from a fellow the other day who said he had made application at a certain war plant for a job in the fire department, and they rejected his application, because he had a son working there in the fire department already, and they did not want two members of the same family. So then he said, "All right; give me a job as a guard," and they said, "You are 52 years old, 2 years too old to be a guard."

Now, it seems to me that as long as conditions such as those prevail in our war plants, we are not tightening up as much as we should in order to get full utilization of our manpower.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I think those instances are exceptional.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I know, but I have seen lots of them.

Mr. PATTERSON. I have seen lots of grandmothers working in shell-loading plants, and they say, "Well, I have got sons and grandsons fighting in Europe," or "in the Southwest Pacific, and that is why I am working in the plant."

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; I have seen that, too.

Mr. PATTERSON. And they are working on the midnight shifts, too, and anybody who wants to get cynical can get a good deal of benefit from going to those places and seeing the people that are working there and hearing the reasons why they are working there. You ask them if they are worried about their post-war rights, and they just say, "No; I want to get those men home."

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you feel that our various war plants are utilizing, as much as possible, the manpower available to them, not building up any surplus?

Mr. PATTERSON. I don't think there is much hoarding of labor.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is what I mean.

Mr. PATTERSON. I think there doubtless was a good deal of it 2 years ago, when they did not know the size of the task, had no experience in producing tthe weapon that they were going to be called on to produce, did not know what the manpower requirements would be in the production of it, and sought to safeguard themselves. It is natural enough, with inventories of material and resources of manpower, but I do not think there is much of that today. The job is pretty well shaken down.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I heard a statement made on the floor of the House yesterday that first we ought to get rid of a million Federal workers. Of course, I notice in the President's message that something over 2,000,000 of the workers are engaged in war and Army and Navy arsenals and plants and services of various kinds. Are you of the opinion we could cut that down by a million?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir. I can only speak for the War Department. We have, I believe, around 1,200,000 civilian employees. About 600,000 of those are men. There are only about 200,000 of those that are below the age of 37. None of them are below the age of 26. Long before this pressure for men from 18 to 25 came on, a year ago, we saw to it that the War Department had none of those people as civilian employees. We had or have got 20.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Twenty in the whole of the War Department's employment who are below 26?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; of physically fit men who are occupationally deferred. Twenty.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And that includes your workers in all arsenals operated by the War Department?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Air depots, bases, and civilian workers of every type on the War Department pay roll?

Mr. PATTERSON. That is right. And we are going to raise that now to include the men from 26 to 29 promptly.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You mean nondeferment?

Mr. PATTERSON. That is right. And they are doing industrial work, most of those men, the same as the men who work in war industries, where it is run by private management. Same kind of work.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, it seems to me that is a very fine record. We often hear criticism about another thing that I want to ask you about, and that is the men on duty here in Washington, officers and enlisted men. Have you pretty well sifted out the able-bodied enlisted men and officers?

Mr. PATTERSON. We have had the rule for more than a year, that no one under the age of 28, no officer of the Army under the age of 28 could remain on duty in the military district of Washington. And that rule has been rigidly applied. You will not find any.

Mr. SPARKMAN. What about enlisted men who are able-bodied?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, we have got quite a few enlisted men, but they are in the main men who have returned from overseas; wounded men.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, I said able-bodied. You do use returned, wounded men to do guard duty and various duties here in Washington?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; we probably have a few of clerical character that have not been overseas. In fact, I know of some that have not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is it possible to replace them by WAC's?

Mr. PATTERSON. That has been done as far as we could.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is the WAC recruiting program proceeding regularly, satisfactorily?

Mr. PATTERSON. Not satisfactorily. The last figure I heard, I think, we had around 85,000 or 90,000.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I have heard it given at around a hundred thousand and I wondered if that is correct.

Mr. PATTERSON. I am told it is around 90,000.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you still need more?

Mr. PATTERSON. Oh, yes; our objective has been 150,000, all along. I think they are coming in at about the rate of three or four thousand a month.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Judge Patterson, to what extent did this recent order granting furloughs to tire builders get men back into heavy-tire production?

Mr. PATTERSON. In view of the urgent need we had of tires, and the shortage, in production, particularly the heavy-duty tires, that is, truck tires, we furloughed soldiers for 90 days, to go to work in the tire plants, I think around 2,500, and they are scattered around at the different tire plants.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is that sufficient to meet the requirements?

Mr. PATTERSON. No.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I would like you to comment on that case. I had a letter a couple of days ago——

Mr. PATTERSON. The tire industry has agreed to go along for 120 days on a straight 7-day week, without any break, for 120 days. But also measures have been taken to build new tire facilities.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. PATTERSON. No effort is being spared at all to get the maximum output of tires, and that assignment of soldiers on furlough to work in the tire plants was one of several measures taken to get the maximum output.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, I would like you to comment on this letter I received a couple of days ago from the wife of a soldier who is 38 years of age. He has been declared physically unfit for combat duty and physically unfit for heavy duty of any type. He is in Europe. She tells me that he has had 15 years' experience as a heavy-tire builder; that that was his whole experience before going into the Army; that he is an expert at it; that he is doing nothing now except handing these towels out or something like that, as you described the service awhile ago, and yet his application to come back as a tire builder was not favorably acted on.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, the recruiting of the tire builders to go to the plants on furlough was confined to the continental United States.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, do you think the others might be found, such as this man I have described, for instance, that cannot be a very great asset to the Army anywhere?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, that is true. It was that we would not get men from the distant overseas theaters in time to answer for this need, which was pressing upon us.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, you said production is behind requirements. Has it been behind the scheduled program, or have your requirements stepped up as your program was going along?

Mr. PATTERSON. Both.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It is behind in production?

Mr. PATTERSON. Tires have been behind schedule, agreed schedule production, since last May. Heavy deficits each month.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I wonder if it would not be helpful to the committee if we might not have a simple statement showing——

Mr. PATTERSON. Same is true of cotton duck.

Mr. SPARKMAN. A statement showing the various things on which we are behind not only in requirements but of scheduled production and the percentage we are behind. In other words, break it down.

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, what you say about stepped-up requirements is also true. I said both.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes, I understand. Now, Judge Patterson, you referred to these people being civilian workers and receiving a civilian wage. Would that apply to those who were taken into those special service units or would they simply receive the pay of servicemen?

Mr. PATTERSON. Basic pay.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of servicemen.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; without the extra emoluments and benefits that go with military service.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, am I correct in understanding that the only ones that would be placed in those service units would be those who stubbornly resisted or refused to get into civilian production of their own accord?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir; recalcitrant people who disobeyed the local selective service board.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I have just one more question.

Mr. Patterson, some was telling me yesterday that due to the cut down of production of B–29's at Cincinnati, I believe it was, there were some 2,000 workers out of employment there, and yet there was no means and apparently no effort to shift those to employment elsewhere in the country. Will you comment on that?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; I do not know anything of that incident.

Chairman MAY. Well, if we had a national service act, it could be made effective.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir. Of course, those dislocations will occur from time to time. There is no denying that, Mr. Sparkman.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Oh, yes; I fully understand that. But I was just wondering to what extent every effort is being exerted to relocate them when they do occur, or to shape our production program in such a way as to have the minimum of dislocation.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, everything of that kind is taken into account, The minute the Air Forces cut back production in a certain plant, the

Ordnance move into it with a new line. We have to take care of these changing needs all be time. I talk on that and harp on it, no doubt, until everybody is sick of it, but it is the primary lesson of war production, that, as you will overestimate the requirements of something, as the war develops—it may be training airplanes—and you underestimate another one, and the changing needs come along on combat operations, you have got to drop one or cut it back and increase another. Two years ago everything was going to the Air Forces. For the last year the trend has been the other way and everything is going

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Air Force relatively are in very good shape.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, is it not true that the tragic occurrence in this estimation has been the underestimation of artillery ammunition and needs generally?

Mr. PATTERSON. The experience of the fighting, a year ago in Italy, convinced the Army of the need of more heavy artillery and heavy artillery ammunition and measures were taken last February and March to greatly step up that production, and the production as a result of that began to come in along in October. There has been no shortage at the front, however.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, there has been——

Mr. PATTERSON. But we have no reserves of it. We send the ammunition right from the loading plant to the port of embarkation and overseas.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, there has been an actual rationing though of artillery ammunition at the front, has there not?

Mr. PATTERSON. There always is.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I mean——

Mr. PATTERSON. It has been light.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It is going to be a little more drastic this time.

Mr. PATTERSON. If it is not too short. There is always rationing of everything expendable, not only ammunition, but gasoline or anything else.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly your supplies have to be billed on that assumption.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is right. They calculate it that way.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Just one more question. I understood you to say a few minutes ago we were behind in the production of small arms ammunition. I understood all along we were ahead on that.

Mr. PATTERSON. I meant that we need more employees in production of small-arms ammunition.

Mr. SPARKMAN. In certain types?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; because several of the plants that have been on one shift have got to go on two or three shifts. We need more employees and that is going to be quite a large requirement for us over the next 3 months. There are good reserves of small arms ammunition that we know of, but they are being depleted and we have to step up production.

Mr. SHORT. I wanted to ask, Mr. Secretary, what effort has been made to get these IV–F's to enter war production. Have any of these IV–F's been interviewed or invited by any Government agency or requested to go to work in war plants?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, the same as every other citizen, in a civilian status, has been urged and I think the word is "exposed," is it not?

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

Mr. PATTERSON. But in the——

Mr. SHORT. But if a IV–F is engaged in a butcher shop or works in a grocery store or is employed as a clerk, it seems to me he would not have to be forced by law to go to work in arms plant that will pay him three or four times the wages or salary that he is drawing now.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, just take a look around, Mr. Short, in any of our cities, and see the people that are engaged in trades and services of a kind that, to my mind, are utterly inconsistent with a war economy, and the need of war production.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Arends, do you have any questions?

Mr. ARENDS. Judge, you mentioned a moment ago in answer to a question from the gentleman from New York, Mr. Andrews, that you felt that the young able-bodied boys on the farm should be taken away at this time regardless of the situation?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think the war urgency is such that it has got to be done.

Mr. ARENDS. I would just like to sound a little warning there now. Of course, we cannot take credit for what the good Lord has done in the way of providing good weather in the past 2 or 3 years and possibly we would have not gotten such good crops had it not been for the weather.

A little survey was made out in my part of the country recently, where the average farm is just absolutely running out of not materials but help, and it showed in this survey that a great number of men aged 65 were operating units by themselves, farming units of 160 acres, and in one county there were 28 individuals over 70 years of age trying to farm. Now they are about at the breaking point and I wonder how long they can keep this up.

Now, in trying to replace individuals helping boys on a farm by someone like a IV–F or someone who has never been on a farm we are going to run into a condition that might prove alarming to the crops.

Mr. PATTERSON. The farmers of the country have done a wonderful job. They have certainly gone on an all out basis with the result that your crops for 1942 broke all records.

Mr. ARENDS. Thanks to the good Lord, yes.

Mr. PATTERSON. And the crops for 1944 equaled the 1942 records.

Mr. ARENDS. That is right.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is a wonderful effort.

Mr. ARENDS. They have done a great job but I do not know how long they can keep it up.

Mr. PATTERSON. There is certainly no shortage of food in this country.

Mr. ARENDS. That is right. Now, you mentioned awhile ago the difficulty you are having with cotton duck. It just happened yesterday I received this letter; I do not know the individual who wrote it, but here is four or five pages of a letter he sent me citing instances of where the employer has his rolls stacked with needless employees, and since you mentioned duck, I would like to take the time to read this one thing [reading]:

In a small South Carolina city there are two textile plants manufacturing duck and twill for the Army and Navy Departments. Although in the same city there are two finishing plants that handle this material, this duck is loaded into freight cars and sent way over to Alabama for finishing processes. In the

same Alabama city in which all this duck is consigned, there are at least two textile plants who manufacture duck and twill and they load it into freight cars and send it back to the same above-mentioned South Carolina city for finishing. Thus all the labor of loading and unloading, valuable freight car space, rail travel and so forth, is unnecessary—

and here is four pages or five pages of a letter citing just instance after instance of this very thing.

That raises the question in my mind that was brought up by someone else: Do you believe that we are effectively using our manpower today to the best of our ability?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do believe it but I would be glad to have that instance given to me for notice.

Mr. ARENDS. All right. Now, here is another one which came to me this morning from another individual. [Reading:]

Furthermore, on New Year's Day, many laborers and civil-service workers as well, refused to work—

and he goes on—

I think it is high time we jump this wishy-washy policy and get down to brass tacks and pass a national service law—

I am concerned with the statement made a while ago when you said that we should insist that men go to work. I think plenty of fellows go to work but I wonder how many of them work when they get to the plant. In the recess of the last 2 weeks, at home, I contacted individuals working in ordnance plants here and there—fellows that you have known all your life and grown up with, and they will sit there and tell you they do not work half the time because they are ordered not to work half the time. I could take you to them one after another and I do not know what we are going to do about a condition like that. Someone is responsible. I do not believe the average laboring man is responsible, but someone is responsible and we are not getting the work done; and, furthermore, the 44-hour work week could be lengthened a little bit.

Mr. PATTERSON. On the whole, I think, though, both management and labor in war production have done an excellent job.

Mr. ARENDS. I will agree with you.

Mr. PATTERSON. With notable results. The only trouble is there are not enough of them.

Mr. ARENDS. I do not think they are doing the best they can.

Chairman MAY. Is that all, Mr. Arends?

Mr. ARENDS. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Durham, have you any questions?

Mr. DURHAM. You have stated that the primary objective you advocate through the legislation is to get production; is that right?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, what worries me is the question that Mr. Arends asked, and also Mr. Short. On Monday of this week, I believe, going into the roots of this thing and trying to find out if it will help, I went into this duck mill that he talked about. It employs about 2,250 people. I said to the manager: "Suppose under this bill we assign 25 percent of the personnel to IV–F's, what is it going to do for you? Could you handle them"? Now, that is a top priority that he is going to get under this bill. He said, "Well, I would have to take them and train them." He said that it would take 90 days and probably 6 months for most of them, and he said, "I have got more than I need now and," he said, "instead of upping production, you are going to be in a position where you are going to run 6 months behind, in my opinion." I think if you will go into these mills and analyze these things—and I have had some experience with the cotton mills and know something about their conditions—I think you will see that what worries me is whether or not we will get the production.

I am in favor of the objective. I have been in favor of the National Selective Service Act just like you were 3 years ago.

I think we made a mistake by not putting it into effect. But what worries me is whether or not we are going to get the objective out of it. These little people we talk about—they have been buying War bonds and they are all patriotic; many of them have tried to get in the Army or Navy and have been turned down and they have got themselves in a sort of permanent status with a little grocery store or something, and they have been buying War bonds in my section, always doubling the quota, and they are the ones it will put out and I do not know whether it is right to classify them as unpatriotic, and I am afraid we are putting them in that position.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, of course, the proprietor of the cotton-duck mill, if he is working on orders for the Army and Navy, and if he convinces the Army and Navy, as he ought to be able to, that the assignment of war workers into his plant will hurt rather than help production, I do not think he needs to have any worry about getting any additional workers because, of course——

Mr. DURHAM. Well, who is going to handle that? Are you people going to say to him: "You ought to take 400 of these IV–F's and up this production"?

Mr. PATTERSON. We certainly would never say that if he could convince us that the addition of those men would hurt rather than help production. We get along very well with these people.

Mr. DURHAM. Are you going that far with it? Are you going to leave it up to the Selective Service boards to just say: "Here, you have got to take these men"?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; the War Department would take the contrators and take the places where the industry itself has said it was short of workers and we would report that, I suppose, to the United States Employment Service, and they would report it to the Selective Service, and Selective Service would take the means necessary to get them in, and they would only take the ones best qualified and could do it with the least sacrifice.

Mr. DURHAM. Judge Patterson, you cannot train a man to be a loom fixer. It takes 6 months to train a loom fixer.

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not doubt that.

Mr. DURHAM. To get production.

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not doubt that.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, if you are going to take this man out of this group and train him to up the production of duck, I am afraid you are going to run into difficulties. I am just speaking from some little experience I have had with the cotton-mill industry.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Chairman MAY. I hope we can confine our questions to this particular bill.

Mr. Clason, have you any questions?

Mr. CLASON. I have been rather interested in the concluding paragraphs on page 3: A man, as I understand it, is inducted into military service. That means he takes the regular Army oath and becomes a soldier or a sailor; is that right?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think it says, "subject to discipline, supervision, obligations, and punishment"; yes.

Mr. CLASON. After he got through with his service, when the war is over, he is going to be a veteran anyhow, is he not? He has taken the regular military oath, and he is a veteran regardless of whether he is entitled to emolument or not?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, that act provides that in many respects he is not treated as a veteran, and I think properly so.

Mr. CLASON. Well, would you say he is or is not a veteran?

Mr. PATTERSON. I would say he is not.

Mr. CLASON. Even though he takes this oath and becomes subject to military discipline, and if the military authorities wish, they can make him fight, yet you would say he is not a veteran under the terms of this act?

Mr. PATTERSON. I would say he was not, because the next sentence provides all the things he should not be entitled to; where the laws provide benefits for the former members of the armed forces or their dependents and beneficiaries, and that is absolutely necessary.

Mr. CLASON. Yet subject to service in regular military units and assignments, and if that is so, he could be sent overseas?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, no; that is for the ones that are fit.

Mr. CLASON. No; it says "anyone who is classified under this subsection" and so forth.

Mr. PATTERSON. I think, Mr. Clason, that if they go into a regular military unit they are certainly veterans in every sense of the word, but it says: "or for service in a special service unit authorized to be created." While they are in the special-service unit, they have not those rights; that is what it says.

Mr. CLASON. Well, I will take the position—you are going to pay them basic pay, I suppose?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Fifty dollars a month and they would be all treated as privates, most of them, that is?

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, if you get more than a few thousand men in this thing, the act is a flop. There is no doubt of that.

Mr. CLASON. Which act is a flop? This one?

Mr. PATTERSON. This one. If you get more than a few thousand men who refuse to obey the direction of the local selective-service board to go to work in a civilian capacity for war industry and instead get landed in here in these special-service units, I say if there are more than a few thousand, then, the act is a flop, because they are a burden to the Army rather than a help, these special-service units.

You have got to give them officers, noncommissioned officers, and a lot of these men will get sick on you and you have got to assign more men to take care of them. Unless they obey the request or direction or mandate of the local selective-service boards and go to work in a war industry, which is the aim of the bill, as I take it, unless they do that, if you make things, in other words, attractive for them to go into these special-service units where they undertake none of the hazards of a soldier, the ordinary soldier, keep them here in this country, no overseas duty or anything of that kind, and if you give them all of the emoluments and all of the benefits and consider them entitled to all of the rights and all of the credit that goes to men in the armed forces, so that you get a whole lot of them, then the law has done more harm than good.

Mr. THOMASON. Who has the final say as to whether or not they can do that?

Mr. PATTERSON. The man himself is supposed to see that if he can get work, say, at $40 or $50 a week, and live where he pleases, and all that kind of thing, that is the more attractive of the two options he has, and I think, too, most men would take the direction of the local selective-service board as their patriotic obligation.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, the purpose of this bill is solely as a club over the heads of persons classified IV–F or some other class that comes within the scope of this act and refuse to obey the orders because the selective-service boards do not have the power but merely the suggestion of selective-service boards throughout the country?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir; it is to put pressure on them to obey the direction of the local selective-service board to go into war industry. That is the purpose, I take it.

Mr. CLASON. Now, supposing there are several thousand of these persons who either because of disagreement with the local boards or for other reasons, do ultimately turn up in the Army under this act——

Mr. PATTERSON. If they are physically fit, they are all right, because then they go into regular military units.

Mr. CLASON. Yes.

Mr. PATTERSON. We can handle them all right.

Mr. CLASON. Well, some are not physically fit and you put them to work in some plant. Then they are not entitled to servicemen's dependents allowance under the act of 1942 as amended. These people may very well be married and have five or six or seven children and one of the reasons that has been uppermost in their mind for refusing to go into this industry or away from home to work in some plant, perhaps a hundred miles or a thousand miles away, is because of the wife and children. Yet, those people at home are not going to receive any allowance whatsoever.

Who is going to take care of them?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, what is his grievance? That his neighbors on the local selective-service boards did not believe him when he gave different excuses, and told him that it was his duty to support the war and go to work in a war plant, and he just said, "I won't." Is not that the case?

Mr. CLASON. Not necessarily. He may be in a town where there is no war plant and he is to go away from his family and children. He is taken away from his children and family who are left without proper support.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, he has his remedy before the local board with appeal right up through the Selective Service System in case of hardship. We have got to assume that some justice would be done by the Selective Service System and their local boards.

Mr. CLASON. I have had men who were put in the Navy, and tried to get them out, that had seven children and I have tried to help them through the State director and ultimately they were in and——

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, that is a tougher case than the man we are talking about right now.

Mr. CLASON. I do not see that there is any difference.

Mr. PATTERSON. Where he is put into actual military service unjustly?

Mr. CLASON. If he is put in unjustly by the selective-service board, what difference does it make when he is put into Army and Navy unjustly or into this type of work unjustly? It is an unjust act on the part of the local selective-service boards, is it not?

Mr. PATTERSON. He faces a different life.

Mr. CLASON. Well, we will agree with that, but you say he has got a right of appeal and everything.

Suppose he loses the appeal? Then his wife and children are going to suffer under this act.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, the possibility of abuses you mention, Mr. Clason, are present right now under selective service with men to be sent to battle.

Mr. THOMASON. It was his neighbors who put him in the service.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir. I think the system, on the whole, has been remarkably successful, and the decisions made by the local boards fair and just; of course, some blunders are made.

Mr. CLASON. Now, these furloughed men that are used at these different plants. They are receiving both pay from the Army and civilian pay?

Mr. PATTERSON. Those on furlough are; yes, sir. We would not do it except in a crisis.

Mr. CLASON. Well, now, do you notice any——

Mr. PATTERSON. And for short times.

Mr. CLASON. Do you notice any feeling on the part of the civilians employed that others are brought in, to some extent, untrained and unable to do as good work as they are and yet are receiving the same pay plus fifty or more dollars a month?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir; I think they realize that it is a temporary job, and that there is an emergency that just has to be met.

Mr. CLASON. When they do go to work, these soldiers, what is their connection with the union?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not know.

Mr. CLASON. In other words, they work without joining any union, do they not?

Mr. PATTERSON. I have heard of no trouble along that line.

Mr. CLASON. But you do not know what is done about that?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. CLASON. You do not know whether there are any fees being paid by anyone to any unions?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, but I am sure if there had been any trouble about it, I would have heard of it.

Mr. CLASON. But that does not explain very well what is being done, though.

Mr. PATTERSON. No; I do not know what is being done, Mr. Clason.

Mr. CLASON. I am wondering.

Mr. PATTERSON. There is no big fracas on about it or I would have heard about it.

Mr. CLASON. What would you say about these people if they were brought in to the plants? Would you expect them to join the unions in those plants in which they were working?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not know. I have no opinion on that one way or the other. They certainly would not have to unless it was a closed shop.

Mr. CLASON. Well, if it is a closed shop, would they have to?

Mr. PATTERSON. I suppose it would be the instance where it would be raised. I do not know. There is something in the Austin-Wadsworth bill about that, but I forget what it is.

Mr. CLASON. Well, it ought to be straightened out, ought it not, in the legislation, so that we would not have a cause of friction or trouble arising out of this war——

Chairman MAY. Mr. Thomas, do you have any questions?

Mr. THOMAS. Judge Patterson, what effect would this legislation have on men who are working in war plants and then go out on strike?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I do not believe this bill is addressed to that at all. I do not believe the bill touches on that possibility.

Mr. THOMAS. So if a man comes in this category and he is working in a war plant and decides to go out on strike, the bill does not affect him at all?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not believe the bill does.

Mr. THOMAS. Do you not think there ought to be an amendment to the bill which would cover that point?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; I do not think it is necessary.

Mr. THOMAS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Stewart, do you have any questions?

Mr. STEWART. Judge Patterson, would it not be just to write a provision in this act that no IV–F would have to pay union dues?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not think the act ought to go into that. I have no doubt that no man would pay it against his will.

Chairman MAY. A good many of them might want to pay it.

Mr. PATTERSON. I know. I do not think the War Labor Board enforces any such provision now.

Mr. STEWART. Do you think it would be right to throw a man into bankruptcy and when he gets to his work, to pay union dues before he can work for his Government in the war effort?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, no. If the local board has assigned him to a place, and he is unwilling to pay dues, I do not suppose he would pay them.

Mr. STEWART. Well, should we not put a provision in there where he would not have to pay them?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I do not know, Mr. Stewart. I have not thought that problem through. If the problem did arise, and the people who assisted in drafting the act had that in mind and decided it was unnecessary, I do not know. I do not think the act goes into these matters such as Mr. Thomas mentioned, about the possibility of strikes and union dues.

Chairman MAY. It does not mention strikes.

Mr. STEWART. Well, let me ask you further regarding strikes: Since this is more or less a club or pressure upon the IV–F's, would it not

be good and wholesome that we write a like provision in this act to amend this law where it would take care of the strikers?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not think so. You have separate legislation on that in the Smith-Connally Act, and this bill is designed, as I see it, to get enough workers for the important places in war industry. That is a real need. We do not lose much production in the way of strikes. That is a different problem.

Chairman MAY. May I interrupt to say to my colleague that when we get to that stage, we can amend the bill as we want, if the majority so desires.

Mr. STEWART. Well, I thought I might get his views.

Chairman MAY. Well, he has stated his views.

Mr. STEWART. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Martin has a question.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Secretary, this opening paragraph speaks about any registrant between the ages of 18 and 45 who leaves the farm or plant or war activity; do you mean by that who hereafter leaves his present occupation or who may have already left the occupation for which he has been deferred?

Mr. PATTERSON. That would mean hereafter, of course.

Mr. MARTIN. And any man who has now already left his selective service classified deferment occupation is not affected by this act, then?

Mr. PATTERSON. Not by that clause of it, but if he were doing something utterly unessential, he might be affected by the other part of it.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes; but if he is in an essential war industry, he probably would not be so classified unless he has changed his occupation.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is true.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, what classes are intended to be reached by this particular act? Is this intended primarily to reach those classified in IV–F or those classified as occupationally deferred?

Mr. PATTERSON. I take it it covers every man from 18 to 45.

Mr. MARTIN. Both the IV–F's and——

Mr. PATTERSON. Who are not actually in military service already.

Mr. MARTIN. It is broad enough to cover all classifications that are not in the active armed forces?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. Now——

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, the men between 37 and 45 are not classified at all.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, the powers given here to the selective service organization, to pass on the occupation of a man, with the intent to give the power to force men into approved occupations, in the war effort, is it intended to give them the power to force a man into a given field of occupation or is it strong enough to give them the power to force a man to work for a specific plant?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think for a specific plant.

Mr. MARTIN. They could force him to work for a specific plant or employer?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think so.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, that gets into the borderline on the constitutional question, and I would like to have that enlarged upon a little more as we have time later in the deliberations on this bill. There is a vast difference in requiring him constitutionally to work in any industry

and in any specific plant along the line Mr. Short developed a while ago.

I would not take the time now, but I want to give some thought to that distinction as this bill is developed.

Now, we have had some discussion here about furloughing men, and it has been done, to work in industries in certain crises. If the farm workers are depleted very seriously by the operation of this act, or any other act, more than they are now depleted, and a crisis arises in the harvesting or the planting of a crop, has the position of the War Department changed with reference to the matter of furloughing men for work on a farm analogous to your meeting the crises in industry?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; if there was a real one, we would have to help if we had the men.

Mr. MARTIN. Would you furlough them?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, heretofore, we have assigned them in units, as you know.

Mr. MARTIN. I know. I have had this discussion with you many times in this legislation heretofore, and the War Department has stood adamant against furloughing farm workers. They assign them as units.

Mr. PATTERSON. Against furloughing them singly, that is true.

Mr. MARTIN. And that is contrary to good farming practice.

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, I think this bill would help in getting a necessary supply of labor into agriculture.

Mr. MARTIN. One good farm worker furloughed to a farm can do more work than a squad sent out as a squad, I will guarantee that, and we were talking about the efficient use of manpower and I have had this discussion with you many times on selective service bills before, and I have never yet been able to get a man furloughed to work on a farm, and yet you are doing it for industry.

Mr. PATTERSON. Of course, we have sent plenty of soldiers to work on farms.

Mr. MARTIN. As units.

Mr. PATTERSON. In units.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes, sir; and that is just exactly——

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not think we sent any last year. None were really called for last year, as you know, sir. We did in 1943, however.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes. I would like to put in a word now in favor of matching your meeting of emergencies in industry by asking for the furlough when the crisis may arise, the furlough of expert farm workers individually to farm work, rather than by units.

Mr. PATTERSON. That is possible, Mr. Martin, but thus far the furlough thing has only been on war production that we are directly interested in. War Department contracts. It has not been to relieve an over-all civilian need or something like that.

Mr. MARTIN. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Before I call on any other gentleman of the committee, let me make a statement.

Secretary Bard will be the next witness and we are going to run until 12:30; to accommodate him. The committee will be in session again at 2 o'clock for the benefit of the other witnesses who will be here, Judge Hay and Mr. Krug. Two o'clock in the afternoon.

Go ahead, Mr. Winstead.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I have no questions.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Elston, do you have any questions?

Mr. ELSTON. Yes. Judge Patterson, how many men would you say would be affected by this bill?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I do not know. I have heard it estimated there were 4,000,000 IV–F's. Of course there would be many more affected by this bill than that.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Keesling has all that information.

Mr. ELSTON. I believe you said 700,000 persons are needed in war production—700,000 additional.

Mr. PATTERSON. Which will be in the first 6 months of 1945; it is estimated.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, do you know whether or not these could be obtained under this legislation?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not know that.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, if there are, we will say——

Mr. PATTERSON. We also need more than 700,000, because if 900,000 are taken into the armed forces, we will need many hundreds of thousands to replace those of the 900,000 that came out of war industry.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, a great many of your 900,000 come from boys who became 18?

Mr. PATTERSON. Less than 50 percent, probably.

Mr. ELSTON. If there are between three and four million persons who would be affected by this bill, and you need, we will say, 700,000 men, you do not know whether or not you could obtain them out of the three or four million IV–F's?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; I do not. Of course, a great many of those 4,000,000 are already in war industry. No one knows how many, or at least I do not know how many.

Mr. ELSTON. Until we know that, we would not know whether or not we needed anything more than this particular bill?

Mr. PATTERSON. So far as numbers are concerned, that is true.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, Judge Patterson, when did this shortage of men become acute?

Mr. PATTERSON. We have always had it in one program or another.

Mr. ELSTON. Is it any more acute now than it was, we will say, last spring?

Mr. PATTERSON. I think I would say yes. As you dig deeper and deeper into your manpower for men for the armed forces, the strain gets greater, of course. It is a harder job with, say, nearly 12,000,000 men in the armed forces, it is a harder job to find replacements for people in civilian life than it was when your armed forces were only 6,000,000 men.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you not think that men also left essential occupations and went into nonessential occupations under the belief that the war in Europe was over?

Mr. PATTERSON. Unquestionably.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, have you any idea of how many men left their essential job and took nonessential jobs under that belief?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; I can say this, that 10,700,000 persons were engaged in war industry in November 1943, and in November 1944 those same industries employed 9,300,000. That is a diminution of about 1,400,000.

Mr. ELSTON. Have you figures more up to date? Do you know how rapidly the number diminished, say, during most of July, August, September, and October, and the first week in November?

Mr. PATTERSON. My understanding is about a hundred thousand a month.

Mr. ELSTON. One hundred thousand a month?

Mr. PATTERSON. About that. Part of that, however, it is only fair to point out, were due to some reductions in certain programs, and I suppose increased efficiency on the part of the individual worker as he got into the groove and got trained to do his work.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, you do not blame those individuals so much if they were lead to believe that the war was over?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, they were being urged all the time not to leave war production, but they did it just the same, a great many of them.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, are not a good many of them now going back into war production since the German counteroffensive, and things appear to be quite different than they were last fall?

Mr. PATTERSON. Some. Some will. I think the soldiers and the sailors are entitled to absolute assurance of their supplies and are not supposed to take the gamble that we can coax you to "Please support them" and so on. They are entitled to more than that.

Mr. ELSTON. I do not think anybody will quarrel with you on that proposition. Last March the 28th this committee was conducting the hearing for the very purpose we are conducting one today. Only then we were concerned with a bill which you say is essential; namely, a universal service act, and on that occasion, we had before us the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, and asked him questions similar to those we are asking you today. I will say for you that your position has been rather consistent all along, but I think this should go in the record: The chairman was asked this question, or rather, this statement was made, speaking to the chairman of this committee:

> Mr. Chairman, if I may, I will give you a statement as to what we think the situation is.

The reason I am asking you this is to see if there has been some change.

> Now that we are withdrawing most of the people, our young men, from the war production and the supporting industries, we will have to find other workers to replace them and as the President has said, the older workers, the men and women who are disqualified for military service, will have to take their places. We must, therefore, ask whether we will be able to effect these replacements. The first question is: Do we have a sufficient supply of manpower to fill the gaps; and the second question is: Will we be able to find this manpower and to move it where it is needed? In order to answer these questions, I must turn for a few minutes to the manpower situation in which we now find ourselves.

Chairman MAY. Who is that speaking?

Mr. PATTERSON. Mr. McNutt.

Chairman MAY. That is what I thought.

Mr. ELSTON (continuing):

> At the present time, the manpower situation is relatively good. Labor shortages are causing less damage to production now than at any time since the early months of 1943. The vast majority of war plants have been supplied with the manpower they need. Most of our production programs are on schedule or ahead of schedule, including the critically important aircraft program.

Now, a little later, and I think these should go in the record on this subject, this question was asked:

Now, are you in favor of any legislation that would make possible for you to shift the IV–F's in nonessential occupations to essential occupations?

Mr. McNUTT. I have not any objection to it if Congress wishes to do it, but I am not here urging it.

QUESTION. Congress looks to you, as the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, for advice. You are in a position to advise Congress.

ANSWER. I am not here urging it this morning.

QUESTION. When are you going to urge it?

ANSWER. Whenever I think it necessary.

QUESTION. At the present time?

ANSWER. I do not.

QUESTION. You do not think it necessary?

ANSWER. That is right.

QUESTION. That Congress enact legislation to shift power from nonessential to essential occupations?

ANSWER. I do not. I have no objection, mind you, but I am not here urging it.

QUESTION. Who would you expect to urge it if you do not?

ANSWER. I would urge it if I thought it necessary—

and then this question:

QUESTION. Have you any recommendations to make to this committee?

ANSWER. I have no recommendation on it. I do not think that it is necessary as of today, as I said before.

Mr. BROOKS. What is the date of that?

Mr. ELSTON. March 28, 1944.

Mr. SHORT. There was no shortage of anythink in October.

Chairman MAY. What is your question?

Mr. ELSTON. I have not had a chance to ask it since my colleagues got rather political.

Mr. SHORT. No, I am not mad, I am just surprised.

Mr. ELSTON. Judge Patterson, what I want to know is simply this: I think we ought to have these facts before us in passing on this legislation: Whether or not the situation has changed since that time sufficiently to warrant this legislation.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I did not agree with the statement at that time. I was here at that time and testified on the same day, I think, along other lines.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, now, if you and the Chairman of the War Manpower Commission do not agree, of course, you cannot blame Congress for not enacting legislation on the subject?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not know what his views are today; at that time my views were the same as now.

Mr. ELSTON. He said he would let us know if his views were changed and we have not heard from him.

Now, just another question: Some time ago, of course, the War Department announced the policy of not taking men over 37, and I think your reasons for doing it were very good, but do you not think that at the same time that caused many men over that age who felt they were no longer subject to call for military duty, to shift from essential to nonessential occupations?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, that was only as to military service, Mr. Elston; the duty of a man to do his utmost to supply the Army and Navy was there just as much after as before that time, for a man over 37. And it would seem to me that if he were making artificial flowers, and there was a plant that was making mortar ammunition or something in the same town, that it was very evident if they did not have enough workers for that munitions program that it was up to him to go and assist in making the thing that was of importance.

Mr. ELSTON. I agree with you, he should have done it. But a lot of men did feel, when they were no longer subject to call for military service, that they could engage in any kind of an occupation they wanted to and they did shift from a more essential to a less essential occupation.

Now, that is correct, is it not?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, I think the majority, however, felt the duty pretty keenly and did stay in war work, Mr. Elston.

I repeat, we have no complaint at all of those who are in war work. They have done an excellent job. It is for the increase of them and the more effective mobilization of them in war work that we feel the need.

Mr. ELSTON. Judge Patterson, just one more question, and this may be a little hypothetical. Suppose a man is placed in one of these units and he is assigned to a war plant, and we will assume that, while he is there, a strike is called. If he goes out with the other men, would he be subject to court martial by the Army for not working?

Mr. PATTERSON. No; if he goes to the plant, he goes in a purely civilian character.

Mr. ELSTON. Yes, I know, but he is under Army jurisdiction insofar as punishment is concerned.

Mr. PATTERSON. Not in the least. If he goes in response to the call of the selective service board, he has no contact whatsoever with the Army, Mr. Elston. I am talking about the fellow who does not go in response to the call, but who has to be assigned by the Army. That man is under the jurisdiction of the Army. It is not intended by us at all that any man who lands in these so-called special service units will ever get into an industrial plant and work with civilian labor.

Mr. ELSTON. Where are you going to put them?

Mr. PATTERSON. Oh, we will have to use them around our arsenals, I suppose, and in the maintenance of air fields, and things like that. We have not much work of that to be done, Mr. Elston. I have said all along that we cannot take many men; we have plenty of men now to do that kind of work and we are getting more all the time as men get wounded and unfit for active duty.

Mr. ELSTON. You just contemplate using them for some more menial employment and not assign them to war plants?

Mr. PATTERSON. That is right.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Fenton has a question.

Mr. FENTON. The advantage of sitting down here at the end, of course, is very obvious. Mr. Elston has just struck a point that I was about to ask about.

Mr. Secretary, are you in a position to tell us just what number of limited service men we now have in the Army?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, yes; I would rather do it in executive session.

Chairman MAY. That will be fine.

Mr. PATTERSON. I will say there are large numbers and I will furnish the chairman with the information.

Mr. FENTON. Well, now, I was just going to ask, along that line, what will the Army or the various services do with these men who get into these special service units?

Mr. PATTERSON. We cannot do much with them.

Mr. FENTON. So that if you have a considerable number of them, you are going to have a problem on your hands?

Mr. PATTERSON. The law will not have worked if there are a considerable number of them and I think it will have to be repealed and some other measure taken.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Secretary——

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not expect that to happen, however.

Mr. FENTON. I take it that you are not very much in favor of that particular provision of this bill, then?

Mr. PATTERSON. I would have preferred to have seen purely civilian sanctions. The declaration of a duty to obey the call of a selective service board to go to an assigned job of a civilian character with the same penalties as in the Selective Service Act—fine and imprisonment.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Secretary——

Mr. PATTERSON. This is not a job we are hankering for, but we will do it if this is the form of legislation that Congress thinks is best. That is our position.

Mr. FENTON. I wonder if the Secretary could tell me how the production of aluminum is progressing?

Mr. PATTERSON. Aluminum?

Mr. FENTON. Yes.

Mr. PATTERSON. We need some aluminum sheet for the second quarter of this year; additional, I mean.

Mr. FENTON. Well, I know of one instance where they have discontinued the production of aluminum. I was just wondering whether or not that was in line with keeping up production.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, you know, first we were very short of aluminum, particularly aluminum sheet; then about a year ago, we had a surplus of aluminum, so production was cut back, and inventories in the companies' hands, the aircraft companies I am speaking of, became low, and now we have got to get some additional labor for the aluminum sheet mills again.

Chairman MAY. Judge Patterson, if you go into details on this particular problem, we could go on indefinitely.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, that is my answer.

Mr. FENTON. The only thought is it is affecting the manpower in certain localities.

Chairman MAY. Of course.

Mr. FENTON. I do not think those men should be subjected to criticism and——

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir; they were cut back and have to be recruited again.

Mr. FENTON. What about the facilities for production of ammunition, both small and large?

Mr. PATTERSON. The facilities? Small arms ammunition facilities are there in being, it is just a question of recruiting labor and training it. For the larger calibers, mortar ammunition and artillery ammunition, there have to be some new lines tooled up. The two problems are different, you see.

Mr. FENTON. Well, I am again thinking of another plant which has been discontinued. Not a pound of ammunition was ever produced and yet there is a so-called shortage of ammunition.

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, we converted a good many of those plants designed for small arms ammunition to other uses. I think the plant you have in mind was used by the Ordnance Department for assembly of——

Mr. FENTON. Storage plant?

Mr. PATTERSON. Storage and assembly. I think, in Pennsylvania.

Mr. FENTON. Yes.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. FENTON. In other words, I have in mind two plants, one ammunition plant that never produced a pound of ammunition, and another very fine aluminum plant that was discontinued from the manufacture of aluminum.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes; that is true.

Mr. FENTON. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Johnson, do you have any questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. The question I wanted to ask is prompted by a great many letters I get from war industries and from the Government—some Government operated and some civilian operated.

Here is what it is: I hear from various types of plants that there is a great deal of idleness in the plants; that the men are not occupied the full 8 hours a day that they are there to work, and you and many others have repeated the conclusion that the production of the country has been marvelous and stupendous. I want you to tell us, is there any standard whereby you can measure a plant? For instance, if there are a thousand men, that they ought to produce a certain amount of units. What is your yardstick when you make those statements?

Mr. PATTERSON. I do not think there can be any possible single standard to measure the efficiency of production. Of course, you can measure efficiency in comparable plants and that is done all the time.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what I am thinking of is this: I know of a paper plant in my town that has a way of determining, when they have 500 people, and if the men are working properly under satisfactory supervision, what the production should be.

Is there anything like that that you can apply in these various war plants throughout the country?

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes. The Air Forces will have an efficiency index for the aircraft plants that produce for them. The Ordnance Department will have the same thing for plants of the same kind. They do that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, now, I have seen those at Wright Field, for instance.

Mr. PATTERSON. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. How do you know that the top plant is producing what it ought to produce? They compare the plants with each other, but how do we know what the best one is producing what those men ought to produce in the time those men spend working there?

Mr. PATTERSON. They know it from past experience. They know it—take the Boeing plant at Seattle. Compared with what it produced in 1941 with the same number of man-hours, they can see a steady improvement all the time.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, is it your conclusion, then, that the over-all picture is that, by and large, the plants are producing to capacity, to what the men should produce?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, I am not a production expert, Mr. Johnson, but General Knudsen is, and he tells me it is good.

Mr. JOHNSON. I will ask you one other question. Last spring, after talking to you and getting permission from the chairman, I went out to an air-service command field on the coast to look into some matters, and one thing that impressed me more than all others was this: Some of the foremen there claimed that they spent too much time cleaning up and painting up the various shops. In this plant there were dozens and dozens of small shops. When some celebrity was coming through there or the inspector general coming through there—has that sort of thing stopped or is it still going on?

Mr. PATTERSON. I will bet it is still going on, and I bet it will go on.

Mr. JOHNSON. Here is my thought, Judge Patterson: After all, when you run a big——

Mr. PATTERSON. That is the way when you have a regimental mess and the major general is coming around, why, they always try to furnish him something good to eat; and when a congressional committee comes around, they always try to have something good to eat.

Mr. JOHNSON. The point I want to try to get you to explain to us is this: When you run Patterson Field, you are not running an Army installation; you are running an industrial plant. Why can you not supply industrial rules for that?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, it should be, of course.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is there not a way we can do that?

Chairman MAY. That is a matter of administration of the law.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is a matter of a great deal of production, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman MAY. Well, I know it is; but——

Mr. JOHNSON. I wonder if the judge could not help us?

Mr. PATTERSON. Well, they are all there under General Knudsen's command now, and I have great confidence in his administration of anything along industrial lines.

Mr. JOHNSON. One other question. Early in 1944 General Eisenhower made the statement—this is not any critical comment—but he made the statement that the war would be over in 1944, and many high officials concurred in that.

Were your calculations on production based on that assumption?

Mr. PATTERSON. No, sir. You have got to play your production on the safe side all the time.

Chairman MAY. Is that all?

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all.

Chairman MAY. On behalf of the committee, Judge, I want to thank you for your appearance here. You have been completely consistent in your position from the start to the finish and you have been a good soldier since you have entered the service, and we are all very glad to have you. We are sorry to have kept you here for so long, but I would like to say that at the conclusion the committee will likely in executive session interview you on other matters and I will let you know in plenty of time as to the matters on which we will consult you.

Mr. PATTERSON. Thank you.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Secretary Bard.

STATEMENT OF RALPH A. BARD, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Chairman MAY. Mr. Bard, you have considered H. R. 1119. Will you tell us about it or make any statement you wish to make?

Mr. BARD. I have a very short statement.

Chairman May, and members of the House Military Affairs Committee, before commenting on H. R. 1119, I wish to make it clear that the Navy feels that a national-service act is a necessary part of the machinery of this war, providing we wish to conduct a war with the greatest efficiency and within the shortest possible time with a minimum of casualties.

In modern war we do not know today what may happen tomorrow. It has been sufficiently demonstrated in the recent past, that the best-planned military operations sometimes go awry, which demands, as a result, immediate changes in war-production requirements, and increased civilian participation in the war effort.

When these requirements change, we do not have time to rush to Congress for action on specific needs, and it is obvious that such needs must be met promptly for the successful prosecution of the war.

We face now an extremely serious phase of this all-out war. I am sure Congress and our people everywhere now recognize this fact as never before. We should give our fighting men all-out support at home.

Under our present home-front program we are planting the seeds of bitter resentment in the armed forces if we continue to permit our civilians to contribute to the war effort as each one of them may see fit. Contrary to the ideas expressed by some of our industrial organizations and labor leaders, I am confident that the great majority of our people want to be told how they can help, where they are needed, and what they should do to back up our fighting men at the front, and the adherence to this principle of service by a large majority of our citizens has been definitely indicated by responsible polls which have been taken on this subject.

This means a national service act. And my idea of such an act on a broad scale is encompassed in two short paragraphs:

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That it is hereby declared to be a national policy that every citizen of the United States has an obligation to render such personal service in aid of the war effort as he or she may be deemed best fitted to perform. Furthermore, the Congress hereby declares that authority for immediate and total mobilization of the manpower—

Please note I say "authority"—

for immediate and total mobilization of manpower of this Nation for the purpose of providing an adequate supply of labor for war production and other essential activities is imperative for the successful prosecution of the war.

To effectuate the purposes of this Act, the President of the United States is hereby authorized to issue regulations as he may deem necessary to provide for the effective and orderly mobilization and utilization of civilians whose services are needed in the war effort and to prescribe functions of Federal officials and agencies in administering such regulations.

The only additional paragraphs necessary, as I see it, would be a penalty paragraph providing for penalties for any person who refuses or knowingly fails to comply with the provisions of this act and a paragraph terminating the act at the same time the Selective Training and Service Act is terminated.

In my opinion, following the passage of such a national service act, the President could immediately, through the Director of War Mobilization, Justice Byrnes, cover the IV–F problem by directive within 24 hours and issue other directives to cover other particular situations where control is needed, and only where such control is needed.

It is my belief that if there was such authority granted by Congress the need for implementation of this authority on a broad scale will, to a considerable extent, disappear and a great majority of the people of this country will be unaffected.

Pending action upon such a national service act, it is my opinion that it is the only proper solution in view of the seriousness of the war situation, and the Navy Department strongly recommends the favorable consideration by Congress of H. R. 1119. With reference to this bill, I have only two comments to make.

The first is that the control of the machinery necessary to put into effect the provisions of this bill should be lodged in the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Various agencies will have to be used but the coordination of their duties and their efforts should be left to the Director of War Mobilization.

Second, I want to make it clear that the Navy Department does not need and does not want a work corps such as would be created by this bill. This work corps will be set up as a landing place for civilians who refuse to engage in essential war work under the terms of this bill.

The purpose of this bill is not to develop such a work corps in the Army or Navy, but rather to use liability for employment in such a corps as an unattractive alternative to working in a job in essential war industry and the whole purpose of the bill would be defeated if any large numbers of citizens should prefer to be inducted into such a corps rather than to take a job in essential war industry.

The Navy has approximately 100 000 limited-service naval personnel and in addition 20,000 men of limited service who have returned from battle areas and who cannot again be sent outside of the continental limits. So we are well supplied with limited-service personnel inside the continental limits at the present time.

That is the end of my statement. I will be glad to answer any questions.

Chairman MAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Bard. I wish we could have a chance to question you further, but I think you have made your position understandable at least.

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. As I understand, Mr. Secretary, you feel that the penalties set forth in this bill should be removed and others substituted for it. In other words, you do not think that this is going to help the carrying out of the war and that other penalties might be just as effective and ought to be used rather than setting up a work battalion?

Mr. BARD. No, you misunderstood me; on the set-up of the work battalion—I agree with Judge Patterson that we would prefer to have the civilian fine and imprisonment feature rather than work battalions, but we will go along with the work battalion. However, it should be made so unattractive that nobody will want to go into the work battalion, because the purpose of the bill is to get people into industrial work and not into the Army and Navy.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it not your considered opinion that that bill will do exactly that if it is worked out the way it reads?

Mr. BARD. Yes; I think it will.

Chairman MAY. Thank you very much, Mr. Bard.

We will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12: 30 p. m., a recess was taken until 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess.)

Chairman MAY. Our next witness is Mr. J. A. Krug, Director of the War Production Board.

Mr. KRUG, you have no doubt read and considered H. R. 1119.

Mr. KRUG. I have, sir.

Chairman MAY. Would you care to make a statement for the benefit of the committee on the matter? You may proceed as you desire, sir.

STATEMENT OF J. A. KRUG, DIRECTOR OF THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD

Mr. KRUG. I have only a brief statement, Mr. Chairman.

The War Production Board endorses H. R. 1119 without any qualifications. We feel that perhaps there is a matter of detail that the committee will want to look at when it completes the final drafting, but we think there is nothing sufficiently important to hold up its prompt enactment. Naturally we would like to have a more comprehensive act, and I hope that Congress will proceed to work that out, but in the interim we think this bill as drawn will be exceedingly helpful.

I will not take the time of the committee to go over the same problems that Judge Patterson discussed this morning, but I heard his testimony, and I agree in substance with what he had to say.

The committee this morning was interested in the detail of some of these war programs that have caused trouble, and I have here a report which covers the whole picture up through October, which is available for public use.

I also have two confidential reports, which bring the program up through the end of the year. These are confidential and are for the committee, and I assume that they wil be treated as confidential war material. I would not print these two for the record.

Chairman MAY. You can leave them for the committee and I will see to it that they are not printed and that they are properly protected.

Mr. KRUG. These reports show the detail of the principal critical programs in terms of past performance as against the schedule, and also, what we must do in the period ahead.

Now, there is one very important change in the picture that I think the committee should know about. Judge Patterson referred to it generally. Since October 1, there has been a very substantial increase in the projected war program for 1945. The program we are looking at as of this date approximated $56,500,000,000 on that basis. Since that time, an additional $5,000.000,000 has been added to the program. That represents, in large part, ammunition, tanks, ships, and airplanes. I can give you the detailed break-down of that, if the committee would like to have that for its consideration.

Roughly, about 20 billion dollars of the program is aircraft, about 10 billion is ships, another 10 billion would be ammunition. About 11 billion, miscellaneous, and about 6½ billion for combat vehicles, and about 2½ billion dollars of guns and gun-control equipment.

Now, I heard, only this morning, that a new program is yet to come, and that it will come very soon. It will add another 2½ billion dollars to that 61½ to 62 billion we already have, which will make the task for 1945 even greater than the job for 1944. And this is the important thing to keep in mind: If we were just turning out 64 billion dollars of munitions, of the same kind that we produced in 1944, it would not be a difficult job, because we know how to make those things, and we have the lines set up and they are going. But every day it has a change, an improvement, something new. The result is that of this total program for next year, fifty percent is going up steeply.

As a matter of fact, to give you a short picture of that, in that 50 percent we must reach, by the second quarter of 1945, a level 65 percent above where we were in October of 1944—in short, in about 6 months, in those critical programs, we have to boost them 65 percent.

Now, it is true that, looking at the other half of the program 35 percent is going down, and of course that will give us some leeway if we have a flexible way of moving the manpower and resources from the programs that are going down to these programs that must go up. But of the total picture, only 15 percent remains stable.

Now, even with that picture to look forward to, we would not be so much concerned were it not for these new manpower demands of the Army. Judge Patterson said this morning that the Army and Navy will need another 900,000 men in the first 6 months of this year. I do not know where the Army will get them, if they do not go into industry and take some of these able-bodied men that we have deferred.

We have, in so-called II–A and II–B, about 820,000 or 830,000 men who have industrial deferments. Now, I presume that perhaps half of those are qualified for military service. But, if we lose those men, and have this added load put on our productive resources, we must have a speedy way to replace them. We will find some way to train men wherever we can, but we must have the men to train.

Chairman MAY. Pardon me, may I interrupt you? As I recall Judge Patterson's testimony, he said that they were not trying to procure for the Army any large group of men out of this IV–F group, but that they wanted them principally and primarily for the industrial jobs, so that there ought not, therefore, be a great deal of conflict between your effort to keep them in industry and their effort to get men for the armed services.

Mr. KRUG. I do not think he made that point clear, sir.

Chairman MAY. That is the way I understood him. I may be wrong.

Mr. KRUG. He is after 900,000 physically fit men, and when you look for that group, a large part of them will have to come out of essential industry. That is the only place where they are.

Chairman MAY. So then there is a conflict here or an impasse between the industrial picture and the war manpower picture.

Mr. KRUG. I would not say it is an impasse. It is part of the old story. We have been losing men now for the last 3 years from war industry to the armed service, and they will dip further into it in 1945.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And you do not question their right to continue to do so?

Mr. KRUG. No, sir; but where are we going to get substitutes?

Mr. DURHAM. How many do you need at the present time? As I understood Judge Patterson, he said in war production you need 700,000 and at the present time you have 800,000 in II–A and II–B.

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. You expect enough of them to be called?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. That is further?

Mr. KRUG. That is included in the total demand.

Mr. DURHAM. Is that included in your 700,000?

Mr. KRUG. Oh, no; you see if he takes these men out of war industry, we not only need the 700,000, but replacements for every man he takes out of industry to make up that 900,000.

Mr. DURHAM. Instead of needing 700,000 you are liable to need a million or more?

Mr. KRUG. Seven hundred thousand plus the men that will go into the Army from industry.

Mr. CLASON. Judge Patterson said this morning a million and six, and I do not see that there is any disagreement between Mr. Krug's statement and Judge Patterson's statement.

Chairman MAY. No disagreement, but there is conflict. Each of them wants the men, and each one wants to get them.

Mr. ARENDS. What you are worrying about is who is going to replace them?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir.

Chairman MAY. All right, Mr. Krug, continue.

Mr. KRUG. The picture for next year cannot be described in overall terms. To get it you really have to get at the stuff that is in here. I would like to describe just a few of the items.

You all have had the aircraft program before you many times and are acquainted with it. But at this stage of the war, we are met with the necessity of putting new planes into production, and increasing the production of those planes that have demonstrated their capacity in battle. The net effect of that is, while the total airplane program for 1945, dollar-wise, will not be much larger than for 1944, the segment which includes the hot airplanes, the good airplanes, has to go up from a level of $367,000,000 in October of 1944, to over $900,000,000 in the second quarter of 1945. That gives you some idea of the need for operating fast and without a lot of lost motion in getting these new production lines manned, in getting this new equipment out, which we need so badly.

Now, it is for that reason that I feel strongly that we can no longer take any risk in getting manpower for this job. This legislation will help, and it is the time when help must come and must come in a hurry. These demands are not going into any stock piles, they are not going to training troops, we are not building up strategic reserves. The stuff that is being produced now is what they need in Europe and in the South Pacific, and they need it right away.

Mr. SHORT. You say this will help some. Do you have any alternative?

Mr. KRUG. I think we ought to have comprehensive legislation covering the whole field.

Chairman MAY. In other words, you are just like the other gentleman. You prefer national service legislation to this particular bill, but since you do not have national service legislation, and if you cannot get it forthwith, you want this?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir. I would like to say I hope there will not be too much fussing around about details in this.

Chairman MAY. Well, you mentioned something about some suggestion you might have with respect to the details of the legislation. If you will, I would like you to go into that.

Mr. KRUG. I would rather not give any suggestion in the hope that that will speed the passage of this bill.

Chairman MAY. All right, sir.

Mr. KRUG. I will be glad to answer your questions.

Chairman MAY. All right.

Mr. KRUG. That is all I have as a direct statement.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Krug, you say "more comprehensive legislation." Now, while it is true we have been talking here primarily about IV–F's, is it not a fact that this bill covers all registrants between the ages of 18 and 45 and to that extent it is comprehensive?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir; to that extent.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, when you speak of "more comprehensive" do you mean that you would like to go above the 45-year age level or below the 18, or what?

Mr. KRUG. I would like to go up to 60.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Up to 60? Your idea of more comprehensive legislation would simply be to extend this up to the 60-year level?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; and I think, to avoid difficulties, we ought to have civil penalties in that bill, rather than this device of taking them into the Army.

Mr. SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, we have registered those above 45.

Mr. KRUG. Yes; we have.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We have registered them to 65, have we not?

Mr. KRUG. At least to 60, as I recall.

Mr. SPARKMAN. If this should be amended simply to change the upper age limit from 45 to 60, you would have your comprehensive legislation, would you not?

Mr. KRUG. It would be quite comprehensive; yes, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Short, do you have any questions?

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Krug, how many IV–F's do we have now?

Mr. KRUG. Their total, as I recall the figure, is about 4,500,000, of which 1,000,000, I believe, are already classified as being in essential industry.

Mr. SHORT. I wonder if any governmental agency has taken a census or made a survey of these IV–F's to find out just how they are now employed, whether they have been interviewed or urged or requested to seek employment in industries more essential to the war effort.

Mr. KRUG. I believe Judge Hay follows me and he can tell you what has been done in that field. We look to the War Manpower Commission to provide our manpower needs.

Mr. SHORT. Do you not think it is just a little unfair to single out this particular group for stigmatization? You do rather stigmatize the IV–F, and punish him, it seems to me, for disability, perhaps, beyond his own control.

Mr. KRUG. I certainly do not think we should do that.

Mr. SHORT. How come we answer the charge that this is class legislation?

Mr. KRUG. Well, as I understand it, this covers everybody from 18 to 45, whether he is IV–F or not, if he is not already in the Army or Navy.

Chairman MAY. That is right.

Mr. SHORT. You would be in favor of raising that to 60?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; I think the more comprehensive we can make it, the better off we will be and I think we have reached the point in the war that we cannot afford to leave any tool, that would be useful, out of the kit.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Krug, how many contracts are now being let on the cost-plus-fixed-fee basis?

Mr. KRUG. I am sorry, Mr. Short, I cannot tell you that. We are not responsible for procurement. Judge Patterson, and Mr. Bard would have to give you the answer to that.

Mr. SHORT. That system, do you not believe, has tended to increase the number of employees in order that the employer might increase his earnings because he is guaranteed this profit, and it perhaps accounts for some of the idleness that we have heard much about in different plants?

Mr. KRUG. Well, I have been very much opposed to those contracts, and the War Production Board has attempted to get them out in every possible case, but with a war job of the kind we have, you cannot avoid all of them.

Mr. SHORT. That is true, in manufacturing certain munitions and instruments of war that have never been manufactured before. They are costs that are unpredictable, but it seems to me that it has been a very vicious system that we have had, and it has tended to increase the cost to the taxpayers of our Nation, and has contributed largely to the idleness and absenteeism that we hear about in certain war industries.

Mr. KRUG. It is the policy of the Army and Navy, and I think they are doing a pretty good job in carrying it out, to avoid contracts of that type in every possible case. Of course, in the end, that is a matter of bargaining, and if the industry says we just cannot take it any other way, you will have to decide whether you are going to haggle about it some more or get them going on it.

Mr. SHORT. I think you will find on examination that many of these IV–F's are, at the present time, engaged in vital war industries.

Mr. KRUG. That is quite true.

Mr. SHORT. And others, who are engaged in perhaps textile or tobacco factories, or other civilian industries, are reluctant to leave their present jobs to go into a war industry because they are not guaranteed, or given any assurance that they will be given back their old jobs when the war is over. It seems to me if we had a sim-

ple amendment to the Selective Service Act, which would guarantee to the IV–F's or to war workers, give them the same protection that we give to men in our armed forces, by assuring them that when the war is over and they leave their jobs in war plants, or Government arsenals or shipyards, that they will be given back their old jobs, that you would find that this situation would be largely alleviated.

Mr. KRUG. It seems to me that you could not give them more than a second priority on those jobs. I think the man that is over fighting ought to have the first priority.

Mr. SHORT. That is right. I do not think there would be any argument on that score, but if we could in some way guarantee, to these men engaged in civilian pursuits, that they would be given some consideration, or assurance of getting their old jobs back, they would not hesitate as they now do to leave their present jobs to go into war industries. After all, a IV–F is a human being, and he perhaps has loved ones in the service, he perhaps is a married man with a family, and he has got to look after himself and take care of his own personal responsibility. You cannot very well blame him for that.

These IV–F's have suffered enough by being turned down. Many of them were very anxious to get into the armed services and were bitterly disappointed when they could not get into the Army or the Navy. I think we ought to try, if we have any legislation along this line, to remove any stigma that might be attached to a man who has been rejected, for physical reasons, for combat duty.

Mr. KRUG. I certainly cannot disagree with you on that.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Durham, any questions?

Mr. DURHAM. Of course, you have no estimate as to how many would be covered beyond the IV–F's. Evidently it would cover a considerable number.

Mr. KRUG. I have in mind, if we have legislation of this kind, so that the workers of the country know the seriousness of this war picture, they are going to take jobs in war industry voluntarily.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, we have quite a turn-over so far as the women are concerned, too.

Mr. KRUG. We have, sir.

Mr. DURHAM. You speak of comprehensive legislation. Would you go so far as to say we should include the women in this legislation?

Mr. KRUG. I would.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Arends, do you have any questions?

Mr. ARENDS. Is that your feeling, so far as further amplifying the power of the Selective Service, or of the draft boards, in carrying out what might be the provisions of this bill?

Mr. KRUG. Well, I thing we would have to gear into the local draft boards the services that are available for fitting the available workers to the available jobs. That is a very complicated and technical job. I am sure that Judge Hay can tell you some of the practical problems involved, and I think we ought to tie in all those services with the local draft board, so we are sure the men are put in the right place. In that connection, I want to make clear that I assume that if this is enacted, it will not work against a very essential part of our industrial process. That is the turn-over that is necessary (1), for the worker to find the right job to fit his capacity, and (2), so that management can select the right work force to do a certain job.

For example, the Chrysler engine plant in Chicago, that is making this tremendous engine for the big bomber, an engine that everyone said just could not be built on a mass production line, has 30,000 workers building that engine now and they will need about another 5,000 when they reach the peak. I certainly would hate to have responsibility for that plant, and the 35,000 people in it, if I could not select workers that were capable of doing the thousands of different operations necessary to build that engine. And, I do not think that anyone should have in mind that you can adopt a system that is so inflexible that you keep a man in a job whether he is competent to do it or not.

Mr. ARENDS. Well, now, lifting the thought that I had as a result of Judge Patterson's testimony, and your observation based upon the facts that the Army and Navy are not anxious to have a great number, if any more, so-called limited services, or special listed trainees, as a result of what we might do, it is quite obvious that they are going to want, as you have already indicated, some of your men who are in industry and more physically qualified.

Now, how is their induction going to be brought about? That would again be left up to the selective-service boards, would it not?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; although we are working with them on a plan to draw from that pool, of over 800.000 those that can be spared best and retaining the most essential. And if we do not retain a part of that group, we just cannot make this production program.

Mr. ARENDS. Well, give us an idea. You said you are working with them. How is that process going to work out?

Mr. KRUG. What we are trying to do is set up the types of skills and the types of industry, where we must have consideration from the draft board in terms of the man's essentiality in the war effort, which will greatly narrow down the field of deferment, but will still permit, on a selected basis, certain deferments in that group, where it is clear to the local board that in those categories the man just cannot be spared.

I am talking about able-bodied men.

Mr. ARENDS. I will continue a little further. Your point of view is, the higher you go above 45, the less pressure you are going to put on any particular group or age group. If you raise it to 50, it will relieve the pressure on some other groups.

Mr. KRUG. Yes.

Mr. ARENDS. Of course, you have the very young men who are IV–F, 18 or 19, in the colleges, today, a comparatively small number.

Mr. KRUG. Well, I think the selection of which men can be made available to fill these necessary jobs in industry is one that I am hardly qualified to testify about.

Mr. ARENDS. It will be the same in that group probably as it would among any other group. Some would be qualified and others would not be qualified for productive work.

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir.

Mr. ARENDS. I have no more questions.

Chairman MAY. Have you any questions, Mr. Thomas?

Mr. THOMAS. No questions.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Martin, do you have any questions?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Krug, this new demand for arms and ammunition is probably going to cut into civilian production.

Mr. KRUG. Probably. For instance, in steel, the first two quarters this year are worse than any we have had so far and that is putting a pinch on the civilian items.

Mr. MARTIN. I had in mind the effect on the manufacturer of farm machinery because this present manpower situation indicates there may be some cutting-in on farm manpower and that brings to light a serious point with regard to the availability of farm machinery, at least replacement parts of farm machinery. In this coming crop season, for instance, if the manpower is cut down, what is the picture with regard to the manufacturing of farm machinery, looking ahead?

Mr. KRUG. I would like to answer that just as frankly as I can. The picture about this: I think we can get the repair parts to keep the equipment we now have going. I think there we will need a little greater time lag than normally is encountered, so we are encouraging farmers to start repairing their equipment early, so if there are delays, it will be ready.

On the new equipment program, I am fearful it will have to be cut from what we proposed doing, in the light of these new war demands. We are working that out now and as soon as we have it, I have agreed to sit down with the farm leaders to go over with them what the picture is, so the farmers of the country will know what they must organize in this very difficult year. I have followed that program personally now for 3 years. I know what they have been up against, and it is a very, very serious problem. We are reaching a point, however, on the new equipment, where it is a choice of whether we are going to get these new tanks and these new big trucks or cut back on some of the farm machinery.

I am afraid we will have to cut back some on the schedule we had hoped to carry out in 1945 on farm machinery.

Mr. MARTIN. Has our production problem of war materials increased since your statement there in November?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; there have been increases in the program almost every week. I am not sure you were here when I gave the figures. We have had an increase of $5,000,000,000 in the 1945 program in the last 2 months. I heard this morning that there are another 2½ billion dollars which will come along very shortly to give us a total program for 1945, which is higher than 1944, and in some of the most critical categories, those that are very hard to make.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, you have not formulated any program that enables you to say what specific effect that would have upon the production of farm machinery?

Mr. KRUG. We are working on that right now, and as soon as we have this new program intact, I think we can give a pretty good answer on it.

Mr. MARTIN. That is all I have.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Thomason, have you any questions?

Mr. THOMASON. No questions.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Elston, do you have any questions?

Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Krug, you said you would like to have a universal service bill and go up to 60 so far as men are concerned?

Mr. KRUG. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. And how far would you go with respect to the ages of women?

Mr. KRUG. Well, I would rather have the people who know the manpower pool testify on that. My concern on the women is that there are some of these plants where the women have been doing a perfectly grand job. There has been a tendency, in these plants, during the past 6 or 8 months, for some of them to feel the job is over. Now, I think the manpower people, after surveying the thing, would say if we can get the relief we need, on the male help, we can draw enough women voluntarily into the pool of female workers. I certainly would want to accept their judgment on it after they look at the aid to the manpower pool that will come from getting more of these men into essential industry.

Mr. ELSTON. Where do you think the women and the men, too, got the impression that the war was over?

Mr. KRUG. I think you know as well as I do. I hardly know a leader in the world that did not think the war was over and said so. I think that is quite unfortunate.

Mr. ELSTON. I will say to you that while we were overseas, the high ranking Army officers over there very much deplored the belief on the part of the American people that the war was over, so I do not think it came from them. It came from over here.

Mr. KRUG. Well, I recall, in reading Time Magazine a few weeks ago and seeing the statements by the military leaders of the world as to when the war would be over, and it seems to me they started from February 1943 and ended up with the end of 1944.

Mr. ELSTON. All right, people left their jobs because they thought the war was over and they are now convinced the war is not over, and we still have a long hard fight ahead. Do you not think they will go back to work voluntarily without a national service bill?

Mr. KRUG. I am fearful of the time which may come again when they think the war will be over and we just cannot afford to have it come again.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, when do you thing that time is coming when we are going to think it is over, 4 years from now?

Mr. KRUG. I do not know. It depends on events.

Mr. ELSTON. Well now, you say that there are about three and a half million IV–F's that are not in essential industry.

Mr. KRUG. I did not say that. I said there are three and a half million who are not classified.

Mr. ELSTON. Yes.

Mr. KRUG. Some of those certainly are in essential industry.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, you said out of the four and a half million, a million of them are in essential industry.

Mr. KRUG. They are classified as such.

Mr. ELSTON. That would leave three and a half million.

Mr. KRUG. Right, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, have you any figures on how many of the three and a half million are available for placement in essential industry?

Mr. KRUG. I have not.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, then, why do you insist upon a national service act when you have not even made a survey to determine how many of the three and a half million would be available under legislation such as we have before us today?

Mr. KRUG. I know this, sir, that in the labor pool, there are all the workers we need to do the largest war job we want to do, and carry on

68175—45——4

all of our essential activities, with a lot left over, and all we want is a way of getting the men we need in war work, to the places where they are needed. There are plenty of them there. You can look at the figures and see it.

Mr. ELSTON. Well now, do you agree with Secretary Patterson that 700,000 are needed?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir, that is an estimate; but I think it is as good as any you can get.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, at that rate, you would only need about 20 percent of the three and a half million to fill the bill?

Mr. KRUG. Right, with the skills that you need to fill those 700,000 jobs.

Mr. ELSTON. You do not know whether you can get that 20 percent out of three and a half million or not, do you?

Mr. KRUG. I do not.

Mr. ELSTON. And yet you are in here suggesting a national service act which would include men up to 60 and include women.

Mr. KRUG. The point I am making is, I know we can get the men we need, the 700,000 and more, if we need them, out of that total labor pool, and that is why I would like to see it as broad as we can make it rather than restrict it to a group which may not be enough.

Mr. ELSTON. Why resort to that drastic legislation, even including the women of the country, until you have tried this bill that we have before us today, or something similar to that?

Mr. KRUG. I said I am willing to try it and I hope that without any further argument it will be adopted. I would like to have the other.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, what did you mean when you said you did not want any fussing about details?

Mr. KRUG. I said rather than for me to propose minor changes in detail, I would waive them in the hope that we get action on this bill at an early date, because I think it is so badly needed.

Mr. ELSTON. Are you in favor of the type of bill that Mr. Bard suggested here this morning?

Mr. KRUG. I am in favor of the bill that is before this committee, H. R. 1119.

Mr. ELSTON. Are you in favor of trying it before you resort to a national service act?

Mr. KRUG. I am in favor of trying it the minute we get it. I hope Congress will lose no time in going ahead with the more comprehensive legislation.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, why do you want the more comprehensive legislation if you may never need it?

Mr. KRUG. I would like to have every tool this country has in the tool bag, in fighting this war.

Mr. ELSTON. Before you need them?

Mr. KRUG. Even before we need them. It cannot do any harm.

Mr. ELSTON. Who would you have administer this act that would include men up to 60 and include women?

Mr. KRUG. Selective Service.

Mr. ELSTON. Rather than the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. KRUG. Well, they would have to work in harmony, because the War Manpower Commission has to do the job, the technical job, of fitting the people into the specific places where they are needed.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, Mr. Nelson, your predecessor, was not in favor of a national service act. He testified before this committee on March 28, last year, and this question was asked him by Mr. Sparkman:

> Do you think that, Mr. Nelson? I would be interested in your comment on this particular phase of this proposal that we have been discussing and, of course, this is a limited service proposal.
>
> Mr. NELSON. I understand that.
>
> Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you think that would be preferable to the general overall service proposal?
>
> Mr. NELSON. I do, sir.
>
> Mr. SPARKMAN. As contained in the Austin-Wadsworth bill?
>
> Mr. NELSON. I think so, sir. At one time, when I was early in the game, I was very strongly in favor of selective service, after Pearl Harbor.
>
> Mr. SPARKMAN. You mean national service?
>
> Mr. NELSON. National service. However, I think the time is past when you can get the administrative details operating in that bill in order to help us. I think if we go into this narrow field and work it out through the narrower field, it will solve our problem. If it does not, why then, of course, all you need to do is step up further and further into the age limits. I think the fact that you work out this thing in a narrower field will go a long way toward stopping the turn-over and some of these problems.

Now, is the situation more acute in the War Production Board now, and in the country than it was when Mr. Nelson made that statement to this committee?

Mr. KRUG. I would not want to answer whether it is more or less acute in the War Production Board, but I do think the war programs are far more acute than they were at the time that statement was made.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you have any young men working in your department?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; we have some young men.

Mr. ELSTON. How many?

Mr. KRUG. I think——

Mr. ELSTON. How many under 30?

Mr. KRUG. I cannot give you that. I can furnish it. We have none under 26, as I recall. We have let all of them go. I think our total deferments for all age groups is a very small figure. I can get you that figure.

Mr. ELSTON. Have you stopped to figure out the housing problem that would be involved in legislation which would make it possible to transfer men around the country wherever some agency might want to send them?

Mr. KRUG. There will be housing problems involved. They will be involved whether or not we have this.

Mr. ELSTON. And it would take a considerable period of time to provide housing; would it not?

Mr. KRUG. It would take time to provide housing.

Mr. ELSTON. And there is transportation. Have you figured out what that would amount to?

Mr. KRUG. We would have no difficulty transporting essential war workers to their jobs.

Mr. ELSTON. Where are your acute labor shortages today?

Mr. KRUG. There is hardly a major industrial section of the country that is not acute today.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, they let out a couple of thousand in Cincinnati in the last few days, Wright Aeronautical Co., so it must not be so acute there.

Mr. KRUG. I have not looked at Cincinnati recently, but I have been in a great many parts of the country and I have not found one where labor could be called loose. I would include Cincinnati in that group.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, where would you get the help to send into those cities to fill the places?

Mr. KRUG. We would get help from within those cities, people that are working there and in nonessential or less essential work.

Mr. ELSTON. Just one other question. In addition to providing for an over-all service act, you would like to have civil penalties. What would you have those penalties be?

Mr. KRUG. I think they could be reasonably modest. A $500 fine, and maybe 6 months in jail.

Mr. ELSTON. And who would you have impose those penalties?

Mr. KRUG. I would assume, the civil courts.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Philbin, any questions?

Mr. PHILBIN. No questions.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Kenton, do you have any questions?

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Krug, you heard my questions relative to the shortage of aluminum this morning?

Mr. KRUG. I did, sir.

Mr. FENTON. What is your thought on that matter?

Mr. KRUG. Now, there is another——

Mr. FENTON. Having in mind a plant that has been shut down.

Mr. KRUG. It is a very good example of what comes when these programs shift back and forth. Those plants were curtailed, as you know, back in various times in 1944, when we had them operating. It is going to be very difficult to get the people back into them now, particularly when they do not know how long the war will last, and how long the plant will operate, and the net effect of it is that we are going to be short of aluminum in the next few months, because we cannot get the people back into those plants fast enough.

Mr. FENTON. I believe the vast majority of those people in the area, that I have reference to, have been absorbed into the same plant which is now being used as a repair depot by the Army, and I am sure they would be very much more willing to produce aluminum than be shipped out of our area, which is already depleted to the extent of twenty-five or thirty thousand people, and be shifted down to these other areas that are teeming with war industry.

Mr. KRUG. That is a very important point. We are doing everything possible to keep facilities going that we have, and keep the people where they are, rather than move them around the country. I think by and large there are enough people in these areas to do the war job, if we had a way of getting them to take the essential job and leave the less essential job.

Mr. FENTON. There is a very, very acute problem in my area, and I think it was a mistake to cut that plant out in view of present events.

Mr. KRUG. I am afraid, sir, that we made a number of mistakes of that kind. They resulted from this dropping off in military requirements, which suddenly were replaced by increasing demands. Plants were shut down and now they have to be started up again. Small-arms ammunition is a very good example of that problem.

Mr. FENTON. That is all.

Chairman MAY. Mr. Johnson, any questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. When was that cut-back of 15 percent made, Mr. Krug?

Mr. KRUG. In the total war program, you mean?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. KRUG. I do not recall a 15-percent figure.

Mr. JOHNSON. Was there not a cut-back made there in some of the plants that, were used to produce war materials, which were turned over to produce civilian material?

Mr. KRUG. No; there was never any blanket change of that kind. We did cut back the aluminum plants at a time when we had aluminum ingots piled up all over, and two or three hundred million pounds of aluminum sheet, in inventory. But aside from a very modest amount of civilian work authorized under the so-called Priority Regulation No. 25, there have been no blanket conversions of war plants to civilian work.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, the moving of men from one war plant to another wastes a lot of manpower. You concede that, do you not?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, some months ago, we heard some testimony here, and also I heard a discussion at an off-the-record meeting by a War Production official regarding some plan they had a freeze workers on their jobs, and as outlined then, it would save a lot of man-hours, millions of man-hours, and the matter was supposed to have been put into effect on the Pacific coast. What do you know about the effectiveness of that regulation?

Mr. KRUG. I am afraid you are referring to the War Manpower Commission. We have no regulations to freeze men on their jobs.

Mr. JOHNSON. They are the ones that had it. But would you not be familiar with it? That is what is called the west coast plan. Out in my district there is a big navy yard and there is a stream of men going in there and a stream of men going out continuously. Last summer the commandant told me that that had not been stopped. They go to Maryland. Then they go to another land. Then they go to Long Beach, and it is just a continuous circuit. If we could stop that, could that not save millions and millions of days of man-hours?

Mr. KRUG. That is what we are trying to do, is to stop that. We have no authority at the present time.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the Manpower Commission came out with definite statements that they had a plan to solve that.

Mr. KRUG. Well, we still have it, and it is still being used and it is doing, I think, the best possible job under the limited authority we have. It is called the referral system. Where a worker is available in a given area, they must take the top priority jobs first.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is right.

Mr. KRUG. Unfortunately, you cannot hold them in the job by that device, and the turn-over is running something like 700,000 a month in war industries alone.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, you mean by the referral system that a workman has to get permission to go to the next plant; is that it?

Mr. KRUG. You pour them in the top but you cannot keep them from falling out at the bottom.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mean they can quit?

Mr. KRUG. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Was there not a stop at the next plant which said he has to get a reference?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; but if he says I am sick, or I cannot stand the work in this plant, or a thousand and one other excuses, he can find, if he wants to quit, there is no authority to make him stick to that job.

Mr. JOHNSON. In other words, the plan has not worked at all.

Mr. KRUG. It has worked. It has helped, but it has not solved the difficulty. It has contributed, but we are short in these plants, and this plan alone has not remedied the difficulty.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, in making your plans for the production of all these critical materials, do you now, or have you in the past, assumed that, say, the European war would terminate at any given time?

Mr. KRUG. We have never assumed any date of termination.

Mr. JOHNSON. Has anybody that has been discussing this matter with you made any assumption that the war would be through in 1945, 1946, or 1950, or any time?

Mr. KRUG. I have never heard any official make any prediction of when the war would end and plan accordingly.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the article you referred to in the magazine, where it was stated by top officials in the Army, that the war would be terminated, did that have any effect on your program?

Mr. KRUG. Well, it had the effect of workers saying, "The war is about over," and leaving their war jobs. In July and August, and the first part of September, turn-over rates increased greatly throughout war industry.

Mr. JOHNSON. Did that in any way affect your system of priorities and let you relinquish a little more than you had before for nonessential uses?

Mr. KRUG. There were many plans discussed at that time, and undoubtedly just talking about those plans had an adverse effect. But there were no material effects.

Mr. JOHNSON. What effect did it have on the policy of the War Production Board is what I want to know.

Mr. KRUG. It had none whatever.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all.

Chairman MAY. I have a few questions, Mr. Krug. Can you furnish the committee with a list of industries as vital to the war effort?

Mr. KRUG. We can give you a list of industries, and a list of plants, showing our manpower shortage, too.

Chairman MAY. That will be fine. We will be glad to have it. Now, is lumber regarded as a vital industry?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, indeed.

Chairman MAY. It is very strategic, is it not, right now?

Mr. KRUG. Certainly, it is one of our most difficult shortage problems.

Chairman MAY. Well now, in that connection should a local draft board, drafting for the military service, take a young man who owns and operates a portable sawmill producing ten or fifteen thousand feet of lumber a day?

Mr. KRUG. It would depend on whether we could find somebody else to run that mill for him.

Chairman MAY. Well, I am assuming he is the only operator and that it would have to be shut down in the event he has to go.

Mr. KRUG. That is a pretty broad assumption. I think from our own experience in lumbering, it is hard to make a convincing case that you should defer a young man, who is fit to fight, to run a sawmill.

Chairman MAY. Now, you said awhile ago something that surprised me, and that was that the steel industry was further behind in production during the first two quarters this year than they had ever been.

Mr. KRUG. Not behind in production, production is setting new goals, but behind in meeting requirements.

Chairman MAY. It is your thought that it is due to the increased demands for steel?

Mr. KRUG. Right, sir.

Chairman MAY. Now, one other thing that I want to bring out here, and I think the committee would be interested in this: Congress has passed many measures, and in fact every one we could think of to pass, that we thought would be helpful to veterans that are returning from this war, in order to get their jobs back for them, and we have provided for their reemployment, and done everything we can do. Now, I have an instance where, in one particular industry, and I assume it is true in nearly all of them, that there is a ceiling fixed by the War Manpower Commission. For instance, they will say that industry may have 600 employees. When they get up to that ceiling, we will say 25 veterans apply for work, and they say, "All right, we would be glad to give you a job but we have got a fixed ceiling and we cannot hire you."

So, as a matter of fact, unless there is some elasticity in these Manpower regulations and ceilings, they simply discriminate against the veteran rather than help him. What would you say about that?

Mr. KRUG. I would say in any place where there is a ceiling and a veteran returns, who has a priority on a job, we ought to give him a job and release somebody else to go to another job in the area, because there are plenty of jobs there.

Chairman MAY. Would it not be a sufficient solution of it that the ceiling not apply to veterans?

Mr. KRUG. That would be exceedingly difficult, because if you did that, you would defeat the entire purpose of ceilings in that they would include in the ceiling only the nonveteran, and take in others on top of all the veterans they could find. The net effect would be, there would be a dissipation of manpower. So you would adjust for that by moving the ceiling down, so as to come out to the same result. A plant that had a ceiling of 600, and had 100 returning veterans, if you gave him 600 plus 100, he would be up to 700, and the next time you needed manpower, you would cut him to 600 and he would have 500 plus 100 veterans.

Chairman MAY. Well, what is the solution to it, to keep these veterans from being shut out?

Mr. KRUG. They have a priority right to those jobs, do they not?

Chairman MAY. Yes; but suppose a man is trained on a machine of some kind and a veteran comes in that is not trained, would you discharge the man off the machine that is trained in order to give a veteran a job?

Mr. KRUG. Not if he was not qualified to take the job. I think the act contemplates that you are to give him priority on the work that he is able to do.

Chairman MAY. Well, perhaps Judge Hay can enlighten the committee on that, and I am sure he will.

Mr. ELSTON. I am wondering if, in addition to the data you suggested Mr. Krug furnish the committee, we could also have him furnish data about the industries and the class in which cut-backs have been ordered and when they were ordered.

Mr. KRUG. Well, that is a tremendous volume of information. We will try to assemble it, if the committee wants it. The Army and Navy have made hundreds of cut-backs, because they are adjusting one program and building up another. The request should be made to them, as they are the procurement agencies and have the complete data on contract cut-backs.

Mr. ELSTON. You do not have a record?

Mr. KRUG. On the principal ones, but not all of them.

Mr. ELSTON. Will you furnish the principal ones, then?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; we will be glad to.

(Chairman May turns chair over to Mr. Thomason.)

Mr. THOMASON. Mrs. Luce, do you have any questions?

Mrs. LUCE. Mr. Krug, this has been referred to as legislation in a narrower field, but would you not describe it as a national service act for all men to 45?

Mr. KRUG. I would, Mrs. Luce.

Mrs. LUCE. Now, the bill, as I read it, and the power of the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, is to certify manpower shortages, but leaves in the hand of the Director of Selective Service the act of assigning men to critical industry; right?

Mr. KRUG. Well, I had understood that the Director of War Mobilization could set up the mechanics as to how that assignment would be worked out. If that is not the intent, I think it should be sufficiently broad to permit that, because we do need to use the facilities and the know-how of the War Manpower Commission in attempting to find——

Mrs. LUCE. Well, now, my question was, Are you in accord with the provisions as stated in this bill, or would you prefer to see those shortages determined by the War Manpower Commission and the actual assignments made by the War Manpower Commission? In other words, the question I wanted to ask you was, What, under the provisions of this bill, do you see the authority and the function of the War Manpower Commission to be?

Mr. KRUG. Well, if I may just tell you how I thought it would operate—I had assumed the Army and Navy and the War Production Board would determine the plants where we must have help. The War Manpower Commission would take those plants and determine their manpower needs, and the categories of skills that are required in those plants. The local draft boards would be told the size and the nature of the manpower demand. I think it would be most proper if they would then call in what they think is adequate manpower to take care of that need and refer those men to jobs through U. S. E. S., so that they can be properly fitted into the job that they are capable of doing.

Mrs. LUCE. But so far as this bill goes, it would be possible for the Selective Service Director to completely ignore the War Manpower Commission, if he so chose, in determining actual critical manpower shortages.

Mr. KRUG. Would it be true, Mrs. Luce, regardless of directions of the Director of War Mobilization?

Mrs. LUCE. Well, that is not the question I am asking.

Mr. KRUG. I know, as I understood the bill, the Director of War Mobilization would have the authority to tell Selective Service how to operate the mechanics of the bill. If that authority is there, I do not think we have to worry about the mechanics in the bill itself.

Mrs. LUCE. In other words, so far as you are concerned, the authority of the War Manpower Commission is quite all right, so far as this bill goes.

Mr. KRUG. I am sorry that, technically, I do not think I am in a position to say yes or no. I would like to check it. I want to be sure that the bill gives the Director of War Mobilization enough flexibility so he can set up the detailed mechanics of how the War Manpower Commission and Selective Service will work together under this bill.

Mrs. LUCE. And you think then that the Director of War Mobilization has that power under this bill?

Mr. KRUG. I understood the language could be improved and that specific language is forthcoming. If it is, I think it should be cleared up, because I would not want any doubt on that point.

Mrs. LUCE. I do not know, but just reading the bill, I would say the War Manpower Commission has no authority under this bill at all for the actual assignment or certification of critcal manpower needs.

Mr. KRUG. Except as the committee could, through an arrangement——

Mrs. LUCE. Except as the committee could, through Mr. Byrnes' office, itself?

Mr. KRUG. Well, personally, if Mr. Byrnes' office has that authority under this bill, I would not worry about it. If he does not have it, I would worry about it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it not a fact that every questionnaire sets out a detailed history of the registrant and giving his vocational experience? Is there any data outside of that that the War Manpower Commission uses to place these men?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; they know about the plants requiring the labor and the nature of the jobs in the plants, so that with their knowledge of the jobs that are open, they can fit those jobs to the manpower.

Mr. JOHNSON. I mean do they use any other data to fit the man into the right job than the data on the questionnaire?

Mr. KRUG. That is only half of the data. You know what the man can do. You have to know what jobs are open that fit in with his qualifications. Now, the questionnaire gives the information on the man's capacity, but War Manpower Commission, working with management, has to work out the information on job opportunities. That is not on the questionnaire.

Mr. JOHNSON. No, I understand that.

Mrs. LUCE. Then you see the War Manpower Commissioner under this bill acting merely in an advisory capacity to the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion and having no specific authority himself in the certification or assignment of men to critical war industry.

Mr. KRUG. No; I had assumed that the Director of War Mobilization could say, under this bill, to the Director of War Manpower Commission, "I want you to perform this function, of taking this man-

power that is called up, and fitting it to the available jobs that are certified to you by the Army and Navy and the War Production Board, as being necesary in the war effort."

Now, I do not see why that cannot be done as the bill is drawn, but if it is not clear on that point, I would want it perfectly clear.

Mrs. LUCE. You would not suggest some language to make it clear what authority the War Manpower Commission should have?

Mr. KRUG. I do not think I would try to work in that detail, because I think we should have flexibility and it might have to change from time to time. I would make Mr. Byrnes' authority clear, as to how the various Government agencies, that have to work under this bill, are to work together to make it effective.

Mrs. LUCE. If that is not clear, you would suggest it be changed in the legislation?

Mr. KRUG. Yes; my general counsel said that point should be cleared up.

Mrs. LUCE. Could you suggest a little more of the clarification?

Mr. KRUG. Do you have in mind the clarification of authority?

Mr. EATON. There has been a good deal of discussion on this point, Mrs. Luce, and it was thought that the Office of War Mobilization and its Director would have the coordinating authority to see that the functions of the Army and the Navy, the War Production Board, and the War Manpower Commission would be tailored into the operations of the Selective Service System and that that would best be done by a general provision giving coordinating authority to the Director of the Office of War Mobilization rather than to try to work the details of it into the legislation.

Mrs. LUCE. As I read the bill, a man who goes into his local board is told by his local board where he is to work. He is not turned over to the War Manpower Commission, who then tell him what to do; is that correct?

Mr. EATON. That is correct.

Mrs. LUCE. He is directly handled by the local boards and Director of Selective Service?

Mr. EATON. Yes.

Mrs. LUCE. Would you suggest a change on that point?

Mr. EATON. Well, I do not believe I am competent to suggest the language. Colonel Keesling, has the language been worked out that was suggested?

Colonel KEESLING. It is not available as yet, but there was a suggestion, as you indicated——

Mr. THOMASON. Well? Well, Colonel Keesling is going to testify later as to that. I think we better proceed in the regular way. Any further questions to the counsel for the War Production Board?

Mrs. LUCE. That is all.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Brooks, do you have any questions?

Mr. BROOKS. I wanted to ask you a question, Mr. Krug. We started out on this program a number of years ago, of putting this industry where manpower was located. Then the War Production Board made a change, and we put the industry where it was easiest to place the industry, as I understand it. So you built up certain areas of intensely congested populations. What gripes many people in this country is the fear that, with compulsory legislation over these war

workers, it may be that you will require wholesale migration of workers from one area to another. The country is fairly well settled down now to work, but what would you say about that in the event this law, or a national-service act, were passed?

Mr. KRUG. Well, I would like to say this, Mr. Brooks: First, from the very start, we have had a policy of trying to fit the war work in where the labor is.

Mr. BROOKS. But you changed that.

Mr. KRUG. We never changed it. It has not always been possible to do that, for various circumstances that are obvious to you. So there have been cases where we have had to put urgent work into an area where we had facilities or we had management skills that could not be moved. Say they were linked to other work in that area, and that has caused these problems. But those have been exceptions to the policy and there has been no change in policy.

As I see the picture now, from now on out in the war, we have generally, in most parts of the country, enough labor to do the job, so it is a question of getting the labor into those respective regions, that is, into the places where it is needed, and not moving it around the country.

There may be some exceptions to that, but I think they will be few in number.

Mr. BROOKS. You do not anticipate any wholesale migrations, then, of labor from one area under the whip of this bill, do you?

Mr. KRUG. I do not.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Arends, any questions?

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Krug, in answer to one of Mr. Martin's questions a while ago, I want to make clear in my mind the answer. Would you say that there will be less production of machinery in 1945 than there was in 1944 or 1943?

Mr. KRUG. I think there will be less in 1945 than in 1944. Repair parts might have to be increased in production.

Mr. ARENDS. That situation is serious?

Mr. KRUG. I know it is, sir, and I am very much worried about it.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Stewart, do you have any questions?

Mr. STEWART. Is there any slow-down pressure in the heavy-duty-tire plants with respect to soldiers, who have been furloughed to those plants?

Mr. KRUG. None that I know of, sir. I understand that the soldiers have helped greatly.

Mr. STEWART. Have done what?

Mr. KRUG. Have helped production greatly.

Mr. STEWART. No tendency of slow-down in those plants to which the soldiers have been assigned?

Mr. KRUG. Not that I know of.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Martin, any questions?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Krug, with further reference to the manufacture of farm machinery last spring and summer and fall, we were informed that the shortage of farm machinery was no longer due to the lack of materials, but rather a manpower shortage in the factories. From your first answer here today, I gathered that there will now come into the picture some shortage of materials.

Mr. KRUG. It may, although I think the binding spot will still be in the foundries.

Mr. MARTIN. Manpower, primarily?

Mr. KRUG. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. And that shortage of materials has not really seriously entered into the picture yet?

Mr. KRUG. Not at the moment. The steel picture is more serious, and with this two and half billion dollars of war production coming in, materials may become a factor again in farm machinery.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, does the War Production Board exercise any jurisdiction over the distribution of farm machinery?

Mr. KRUG. None whatever.

Mr. THOMASON. Thank you, Mr. Krug. The next witness on the list——

Mr. SHORT. Just a moment, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Krug, this particular bill is no cure for strikes in war industries, is it?

Mr. KRUG. It is not, sir.

Mr. SHORT. It is not an answer to idleness in war plants?

Mr. KRUG. I am afraid not.

Mr. SHORT. Nor absenteeism?

Mr. KRUG. It is not.

Mr. SHORT. Nor does it lengthen the working hours of the day, or the days in the week?

Mr. KRUG. No, sir;

Mr. SHORT. And there are some unions that are still applying peacetime restrictions in hours of labor, are there not?

Mr. KRUG. Not that I know of.

Mr. SHORT. You are sure of that?

Mr. KRUG. I know of none.

Mr. SHORT. It certainly does not cure the cost-plus-10-percent contract, does it?

Mr. KRUG. No, Mr. Short.

Mr. SHORT. And yet you want this legislation before any of these evils that I have mentioned are cured or remedied?

Mr. KRUG. I want this, and I want everyone to continue doing everything possible to cure the other things you are talking about, and a lot has been done.

Mr. SHORT. I wish I could honestly have your faith in the effect of this legislation. I am no prophet or son of prophets and only fools dare prognosticate. Of course, I qualify in that role. I want to say that when legislation like this is enacted into law, that it will retard rather than accelerate production and you will have a lot of people, forced labor or slave labor, sitting out the war in our industrial plants.

Mr. THOMASON. Mrs. Luce, do you have a question?

Mrs. LUCE. Is it not true that it is turn-over and the failure to have the right men in the right place, far more than either absenteeism or strikes, which causes the manpower shortage?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, indeed.

Mrs. LUCE. More than either?

Mr. KRUG. They are a drop in the bucket compared to the other.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to ask Mr. Krug if he feels he could offer any legislation which would tend to reduce turn-over in plants by requiring men who are in plants now to remain on their jobs?

Mr. KRUG. I assume that that is what this law will do.

Mr. CLASON. You think this will be sufficient to accomplish that purpose, as well as to put persons in essential industry from nonessential industry at the present time?

Mr. KRUG. Well, this question of a fellow taking a day off once in a while will not be cured by it.

Mr. CLASON. That is right; but you would expect him to stay in one particular job rather than run from one shipyard to another?

Mr. KRUG. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. Thank you, Mr. Krug.

The next witness is Judge Charles M. Hay.

STATEMENT OF JUDGE CHARLES M. HAY, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN AND EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION

Mr. THOMASON. What is your official position and for whom do you speak?

Mr. HAY. I am Deputy Chairman and Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission.

Mr. THOMASON. And the Director is out of the city?

Mr. HAY. Out of the country.

Mr. THOMASON. And you are appearing for him and his Commission?

Mr. HAY. Yes; I am at the moment, I presume, properly considered the Acting Chairman of the War Manpower Commission.

Mr. THOMASON. All right, sir; you may make such preliminary statement as you desire.

Mr. HAY. I would just like to make a brief statement.

We are cooperating with the other agencies in supporting this measure. There is an amendment which was referred to in the discussion just a moment ago and which is being worked on now covering the matter referred to which I would very much urge the committee to consider for reasons that I will mention a little later on.

I think in the light of what was said this morning, you will indulge me, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, in a brief retrospect with respect to the attitude of the War Manpower Commission on legislation of this kind or of a similar nature. Reference was made to the testimony of Chairman McNutt in one of his appearances before your committee.

You will recall, perhaps, that early in the war, Mr. McNutt made the statement that he thought that national-service legislation was inevitable. He added that that was a matter of course for the consideration of the Congress. When he appeared at the time mentioned by the Congressman in reference to his testimony, he made the statements as quoted. Now, after Mr. McNutt had made this first statement with respect to his belief that national-service legislation would be inevitable, he went on as Chairman of the War Manpower Commission, acting under the Executive order of the President, to set up and perfect, so far as possible, the manpower programs under that Executive order. Those programs have been set up and have been operating and have been perfected as best they could be perfected in the judgment of those in charge, since that time, and they are in force at this time.

I am not here, Mr. Chairman, to plead the cause of the War Manpower Commission or the record that has been made, but I would like, if you will indulge me, for just a moment, to call attention first to the general nature of the programs that have been set up. They have been popularly referred to as voluntary programs or as controls insofar as there are controls voluntarily imposed.

They have been referred to also as cooperative programs.

Now, the pograms that have been worked out have been worked out not only by the representatives of the officials—I mean of the War Manpower Commission—but by them in cooperation with and with the aid and counsel of management-labor groups.

The highest management-labor committee that we have in the country consists of the representatives of business, agriculture, and labor. Mr. Eric Johnston of the United States Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Frederick C. Crawford of the National Association of Manufacturers, Mr. R. Conrad Cooper of the steel industry, Mr. William Green, Mr. Philip Murray, Mr. H. W. Fraser of the railroad brotherhoods, Mr. Albert S. Goss, Mr. Edward A. O'Neal, and Mr. James G. Patton of the farm organizations; they constitute what is called a national management-labor policy committee. They are at the national level.

We have regions and areas. We have regional committees composed of outstanding representatives of management and of labor, and wherever it is deemed necessary, of agriculture.

In New York, for instance, no less a personage than Mr. Owen Young is a very active member of the Management-Labor Committee.

Now, these committees have cooperated with the Manpower Commission in the development of the programs that we have, the stabilization program, as we term it, the priority referral program, and the ceiling program, which are the outstanding programs.

The objective of the Commission, in working out these programs, has been to provide a system of what may be called hiring controls. I shall not take the time of the committee to go into the details of that. I could if you want me to, but it would take perhaps too much time, but the purpose of that is as the name indicates, to attempt to stabilize labor in essential employment.

We provide, for instance, that if a man is working in an essential industry and wishes to change from that to another industry, he must have what is called a statement of availability. That may be issued by the employer. In some areas it is issued only by the United States Employment Service.

If the employee leaves without a statement of availability, he may not be employed thereafter for a period of 60 days; that is the penalty provided for it.

That is the provision that was developed through the cooperation with the consent of management and labor. That illustrates basically the method by which we have developed these programs and is one incident of the operation of them.

Reference was made a moment ago as to the effectiveness with which our so-called stabilization programs have stabilized labor and prevented turn-over. We are fully conscious of the fact that it has not, even to the extent that we could wish, reduced turn-over and effected a perfect stabilization of labor.

The situation is spotted with respect to that. In some places we have a satisfactory condition; in other not. Turn-over is contributed to, as you know, by many causes. Bad labor relations, working conditions, in-plant conditions, living conditions in the community, transportation troubles, and wages, frequently enter into the matter.

Back in July of this year, when it was apparent that there was theatened a shortage of male labor for heavy work, we worked out what is called a priority-referral program. That was for the purpose of providing that employment should be through the United States Employment Service or through an arrangement with the United States Employment Service, the objective of that being to bring the greatest possible influence to bear in guiding men into the jobs where they were most needed. Later, we went in more vigorously for a ceiling program, particularly at first to provide a ceiling for men in essential industries, so as to obviate the hoarding of labor and to provide also reduction by attrition. Later, a ceiling for the purpose of less essential industries to make workers available for essential industry.

I shall not go further into details of that. I have given you that just roughly and briefly as the major provisions of our manpower program.

From the time Mr. McNutt appeared, when he said that national service was inevitable, up until the time when he appeared last year, we were operating under this program and a job of mobilization had been done, which I think was most significant. I think all must admit a great production job has been accomplished. I think all of us, last year, were more optimistic than we are now, with respect to the war. I must confess, speaking personally, that during the summer of last year and up until the middle of October, I thought—and I am sure I was not alone in the thinking—that the war's end in Europe was not far distant, and we felt, I am sure Mr. McNutt felt and we all felt, that our programs had accomplished a tremendous job in the mobilization of manpower of the country and we could see the job through without legislation.

Now, what Mr. McNutt would say if he were here at this moment, I have no means of knowing, except this, that Mr. McNutt is a realist; he is a gentleman, I think you all will admit, of rare courage and in the light of the present situation, I am inclined to think he would say to this committee what I have said candidly to you, that representing the Manpower Commission as I do today, we are cooperating with the other agencies with respect to this bill.

You may ask me why I would change attitudes, assuming that I had taken a position some time ago that there was no necessity of national service legislation. My frank position with respect to the matter is this: We might be able, under our programs, perfected as we have endeavored to perfect them, to accomplish an adequate mobilization of manpower to the end of the journey without additional legislation, particularly in view of some orders that have been recently issued, such as the selective service order, and certain orders with respect to civilian production, but I do not know that we can do it; I am not certain that we can do it. I am of the opinion that legislation of this kind, in the manner that I will point out in a moment, will be helpful.

I think we ought to put ourselves in the position where we cannot fail to do the adequate job.

You may ask me what I have to say with respect to national service. I have just this to say: Just as I said a moment ago, we might be able to do this job without the power of compulsory assignment, which is the essence of the national service, we perhaps could do it without that, but we cannot afford to deal in "perhapses" in view of the sudden shifts in the demands for materials, in the demands for end products, and manpower.

I think it would be the part of wisdom to put ourselves in the strongest possible position. But to make this, I hope not too long, but to get before you my conception of what I think would be the wise thing to be done, I think that a thorough and exhaustive study of the programs that we have at the present time will lead any candid person to the conclusion that we have there the basis, that we have there the sort of controls which, if properly implemented and supported, would provide for the doing of an absolutely adequate job.

Remember we have been doing this job without any power to punish anybody for anything except one thing: There is only one offense that can be committed under our manpower programs for which there can be an invocation of any criminal sanction, and that is if an employer employs a man who is engaged at a certain wage in an essential industry, at a higher rate of pay, the employer can be prosecuted for that, and the employee can be prosecuted for accepting the employment under those conditions. That is the only offense for which there can be the imposition of criminal sanctions.

Therefore, the job that has been done, the mobilization of the manpower and the womanpower of the country, the placement of men and women in the best places in which we could place them, has been done without the mandate of the law insofar as the ability to invoke criminal sanctions is concerned. This has been accomplished through what may be termed the "voluntary" cooperative processes of management, labor, at the national level and in some 1,650 areas of the country, through their respective committees cooperating with their Government.

In my judgment, if we are to come to any general, over-all legislation, if that is in the minds of the committee or others, I think we should build on what we have done up to this date. I think we should avail ourselves of the good will and the experience of these numerous management-labor committees throughout the country and avail ourselves of the knowledge that has come to an administrative force in dealing with this problem.

In my judgment, if the Congress should enact a measure that would give statutory support for the sort of programs we are endeavoring to administer in this country under the Executive order, that would put us in a much stronger position.

Mr. THOMASON. Judge Hay, if you will pardon me, of course the work of your Commission is a matter of record, and as I view the situation, what was done and said last year under very different conditions to those now prevailing is water over the dam.

We are now dealing with the present and the future. I am sure what the committee wants to know, in order to be quite specific, is, Do you favor legislation? If so, how do you feel about this bill? And also, in what respects would you amend it if at all?

Mr. HAY. I will answer that.

Mr. THOMASON. All right.

Mr. HAY. Having said what I have, I will now do what you want me to do.

Mr. THOMASON. Very well.

Mr. HAY. If I can do it. Mr. Chairman, I am trying to get into the picture what we are doing now and how this bill will fit into the picture, so that you will discover, my dear friend, when I am through, that what I have just said perhaps is not so wide of the mark as may have seemed at first; but just to conclude that point, Mr. Chairman, I would say that any legislation of a general nature should build on what we have at the present time. We do not now have the power of compulsory assignment, which is the essence of a national-service act. If you wanted to augment the power that we have by vesting the power to call up men to meet emergencies, that would be additional power and in my judgment would have the essence, then, of a national-service act. It would be bottomed upon the experience that we have had up to the present time, and would have, in my judgment, the reception—a favorable reception—at the hands of these magnificent committees who have cooperated to try to make this plan work.

With respect to this bill, let us take a look at it for just a moment and see exactly what it provides. That has been discussed and perhaps we have a clear view of it. This bill, it has been admitted here very frankly, is not for the purpose of getting men into the Army. Judge Patterson says they do not want them in the Army. It is said that it is a "work or fight" bill. It is a "work or fight" bill only for the men in these age groups, 18 to 45, who are qualified for military service.

With respect to men who are not qualified for military service, it is a work bill, either work voluntarily in a war plant at regular wages or work as you will have to work in a work battalion, at military wages.

That is the essence of it. That is the choice a man has. Either to go into a war plant or some war supporting agency and get a job that will be deemed to be essential to the war effort or else be called up and put into a work battalion if he cannot qualify for fighting.

You say, it is a "IV–F" bill. Well, it includes more than the IV–F's; some might say it includes IV–F's and the IV–B's. I belong in it by that "bald, bent, bulging, and bifocal," that is the four b's. That is the group. Manifestly, the purpose of this bill is to get men into war industries. I think there is much to be said for what Judge Patterson and Mr. Bard both said, that perhaps more consistent with the real purpose of the bill would be an enactment specifying the duty of these men to make themselves available for war work, or suffer civilian penalties. That would be the more direct approach to it.

You konw that nobody will be misled into believing that this is a measure to get men into the Army. It has the essence, as has been said here this morning, of a national service act, with a system of punishment or penalty that is different from the ordinary penalties of the national service act.

My own principle, my own view of it is that it would perhaps be in better posture if it assumed the aspect suggested by Judge Patterson and Mr. Bard. What is the purpose? The purpose, first of all, is to

68175—45——5

hold men who are in plants at the present time, where their services are needed, to those jobs. And I think in that respect it would be helpful. I think it would be helpful in reducing turn-over and that is one of the biggest jobs that we have at the present time. If we could reduce turn-over to the extent necessary to reduce it, we would have little if any manpower problem. Of course, paradoxical as it may seem, we want to stop turn-over on the one hand and encourage it on the other. We want to prevent turn-over from plants in which men are needed and encourage turn-over to get them into plants from the plants in which they are not needed.

I think it would help to stabilize the men who are presently employed in war plants. On the other hand, I think it would encourage men getting into war work. I think the men who are now unemployed, or who are in less essential industries, would seek out opportunities to work in war plants to avoid these penalties.

In my judgment it would have that effect. As Mr. Krug has well pointed out, we not only want to get them into war industries, but we want to get them into the right war industries at the present time. Our situation now is this, with respect to war production: 55 or 60 percent of our war programs are on schedule and we have adequate manpower for them. There is about 45 percent that are not on schedule and with respect to certain of them, we have a very acute manpower shortage. At the immediate moment, in the critical war plants, we have a manpower shortage of approximately 150,000—that is men who are needed at this moment. Within the next 4 or 5 months, we will need, in those plants at least an additional 150,000. We need some hundred thousand men at the present time for such industries as transportation and construction, so that we have an immediate need now, in these critical plants, and in others that are of great importance of about 250,000. I mean by that that we need a net increase. That does not spell out all of our recruiting job. We have to take care of turn-over.

I think this would help us in that particular, but there should be the highest intelligence possible exercised in the placement of the men who make themselves available by this process for placement. That is the reason why, we think, there should be a correlation of the work of the selective service with the War Manpower Commission, so that our placement agents could be made available to put the men where they are most needed.

The selective-service boards have done a magnificent job. I do not derogate for a moment the job that they have done, but we have here, through the War Production Board, committees set up to specify the plants in which there is the most urgent need of men. Our manpower priorities committees, which represent the procurement agencies, the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, and so forth, undertake to take those industries and then determine where the men are needed, the kinds of men that are needed, and where they are needed most.

We have what we call our priority referral category giving gradations with respect to the urgency of the jobs that are needed. Now, we feel that certainly, in the last 2 years, our people have developed a system and an experience that could be helpful, and we would like for this bill to be so framed and so stated as to make it certain that we

take advantage of the best system possible to get the men placed in the right places.

Mr. THOMASON. Then, you do think that, in view of the present situation, some legislation is needed to supplement existing legislation affecting manpower?

Mr. HAY. I think it should be enacted in order to make certain that we will do the job and do it when and as it should be done.

Mr. THOMASON. Then, are you willing to say, Judge, that you favor this bill?

Mr. HAY. Well, I have said so, have I not?

Mr. THOMASON. Well, you have, but you favor changes in it.

Mr. HAY. I just used too many words, have I not?

Mr. THOMASON. No. I want to know if you are favorable to it as it is now. The committee will have to be——

Mr. HAY. No; I am not favorable to it in the present language. I mean I am in favor of the general objective of the bill, and I am in favor of the amendment that I suggested a moment ago, which is being worked on and which will be submitted to the committee.

Mr. THOMASON. I am sure the committee would welcome your suggestion and advice as to just how to amend it in order to meet the present crisis.

Mr. HAY. Yes. I think that is the only statement, Mr. Chairman, that I have.

Mr. THOMASON. Are there any questions, Mr. Brooks?

Mr. BROOKS. Judge Hay, you were on the radio Sunday night, were you not, Chicago Round Table?

Mr. HAY. Sunday afternoon.

Mr. BROOKS. I thought I heard you. One part of your answering seemed to be a little disturbed about some committee in Congress. That was not this committee, was it?

Mr. HAY. No; I never get disturbed about anything.

Mr. BROOKS. I got the impression you felt as though some committee treated you a little roughly in your testimony. This is your first time here, I take it.

Mr. HAY. No; I never even thought that. I was treated with the utmost of courtesy. I may have dealt roughly with the committee, but they did not with me.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, that is fine.

Mr. SHORT. All congressional committees are disturbing.

Mr. HAY. No; I will tell you what I have in mind. You may have read that story that I told you of before that other committee.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I heard you.

Mr. HAY. Some newspaper reporter may have gotten the idea that I was throwing off on the committee; I did not mean to do that.

Mr. BROOKS. You felt that Congress was negligent in not legislating more promptly, and I wondered then why no mention was made of the fact that your chief had advised this committee not to take up the bills that we were considering when you appeared here .

Mr. HAY. No. Now, let me get straight just what I had in mind.

Mr. BROOKS. I wish you would, Judge Hay.

Mr. HAY. What I had in mind was this: I said before the Mead committee, when there was a question then raised as to whether or not there should be legislation: "If there is to be prompt legislation, I

think it would be helpful, but if there is to be prolonged discussion and the ultimate upshot of it is no legislation, then I think it would be worse than if we did not talk about legislation at all."

Mr. THOMASON. That is the very reason I asked you, Judge, if you would not submit your amendment as soon as possible, because the committee has to start reading this bill in the next 2 or 3 days.

Mr. BROOKS. You knew, Judge, that Mr. McNutt had advised in other hearings that he was not prepared to recommend action. You knew that; did you not?

Mr. HAY. Yes; I heard him say it.

Mr. BROOKS. I want to ask you then about this process of priority referral to which you have just made reference.

In some sections I have noticed—an employee may leave my section, for instance, and go out to the Pacific coast and get employment, and after he has been there 30 days his employer sends word back for a priority referralship, and the War Manpower Commission then grants it on the basis of the 30-day service which is unauthorized on the Pacific coast.

What would you say about that method of priority referral?

Mr. HAY. We tried to get the utmost consistency we could between the regions—I think there are many irregularities which have resulted in our system not working as perfectly as we would like to have it work, and I think that would be an example of it.

However, when a man goes from one region to another, and he does not have his "clearance," as we term it, then he is held up out there, pending the time when they can communicate back.

Mr. BROOKS. He is working while he is being held up, and then the amount of work he puts in is credited against his application for a priority referral, and you use that as a basis for referral; is not that right?

Mr. HAY. I presume in some places that may be done.

Mr. BROOKS. Then in other cases I have noticed agricultural workers have gone to your offices, the U. S. E. S., and without adequately checking into their history as workers, you have referred them to war industries in remote areas. Is not that correct?

Mr. HAY. I presume that may have occurred in some cases.

Mr. BROOKS. And then in other cases, critical areas, too, I notice that the U. S. E. S. has a practice of sending men to distant points in spite of the need of those workers locally.

Mr. HAY. Well, that does——

Mr. BROOKS. What about that?

Mr. HAY. That does occur, Mr. Brooks. I will only say this: We have certain priorities, for instance the Pacific coast project with which you may be familiar, which has a priority over every other employment in this country. We are recruiting everywhere for workers for that great secret project out there, and that makes it necessary to take some workers, even in tight areas. We find that in some of these tight areas, here are men who, although exposed to local jobs which are done first, prefer to take the jobs out on the west coast.

Mr. BROOKS. In other words, that works this way: That you have recruiters in a critical area, recruiting people for very distant points. Is there no way to avoid that situation?

Mr. HAY. We are trying to minimize that as greatly as possible. We are trying by our quota allocations of recruiting to avoid that as much as possible, but we cannot do it with respect to certain activities completely, so that we are taking a reasonable amount of workers wherever we can get them for these enterprises that our production executive committee here, representing all of the various agencies, denominates as having the highest priority of any work in the country.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, is not there some way, though, to organize your office so that you would not recruit, we will say, dairy workers, from an area where dairies are being closed down for lack of labor and send those workers out to the other areas?

Mr. HAY. I think you will find, Mr. Congressman, that there is a very small percentage that is actually recruited as compared with the quotas.

Some of our areas have found this to be true, that these recruitments under our interregional recruiting programs for men to take out of the area have stimulated so much interest in the general war effort that it has resulted in a better recruiting job for workers in local plants.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I have seen a good deal of dissatisfaction arising from causing people to go to distant points when they were needed so badly locally. If there was some way to iron that out, so that you may use the people locally, it would help your cause a lot.

Mr. HAY. I may say we are putting increasing emphasis, Mr. Brooks, upon getting everything possible out of the local community by the use of our ceiling program on less essential and all that so as to obviate that to the greatest degree.

Mr. SHORT. I have a question.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Short.

Mr. SHORT. Judge Hay, we all agree that the objective of this bill is worthy and desirable. The only difference is an honest difference of opinion as to the methods whereby we can achieve increased production. I think we will also agree that America's industrial outlook is that our war production has been almost a miracle in this modern age, and the amazing thing about it is we have done it with free labor. We have out-produced slave labor, forced labor in Germany, Italy, and Japan combined.

What I am fearful of is if we now pass legislation of this sort and jerk some fellow up from Kokomo and Seattle, down over Oshkosh, just about over the country, instead of achieving a worthy end, we will really hamper and hamstring production.

Mr. HAY. Well, Mr. Short——

Mr. SHORT. I think we will fail in our objective.

Mr. HAY. That is exactly why, Mr. Short, I am so strongly in favor of our preserving, absolutely preserving the cooperative, voluntary processes that we have now and superimposing anything else only to meet emergency situations.

Mr. SHORT. I am pleased that you have put great emphasis upon that. And I do not think that Charlie Hay at heart is too hot for this bill. I said he is one of the great.

Mr. BROOKS. Could you give us a copy of your address of Sunday night, your questions and answers?

Mr. HAY. I do not have it but I can get it for you. I have found myself interpreted differently from what I had in mind at the time, so I would like to get it.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Clason, do you have any questions?

Mr. CLASON. Judge Hay, I have a constituent who was working East and one of the pensioners of the Government, and he says, that class of men who are under a pension are in effect banned from gainful employment under penalty of forfeiture, and he says there are thousands of these skilled mechanics from the railroads and steamships and Navy and kindred branches of the service who, if their pension status could be left undisturbed, would crowd into war-production plants of the country.

I wonder if anyone has looked into that question to see if there are Government pensioners who are refraining from going into employment because they fear the effect upon their status as pensioners?

Mr. HAY. I have not looked into it. Miss Lotwin may have. She is, may I say, one of the best lawyers in Washington.

Mr. THOMASON. Would you like to supply that for the record?

Miss LOTWIN. Mr. Chairman, under the provisions of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Act, if an individual is entitled to a pension and earns in any one month $15 or more, he loses his pension for that month.

Mr. CLASON. But the Government pension is going much higher than that, under railroad retirement and these other services and I am wondering if anyone in the Government has made an effective check on that situation to find out if there are not thousands of skilled mechanics and engineers who would be available for duty if allowed to retain their pensions.

Miss LOTWIN. I think that the Social Security Board can submit to you the figures on that.

Mr. CLASON. They are not under social security, they work in Government arsenals, shipyards, and railroads.

Mr. HAY. We may be able to give you a memorandum on that.

Mr. CLASON. I wish you would.

Another thing I have in mind is this: I do believe and I understood that the Government officials believe that the unions have done a fine job in securing production in various plants and I would like to know whether you have contacted any of the union officials to see how they feel about this particular legislation.

Mr. THOMASON. I understand, Mr. Clason, that the representatives of organized labor will testify before the committee on Friday for themselves.

Mr. CLASON. Then I would like to ask you this, sir—well, have you contacted them about this bill?

Mr. HAY. No; I have not.

Mr. CLASON. Will you tell us whether or not the turn-over in Government arsenals and shipyards, how that compares with the turnover in privately owned plants manufacturing similar goods.

Mr. HAY. In the shipyards we have had an unusually high turn-over.

Mr. CLASON. In the Government ones? I say, compare the Government ones with the ones which are run by private officials.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Collis Stocking. In Government shipyards, how does the turn-over compare with private shipyards?

Mr. STOCKING. The turn-over in the Government shipyards as a general proposition is about the same as it is in private establishments for similar work.

Mr. CLASON. As a matter of fact, Government plants pay less to some degree than those run by private industry, is that not right?

Mr. STOCKING. That is true, but at the same time, the Government establishments have vacation rights, and other considerations that may be interpreted as substantially equalizing the rates of pay.

Mr. CLASON. As a matter of fact, all of these Government rights cause all of these people who go into Government employment today for temporary employment are of little value, are they not?

Mr. STOCKING. I was thinking particularly of vacations with pay which are generally longer in Government service than in private service, and certain sick leaves that are enjoyed in Government service that are not regularly enjoyed in private service.

Mr. CLASON. Well, as a matter of fact, Government employees are not being given vacations at the present time with pay in most plants where they are busily engaged, is not that true?

Mr. STOCKING. That is true but they accumulate the vacation rights so that they are enabled to take it——

Mr. CLASON. Thousands of them have already obtained their full limit of 90 days of accumulated leave and they secure no rights whatsoever, is that not true?

Mr. STOCKING. Well, I think that is true, Mr. Congressman, but I think that in view of the fact that so many of them are temporary employments, and it takes about 3 years to accumulate the full 90 days' vacation rights, and they get currently certain sick leave rights as Government employees.

Mr. CLASON. Well, do not the people in private industry also get vacations with pay and also sick leave?

Mr. STOCKING. They do, but you do not have the same uniform pattern. It varies from industry to industry and it is generally not as extensive as those permitted in the Government service.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, I would like to ask one more question of the Judge.

Judge Hay, you brought up the proposition that because you felt that the war with Germany or in Europe might end during 1944, or shortly thereafter, therefore you did not think legislation would be necessary.

I would like to have you tell the committee what effect on the manpower question you believe the cessation of hostilities with Germany and other European countries would have? What effect would it have on the manpower question?

Mr. HAY. In some respects Mr. Clason, I think our situation would be more difficult than at the present time, and others not so difficult.

We would not have as great demands for great war production, but with the resumption that there might come, then, of civilian production, it might be more difficult to hold men in war jobs and to get them into the war jobs in which they were needed than at the present time.

Mr. CLASON. You think, then, legislation of this type would be necessary if Germany should capitulate?

Mr. HAY. Oh, I do not know; perhaps it would be helpful.

Chairman MAY. Is that not pretty speculative right now?

Mr. HAY. It is just an emergency. You say it would be absolutely necessary. I do not know about that. I think it would be perhaps helpful in the respects that I mentioned a moment ago. I think it would tend to hold people in war jobs of this class.

Mr. CLASON. Well, you based your opinion formerly on that very proposition, did you not?

Mr. HAY. Well, I am basing it on it now.

Mr. CLASON. Well, I understood you to say you did not think previously that the legislation was necessary.

Mr. HAY. I do not know whether I said—that I did not think it was necessary. I sincerely thought last summer that we were going to see this thing through, and do a reasonably adequate job under the system that we have, and I will say to you frankly, we might be able to do it even without the legislation now, but I think it advisable because of the extreme urgency of the war, to take no chances on it, and legislation of this kind, I think, would be helpful and advisable.

Chairman MAY. Any further questions? Mr. Martin, do you have any questions?

Mr. MARTIN. Judge Hay, under this power of compulsory assignment which has been discussed here today, does the War Manpower Commission ask the granting of power to force the worker to work for any specific private plant or private employer?

Mr. HAY. I do not quite get that, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you advocate granting power to force a worker to work for any specific private plant or private employer, or do you advocate, on the other hand, their compulsory assignment to an industry or to an enterprise?

Mr. HAY. Well, I would say this: I think the first aspect of legislation I mentioned a moment ago, that is, a statutory validating of our referral system, giving greater force to our referring men to a choice of jobs, would be very, very helpful.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you go further?

Mr. HAY. Well, I think perhaps out of abundance of caution it might be advisable to have power to meet extreme emergencies to give the power to call up men for specific work.

Mr. MARTIN. For a private individual or plant?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. At that private individual's profit?

Mr. HAY. Oh, well, now, you are getting into the most objectionable aspects of the whole power.

Mr. MARTIN. Absolutely. I want your opinion on it.

Mr. HAY. I do not—frankly I personally do not like that aspect of it. That is my feeling about it. But I do think that we should take no chances and that we would be justified in vesting that power so that if it became necessary to use it, we would have, as Mr. Krug said, that power to use if it became necessary.

Mr. MARTIN. Would we be taking some chances of constitutionality on that point?

Mr. HAY. I do not think so.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, the next question: Once a man is inducted into this special category in the armed forces, where he is neither fish nor fowl, will it be possible to get him discharged from that category on a showing of need for a man of his skills and services in private industry and his willingness to return to them?

Mr. HAY. You mean if he got into that labor pool that we are talking about?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes; once he is inducted into this military category where he does not enjoy the rights and benefits of a military man, after he is inducted, can he be taken out of that on a showing of need for him in private industry?

Mr. HAY. Well, I would say certainly that if a man went into this labor pool who had declined to go into any other work, and he were willing to take a job then in private industry that undoubtedly there would be a ready release of him for that purpose. Do you not think so, Colonel Keesling?

That would be my thought about it.

Colonel KEESLING. May I answer the question?

Chairman MAY. Yes.

Colonel KEESLING. The committee went into that last spring and they decided that they should not advertise in advance that men that got into this would be released right away, otherwise there would be no way of getting men to go. And they would sit around and say, "Well, we will wait and see whether there will be any penalty" and the only penalty would be to get into the pool and be a 1-day veteran and get right out again.

Mr. MARTIN. It is your position, then, to freeze him there?

Colonel KEESLING. The position of the armed forces is to let him out under unusual circumstances and they certainly would, but you should not let him know that there is no penalty.

Mr. MARTIN. Another question: Is there any manpower shortage today or any increase in the shortage of manpower, I should say, in the manufacture of farm machinery as compared with 6 months ago, Judge Hay?

Mr. HAY. Let me get my agricultural expert here.

Collis, can you answer that question?

Mr. STOCKING. I do not think there is any significant difference today as to a few months ago. We will check that and give you a note on it.

Mr. MARTIN. I will be glad to know because that was the shortage, 6 months ago we were desperately short of farm machinery. It was not the shortage of material then, it was explained to me that it was a shortage of manpower in the farm machinery manufacturing plants.

Another question, Judge Hay: When did the need for nurses come strongly to your attention in this present emergency?

Mr. HAY. Oh, frankly, it has never been presented to me personally as a particular proposition; I have been hearing discussions of it for some time.

Mr. MARTIN. How long a time?

Mr. HAY. Oh, I cannot be specific. I should say the last month or two I have heard mention of it.

Mr. THOMASON. They are not covered by this bill.

Mr. MARTIN. I know, but I have got a point that is covered by the bill.

Mr. THOMASON. All right.

Mr. MARTIN. Judge Hay, you enlarged a moment ago on the matter of making statements of availability necessary for change of jobs, through the U. S. E. S. I know that operates that way. Last summer, a high-school graduate in my district took a temporary job at the Rock Island arsenal as file clerk, a job which she learned in a matter of a few days. She had scheduled to go into nurses training at Davenport in her home town. U. S. E. S. refused to give her permission to leave this temporary job in the summertime to enter nurses training September 15, and their refusal stuck until I got into the picture.

I wonder where we have been with the shortage of nurses that has now come upon us with considerable emphasis when your very machinery was the means of blocking her getting into the nurses training last September.

Mr. HAY. I am glad you got that one straightened out, anyhow.

Mr. MARTIN. Are you going to give us a green light for transfers of girls who are employed as file clerks over to nurses' training if they elect to do so?

Mr. HAY. I would say we would encourage that.

Mr. THOMASON. Mr. Elston, do you have a question?

Mr. ELSTON. Judge Hay, you say that about 150,000 men are needed at this moment.

Mr. HAY. Yes, that is our estimate of it, Mr. Elston.

Mr. ELSTON. Have you ever had that large a number before that were needed?

Mr. HAY. Oh, I would take it we have had. Mr. Stocking may be able to answer that better than I can.

Mr. STOCKING. Yes, we have had that need before. If you break down, though, by plants and types of activity, I think that this can be classified as a more critical need because of the nature of the products that are so urgently needed in war work. I mean, in war activity.

Mr. ELSTON. What is the greatest number you have had before?

Mr. STOCKING. Well, we have never had such accurate figures in the past as we are now getting, and I would have to give you the answer on the basis of my judgment rather than the actual fact.

I think that in August of last year, if you will remember, there was some expansion in the war effort and I think the figure was roughly about the same then as it is now. I might say, by way of modifying the judge's answer, that is a minimum figure of 150,000 for what we call "must" plants that are behind schedule because of lack of manpower.

Mr. ELSTON. Have you never had 150,000 before in that same category?

Mr. STOCKING. I think we probably have, but, as I say, it is only recently we got a sufficient refinement of the figure to be certain of it.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, now, you were able to cope with the problem before, were you not?

I will ask Judge Hay that question.

Mr. HAY. Well, of course, we have been able to get along. We have not been able, at any time within a certain period, to build the thing up. I think the difference, Mr. Elston, between our present situation and any situation we have ever had before is that now we need speedier action than we perhaps have needed before on account of the war situation, where they are actually using up the ammunition at the present time, and we cannot take the time to do the job that we might have taken before when the pressure was not as great as it is now.

Mr. ELSTON. Are these needs confined to a few areas or are they pretty widespread?

Mr. HAY. No; there are quite a number of areas involved. Some weeks ago, a committee representing the various agencies went to work to try to cast up the needs in what they call these critical programs, and there are certain programs, such as B–29 fortresses, heavy artillery, ammunition, tanks, air-borne radar, and others, in which it was found that there was a shortage of manpower and from all that we cast up

the needs as of the present time, to be about the figure which we have mentioned here.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, in your judgment, do you think you can get all you need out of the IV–F group that would be covered by this bill?

Mr. HAY. Well, I do not know whether we can get all of the classes of labor that we need or not. That would be a matter of speculation, I think. I do not know; of course, some of them are already in war plants. I do not know that there are any figures on how many.

Mr. ELSTON. As I take it at the present moment you are not urging a Universal Service Act? You feel that the bill before us today, H. R. 1119, plus the amendment you suggest, would be adequate?

Mr. HAY. Well, what I would like to see enacted—I manifestly have not made myself perfectly clear—what I would like to see enacted and as promptly as possible, would be this legislation in the form in which I suggested it be amended, and also a statutory, or I mean, an act of Congress that would give legislative support to the manpower program that we have.

Mr. ELSTON. That would not require a National Service Act?

Mr. HAY. Well, unless you put into it, or unless you vested this power that I mentioned a moment ago to call up men in critical situations, that would take on the aspects of national service, but it would be of national application and you might, by a little liberality, call it a National Service Act. But it is not the popular conception of a National Service Act.

Mr. ELSTON. You do not see any reason to include men up to 60, do you, and women?

Mr. HAY. Well, of course, this legislation, the second legislation I mention would include all ages and sexes. I think if I were going to lift this up to 60, I would just go ahead and pass a National Service Act and not try to transform this particular bill into a general National Service Act. I think, with respect to this group, 18 to 45, you may have some, shall we say, additional moral ground to stand on in that that is the particular group that has been selected for military service. Of course, everybody is under a moral obligation to do his best in the war effort. This particular group is under an obligation to render military service if fit. I think there is some justification for confining this to this particular group, and I think the mechanics of dealing with that may be simplified as against what it would be if you went up to, say, 60.

Mr. ELSTON. You do not see any reason to include women, do you?

Mr. HAY. Oh, I hardly think so. Not in this bill.

Mr. ELSTON. That is all.

Mr. THOMASON. Dr. Fenton, do you have any questions?

Mr. FENTON. Judge Hay, we have listened to the Assistant Secretary of War and Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and the War Production Chief, and they do not seem to favor the enactment of this bill. They would rather see it amended. I believe you suggested that an amendment was under consideration. I am just wondering whether you can give us, in plain words, the gist of that amendment?

Mr. HAY. Well, the gist of the amendment would be this: An amendment which would provide—I think Mr. Krug rather fairly stated the matter a while ago—that the selective service boards instead of assuming the burden of making the specific placement of the individuals who are called up under this system, would refer them to our

employment services so that they would make the placements consistent with our referral system that we have worked out. That is the way we think it ought to be. We think in that way we would get the benefit of the system as it has been developed and the knowledge that we have with respect to the demands of the respective industries and the fitness of the men for those industries.

Mr. FENTON. Well, Judge, are you not really doing that now? The man who wants to leave one plant has to be cleared by the eunemployment——

Mr. HAY. Oh, yes. In other words, we would like for these men to come through in the same way as other men who come in to our offices for jobs. That is our point.

For instance, if we undertake to have two agencies making specific referrals to placements, we are likely to have confusion, and we think it would be better to have the actual placements made through the one agency that has the over-all placement problem.

Mr. FENTON. What about the problem of penalties that you would impose?

Mr. HAY. The amendment that I mention?

Mr. FENTON. Yes.

Mr. HAY. That would not affect that. That would not change that. This is only as to the mechanics of the actual placements.

Mr. FENTON. That is all your amendment would do, then?

Mr. HAY. Well, you perhaps have in mind, Mr. Fenton, what I said a moment ago, that I rather share the views of Judge Patterson and Mr. Krug and Mr. Bard with respect to the penalty that should be imposed for the failure to get into war jobs.

The penalty you provide here is bringing them up and putting them into a labor pool. The penalties that they referred to were the civilian penalties of fine or imprisonment, which I think is a more direct approach to the matter, and that appeals to my reasoning.

Mr. FENTON. Is that in your amendment?

Mr. HAY. I would not offer that as an amendment. I would go along with that without that. The other, I think, is vital to doing this job.

Chairman MAY. Mrs. Luce, do you have a question?

Mrs. LUCE. Judge Hay, just to keep the record straight as between this committee and the War Manpower Commission, it is fairly simple, it is all there, a great deal of it is there; before this committee there were hundreds of thousands of words; as a matter of fact, 1,067 pages of testimony on the manpower problem in the year 1943, and by May 6, 1943, the Congress was aware of the serious manpower problem.

Now, the star witness, naturally, of all those appearances before our committee was the man in charge of manpower, Mr. Paul McNutt himself, and I turn to page 1038 of the hearing, and I asked Mr. McNutt this question:

> As you see it, you feel that if you can get, by the voluntary method, as you believe you can, by the end of 1943, 2,700,000, our manpower problem as of 1943 will have been solved; is that correct?

Mr. McNutt said, "That is correct."

Then we took up the question of the Austin-Wadsworth bill, and I asked him if, in his opinion, the passage of that bill would become essentially a drafting of women labor. Mr. McNutt said, "That is right"; so I said, "So that it is in reality a draft-women bill?" And Mr. McNutt said, "That is a part of it"; and then I went on to say—and this is a question that all the members of the committee at one time during 2 long years asked of the War Manpower Commission—I said, "Mr. McNutt, do you feel that you need any further authority—any authority which you have not got—to do your job and carry out the task assigned to your administration?"

Mr. McNutt said:

> Not at the present time. I shall come to the Congress whenever I feel that I do need it.

Mr. McNutt never came to the Congress to ask for any further authority or any legislation to enable him to do his job.

I will continue with the testimony: In your opinion, if the Wadsworth-Austin bill were passed, how long do you think it would take to set up the proper administration and to have it functioning smoothly? Mr. McNutt then went into a little discussion about what the bill was aimed at and I then said:

> Now, at some time I read in the press that you made the statement that you believed that this bill was inevitable. Have you changed your mind?

Mr. McNutt said:

> I have not changed my mind, but that "inevitable" is a question of when. It is not necessary yet. It may not be. I hope it is not. I would rather see us demonstrate on a voluntary basis.

Then I said:

> Well, then, you have changed your opinion that it is inevitable?

Mr. McNutt said:

> No; I have not changed my opinion. It all depends upon how long this war lasts. I think I was present at one meeting when we were all guessing as to how long it would last.

I said: "Inevitable means that it is necessary sooner or later." Mr. McNutt said, well, "Sometime." And I said: "Do you think this bill will be sometime necessary?"

Mr. McNutt said: "Sometime it may be necessary," and I said: "But you do not think it is inevitable?"

Mr. McNutt said:

> Well, I won't quibble over the use of the word "inevitable."

I just wanted to know whether you had changed your opinion about the Wadsworth-Austin bill, and Mr. McNutt said:

> I have a feeling, but it may be intuition more than anything else.

I then said,

> Mr. McNutt, shall we put it this way? You, Mr. McNutt, feel that you can do your job and if it goes along as you think it will, it will not be necessary?

Mr. McNutt said, "Yes."

I said,

> Therefore, if you do your job it will not be inevitable?

Mr. McNutt said "I won't argue with you about that."

Now, in the time that has passed, Mr. McNutt did appear before this committee for legislation very similar to that under discussion today which is being discussed in the subcommittee. The chairman of the

committee, every other member of this committee who had a crack at Mr. McNutt, tried to get from him a direct statement as to whether, in the autumn of last year, he felt that this legislaion was desirable, inevitable, necessary, proper, useful. Mr. McNutt said in effect, he was asking for no legislation, he needed no legislation; legislation was entirely up to the Congress.

This committee took, and I believe what is a proper point of view, that the man in charge of our war manpower problems was the man to advise this committee as to the war manpower situation and that if he thought no legislation was necessary and refused to say so, that it was not beholden on the part of us to pass such legislation in the absence of facts on the war-manpower situation and in the absence of any urging from him.

Now, that was the situation between the War Manpower Commission and this committee.

Now, in the absence of Mr. McNutt, during what has become another war-manpower crisis, he being away, I gather from the papers—on the battlefield—in your opinion, when he returns, will he think this legislation has at last become inevitable?

Mr. HAY. Mrs. Luce, may I make just this observation before I answer your question? You were not in here a while ago, were you, when some one suggested that we let bygones be bygones?

Mrs. LUCE. I am perfectly willing to let the bygones be bygones, providing we do not hear, on the radio, that it was this committee which forstalled legislation on a matter so vital to victory.

Mr. HAY. Well, are you referring to anything that I said on the radio?

Mrs. LUCE. What I gathered you had said, sir.

Mr. HAY. No; I did not make any such statement as that on the radio.

Mrs. LUCE. I am used to being misquoted myself, so——

Mr. HAY. Well, I frankly do not always know what I say, and I scarcely ever remember what I say, but I do not think I said that. I never thought so. I said, perhaps you were absent when I said a while ago that the only thing that I said to the committee, and what I said behind the committee's back I am willing to say to the committee's face, the only thing I said with respect to the committee with respect to legislation was that I thought the mere discussion of legislation would divert attention from the job we have at hand, and if no legislation is enacted, it might not be fruitful.

Mrs. LUCE. But if Mr. McNutt is not here to discuss it, we may be able to proceed.

Mr. HAY. But getting down to your question whether Mr. McNutt will think it is inevitable or not, not to bandy words with you, but I might say that if, in his absence, you should enact legislation, I should think he would say it has been inevitable.

Mrs. LUCE. May I say, Judge Hay, that is precisely the position which I feared Mr. McNutt would put us into.

Mr. HAY. Well, I frankly think this, I do not know, I presume you, Mrs. Luce, brilliant as you are, I have winced much under your brilliance as a member of the opposite party—off the record—I should say this, I should think Mr. McNutt is a realist. I know he has courage. It sometimes perhaps takes more courage to announce a change of mind than adherence to a position. He has been to the battlefront, you have been to the battlefront. I have no doubt that when he gets back, he would welcome any additional legislation to assist in doing this job. I would, we all would. My own personal opinion, as I said a while ago, and I do not say this to evade anything, is that we might be able to do this job without any additional legislation. We might not. I do not think we are in a position now when we can afford to take any chances. I think this legislation would be helpful.

Mrs. LUCE. I thought so, sir, a year ago.

Mr. HAY. Well, let me agree with you now, will you, and I think it would be helpful; I think certainly legislation that gives statutory validity to a program, developed through the earnest efforts of more than five or six thousand high-classed men of this country, would be helpful. I know—I was not born yesterday—I know there has been a lot of criticism. There has been criticism, perhaps, of Mr. McNutt. But I want to say this: When you damn this manpower program, or criticize it, you are not simply criticizing Paul McNutt, you are criticizing the efforts of as high-classed businessmen, labor men, farmers, as there are in the country who have given their best thinking to try to work out a voluntary cooperative manpower program.

Mrs. LUCE. Judge Hay, may I interrupt? I am not criticizing the War Manpower Commission. I am merely trying to defend this committee which also has tried with all its heart and all its will to see that the voluntary program was carried out, and as one Member of Congress who has, with all the other Members, been on the battle fronts, we become unduly sensitive to the fact that Congress tends to become the scapegoat for anything that goes wrong, a tendency which is by no means always averted by other branches of the Government.

Mr. HAY. Mrs. Luce, you and I disagree radically on some things. You do not know me from Adam's off ox, but I know you pretty well. I have followed your speeches and I have enjoyed them.

Mrs. LUCE. Could we take this off the record?

Mr. HAY. Oh, let me compliment you on the record, won't you?

Mrs. LUCE. With 3 years to go, there can be no harm.

Mr. HAY. I say this, I agree with you thoroughly—while we have disagreed on some things—I agree with you thoroughly that perhaps in Government there is too much disposition to say the other fellow is responsible. I started to say we bureaucrats but I am not a bureaucrat. If I am, I am a spurious variety. I am just an ordinary country lawyer who wandered into St. Louis and conducted the largest nonpaying practice of any lawyer in Missouri, and I just came over here to try to help do a job. I have done my best. And I think Mr. McNutt is doing the best he can. I think you Members of Congress are doing the best that you can, and if there is one thing on which we ought to have a moratorium until the war is over, it is the disposition not to look for something to criticize destructively, and to look for opportunities to cooperate with one another.

That applies within the Government departments and as between Government downtown and on the Hill. If we are not careful, we might indulge in so much criticism of one another, so palsy our efforts, that we lose the precious right to criticize each other, which is a great right.

Mr. BROOKS. Judge Hay, in the light of that, won't you give us a copy of your speech at Chicago?

(Chairman May returns to chair.)

Chairman MAY. Mr. Johnson, do you have any questions?

Mr. BROOKS. I am serious about it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Judge Hay, you are only talking for the Manpower Commissioner, are you not?

Mr. HAY. What is that?

Mr. JOHNSON. You are representing the Manpower Commission, that is what you are here for?

Mr. HAY. That is what I understand I am.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, anyhow, here is what I want to ask you: You think the present bill is wrong because, on the face of it, it purports to get men in the Army but the real purpose is not to get them in the Army but into industry.

Mr. HAY. I would not say the objective of the bill is wrong, and I would say I would go along with that if that is the judgment of the committee—I would have to go along with it—but I do think it is a more candid, forthright approach to name this thing what it is.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well now, let me ask you the next question: Do you think we ought to provide you with a bill specifically, when men are put on a critical war job, that they cannot leave without the permission of the War Manpower Commission, assuming that they are capable of working?

Mr. HAY. No; I would not go that far.

Mr. JOHNSON. How far would you go? We are trying to find out just how far you want to go to freeze men on the job.

Mr. HAY. Well, you are dealing here, in this bill, with the placement of men—well, for instance, here is a man who is in a war job now and who leaves a war job. Of course, you could provide in the bill for a penalty if he left the job without good reason.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you believe in that now? I want to find out.

Mr. HAY. Well, frankly, I think that is a more candid approach to the situation than the present system set up here, although I would not make that a point of difference.

Mr. JOHNSON. Another question: Do you believe we should provide in this bill that the Manpower Commission should have the power to place men in jobs and if they refuse to do so, then they shall be punished?

Mr. HAY. Well, I would not go that far as to the regular system. Under our present system, we do not refer to a specific job. We give a man a choice of jobs. They are hiring controls, really. I would prefer to see that system validated, which would mean this, that if an employer hires a man in violation of our program, then he could be punished for that. A man is given a choice of several priority jobs. If he does not take those jobs, he goes unemployed until he consents to take some job in war activities. I would preserve the present system insofar as our——

Mr. JOHNSON. As I understand your viewpoint, when once you get him in a job and he leaves it without your permission, then you want sanctions applied. You want fines.

Mr. HAY. I would not not go that far as to the universal application of it; no.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, just how do you propose—I have a big navy yard in my district and there is a group of men walking in and 1 walking out, 38 a month, 10 percent at 38 a month, 10 percent a month. How are you going to hold those men on those jobs? Just tell us that.

Mr. HAY. Well, I think this: Under the present system a man can walk out; that is, some of them walk out without a statement of availability and get jobs elsewhere. I would provide a penalty.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what?

Mr. HAY. For a man—I would provide a penalty of a fine for an employer who accepts the man without a statement of availability, and you might even go further and penalize the man for accepting the job in violation of that program.

Mr. JOHNSON. But he could, according to your idea, he could walk out and he would not be punished until he went to another job without a statement of availability; is that correct?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. So you would place him in the job and he would have the power, the inherent power to walk out without any sanctions; is that correct?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. And the check would be when he went to get another job, then you would catch up with him and catch up with the other employer?

Mr. HAY. That is the way the system operates at the present time and if you validated that system by legislation it would still operate that way.

Mr. JOHNSON. Why cannot Selective Service handle that?

Mr. HAY. It is not so much a question of who invokes the penalty. We would not be able to impose the penalty. That would have to be by the civil court. My only point is——

Mr. JOHNSON. Why cannot the Selective Service group who has that man's card and record and everything about him, why cannot they handle it instead of having it referred to you when you come into the picture?

Mr. HAY. It is because we have built up, through the cooperation of the War Production Board in their local areas and our War Manpower Commission, what we think is a rather intelligent system of selection of the urgent war activities and the priorities with respect to the jobs, in relation to importance.

Mr. JOHNSON. One more question and that will be all. Do you think the provision in there about this work group, I have forgotten the name of it, should be eliminated, or would you let it stay in?

Mr. HAY. You could let it stay or go onto the other theory just as you like.

Mr. JOHNSON. In other words, that would be a different kind of a penalty?

Mr. HAY. That is a penalty as you now have it in the bill. If you want to leave it in, I will not raise any objection to that score.

Mr. JOHNSON. You would have two penalties on there, one is that he goes into a work battalion and the other is if he went to another job without the certificate he could be punished?

Mr. HAY. That would be under the other legislation. Under this particular bill, if you leave in your work battalion that provides your only penalty.

68175—45——6

Mr. JOHNSON. But the view of the Manpower Commission, as you presented it, is that you prefer to have a direct bill where a man who left the job and went to another job and did not have a certificate, would be punished?

Mr. HAY. That has to do with the other legislation I am referring to. I mean the legislation underwriting our present program.

Mr. JOHNSON. With penalties?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is your preference?

Mr. HAY. Yes; as over-all legislation.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the preference of the Manpower Commission?

Mr. HAY. Well, I would take that along with this bill.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, would you have them both in the bill, then?

Mr. HAY. Not in this particular bill.

Mr. JOHNSON. You would have two bills, then?

Mr. HAY. I think you would have to have a different bill, in addition to this.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right.

Chairman MAY. Thank you very much, Judge Hay.

We will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning when Colonel Keesling will be the witness.

(Whereupon, at 5:30 p. m., an adjournment was taken to reconvene Thursday, January 11, 1945, at 10 a. m.)

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee on Military Affairs met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Thomason, Kilday, Durham, Philbin, Stewart, Winstead, Andrews, Clason, Thomas, Elston, Fenton, and J. Leroy Johnson of California.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

We continue our hearings this morning on H. R. 1119.

The witness is Col. Francis V. Keesling, Jr., of the Selective Service System. Colonel, will you come around, please, sir?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, the committee would like to have you give us your judgment and views on this legislation, just as briefly as you can, and if you will, we would like to have you explain the bill, what is intended to do, what it will do, what the results of it will be, and whether or not it accomplishes the purposes intended.

STATEMENT OF COL. FRANCIS V. KEESLING, JR., SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Colonel KEESLING. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to say that what has already transpired here and what is now transpiring here is, in my opinion, an example of what can be accomplished by proper coordination among the executive departments and between the executive departments and the Congress, as the result of the committee's direction.

This bill follows the recommendations of the House Committee on Military Affairs, made last spring. Those recommendations were subsequently incorporated in the first Bailey-Brewster bill.

So as to have no misunderstanding about the situation, the Senate committee invited Chairman May, Congressman Costello, and Mrs. Luce to be present at the first hearings on the Bailey-Brewster bill in the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Represenatives of three departments of the Government: Mr. Bard, Mr. Patterson, General Hershey, and I were also present.

At that hearing, the question was asked by Senator Brewster of Judge May and Congressman Costello, as to whether or not the first Bailey-Brewster bill was in accordance with the recommendations of the House Committee on Military Affairs, they responded that it was.

Mrs. Luce was asked whether or not she was in agreement with the Bailey-Brewster bill, whether it incorporated her ideas in general. She anwered that the bill did.

In answer to the question asked by Senator Brewster, Mr. Bard, Mr. Patterson, and General Hershey answered that they supported the first Bailey-Brewster bill, provided that national service appeared not to be in the immediate offing.

So much for the background. This bill we are now considering incorporates the recommendations of the House committee as of that time, and of the first Bailey-Brewster bill, with some perfecting modifications so as to eliminate certain misunderstandings that existed on the part of labor and management and others.

I believe it would be well to proceed with an analysis of the bill itself.

The first portion of the bill provides a means of stabilizing those who are already in class II, whether they are in class II–A, B, or C; that is, whether they are deferred by reason of their industrial occupation or whether by reason of their occupation on the farms.

This first provision of the bill is in compliance with the House committee's recommendation. Following that recommendation, the Selective Service System, last spring, set up new classfications within class II, known as class II–AF, II–BF and II–CF, into which would be placed those class IV–F registrants who were working in essential war work. Such reclassifications were directed by the Director of Selective Service, and there are now, in those classifications, approximately 1,000,000 men.

However, the War and Navy Departments decided that they did not desire to induct any man who was in class II–A, B, or C–F, who left his occupation without first getting the approval of his Selective Service local board, for the reason that they believed induction into the armed forces was a benefit rather than a penalty; that it would be making a dishonor of induction into the armed forces.

The armed services indicated, however, in the course of the hearings on the legislation, and before the House Committee on Military Affairs, that if they were granted legislative authority to curtail the benefits, so that this service would not be the same service as that performed by other members of the military forces, and that the men inducted would not be in the same status and would not get the same benefits as other members of the military forces, that they would be willing to proceed on that basis.

They believed that that would make it a penalty rather than a benefit. That was the basis upon which they supported the first Bailey-Brewster bill. However, as the committee is well aware, the Bailey-Brewster bill was not reported from the Senate Committee on Military Affairs. Apparently the optimism of the times and other reasons resulted in action not being taken at that particular moment.

However, we have now reached a different situation, which requires the doing of something in order to guarantee the winning of the war at the earliest possible moment. So we have picked up where we left off last spring, it appears to me.

Recently, at the request of Justice Byrnes, General Hershey issued instructions to his local boards to induct, or to forward for induction, any man classified in class II, regardless of his physical disqualifications, with certain exceptional limitations, who left his occupation without first getting the approval of his Selective Service local board.

Pursuant also to the request of Justice Byrnes, the War Department has recently determined to induct such physically disqualified men who shift without first getting the authority of their local board. So we have now proceeded one step further. Last spring, Selective Service carried out the House committee's recommendation to set up these new classifications. We set up those classifications, but it would do no good for us to send to the induction station men who left their jobs without first getting the authority of the local boards if the Army would not induct them.

Now, however, the second step, also carrying out the House committee's recommendation, has been taken by the armed forces. They will induct these men.

The third step, to be consistent, must follow. That is, legislation authorizing the curtailment of the benefits of these men, in order to be consistent and carry out the House committee's recommendation as incorporated in the first Bailey-Brewster bill, and as incorporated in the first section of this bill. Otherwise, men who violate and are inducted in the milltary forces will be in exactly the same status as men honorably inducted into the military forces.

That may not be so important at this moment, Mr. Chairman, when men are being killed and wonded in great numbers, because men think twice before they elect to trade places with those men, when they can stay as free men, in their own jobs. They think twice now. But are they going to think twice when we get over this hump and again are in the optimistic situation we were in some months back? When we had numbers of over-age men volunteering, many thought that if they then got into the armed forces, there was not much risk of being hurt, and that they could thereafter be considered as veterans, and could, thereafter, have all of the benefits of veterans.

Mr. Chairman, that time will come again, unless we prevent it. It is my opinion that we should be completely selective and take in, or permit to go in, only those whom, in the scheme of things, we should take in. If we do not authorize the curtailment of those benefits, when we get back into this period of optimism, the induction into the armed forces, or the threat, let us say, of induction into the armed forces, will be exactly what these men want. Many of these men will actually leave their war jobs so that they can get into the armed forces.

When I reach the second portion of the bill, which covers the men whom we desire to have go from nonwar work to war work, the same thing will be true. If the local board requiests a man to respond voluntarily to his duty by reason of his age and, particularly, his status, he will think. What will he think? "What happens if I do not comply with this request?" "I have nothing to lose by staying where I am. I am getting more money." "They may never come around to pick me up."

"If they do, what is the situation?" "I become a member of the armed forces, with all the honor and with all the benefits."

So, actually, the first two steps that we have taken, without the third step, will aggravate the situation right at the time when it is going to be hardest to hold the line on stabilization and keep men from leaving the plants.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me present, if I may, a situation that I visualize will exist after we get over this hump, and when we get back

into this period of optimism again. The experience that we had before, during the last war, will not be applicable unless both wars are over simultaneously. If the Japanese phase of the war, and the German phase of the war are over simultaneously, Mr. Chairman, then, as Judge Hay has pointed out, we might be able to get through without unnecessarily prolonging the war.

But, even he indicated that that was a gamble that we could not take.

But, there is another point, where you will find no experience from looking back to the last war. If the German war be over before the Japanese war, and you start in having 30 to 40 percent reduction in war production, and veterans start coming home in increasing numbers, and there is no proper, fair program, which will induce men to remain in the individual plant or shipyard in which they are working, do you think that they are going to stay in those shipyards and plants when they see men and women leaving the plants that you properly cut back as a result of contract terminations? And, when they see the veterans returning home, as they will? If you have a proper program, and if you do not penalize them for being patriotic by staying there, as the vast majority of them will do under a fair and proper program, they will stay.

If you put all of the personnel in a given plant or shipyard on the same status and same basis, I believe you can go into these plants and ask the personnel of each plant: "Are you willing to stay in this plant for the duration, or until such earlier time as, under a proper, orderly contract termination program, your production will have been completed?"

I agree with our business leaders and labor leaders and leaders in the Government, that the vast majority would respond and say, "Yes." But there would be a proviso:

Provided everybody else in the plant is in the same boat. The very few in the plant, the fringe, who, if there is no proper program, or restraints, would run off to get the jobs of the patriotic fellows who are willing to remain there, or to get out when competition is not so strong for jobs, to pick up the best available nonwar jobs, must be prevented from doing that.

The philosophy, Mr. Chairman, of any program, be it voluntary or be it implemented by penalty of some sort, must, I believe, sir, be on that approach. This bill, in my opinion, both the first section, that is, the turn-over curtailment feature section, and the second which, on a selective basis, would implement that by requesting persons to leave nonwar jobs on a selective basis to go into these plants, recognizes very definitely the magnificent job, generally speaking, that management and labor have performed already.

It recognizes that the vast majority of people are patriotic, provided we do not penalize them, penalize the patriotic and permit the unpatriotic and shirker, who leaves to benefit at their expense. This bill will protect the patriotic. There is no compulsion asserted over them. They are not taken and placed into a corps, or into the Army, or anything else. Those men we perhaps could consider as being already honorary members of an Army and Navy maintenance corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, let me interrupt you there for the purpose of having you clear up one thing or one impression that I get from your testimony. You speak of two groups of men: One, the

honorably inducted, and the other, the dishonorably inducted. Now, this legislation relates to a group of men who have been classified as IV–F, and so forth.

I believe that those men are not responsible for their classification, and that they should not be classified as unpatriotic or anything of that kind. I think you mean to confine your statement here to the men, irrespective of what group they are in, who refuse to take jobs, or who, after taking a job, want to wander around and go from one job to another.

Colonel KEESLING. Exactly, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want that clear.

Colonel KEESLING. And that is a misunderstanding that should very definitely be cleared up in the minds of all the people. This bill recognizes all of these things I have been talking about. This bill will remove the stigma that has been placed on all of the deferred and rejected registrants, for this reason: I will show you later on a chart a break-down of the number of men who are affected by the first portion of this bill, that is the number of men who are already patriotically doing their job in the war effort. I will then show you a chart showing the number of men who are in class IV–F, who have not yet been classified as having gone into the war effort, and I will also show you, on the same chart, the men who are between the ages of 38 and 45. By being selective with respect to those whom we are going to ask to do their patriotic duty by leaving their present nonwar work to go to war work, we are not going to go out and indiscriminately recruit, regiment, and put a stigma on all the deferred men. No; we will be specific. We will first stop the turn-over, on the basis that we have already indicated here. There will, then, under the second provision of this bill, be a certification by Justice Byrnes to the Director of Selective Service, and I read:

> The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion shall certify to the Director of Selective Service from time to time the manpower requirements of war or war-supporting plants and activities within each industrial area, which (shortages), after consultation with the appropriate officials of management, labor, and Government, he determines—

this is Justice Byrnes—

> he determines will not be met by stabilizing manpower in the manner hereinabove provided—

that is under the first provision of the bill—

> and by voluntary recruiting by management, labor, and Government.

In other words, after you induce these men to patriotically remain in the war plants and shipyards where they are now, and you close the back gate of theoss plants as you would the floodgates of a reservoir, you wait a little while to determine whether those reservoirs or plants, through normal intake, will fill up. Anybody who comes in, under the stabilization program, will, of course, be stabilized, and cannot leave without first getting the authority of his local selective-service board. Now, that, in itself, will reduce manpower requirements and shortages to a minimum. It will permit us to be specific.

Justice Byrnes will get this information, through appropriate agencies of the Government, as to which plants, which foundries, which mines, which activities in the war effort are short how many men right

at this particular moment, without having to throw in this tremendous loading factor of turn-over to the extent that it has been thrown in.

He will then make a determination, after consulting with the appropriate private enterprise men in that area, and governmental officials, as to whether they will be able to fill these requirements within this reasonable, specified period of time through the voluntary means. Then, when circumstances are such as would require labor and management to come to the Army and say, "We must have some of your able-bodied regulars to come and do stevedoring, emergency farm harvesting, canning," and so forth. That has been done before, and they are doing it continually when they cannot solve their manpower requirements by voluntary recruitment methods. This bill is no different, in that respect. Only when the circumstances are such as that will Justice Byrnes decide that he must call upon the Director of Selective Service to furnish him some men.

All right, now getting back to your point, Chairman May. At that time, is the Selective Service System going out to say, "Everybody that is in IV–F, that is not in a war job, is a shirker? Every man 38 to 45 is a slacker and a shirker. Every woman is a slacker and a shirker."

Why no. This bill provides as follows:

The Director of Selective Service shall maintain an inventory of all deferred registrants by age groups, and by other status, within each age group.

By occupation, whether he is single, whether he has a family, what his physical status is; all that confidential information is now in the hands of the local selective-service boards. It is very confidential information. Criminal records, moral records; that is information that we do not permit to get out into the hands of anybody but the man's own selective-service local board.

Now, proceeding:

Upon receiving this certification, for a particular area, the Director of Selective Service shall designate the categories—

the types of men—

by age and other status of deferred registrants between the ages of 18 and 45—

The liability is broad, but the application is selective, the same as we operated it under the Selective Service System when we were taking men for the armed forces, depending upon the demand would depend the category we would call upon, sir.

which estimates contain sufficient numbers of persons who are capable—

again your mental, physical, occupational qualifications—

of performing the work involved.

You have already had a certification of the individual plant, the foundry, the mine, the lumber industry, canning, farms, that have to have these men.

Mr. STEWART. Let me ask you a question there. You have management and labor and Government, why would agricultural not be in there, too?

Colonel KEESLING. It is contemplated they would be in there, sir, and if there is any doubt, an amendment should be made to cover that, sir.

Mr. STEWART. Thank you.

Colonel KEESLING. Point 1:

Who are capable of performing the work involved.

Point 2:

Who are not engaged in services designated by the Director of Selective Service as contributing to the war effort or as being in the war effort.

Now, at that point, the standards do not have to be the same for each type of man. If it is necessary to press men out into class IV–F, the standard for class 2 can be tightened on the young, single men, and made more liberal, as you proceed up through the various types of men of the older ages, and family status, where men are in positions where they do have high seniority and pension rights.

Mr. THOMAS. Who is going to determine that liberality?

Colonel KEESLING. The policies will be prescribed, as they have been for occupational deferment, sir, by the Director of Selective Service, of course, with the full cooperation of the other agencies of the Government. We have always called upon the other agencies of the Government, sir. The President is the head of the Selective Service, sir.

Mr. THOMAS. Is he going to determine it then?

Colonel KEESLING. The President has delegated his authority, under section 10, to the Director of Selective Service.

Mr. KILDAY. He cannot delegate it to anyone else, can he?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. We fixed that in the last amendment, Public Law 197.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Now, in answer to your point, Mr. Thomas, section 10 (a) (4) provides as follows:

The President is authorized—

the President has delegated his authority to the Director of Selective Service, and dropping down to the fourth authorization—

to utilize the services of any or all departments and any and all officers or agents of the United States, and to accept the services of all officers and agents of the several States, Territories, and the District of Columbia, and subdivisions thereof in the execution of this Act.

Pursuant to that provision, the Director of Selective Service already has an agreement outstanding, with respect to job placement for veterans, which comes, to a certain extent, within the authority of the Director of Selective Service. He has an agreement whereby the U. S. E. S. in the getting of new jobs for veterans, will be used to the maximum extent of their offices, their capacities, and their capabilities, but not beyond that extent.

Mr. THOMAS. On that point, did you see the statement made yesterday, which appeared in this morning's Philadelphia Inquirer, made by one of the heads of the draft boards, selective service boards in Philadelphia, to the effect that there was no cooperation between the U. S. E. S. and the Selective Service.

Colonel KEESLING. No; I did not see that.

Mr. THOMAS. And the War Manpower Commission? I will read that to you later on and put it in the record.

Colonel KEESLING. I did not see that, sir. I am very hopeful that we will get the maximum cooperation under Justice Byrnes in that respect. I think we can. There has been some misunderstanding that

has been unfortunate and I think we can work it out. Under this agreement I mentioned which had to do with placement of veterans, where there were no U. S. E. S. offices, but where there were selective service offices, why, of course, you could not do anything else, if you consider it objectively, but use the selective service local board. You did not have any other facilities. I will show you a chart later on which shows the distribution of our 6,500 local boards. They are a going concern. In many places, you have U. S. E. S. offices, and where they are there, of course, there must be the closest of cooperation, and I believe that Justice Byrnes will proprly bring that about, sir.

Getting back to the bill, the first two points were (1) must be capable of performing the work; point 2, who are not engaged in these essential activities, and now, point 3—

Who are by reason—

and this is most important—

of their status, the type of persons he deems can transfer to other work, with the least disruption to the civilian economy and to themselves, in comparison with persons in other categories.

Now, who are such persons?

The last point is very important, because I visualize that if you do have to ask anybody to make a sacrifice; that is, go to work that is unattractive, go to the foundry, who should you ask to go? Well, if this inventory shows that, for example, in the San Francisco area, after you stop turn-over, after you have done everything there locally and in the Government, as determined by Justice Byrnes, to fill the shortage and vacancies, you have, let us take a hypothetical case, 5,000 places for which because the work is rather unattractive and hard, you cannot get persons to volunteer. Until we abolish the so-called voluntary system of getting men for the armed forces, we had the finger of scorn and the white feather put on men whom we did not want to go into the armed forces and who, in the scheme of things, should not go in, when young, single physically qualified men, 18 years of age, would sit back and say, "Yes, I hope these patriotic fellows who are old and have families and are in important positions in the community with large pension rights and seniority, will leave all that and go into the armed forces, because, if they do, then I can sit back and I cannot only be out of the war, but I can go and take their job over."

The same thing is true here. For the same reason we had to adopt a selective system to get men for the armed forces, we must do so to get the right men on a fair and selective basis for war work. The Director of Selective Service would go to his State director and ask him to analyze the local board rosters to ascertain how many men are between, for example, 18 and 23, or 18 and 26, single, in that community, who are not already doing something that is important for the war effort, yet who are physically and mentally qualified to go into that specific plant, and so forth. By being selective we would confine our actions to a very few, and would remove the stigma from the many millions who need not and should not be affected.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, let me interrupt you here for a question. I notice in the papers that Judge Byrnes has ordered a reduction of the fuel allocations here, and something about schools maybe having to suspend on account of the shortage of coal, and I notice

also that the coal operators and the representatives of the workers are meeting here for the purpose of determining questions of production, and in connection with that, have agreed to work on Sunday, or are going to work on Sunday. A 7-day week, in other words.

Now, let us assume that in a coal field, that a man is a mechanic on a locomotive in the mine, or a cutting machine in the mines, and he is a specialist in his work. Who in that community would determine whether he shall be called under ths bill, which is nothing more nor less than a national service act as applicable to those included in it. Who determines whether that man ought to be pulled loose from that machine and taken somewhere else?

Colonel KEESLING. The same board that deferred him.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, that board—for instance, I happen to know of one down in my area, and I think others are doing it, that is just calling them by numbers, regardless of whether they are essential or nonessential, and sending them all to the induction center, and then they have got to appeal and set out all this stuff to a local appeal board.

Why can you not set up some system whereby they would leave these men at work and not take them out of the job until they go through this process of 10 or 15 days of delay?

Colonel KEESLING. It all depends, Judge May, again, on the selective processes. The armed forces have said that they must have the men under 26; that it is much more essential to have them in the armed forces than in industry. They have set up an interagency committee, sir, which determines the very few and exceptional cases where men under 26 should be deferred.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the policy of the Army and Navy, then, is to put everybody under 26, regardless of their essentiality in an industry, into the armed services and everybody above 26 into work plants, is that the idea?

Colonel KEESLING. With but very few exceptions. The tests for deferment are much more strict on the men of the lower-age groups who are physically qualified than on those of the higher age groups, because the Army needs the younger men desperately, and so does the Navy, for combat replacements.

This bill will provide the replacements for those men you are going to take out. Otherwise, you may not get those replacements. That is true as to both farms and industry.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the point I am trying to get to is this: Now, as I recall it, Judge Patterson stated yesterday that if the Army got more than a few thousand men—I think he was speaking then of the IV–F group—out of that group, that they would get more than they wanted, and that they had ample men in the Army. As I recall it, that is what he said. I may be mistaken about this.

Colonel KEESLING. I think I can clear that up, Mr. Chairman. There are two things, and we cannot afford to make any mistaken about this because this is one of the points which resulted in the confusion last spring. The Army desperately needs the physically qualified men under 26. They do not want the IV–F's who are under 26, except those who may perhaps have erroneously been classified IV–F, but who are actually phvsically qualified.

Mr. THOMASON. When it comes to those who are physically qualified, it is all still within the jurisdiction of the local draft boards.

Colonel KEESLING. That is right, sir. Now, on the other hand, the Army said that they will, however, take in a IV–F who leaves his war work without consent of his local board, or who doesn't shift from non-war work to war work when requested to do so by his local board, even though they do not want him and cannot use him for military services, provided two things happen: (1), you will not count that man against their net authorized strength, and (2), you will permit them to put him in a different status from anybody else.

Mr. THOMASON. Why do we not eliminate physically fit, because their status is fixed, and is not substantially changed by this bill?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; that is not changed at all.

Mr. THOMASON. As I understand it, we are dealing strictly with IV–F's.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. Not exclusively; no.

Colonel KEESLING. Oh, no; IV–F's and others.

Mr. THOMASON. All except the physically fit.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; that is right. On one side you have the physically qualified—I might say this generally, at this time to qualify that a little bit. There are over 18,000,000 registrants who are now deferred or rejected between the ages of 18 and 45?

Mr. STEWART. How many?

Colonel KEESLING. Over 18,000,000. This bill applies to all of those. I am going to give you a break-down of that later.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. THOMAS. Could I get back to the question of coal miners? You brought the question of coal miners in line with this and I would like to ask a question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. THOMAS. Supposing these Kentucky coal miners go on strike, then who is it in this bill that puts them back to work?

Colonel KEESLING. There is no provision, sir, in this bill, which would provide for a man on strike to be placed in this corps——

Mr. THOMAS. I do not mean in the corps. I mean back to work.

Colonel KEESLING. Well, if an appropriate agency of the Government determined that these men were no longer employees, their employment would have ceased, and, of course, they would be in the same status as a man who quit his job.

Mr. THOMAS. Then under the bill they can be put back to work, is that it?

Colonel KEESLING. Provided the President or the War Labor Board declares that they are no longer employees.

Mr. THOMAS. It would be up to the President?

Colonel KEESLING. It is a matter of classification, solely. Under the present Selective Service Act, sir, we may impose, by regulation, any condition precedent for deferment that is deemed to be in the national interest.

Mr. THOMASON. Well, the man Mr. Thomas mentioned, if he is physically fit and is on strike, he can be put in the Army and if he is not, he can be put into the work battalion.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes.

Mr. THOMAS. So under this bill, it does affect men who go on strike from war plants or essential industry?

Colonel KEESLING. Provided their status is determined to be that of no longer being connected with the plant.

Mr. THOMAS. Who determines that status?

Colonel KEESLING. I believe it is the President or War Labor Board, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, just a moment. Does the local draft board not have the power, in the event that I am working in a mine or factory, and go out on strike, could they not reclassify me if they wanted to?

Colonel KEESLING. Under the existing law, sir, as I say, there can be any rules that you want to set up, or the President wants to set up, for canceling deferments on account of improper absenteeism. In the Luce bill, H. R. 3556, there was a provision that persons who are absent without cause for such time and under such circumstances as the President would declare, as determined by the local selective-service board, would be subject to induction into this corps. Now, you are not treating strikers there any differently from anybody else who was absent without cause. There is authority in the Selective Service Act now to remove deferment from anybody who is absent without cause, whether he goes out and is drunk or is willfully absent for other reasons. But the important factor, so that we do not come in here and say we are using the Selective Service System to break strikes, is that there must first be a legal determination by the appropriate Government authority that the man is improperly absent.

Mr. THOMAS. Do you not think you ought to put that right in the law, though, have a section in there concerning persons who are on strike?

Colonel KEESLING. I have no authority to speak on that subject, sir. I only have authority to speak on the bill as it now is.

Mr. ELSTON. May I ask whether or not there has ever been any determination that where a man is on strike, that you can say he has left his plant or place of employment in violation of regulations?

Colonel KEESLING. After most careful deliberation on some circumstances, sir. I cannot say definitely now whether action was really taken. I will have to check that first for the record, but the officials of the Government were ready to act, after they had carefully determined—and it is a most careful determination—that the man was improperly out on strike.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, did they ever determine that in any case, that you know of?

Colonel KEESLING. They had determinations made, sir, but the strikes were over before action had to be taken.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, you had a coal miners' strike last year some time and there was no determination there, was there?

Colonel KEESLING. Well, Mr. Elston, if I may, I would prefer to go over this with the committee in executive session.

Mr. THOMAS. Why in executive session?

Mr. ELSTON. I would like to ask another question. You have got exactly the same situation in the first part of this bill, referring to the last few lines of it, where it says, "He shall be classified into a class immediately available for induction into the land or naval forces, unless his local board, subject to appeal," and so forth, finds he had a justifiable reason for leaving such plant or activity without first obtaining such determination.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. Our philosophy on that, sir, even under existing law or under this, is that we did not believe that the Selective Service System should make the determination as to whether a man was improperly out on strike. Now, if Congress should come out and say that all strikes are unlawful, or if labor or management agreed that all strikes are unlawful in wartime and that you should proceed by way of arbitration through the War Labor Board, then that would be a declaration of law, and the determination would already be made. But that not being the case, we certainly, in my opinion, do not want to have the local selective-service boards making individual determinations throughout the country on a nonuniform basis, until the appropriate Government agency has made that determination.

Mr. ELSTON. The point I am making is this: The door would be wide open for a regulation which would say that a strike would not be a justifiable reason for leaving, would it not, under this bill?

Colonel KEESLING. My own personal opinion is yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead has a question.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I am just wondering if you are of the same opinion as Judge Patterson and others, that strikes have not particularly affected the war.

Colonel KEESLING. I am not in a position to say, sir, because I am not in Procurement.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I do not want to raise a point that will create any more disturbance between industry and labor. That is not my motive, but I am concerned about one thought here. Whether the strikes have affected the war effort or not, there are great numbers of Americans, civilians and servicemen, who think so. Now, if we pass this bill and force these IV–F's in war work, as Judge Patterson said, or tap a man on the shoulder and tell him to go in the service, I agree that if we do that we have a right to tap every other citizen in America on the shoulder and tell him to go where he is needed. So far as I am concerned, I am ready to support any legislation, regardless of whom it hits or does not hit, if it will help the war effort.

Now, if we were to tap these IV–F's on the shoulders and tell them to go into a war industry, we do give this serviceman the right, if he is a conscientious objector, that he is not inducted in the service; is that not right? If we do, men who honestly believe that certain labor organizations, if they become powerful enough, would be detrimental to this country, could conscientiously object to becoming members of that organization. They could also object to paying fees. Now, I do not want to pass any legislation that would destroy organized labor, but if we pass a bill that puts these fellows in industry and forces them to join the union and forces them to pay the fee, and forces them to strike after we told them to go into that industry, we are going to create more confusion, I think, than the value of this bill warrants.

Now, if the Selective Service, and if the War Manpower Commission, the War Department, and the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion all come in here and tell us they want this legislation, I think we should listen to them, but I also think that we should have an opinion from each of those agencies, whether they feel that these men should be forced to join the union against their will. I feel that that is a statement to be required from these agencies, and I am

wondering if this bill takes care of that legislation. Is there any other legislation that will?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair thinks this: We want to hear all the facts pertaining to the operation of this bill and how it is going to operate, and who it affects, and how. After that, we can determine for ourselves whether we ought to write into the legislation a provision on the subject or not. That is after we have heard the labor groups. But, it occurs to me that if the Selective Service Bureau wants to see to it that everybody does work, that they could issue a directive to the local draft boards which would authorize them, in the case of a strike or tie-up, or walk-out, by employees, that it would be their duty to immediately classify them and draft them. That could be done under law as it is.

Mr. WINSTEAD. But, Mr. Chairman, we cannot tell a man he must go into industry, and then permit somebody else to order him to get out and sit down and strike in that industry after we have ordered him into it against his will.

The CHAIRMAN. But that is somebody interfering with the war effort and that is something the law will have to take care of.

Mr. JOHNSON. Colonel, do you think that that section 3 that you have just read could be put in operation fast enough to take care of workers for perishable canning, workers for perishable fruits and vegetables? Those crops have to be canned sometimes in 3 weeks.

Colonel KEESLING. What section is that?

Mr. JOHNSON. You were talking about section sub-3, on page 3.

Colonel KEESLING. Their status, you mean?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; that would take so long you would not get anybody in those canneries.

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; the bill contemplates, going back to the first portion of that section, that this will be a current inventory, maintained at all times. As you know, sir, from being chairman of the appeal board out in Stockton, the local boards have very detailed information, which we correlate at Philadelphia on machines. We have an inventory now on age, dependency, physical, and other status. This would merely be to supplement that so that what we would do would be to take the inventory for particular areas. We could move very fast.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, how fast?

Colonel KEESLING. As fast as you needed it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Ten days?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better let the committee interrogate the witness. Now, you have finished your analysis of the bill, have you not?

Colonel KEESLING. Not quite, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; go ahead.

Mr. ANDREWS. I have a question that I want to get clear. Mr. Patterson approved further amplifying this bill, which would amplify the powers of the draft board in this matter of sifting and determining. Have you discussed that with him at all?

Colonel KEESLING. Not since this——

Mr. ANDREWS. Did you hear his testimony yesterday?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; I do not recall exactly the testimony that you mention.

Mr. ANDREWS. He said they should have more power in making these determinations. I was just going to suggest that you might consult him as to what he has in mind.

Colonel KEESLING. I will certainly do so.

Mr. ANDREWS. The only other thing I have is this: If you take all your IV–F's—the IV–F's presumably are marked unfit for military service; is that not right?

Colonel KEESLING. That is right; yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. The testimony of Judge Patterson is that they wanted very few in the Army and the Navy. They said they wanted no more. Do you have an idea that they are going to change the physical requirements?

Colonel KEESLING. What it amounts to is this, Mr. Andrews: The Army is, in effect, not going to change their physical standards for men whom they want as combat material, or for their regular Military Establishments. They are going to lower their physical standards so as to be able to take men in for this special status who have shifted jobs without approval or who have shifted when requested. They are only going to get a handful of those, if any.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, Judge Patterson testified yesterday that they had relaxed their regulations.

Colonel KEESLING. They have already. I should have said they have already.

The CHAIRMAN. Even to the extent of taking illiterates without limitation?

Colonel KEESLING. They have done that insofar as considering those men physically and mentally qualified for the regular Military Establishments, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Then you presume that the draft board head is not going to assign any IV–F to industry who, if he refuses to go into industry, would not be fit for limited service in the Army?

Colonel KEESLING. When you say limited service, Mr. Andrews, there are going to be two types of limited service in the Army. The type of limited service that the Army speaks of as being contained in their 8,100,000 net strength that they have on active duty, where they have only so many jobs and assignments and billets that can be performed by persons who are below the standards for general combat service. The other type of limited service is this special corps service. There are going to be special physical and mental qualifications for those men which will practically be down to rock bottom, where nobody, practically, will be rejected who is forwarded. But very few, if any, will be forwarded.

Mr. ANDREWS. I will put it in another way. You are not going to say to every IV–F, "You have got to take a war job"?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. All right.

Mr. THOMASON. He will either do that or be put in this work battalion.

Colonel KEESLING. We are going to remove the existing stigma from most of the 18,000,000 men now deferred.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel.

Colonel KEESLING. We are going to put a stigma, if the men do not go, on maybe a handful of fellows. We may have to ask 300,000 men to move. If we do, we are going to ask the 300,000 who are in a position to move with the least disruption to themselves, and so forth, and remove the stigma from the balance of the 18,000,000, which stigma has been placed on them because of indiscriminate recruiting pressures aggravated by uncontrolled turn-over.

Mr. STEWART. Just a word there. Now, in removing this stigma from these 18,000,000, are you removing that from the selective-service board who placed them there or the men who happen to fall in that category?

Colonel KEESLING. You are not removing the liability for either going into the Army or into this war service. But the Congress, if they pass this bill, is saying we are writing the rules and regulations and the categories, if you will, into this legislation.

Mr. STEWART. Yes; but the stigma there is not on the IV–F's; it is the selective-service board.

Colonel KEESLING. Exactly. There should not be a stigma on anybody. It should be removed.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, Colonel, let us get to your statement and complete your analysis of the bill, and then we will question you.

Colonel KEESLING. After having stopped turn-over, after having gotten a certification of shortages, we determine which men can best go to meet these limited shortages that would remain. The Director of Selective Service then would call upon the local boards and ask them to consult with the registrants who fall within these particular categories, and if there happened to be enough single young men qualified to go into these war plants and perform the hard work involved, they would call those types of men in, and would talk with them and explain their responsibility, that they had deferred them not for their own benefit but because someone down the line could make a better soldier; that other men had taken their places, to whom they owed a duty of giving those men, including fathers who have taken their places in the induction line, the best chance of coming home alive by providing them with the necessary equipment. That duty is in addition to their obligation to their country.

That is the psychological relationship between the boards and their registrants. That's why these boards can speak, deal effectively with these young fellows, particularly when the men in their age groups are the ones being killed in large numbers.

Proceeding with the bill [reading]:

> The Director of Selective Service will call upon such boards in such area, and outside the area, if he deems it advisable, in the national interest, to request the registrants within the category so designated to become employed in such plants or activities within a time specified by him—

You have to have a time limit, of course—

> Any such registrants, who fail to become so employed within the time specified, shall be classified into a class immediately available for military service——

Mr. KILDAY. What is a reasonable time?

Colonel KEESLING. It would have to be short enough so that the production of that plant would not fall down. It would be a very short time.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Colonel KEESLING (reading):

and should be liable for immediate induction into the land or naval forces—

unless the local board finds there is hardship or justifiable reason for not doing so. If he goes and presents himself and cannot get work, or we happen to miss, and there were more than enough men in that group to fill the shortages, then, of course, he would have a justifiable reason.

The remainder of the bill merely sets up that the men who are already in war work, or later get into war work, between the ages of 18 and 45, and who leave without first getting the approval of their local Selective Service board, will be inducted. Men who are inducted under those circumstances, regardless of their physical status, and men who are requested to go into war work, from nonwar work, who fail to do so, will be inducted into the armed forces and placed in this special corps, and will not be in the same status as other members of the armed forces, and will not have the benefits.

Mr. DURHAM. If that man terminates his contract in war work, are you going to kick that IV–F out and send him out to Indiana?

Colonel KEESLING. I would assume that that man would be properly out at that time, unless he fell within the categories of persons that you felt should remain in war work, and should get another direction to go to another plant.

Mr. DURHAM. Who is going to pay his expenses if you take him out of Florida and send him to California?

Colonel KEESLING. That question was raised, and I understand that Judge Patterson and Mr. Bard and the others are considering that problem. The local board would never give a man this penalty if he could not go from one place to another for lack of funds. They would consider it as a justifiable reason for his not doing so. We would, of course, endeavor to pick up and apply this to men who are already in California or in the so-called congested and critical areas.

I have been informed that these so-called critical areas and congested areas are really fictions. Once you get this bill, the fictions can be dispelled as a lot of men already using laundry, housing, and restaurants in these critical areas will be transferred to the war activities in that area, rather than bringing in additional personnel.

Mr. STEWART. Well, the Selective Service boards of the county become agents of the War Manpower Commission.

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. STEWART. Well, how are they going to operate and tell him where they go, then, unless you abolish the War Manpower Board and put him under Selective Service?

Colonel KEESLING. Under this bill, it is contemplated that Justice Byrnes will have general supervision and that there will be close cooperation between all of the agencies to the maximum extent of their respective capacities, capabilities, and facilities.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel.

Let us not interrupt any more until we get through. Then we will take the orderly way of questioning.

Colonel KEESLING. All right, sir. The last few sentences of the bill provide that the men taken in who are not the type of men that the Army want in their regular Military Establishment—whom Judge Patterson and Mr. Bard said they did not want and could not use for their regular work—will not be, Congress says, charged against the authorized strength of the Regular forces. A point that has been considerably misunderstood which should be clarified, is that any man who is not going to respond, who is not going to be one of the vast numbers, who are going to respond voluntarily to stay in or shift to war work, who is so unpatriotic and so foolish as to choose going into this type of service rather than remain as a free laborer and a patriot, where the wages are much higher, will become a member of this corps but will not be assigned outside the armed forces to work as slave labor at Army pay or any other pay, side by side with free labor.

There is a safeguard at the end of the bill and that should be definitely understood.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it?

Colonel KEESLING. That they will be used to do some of the disagreeable work that the Army and Navy have to use their own military personnel now to do, because they cannot get civilian laborers to come in and do the work.

Mr. Bard and Mr. Patterson have indicated that there are such types of work in the armed forces. The only time that they could be assigned out would be when circumstances were such that labor and management would come and say: "We must have a crew to come out here and do a certain specified job." We can't recruit men for the job. Then and then only could they be used outside the forces.

But, actually, as Mr. Bard has said, you do not have to worry much about that, because you are not going to have anybody in this corps.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead with your statement.

Colonel KEESLING. Mr. Chairman, I am through.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Thomason.

Mr. THOMASON. I understood the colonel had some charts there.

Colonel KEESLING. I will be very glad to show you those charts. This chart is entitled "Occupationally deferred." These registrants will not go to the armed forces or leave for other jobs without the approval from their selective service local boards.

The pink-colored section of the chart consists of 4,250,000 registrants classified in II–A and II–B—that is, deferred by reason of their industrial occupation—and includes technical students, those in activities in support of the war effort as well as directly engaged in it.

Mr. KILDAY. That does not mean they are physically qualified for military service; does it?

Colonel KEESLING. It does not mean that. Those men have never been given a physical examination. So that you could put a 40-percent test on that and 40 percent of those men would be IV–F's and 60 percent would probably be eligible for military service.

Mr. THOMASON. I do not quite understand. You mean there is nobody in that group who is physically fit for military service?

Colonel KEESLING. Generally speaking, they have not been given an examination, sir. That is where we make a mistake when we talk of having four or five million in the physically disqualified between 18 and 38.

We would have, in addition, at least 40 percent of that 4,250,000 who would be physically disqualified if physically examined by the Army.

Most of these men are now in the older-age brackets. The 1,500,000 II–C's in the green part are farmers. They also have had no physical.

You can put at least 40 percent on that, and then if you added in the 7,000,000 38 to 45, who are considered to be the same as IV–F's, they are ineligible for military service, because even though they could pass the military examination, presumably they do not have the stamina to engage in military service, we would then have an estimated fourteen or fifteen million men physically disqualified for military service.

Now, some of those men—that is, between the ages of 18 and 45—I estimated there were between eighteen and nineteen million men, 18 to 45, who have either been deferred by reason of their occupation, or for other causes, or who were over age, or who were rejected. That would mean that some 3,000,000, if they took the physical examination, would perhaps be found physically qualified for military service, with the balance being rejected under your present standards, either because of being over age or physically unfit.

The bill applies to all of these men whether they are physically qualified or not.

Let me explain this chart. The pink represents classes II–A and II–B containing 4,250,000 deferred by reason of industrial occupation, who have not had physical examinations; the green represents 1,500,000 II–C deferred by reason of their farm occupation; they also have not been physically examined; the blue represents 850,000 who are in II–A (L or F) and II–B (L or F) who have been physically examined; they are in the dual status, having two reasons for deferment, namely, occupation and rejection; and the 125,000 in this yellow slip are the II–C farmers who are in II–C (F or L) who have been disqualified after an examination, and who are also engaged in an essential occupation.

The total is 6,725,000 who are now in class II regardless of their physical status, between the age of 18 and 38.

I do not have a break-down at this moment of the 7,000,000 men who are between the ages of 38 and 45. Therefore, I have not included on this chart the portion of that 7,000,000 who are now engaged in essential work.

I must also state, Mr. Chairman, that the deferments of men who are in II–A, B, and C, with L or F designations, have been granted on a most liberal basis. There are many men at this time in those classifications who are merely doing something that is useful for the civilian economy but not necessarily the war effort.

To the younger single men in that group who are in there on that basis, it may be advisable to make our policies more rigid that would permit us to make a reclassification of them into class IV–4 if it were necessary to do so and if we determined that we needed to have more young single men available for war work than we now have in class IV–F.

Now, the other chart that I have here——

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Mr. Durham has a question.

Mr. DURHAM. Does this bill apply to all of those men?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. The first portion of this bill says that all of those men who are in class II now, who leave without first obtaining the approval of their local selective service board, will be subject to the penalty that is provided by this law.

Mr. FENTON. What about the young man that is physically fit in that category that wants to get into the Army? I have referred specifically to a condition that arises in my area, in which some coal companies have taken advantage of the authority given them to defer all workers around a coal mine, whereas neighboring coal companies have not taken advantage of that authority. Consequently, the boys who are frozen in their jobs by a certain coal company are, speaking of stigma, stigmatized, and they feel it is unjust to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, that cannot be done except with the approval of the local draft board.

Mr. THOMPSON. I would like to hear the colonel answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel KEESLING. This bill provides the same penalty for a physically disqualified man as it does for a physically qualified man. If one of those men in class II–A leaves without getting permission of his local selective service board, not having had a physical examination, he would be reclassified in I–A immediately and he would be sent for a physical examination; if he passed the physical examination or if he failed the physical examination, he would be sent to the Army induction station in either case. Then the Army can send that physically qualified man into this special corps if it so desires, or can use him in one of the regular units. The provisions beginning at line 18, on page 3 of the bill, cover that.

Mr. THOMAS. Let us stick to Dr. Fenton's case. If a man in that group is physically fit and has passed the required examination and wants to go in the Army, you mean to say he cannot get in?

Colonel KEESLING. At the present time—and this is the reason why there should be no stigma on a man who is deferred or rejected—at the present time under our philosophy of selective service if a man is deferred, that is a decision of the Government that he is properly where he should be and should stay here. If he is essential to the war effort—supposing he is a radar expert or something—he should stay there. We have removed the pressure of voluntary enlistment for that reason, sir. That removes the stigma on him, as he has no choice.

Mr. FENTON. Let us stick to the coal mining industry, Colonel, and not to radar.

Colonel KEESLING. It is up to the local board and not to the man, in either event. He has no choice.

Mr. FENTON. We have a condition there in the same local board for this area. Now, permission has been granted to those various coal-mining companies to defer their men. Some companies take advantage of it, neighboring companies do not. Do you not think there should be some uniformity there?

Colonel KEESLING. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what I said—that the local draft boards have control of that manpower, and whether a man should be deferred to do a certain job in a coal mine is for the local draft board and not for the coal mine.

Mr. THOMASON. That is not so.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; it is so. Just a moment. The coal-mine operator can make application for the deferment of the man, but it is a question for the draft board whether he shall be deferred for that purpose or not. So that the coal mine does not control it.

Mr. FENTON. The draft board will give them permission to do it, and some companies would not ask and others will; consequently, the boy that is thrown into this job is looked upon by the serviceman, and the fellow that works for a company that will not take advantage of these freezing propositions—he is looked upon as a slacker.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, Doctor. it gets back to this proposition, and I do not want to be interrupted until I have made myself clear on it.

The employer of a man, in any capacity, can make application for his deferment. When he does that, the board controls it, and no coal company, no other corporation, has got any right to say that a man shall go to the Army or not go to the Army. It is up to the draft board. But a coal company can refuse to make application, and then it is still up to the draft board. Is not that right, Colonel?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. We would like to know of any specific cases where there is a lack of uniformity, because that would raise a bad situation.

Mr. FENTON. That is an actual condition.

Colonel KEESLING. It would raise a bad situation, and we would like to know about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you ought to know.

Mr. KILDAY. I think a moment ago you said if the board determined he was essential to the industry, he must stay there. But there is a provision of the act under which any man registered under it has a right to volunteer and, if physically qualified, shall be accepted.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; but I think, Mr. Kilday, you will recall, if you read that provision, that it is qualified. It says provided he is not deferred after classification. We put that safeguard in so that we would remove completely any choice on the part of the man.

Mr. KILDAY. Is that in the original act?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; we did not want to have happen what occurred when voluntary enlistments were permitted; that is, there would be some casualties and the Army recruiting services or the Navy would go around to a plant. They had an interest in getting recruits; they would go around and these fellows had a choice as to whether they stayed in the plant or left. It was a vicious thing. Talking about the voluntary system, it was the most vicious form of compulsion if not properly applied. These men would feel the urge to go, they would run off from the plants and farms, and war production suffered terrifically, and often they would be the wrong type of men.

Mr. KILDAY. The original act did not make that distinction, did it?

Colonel KEESLING. I think so, sir; just a minute; I have the act around here some place.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; look that up. I want to see what is does say.

Colonel KEESLING (reading):

Provided, That within the limits of the quota determined under section 4 (b)—

so you won't have too many volunteering from various parts of the country and drain some parts of the country more than others—

within the limits of the quota determined under section 4 (b) of the subdivision in which he resides, any persons, regardless of race or color, between the age of 18 and 45, shall be afforded an opportunity to volunteer for induction into the land or naval forces of the United States for the training and service prescribed in subsection (b), but no person who so volunteers shall be inducted for such training and service so long as he is deferred after classification.

Mr. KILDAY. What section is that of the act?

Colonel KEESLING. That is a proviso of section 3 (a).

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the present law?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was what I thought. All right, Colonel; go ahead.

Mr. CLASON. Colonel, do you have a break-down of the IV–F's?

Colonel KEESLING. This chart here is the companion chart to the other one. The other contained those occupationally deferred in class II regardless of physical condition, 18 to 38. It did not include the 7,000,000 38–45 years of age who are in war work.

In the group now in IV–F between the ages of 18 and 38 there are some 3,500,000, roughly. That is the total here. Just for illustration of what we would do, in the most broad way, of breaking those into categories; there are 1,363,000 18–26 IV–F's, who presumably even under the most liberal basis have not gone into this war effort or are not doing things that are worth while..

No doubt some of those are in essential work but have not asked for reclassification, because we have not had this act in effect. Many of those will be asking for reclassification if they are actually engaged in war work, if this act becomes law. Also, many of those who are not so engaged will become so engaged; 26 to 30, 710,000; 30 to 38, 1,508,000.

There are 7,000,000 38–45 years of age. Right after war was declared, they were made liable for military service, and some of them were being inducted. We only inducted, from that pool, for a period of less than a year. At the time we stopped we estimated that there were in that pool some 300,000 single men who could pass the Army general physical test, but the Army and Navy said that experience had showed that although they could technically pass the test, they did not have the stamina to stand up in combat and that therefore they should be considered in the same category as the so-called limited servicemen, the IV–F's, the Waves and Wacs, and that there were only so many billets that could be performed by limited service personnel, whether they were over age, whether they were women, or whether they were so-called IV–F's. And the Army further said, as did the Navy, that they had a rotation program and that they were getting many battle wounded, whom they felt they should keep in the service if they desired to stay in on some shore job, who had been wounded.

Now, that is reasonable, and it is a matter objectively to be considered as to whether or not that is so, but that is the Army and Navy's position as presented to the Congress at the time of the father draft exemption bill.

So, we have a total of 10,000,000—I won't use that total because there are some of those 7,000,000 that we know are already in war work; but I will say that, taking the total on this chart of 10,581,000 and the total that is on the other chart, 6,725,000, we have a total of 17,306,000, to which we add, roughly, 1,500,000 veterans who have been in the service but who have since been discharged to civilian life, giving a grand total of 18,806,000 who are either deferred or rejected or between the ages of 38 and 45.

Mr. CLASON. Am I to understand now that there are approximately 2,000,000 individuals between 18 and 30 there that you have classified under IV–F, that the Army and Navy has no absolute use for them

at all, and the only possible use we could have for them would be to place them under this bill?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. We believe there may be some of those men who, in the optimistic periods of the past months, when they went up to the induction station, although the standards were the same as they have been, were kind of looked at, maybe, with a little different slant by the Army and Navy doctors. However, we are reprocessing some of those men. We do not want to reprocess everybody and throw the home front into confusion, but we are reprocessing some of those men who passed the induction examination but were turned down shortly afterward at the induction station, and some others.

There may be some of those fellows who are improperly classified as IV–F, and we would like to get those out and into the Army.

Mr. THOMASON. Let me understand: What do you estimate the grand total of men now engaged in war work who could meet the physical requirements and be accepted by the Army, if taken out of war work, to be?

Colonel KEESLING. I will go back to my first chart, sir. I would make a rough estimate of 60 percent of the 4,250,000 plus the 1,500,000—3,000,550.

Mr. THOMASON. Does that include farmers?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; it does. I have a break-down which it might be well to put in at that point, Mr. Chairman, of our inductions for the next 6 months, and where we expect to get them.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Just let it be printed into the record.

Mr. THOMASON. I think that is most important. If this bill is passed, would you meet all your calls for the next 6 months out of men physically fit in war work?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir. We have men coming along—in the 18-year age group—coming of age.

Mr. THOMASON. Well, then, you had better explain it.

Colonel KEESLING. Judge Patterson said yesterday the over-all requirements for the armed forces for the next 6 months were 900,000. That includes enlistments of 17-year-olds. We have assumed there will be enlistments of 150,000 17-year-olds during this 6-month period.

The CHAIRMAN. Of 17-year-olds?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. Now, I will have to check that for the record to determine whether that includes WAVES and WAC's.

Mr. THOMASON. Does that mean the Army is accepting 17-year-olds?

Colonel KEESLING. This is mostly the Navy, sir. The Navy has been going along for a long time now getting 17-year-old enlistments at the rate of twenty-five to thirty thousand a month. The break-down of the 900,000 is 150,000 enlistments, 750,000 selective-service calls. Breaking down the 750,000 selective-service calls: For the first 2 months of the year, for the Army, 80,000 each month; for the next 4 months, 100,000 a month; for the Navy, 32,000 per month for 6 months—a total of 752,000, and I said, roughly, 750,000.

The picture is somewhat distorted if you look only to the 750,000, because most of the 150,000 enlistments go to the Navy and Marine Corps, so the average that the Navy is getting would be 32,000 plus 25,000 per month, roughly.

Now, where are we going to get those men? It is estimated that after excluding the men who have volunteered to the Navy, after having reached the age of 17—and that means as soon as they leave 16 and become 17, the Navy can start getting them; that is a vast pool which has been quite well worked over. So, after deducting this average of 25,000 that the Navy gets per month, we estimate that we would get, out of the 100,000 reaching 18 each month, a net of 40,000—after eliminating physically disqualified. The residue we have after eliminating that 25,000 includes the men rejected by the Navy in the process of getting 25,000 qualified men.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean to say the Navy rejects 15,000 out of 25,000?

Colonel KEESLING. I do not know exactly what their rejection rate is, but whatever the number is, that many would register when they reach 18, so our rejection rate on the 18's appears rather high unless we allow for the additional 25,000 already taken by the Navy.

Mr. THOMASON. Are you contemplating the changing of the physical standards of induction?

Colonel KEESLING. I don't believe so. That comes under the War and Navy Departments' jurisdiction.

Mr. THOMASON. I am just wondering about fellows that have a fast pull and become star football players.

Colonel KEESLING. Each individual case should be considered objectively on its own merits. We should not put a stigma on everybody who is IV–F merely because he is doing certain things. I went into this thing thoroughly because I was disturbed about it at the time of the father draft situation. We found men with perforated eardrums who could perform hard work, provided they were not exposed to battle conditions and the elements for 3 or 4 weeks.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead with your break-downs.

Colonel KEESLING. 240,000 from among the 18's, and 180,000 from the men already classified in I–A, who were in process of physical examination and induction. We expect to get the balance of 330,000 mostly from the occupationally deferred groups.

Mr. CLASON. Do you have a break-down of those?

Colonel KEESLING. The occupationally deferred groups consist of, in II–C, 360,000 farmers 18 to 26 who have not had a physical examination.

There are approximately 100,000 II–A's and II–B's under 26 years of age left in occupational deferments exclusive of farm workers. That includes approximately 60,000 who are in the merchant marine, that includes the doctors, the coal miners, the students, the technical men, Federal, State, and local government employees and everyone but farmers—100,000. When we deduct the 60,000 of the merchant marine, that means 40,000 are left deferred under 26 years of age in all those technical groups and in industry, so we have really processed that group.

There are 800,000—and this is the figure there was some misunderstanding about yesterday—in II–A and II–B, 26 to 29 years of age, deferred in industry and in these specialties I have just listed. There are 3,200,000 30 to 37 who are in II–A or II–B. There are 265,000 II–C farmers, 26 to 29 years of age, and there are 700,000 II–C farmers 30 to 37 years of age.

Now, we must get, out of this total of the 4,250,000 II–A's and II–B's, and out of the 1,500,000 II–C farmers, that figure of 330,000.

Mr. THOMASON. In the next 6 months?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. You have given us very valuable testimony. To meet Judge Patterson's requirements, assuming that he is right in the number of men absolutely necessary, what does that leave the total number of men that you must take out of industry and off the farms, in order to meet these reqirements after first accounting for those you have mentioned?

Colonel KEESLING. 330,000.

Mr. THOMASON. Within the next 6 months?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. All ages?

Colonel KEESLING. All ages.

Mr. CLASON. Do you have any determination of how many you expect to take off the farms immediately?

Colonel KEESLING. If you took all the 360,000 under 26, and applied the rejection rate on the basis I was telling you about after eliminating the enlistments that have been very heavy into the Navy, the maximum you could get would be about 180,000.

Mr. DURHAM. From 18 to 26?

Colonel KEESLING. On the farms, yes; so even if you processed them all, you would still be leaving a large percentage who didn't pass the examination, provided you enact this bill to keep them on the farms after they find out they are IV–F.

Now, the figures on the farms—I remember, a member of the committee had asked me to present this because it is quite revealing—although there are 360,000 men 18 to 26 on the farms as against 100,000 in industry and other activities—and if you eliminate the merchant marine, that would be 40,000 in that age group—when you get into the age group 26 to 29, while there are 800,000 in industry and these other groups, 26 to 29, there are only 265,000 on the farms. Also, when you get into the group 30 to 37, there are 3,200,000 30 to 37 in industry and so forth, where as there are only 700,000 in that age group on the farms. Now, the 3,200,000 in industry in the 30 to 37 group are there under the same standards as we had fixed for the men who are in II–C and II–A, B, F. That is, who are doing anything worth while.

We determined that as far as they were concerned, when the military were after the young men, we should have a different occupational test on a selective basis for those men so that we would keep out of the Army the vast majority of those and tighten up our deferment policies on the younger men. Now, that is the same thing that we would do on the other side of the picture when we begin to select the men whom we are going to recruit for home-front service.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how many people are in the group from 37 up to 45? You have not given us that.

Colonel KEESLING. 37 to 45, I only have the bulk figure, 7,000,000, sir, but I can get additional details on that for you.

Mr. KILDAY. Colonel Keesling, in order to meet the calls of the Army and Navy during the next 6 months, you are going to have to take 232,000 from industry and agriculture; is that right?

Colonel KEESLING. I have said roughly 330,000.

Mr. KILDAY. Well, 330,000.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. Is it the opinion of the Selective Service System that this legislation would provide substitutes for those taken out who are now classified as necessary in agriculture and industry?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; and in that connection, in these figures that I have given you, you will notice there are large numbers under 26 on the farms. I am convinced, sir, that the reason you have those men on the farms—they have not had physical examaninations—is because of the second part of the Tydings amendment which says no man will leave the farm without first getting the authority of his local board or else be subject to induction. We have had that for the farmers since 1942——

The CHAIRMAN. Unless he goes in the armed services?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. The strange part about it is that when the Tydings amendment was first going into effect, it was not a blanket deferment. We assisted Senator Tydings in preparing it and we endeavored to the best of our ability to make it the same test written into the law as that being applied administratively for deferment of men in industry. It provided that the man must be necessary to and regularly engaged in an agricultural occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort. Such a man would be deferred so long as he remained so engaged and until a satisfactory replacement could be obtained. Then the proviso, that, if he left without getting the approval of the local board, he would be subject to induction.

The publicity that went along with the Tydings amendment showed that the farms had actually been stripped of labor. California and other places lost their farm labor because the work in the factories gave higher pay, was much more attractive. There were the same differentials as between the airplane factory and the foundry, and so they, uncontrolled, ran off to the factories. But when it became known that they could get deferment, and they were much more needed back on the farms, the men who felt that they might be eligible for military service went back, but the fellows who had already been found to be IV–F's did not go back.

These figures show that was so, because we have very small numbers of deferred farmers in the upper age brackets. With this bill, I am convinced, that a great many of the IV–F farmers and over-age farmers who left the farms will come back to replace any that we have to take out of these younger groups.

The Maritime Commission and War Shipping Administration the other day when I asked them this question: "What is your situation with respect to turn-over" said, here are the figures: "We have 180 to 190 thousand personnel; 20 percent of our officer personnel are in on waivers because they are over age or for some other reason; 20 percent of the able-bodied seamen, so classified, are not able-bodied seamen. They are up-graded ordinary seamen.

I said: "What is your turn-over?" They said: "You should know what our turn-over is. We had to come to you and ask you to permit us to again recruit those men 18 to 26 and give them deferments if they went into the merchant marine."

I said, "Yes, I know. Why was that necessary?" They said: "We had some men who were IV–F's and who were over age, who patrioti-

cally came into the merchant marine and who, when they thought that the war was going to be over soon, felt that the time had come when, for their own protection, when their buddy along side of them was going back to either get the man's job or the best peacetime job, the competition was going to be such that they had no choice but to leave and go back and many of them left."

I said, "If something had been done to induce those men to stay, under a fair program handled by the local board which had deferred them, would you have been able to use those men and not call on us to defer the young men that the Army needed" and they said: "Yes, we could have used those men."

This bill will help them and permit us to take some of those men. I am not saying a man should not be deferred because he is in the merchant marine, but if we need those young men in the armed forces more than we need them in the merchant marine, we will under a program as contemplated by this bill, be able to get these IV–F's and over-age men to go in the merchant marine and replace them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to start in and question the witness a little bit.

Mr. KILDAY. May I just make this thought first——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. Your experience has shown the Tydings amendment has been effective to keep these men on the farms?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. This bill, then, is designed to place the same inducement in other necessary industries which you have found have been affected?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir, and to remedy one failure of the Tydings amendment proviso; that is the situation that the Senate Committee on Agriculture recognized informally, where you have a man on the farm, one of these 1,500,000 men, who has not been physically examined. We find we have to take some of them. We are going to have to take them now. He goes to the induction station, he is given a physical examination and he is found to be IV–F. And what does he say; in many cases, "Well, I have been a patriot a long time now. I am going to go with some of these other fellows and get some of that big money." So he will go into a shipyard or some other place, which has to take him because their turn-over has not been stopped.

The man goes in there, he makes more money than he ever made before, and here is where absenteeism starts. So they recognized that and they recognized it was harming the farms terrifically, so they, and some of the other men who are very much interested in the farm situation, have recognized that the Tydings amendment itself should be extended, as you do in this bill, to cover a man whether he is physically qualified or physically disqualified.

At the time the Tydings amendment was being prepared, we recommended that the words read "agricultural or industrial occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort or any other occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort" but the situation at that time, Mr. Chairman, was that the farms had been stripped, and that the situation was most acute there. Had we had that proviso in there, applying both to the farms and to industry, we would have prevented the headlong rush back from industry to the farms. We could have controlled it on a selective basis, and we would not have disrupted industry at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clason, do you have any questions?

Mr. CLASON. There is just one thing in drafting these farmers. It is possible there are some under 26, but on the whole, there is another thing you have to take into account and that is these kids on the farms are working 14 to 16 to 18 hours a day and they have to be physically A1 if they are going to do that work. That is why they have to be physically qualified to stay there. That is the difference.

Colonel KEESLING. There is no question but that the situation on the farms is different in many cases than the situation in industry because in many cases they are smaller units. Now, may I explain——

The CHAIRMAN. Briefly.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. May I explain what happened so there will be no misunderstanding. The other day when in the committee there apparently was some misunderstanding as to this recent farm directive. Justice Byrnes sent General Hershey a statement to the effect that it was the opinion of the President that physically qualified men under 26 years of age were more needed in the armed forces than on the farms in the national interest and the best interests of the war effort.

General Hershey sent to the local boards the President's expression, but did not wipe out the Tydings amendment or violate the Tydings amendment. He merely stated to the local boards that in considering a man for deferment under the provisions and standards of the Tydings amendment, they would take into consideration the President's expression of opinion. So it is still up to the local board, subject to appeal.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel Keesling. I have one question.

On page 4 of this bill it provides that, as to these men who are inducted who failed to take or stay in an industrial or other war job, they shall not, while so serving, or thereafter, be entitled, by reason of such service, to the benefits of section 8 of this act, the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as amended, the Servicemen's Dependents Allowance Act of 1942, as amended, the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, as amended, the Mustering Out Payment Act of 1944, or of any law administered by the Veterans Administration providing benefits for former members of the armed forces or their dependents or beneficiaries.

Now what, in your judgment, would be the morale effect of that provision if it is written into the legislation on these men who are inducted and are deprived of all those things?

Colonel KEESLING. From the standpoint of the morale of the armed forces this will be just what they want, and from the standpoint of the men doing their patriotic duty in the shipyards who are staying there, this will be exactly what they want.

The CHAIRMAN. But as to these men that are inducted, how are they going to feel?

Colonel KEESLING. We want them to feel such that they will not elect to choose to get this type of status as against doing their part.

The CHAIRMAN. And getting all the benefits?

Colonel KEESLING. And getting all of the benefits of working as freemen and patriots.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomason, do you have any questions?

Mr. THOMASON. Yes. If they get into some kind of useful war work, they ought not to be embarrassed because they won't be put into it.

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; because it removes the stigma.

Mr. THOMASON. And boiled down, the effect of this bill is that if this bill becomes law, there will be approximately 330,000 men taken out of industry and off the farms within 6 months who will be replaced by IV–F's?

Colonel KEESLING. Replaced by IV–F's or the over-age men, but unquestionably, it would be on a selective basis with the men whom you determined could best do it.

Mr. THOMASON. And assuming that the Army and Navy are right in saying that these men are necessary for the war effort, these men who are to be inducted, then you have no other source from which to get these men except to pull them out of industry or off the farm?

Colonel KEESLING. That is right, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clason, do you have any questions?

Mr. CLASON. Yes. Now, is this amount of 55,000 or this number of 55,000 men a month for the next 6 months an unusually large amount?

Colonel KEESLING. Which figure?

Mr. CLASON. You said you need 330,000 more than those coming of age.

Colonel KEESLING. No; 330,000 more than would be obtained from 17-year-old enlistments, men reaching 18 years of age, and men already in class I–A.

Mr. CLASON. That left 330,000 to be taken from occupationally deferred groups?

Colonel KEESLING. That is right.

Mr. CLASON. Would you expect to get that number during 6 months without passage of this law?

Colonel KEESLING. I believe it would be very difficult to get the right kind of men without injuring war production.

Mr. CLASON. Well, would you need either this law or something in addition to what you have already got in order to carry on this work of selective service fairly during the next 6 months?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; in order to get replacements for those men and also to make up the shortages that Mr. Krug told you now existed. It is not only the 330,000 we are going to take out for the armed forces, but it is in addition to that, whatever number it was that he gave you yesterday that he is now short, even after you eliminate the turn-over factor.

Mr. CLASON. Well, that is the manpower proposition?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. As far as selective service is concerned, alone, you still need this law?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; and in some instances we will be taking men out of what we call the least attractive jobs, particularly if it is on the farms or some of these other places.

Mr. CLASON. Another question occurs to me: As I recall hearings we have had before this committee, any person who takes the regular military oath—any person being inducted into service becomes a member of the armed forces and, upon discharge, becomes a veteran; is not that so?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Well, now, any person who goes into one of these labor battalions, having been regularly inducted into the service and taking the oath of military service, and otherwise, I do not see how he can be subject to military government supervision, fines, and penalties.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. He is going to become a veteran, is he not?

Colonel KEESLING. Well, he will be a veteran in the technical sense but not in the actual sense. The Army can give him any type of discharge it desires. There are many men who go honorably into the armed forces but who are recalcitrants and are given either a blue discharge or a dishonorable discharge. Under the existing administrative policies we have already put into effect pursuant to this committee's recommendation, if a man 18 to 38 leaves his occupation without first getting the authority of his local board, he will be forwarded for induction but on his card will be listed, "Not acceptable for general military service but accepted for induction" or words to that effect, and there will be a card that goes along in his file at all times indicating that this man did not comply with what the Congress—because this is a mandate of Congress or would be—that he did not comply with what the Congress and the people felt should be his duty, and that information will be available for the records of any institution or agency or the Federal Government or the Civil Service Commission or any other organization that you want, that this man did not do his duty in the opinion of the people that called upon him.

Mr. CLASON. Let us carry that a little further: He goes into the service and is regularly inducted in; after he is in the service he carries out all orders promptly and to the best of his ability that are given to him by those under whose control he is while in military service.

Do I understand, from the statement you have just made, that, regardless of the service he renders in the Military Establishment, he will, upon the termination of his services, receive a dishonorable discharge, even through he has in no way violated any rules of the service while in the service?

Colonel KEESLING. No, Mr. Clason; it would be within the discretion of the armed forces. If you adopted the personal recommendation of Mr. Bard and Mr. Patterson, that they would prefer to have fine or imprisonment, which I want to make absolutely clear, I do not agree with, because of what we went into with the committee, I agree with the committee here that it should be this form of penalty and not the other, and I will tell you why later——

Mr. CLASON. You say the committee; when was that?

Colonel KEESLING. Well, the committee's recommendation of last spring which we were already carrying out.

The CHAIRMAN. Of last spring?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. Now, if you adopt their type of penalty, imprisonment, he has no benefits. His family gets no benefits. But you can always parole him or let him out in advance, but there will always be the stigma that attaches to this man. He committed a

crime. He committed a crime, even though he is later let out for good conduct.

Mr. CLASON. What kind of a discharge does this man get? That is all I want to know.

Colonel KEESLING. I do not know whether that is a matter of law or regulation of the armed forces, but if it is a matter of regulation, I believe they would work out a special discharge for this type of man without saying honorable discharge or dishonorable discharge but discharged from the special service.

Mr. CLASON. All right. Well, do you know whether or not there is any provision of law permitting such a discharge?

Colonel KEESLING. I will find out, sir, and I think that the committee should seriously consider that if it is not already authorized by law.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kilday has a question.

Mr. KILDAY. Colonel Keesling, the Selective Service System recommends the bill as drafted with some amendments that I believe you are going to submit.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. Of course, you are concerned exclusively with the procurement of the manpower to fill the requisitions made upon you by the armed forces?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; with the related functions of, in order to get the 13,500,000 that have gone in or out of the armed forces, men and women, within the last 4-year period, we have not just gone ahead and said, "We confine ourselves to those 13,500,000." We have had to process every registrant time and time again, including, of course, all of these 18,000,000 who still remain deferred.

Mr. KILDAY. The point I was going to make, Colonel, is that after the man passes through your procurement machinery, he then enters the armed forces and he becomes their problem exclusively?

You prefer, and the Selective Service System prefers, this special service unit, or whatever you call it. Both of the armed forces have told us that they do not need and do not want a unit of that kind. They would prefer that it be either a direct penalty or violation of the Selective Service Act.

Now, I just do not know what they would do with what we hope would be a very few men going into that special service unit, but apparently there is not much of anything they can use them for.

It just occurs to me that they would be segregated from the rest of them and put into this sort of a concentration camp, which would be about all it would be and would perform those useful services, certainly no service that they would now contemplate using.

Colonel KEESLING. At that point I may say that the Army and Navy have indicated that they could not use these men and did not want them for their regular military establishment, but there were some civilian jobs they had in their own organizations that if you did get any men in here, they would put them to work on.

Mr. KILDAY. But if you more or less compel the services to take something that they do not want and do not want to be bothered with, for which they would have to use, probably, some of their trained officer personnel that could be very poorly spared, I do not see where we are going to accomplish anything with that set-up especially in view of the fact that the man condemned to this concentration camp and

suffering the stigma attached to it is going there purely under administrative and not the judicial act.

Colonel KEESLING. As I understand it, the same objection was raised last spring before the committee made its recommendation and at that time the committee assured, as I recall it, the armed forces that they would not look to General Marshall and the Secretary of War to deviate in any way from their primary military functions in order to carry this out, but they felt that an officer could be designated and some of the surplus officers of older age were available, who could handle this very readily.

Mr. KILDAY. There is another thing I am fearful of. If you put these men into the armed forces and that is what this bill calls for, but deprive them of those benefits which the soldier goes in for and he is entitled to on active duty and afterward as a veteran, I am very much afraid that we will get down the line here a few years hence, we are going to be faced with a proposal that they should be entitled to all or some of the benefits, and——

Colonel KEESLING. In answer to your question, we have already taken, as I said before, steps 1 and 2 following the committee's recommendations; namely, we have made these II–A, B, and C–F classifications. We have already issued instructions and are applying administratively this philosophy that a man will be inducted if he leaves his job without permission of his local board.

In order to be consistent and carry that out, we would have to provide that the men who are so inducted will not get full benefits.

Mr. KILDAY. Now, Colonel Keesling, let us take up the question which my colleague raises: Section 24 (b) of the National Defense Act. Shortly after the World War, I guess it was the last Congress or the Congress before that, we restored those men who served in the World War to the retired list at 75 percent of the pay of rank at which they retired.

Now, taking Mr. Martin's view of it, because we opposed each other on it, his view would be that we came around then and felt sorry for having retired them as we did when we should not have. Taking my view of it, many of those cases were cases on which the original action should not have been taken but probably was due to stress under which they were working and that there were injustices. So, whichever view you take 5, 6, or 10 years from now, you see that both might be brought forward; some say that these men should not in the first place have been deprived of those veterans' rights.

Colonel KEESLING. It is not an exact analogy because the men of whom you are speaking, the officers, entered the armed forces under honorable conditions.

Mr. KILDAY. Yes; but they left the service under a stigma of not being able to render the service.

Colonel KEESLING. But there is the question of fact there.

Mr. KILDAY. And those of us who supported that were convinced that in many instances there was nothing more than a conflict of personalities between the officers who were retired under 24–B and those who happened to be superiors at the time.

Colonel KEESLING. Well now, this committee has very well taken care of that under the G. I. bill, I understand, where the man can appeal. There is a special provision there.

68175—45——8

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will adjourn until 2 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:30, a recess was taken until 2.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2 p. m., pursuant to recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Colonel Keesling, will you come around, please? I think we had reached the point of asking Mr. Thomas if he had any questions. Mr. Thomas is recognized by the Chair.

Mr. THOMAS. Colonel Keesling, as I understand it, you have a very high regard for the local selective service boards, and any views that they might have concerning the manpower situation in the particular areas in which they are located; is that correct?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMAS. Have you heard any of the statements made by the chairmen of the Philadelphia selective service boards, that, I believe, were made yesterday, concerning this very question?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; I have not.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, I want to just read to you two or three statements that these chairmen made and I would like to have your views in relation to them. This article I am reading from appeared in this morning's Philadelphia Inquirer, and one of the chairmen there in Philadelphia made this statement:

We here are not jittery like they are in Washington about the manpower situation. The whole trouble is in the administration of the selective-service and manpower laws.

The article is entitled "Draft officials blame War Manpower Commission for job crisis," and I think most of the article should appear in the record at this point.

Failure of the War Manpower Commission and United States Employment Service to notify selective-service boards of the status of men who have quit essential war jobs for unessential work has created a loophole through which thousands of men are escaping induction into the armed forces.

This charge was made yesterday by the chairmen of a number of Philadelphia's 85 selective-service boards in commenting on the announcement that the Government is contemplating a sharp increase in draft quotas for the next 6 months.

Where have all the men who were engaged in essential industries gone?

asked one draft-board chairman.

Many plants have not advised us of men now carried on our lists as essential to the war effort, whom we learned have gone into nonessential work, nor have the War Manpower nor the United States Employment Service advised us.

We here are not jittery like they are in Washington about the manpower situation. The whole trouble is in the administration of the selective service and manpower problems.

We welcome an opportunity to get tough, and we will crack down hard if it is necessary to meet doubling of our quotas.

Then it goes on to say that another draft-board chairman says:

The War Manpower Commission and the United States Employment Service have fallen down on the job.

What the members of my board would like to know is, Where have thousands of workers gone who are classified as essential war workers? Who let them go? Did the plants fail to notify the War Manpower Commission? Did they fail to notify the United States Employment Service? Did they follow instructions contained in existing laws dealing with manpower? We do not know. The problems in finding men either for the armed services or for necessary war-production industries is not too complicated, if the present enforcement machinery is utilized properly.

Now, what have you got to say about that, particularly in view of your statement this morning that there was absolute cooperation between the agencies of the Government, which is in contradiction to the kind of cooperation these chairmen are talking about?

Colonel KEESLING. I did not mean that there was absolute cooperation between the agencies of the Government. What I said was that I was sure that there would be, with Justice Byrnes having the general supervision. The record is absolutely clear, I believe. I know that Judge Hay, yesterday, representing the War Manpower Commission, stated that the certificate of availability program, which attempted to curtail turn-over, had not succeeded. It helped the situation but had not succeeded. In that connection, during 1943, there were not effective controls to stop turn-over from causes other than selective-service withdrawals.

In September of 1943, they put into effect this Baruch-Hancock, west-coast plan. A few days after that had been announced and put into effect, I happened to be called before the Downey subcommittee over in the Senate, at which time I made the observation that I believed the west-coast plan would be helpful but that it would not apply to prevent people from going from war jobs to nonessential jobs. That statement was questioned but was generally agreed to by the other representatives of the Government who were present.

When it is more to the man's economic advantage to stay in a temporary attractive war job, with the attractive working and living conditions, he is going to stay there. But, unless you have a fair program, such as is set forth in this bill, when the time comes, when he estimates it is more to his economic advantage to go into permanent work where working conditions are not as attractive, he is going to leave at that point to take such work. That is what occurred in the case of these men whom I was speaking about, who had gone into the merchant marine. That occurred during the past 3 or 4 months, when we had the optimism about the war's conclusion.

Congressman Johnson yesterday was talking about a certain naval yard around the San Francisco area. I happen to have gone out to make an investigation in July, after I heard that the turn-over problem had been solved and that the turn-over was not the important factor. When I got out on the west coast where this plan was supposedly working and which they were going to extend throughout the country, I was very much surprised to find that while it was helpful, it was not preventing men from leaving that area, the shipyards in that area, to go into other areas, or to go to little farms, or barber shops or what have you, and they were going out in increasingly large numbers. There was nothing to stop it effectively. Well, this may have been the trouble: What I call turn-over, some other agencies of the Government broke into two terminologies. They called it turn-over if you left a war plant to go to another war plant. They called it out-migration if you go from a war plant in one area to any sort of work or activity outside that area.

Mr. THOMAS. Let us confine it to these statements made by the chairmen of these local draft boards. They blame the situation not on the

lack of law, but they blame it on the lack of cooperation between your agency and the War Manpower Commission, and these other agencies, first of all, and then they blame it on the fact that you have not been tough enough. They probably mean that you had coddled some, and they also probably mean that you have sent out a lot of directives so that it is almost impossible for a Chinese lawyer to understand them. I have not only heard this from these Philadelphia people, I have heard it right in my own district.

Colonel KEESLING. Well, I think, Mr. Thomas, this is the situation, and I think that this might explain it: Up until the recent action taken by General Hershey at the request of Justice Byrnes, the Federal Government had not seen fit, up until that time, to bring the selective-service local boards into the industrial manpower mobilization and stabilization picture.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, right on that——

Colonel KEESLING. To the extent that they have under this recent directive.

Mr. THOMAS. You apparently mean to imply that things up to now have been confused, but now with the advent of Justice Byrnes everything is going to be all right, is that it?

Colonel KEESLING. I say this? With the adoption of the recommendation made by the House committee last spring, which these administrative actions followed, saying, recently, that if a man leaves the place of his employment without first getting the authority of his selective service local board, then selective service local boards are going to be in a position to control this turn-over, which before this time has not been able to be controlled.

But there must, of course, be proper coordination, and any information that War Production Board, War Manpower Commission——

Mr. THOMAS. What makes you believe we are going to get the proper coordination in the future?

Colonel KEESLING. I have reason to believe that there will be.

Mr. THOMAS. Why? What gives you that belief?

Colonel KEESLING. I believe that you have recently created an over-all board, which had not existed before, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

Mr. THOMAS. Who heads that board?

Colonel KEESLING. Justice Byrnes.

Mr. THOMAS. Do you not think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to have Justice Byrnes? If all this depends upon the War Mobilization Director?

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe so.

Mr. THOMAS. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Durham, do you have any questions?

Mr. DURHAM. Do you think women should be included in this bill, Colonel?

Colonel KEESLING. Mr. Chairman, I am appearing here today solely on this bill as drafted. It is my understanding that the accord that was reached among the executive departments was to approve this bill now, for its immediate passage, without in any way interfering with the broader national service legislation which the President also requested.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this bill does not include women.

Colonel KEESLING. So I am confining myself solely to this bill.

Mr. DURHAM. You are speaking for Selective Service, though, are you not?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; I am speaking for Selective Service.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, I asked you the question, of course, because you will recognize the fact that women are essential, and I understand there is a big turn-over at the present time among the employees. You recognize that fact, and you have also set up the black corps, and now we are trying to force something on the Army. If we are going to force it one way, let us force it both ways.

Colonel KEESLING. My answer is this, sir, that five executive departments, the Selective Service System, the War Manpower Commission, the War Production Board, the Army and the Navy, are in accord for the immediate enactment of this bill as is, with perhaps one or two perfecting amendments. It is my understanding that the President has asked for the immediate enactment of a bill of this type, and in addition, broader legislation.

Now, the two could, of course, be combined if the Congress so desires.

Mr. DURHAM. And this bill goes further than Selective Service at the present time?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes.

Mr. DURHAM. By including ages from 38 to 45?

Colonel KEESLING. No; men 38 to 45 are now liable under the Selective Service Act. They are not being inducted, however. If the committee so desires, in carrying out what the President has recommended, and what Judge Patterson and Mr. Bard have recommended, and which the executive departments would, I presume, follow in recommending broader legislation, the committee could, of course, accomplish it all at one stroke. That would be granting much broader authority, but you still, even if you had the broader authority, would follow through on the same, I believe, selective basis as is contained under this bill. You would do the same thing you would do in this bill with the 38 to 45's. If men in that age bracket are not now in war work and you determine a category below should go rather than your older men, you are not going to use all your authority. So you could very well put into this bill authority over women and authority over 45 up to 65 and have some sort of an arrangement that if it is not in the national interest to use them, but to use others first, you would have a priority arrangement. The same as you are doing within the limitations of this bill.

Mr. DURHAM. Do you think it would complicate your present system of operation of your selective service boards?

Colonel KEESLING. You mean to include women?

Mr. DURHAM. Yes.

Colonel KEESLING. It would not be a difficult job to register the women.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, this morning, I did not get the exact figures. I would like to know how many of these 900,000 that are to be called by the 1st of July are now deferred in essential industry and agriculture.

Colonel KEESLING. No; I did not give a break-down, sir, of those figures.

Mr. DURHAM. Have you got that?

Colonel KEESLING. No; I do not have here an estimate of how many are going to come from the farms. Numbers of them will have to come from agriculture, particularly in the lower-aged brackets.

Mr. DURHAM. Now, what is your present draft quota running a month for the recent months?

Colonel KEESLING. For January, for the Army, it is 80,000, and for the Navy, 32,000, and that would be——

Mr. DURHAM. That is in the future, but what did it run in December and November?

Colonel KEESLING. As I recall it, it was 85,000 each month for both the Army and Navy combined. That did not include voluntary enlistments of 17-year-olds, which would run, I would say, twenty-five to thirty thousand.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin, do you have some questions?

Mr. MARTIN. Colonel Keesling, you have given a great deal of time to the development of this particular bill, have you not?

Colonel KEESLING. I have given a lot of study to it; yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. And as I understood, you base it primarily on the recommendations of this committee last spring?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir .

Mr. MARTIN. It was our effort then to build up some recommendations that would help in the war effort, and that is still our hope, personally, that we can set up a bill here that we can support vigorously when it comes out before the House for consideration, but there are two or three points in this bill that must be clarified, and I am bothered by two or three of them, and I would like to ask you about them.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. As I understand, the bill now before us for consideration is not calculated to disturb any man occupationally deferred who is still on the job for which he is deferred?

Colonel KEESLING. Unless he is needed in the Army.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I understand that. I am talking about the men now occupationally deferred. This bill is calculated to reach the man primarily who has left his occupation and whom you are trying to force into war work.

Colonel KEESLING. Or who has never been in a war job.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes; to try to get him into either the Army, if he can qualify for that, or into some occupation that is directly in the interest of the war effort.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; on a selective basis.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, the opening paragraph in the bill refers to those who leave a farm, plant, or other activity, and from that I gather that that has reference to those who hereafter leave?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; that is in effect by administrative action already, sir, to those 18 to 38. What this bill would do would be to require or extend it to 45.

Mr. MARTIN. What are you going to do about those who have already left? Do you feel they are covered by the present directives?

Colonel KEESLING. They are not covered by the present directives, unless they were physically qualified and have no basis for occupational deferment. But, they are covered by the second portion of this bill, the same as any IV–F, or over-age man.

Mr. MARTIN. That provides for their reclassification?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; who is not in war work.

Mr. MARTIN. So that this bill does reach those?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. The reason I make that point is, there are some registrants who have been deferred for agricultural reasons and have left already, they have left the farm, and in my opinion, it would be a pretty good idea to pick them up.

Colonel KEESLING. I agree with you. That is what I was indicating this morning. If they were on the farm, and have left the farm, some of those IV–F's and older men can be channeled back, provided we do it on a selective basis.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, there is one major point that I quizzed some of the witnesses about yesterday, and I will ask your opinion about it also. In your opinion, is this bill expected to grant power to force a worker, an individual worker, to work for a specific private employer, and keep him in his employ for the profit of that private employer?

Colonel KEESLING. I suppose that generally speaking that would be the result. The bill provides that there will be a designation of the plants in a given area that need men; that you cannot get men any other way; and you have got to have that product to win the war, say forgings, for instance.

You would designate those plants, and the specific number of shortages, and then you would designate and have the local board call on this category of men, or type of men, and request them to go. If they responded and went through the various processes, into that plant, of course they would be working in private enterprise. They would not be working for the Government. They would get the full wages, and so on. They would have considerable choice of which plant they were going into of those that were specified.

Mr. MARTIN. I have no quarrel at all on the point of requiring them to work in an industry or a given field of occupation. The point I am making is that you would go a step further and require them to work for a specific private employer for that employer's profit.

Colonel Keesling. Even if you designated the broader activity, Mr. Martin, I think you would be doing the same thing, because although they would go into a general field, they would be working after they got in for a private employer. That is the purpose of the bill so that they would not be working for the Government. They would be working as freemen, with considerable freedom of choice. But if you need an 18-year-old or 26-year-old single man for a war plant, it is not going to do any good to say, "You have got to go some place," and have him go around the corner into a drug store and work there. You want to have him go to Bell Aircraft, for instance, or X forgery or foundry, and first come, first served.

Mr. MARTIN. If you require him to get a job in a given industry, and he comes back and proves that he has that job that he himself has taken up, that would not fill your purposes.

Colonel KEESLING. If it were in one of the designated activities——

Mr. MARTIN. Supposing he gets a job under a different employer than the one you have designated?

Colonel KEESLING. You always have the safeguard of the bill excusing him if there is a justifiable reason. Also, there are rights of appeal; and of course, you have the other agencies of the Government that are going to be in this picture.

For instance, if you say to him to go to some employer or some plant, you have the War Labor Board in the picture that has something to do with fixing wages and working conditions.

Mr. MARTIN. Would you advocate going so far as to have the Board, in case of a crop failure, or a serious situation in agriculture, designate that a certain man should go and work for a certain farmer? Or would you tell him to get a job on a farm?

Colonel KEESLING. I think that what undoubtedly would happen would be that you would specify the type of production that was necessary, and get some information from your county agricultural agents or the War Food Administration through their processes and find out what type of product, and what were the appropriate farms in the various counties.

Mr. MARTIN. Help him locate it?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. But to force him to take a job under one particular employer——

Colonel KEESLING. I think that the farm situation is different from the plant situation.

Mr. MARTIN. In other words, you do not think that will operate that way as to farming?

Colonel KEESLING. Not in all cases.

Mr. MARTIN. But it will operate that way as to industry?

Colonel KEESLING. I believe that the choice of jobs and the situation in some of these larger plants is a different situation than small individual farm units.

Mr. MARTIN. Have you given very careful study to the constitutionality of that point in this bill?

Colonel KEESLING. The point of having men——

Mr. MARTIN. Required to work for a given, specific, individual employer, for that employer's profit?

Colonel KEESLING. There is a provision in the Constitution, I cannot quote it exactly now, that says that Congress has authority not only to raise, but also to support the Army, and to provide as well as maintain the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Colonel KEESLING. The Luce bill, H. R. 3556, provided for certain civilian corps auxiliary to the Army and Navy at which time we went into the question. As a matter of fact those corps were called the Army and Navy Maintenance Corps.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, on your answer, I am still not satisfied with your approach to that phase of this bill. And I am not speaking here in behalf of C. I. O.-P. A. C. I am not speaking in behalf of any individual laborer. I do not owe them any support on this point, as far as that is concerned, but I am seriously worried about the bill you have brought here, or are working on, and its constitutionality on that point.

Colonel KEESLING. I think, Mr. Martin, that you will find, in the operation of the bill, that it will be on a basis of the greatest of selectivity and along the lines that you have suggested.

Mr. MARTIN. If you force them to take work in a given field of occupation, without requiring them to work for an individual employer for that employer's profit, then you are getting along the lines that might be possible.

Colonel KEESLING. Let us take an individual case. Let us say that in a certain area the only places where you have shortages are certain coal mines or certain foundries, and you have shortages of a thousand men, and you cannot get them any other way. Now, what are you going to do? You need the forgings to win the war; you have got to say that those particular mines and foundries are the places in which you are going to have these men work.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, perhaps you had better start a little earlier and amend the Constitution before you get down to that point.

Colonel KEESLING. Pardon me, I think I can answer it or throw some light on it. If you did not have this bill, labor and management, under those circumstances, as they have in the past, would call on the armed forces to send them men at Army pay, perhaps, as independent contractors, to do the stevedoring or do that work. That would be the only way you would get it done, or they would have to furlough them back, and the furlough back would be on condition that they would remain at that work, which results in the same thing you are questioning. That is what they have been doing and are doing right now, but they are able-bodied men rather than IV–F's.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, I have to hurry on to two or three other points here. That will not be the last I will express on that point, however, but at this time I will pass on. Can a man, inducted into this special status, be returned to industry on a showing of special skills and of special need?

Colonel KEESLING. I believe that he can be.

Mr. MARTIN. Is it your policy to advocate his return on that showing?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. Then are we studying here a matter of the most efficient use of those men?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; because these men are asked to respond, and if they——

Mr. MARTIN. In other words, you are nonforgiving once he gets into this category?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir. But I know that it would be a great mistake to announce in advance, and have a policy that, if a man left without getting the clearance of his local board he would be inducted and then immediately released.

Mr. MARTIN. But you are to stand hard and fast on keeping him in there for the purpose of making this less desirable for him?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. Otherwise, he would know he could either stay where he was if he was not in war work or, could leave the occupation in which he was and go to some other occupation. The only thing that would happen to him would be that he would go for a train ride some place, and he would go into the induction station. It would increase the work and cost of our selective-service operations and the Army would immediately release him, after he says "I repent"—and there would be no penalty at all.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, that leads to another point I want to make. Why do you take them into the Army in any capacity as a penalty?

You are flying right in the face of all that I have ever learned or thought was essential for the maintenance of a high-caliber Army, when you sentence a man to membership in the Army in any capacity as a penalty.

Colonel KEESLING. I agree that induction into the Army, as such, should not be a penalty, and that is the reason why you are providing that this man is in a special status after induction. Now——

Mr. MARTIN. Why put him in uniform at all?

Colonel KEESLING. You are not going to. I do not know what the Army is going to do with these men that come in.

Mr. MARTIN. They do not want them.

Colonel KEESLING. Well, if they came in, and I had anything to do with it, I would not have those men wear the usual Army uniform or any of the other emoluments of soldiers.

Mr. MARTIN. You know, and I know, throughout my entire lifetime, that it has been looked upon as a very serious mistake to put men into the Army as a penalty or a pay-off for crime.

Colonel KEESLING. I agree with you 100 percent, Mr. Martin, if——

Mr. MARTIN. And you are not lifting the status of the Army when you make that approach.

Colonel KEESLING. I agree with you 100 percent, Mr. Martin, if you induct them on the basis provided by this bill, because you are not then affecting the honorable status of men who are in the Army, all of them who are in there honorably.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

Colonel KEESLING. But this is an entirely different status, and Mr. Bard and Mr. Patterson said that they would go along with this, while they would prefer the other. If they did have this to be sure that it was an entirely different status from that of men honorably inducted, then I think that answers your question.

Mr. MARTIN. I have always looked at service in the Army as an honor and a privilege, and I cannot bring myself to seeing men put in the Army as a penalty for some failure to keep in step with our national interest.

Colonel KEESLING. Well, sir, I look at it this way: If a man gets into the Army, under honorable circumstances, and then disobeys, or does certain things that he should not do, he is reprimanded, he is put into work clothes of some sort, and he is put out to do certain work. Now, there are two types of men in the armed forces, therefore, and what would happen to this man is that he would go into that other capacity.

Mr. MARTIN. Are CO's in the Army?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes and no.

Mr. MARTIN. Are they veterans when they are released?

Colonel KEESLING. We have two types of conscientious objectors. The one opposed to combatant service only——

Mr. MARTIN. Is he in the Army?

Colonel KEESLING. He is in the Army, and the President has designated noncombatant service as being service with the medical units. They go to the front and wear uniforms, but they do not use guns. The other type of conscientious objector is opposed conscientiously to both combatant and noncombatant service, and he is under the jurisdiction of the Director of Selective Service in work camps.

Mr. MARTIN. And not in the Army?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes; and still these service objectors, or SO's, are in the Army?

Colonel KEESLING. I want to clear up one point, Mr. Martin. When you say my idea, again I want to point out that this was the recommendation of the House committee, based upon a recommendation of the Costello subcommittee, after they had gone into the question of whether General Hershey should take jurisdiction over these people or whether there should be a fine or imprisonment. The original suggestion of reducing the benefits came from Judge Patterson and Mr. Bard. On the question of fine, one thing I did not cover this morning was this:

The original Selective Service Act has a provision that there shall be no bounty. The man cannot buy his way out. If all you do is put a fine in here, there are going to be certain individuals who are going to be able to absorb that fine.

Mr. MARTIN. Can you not design a category in which they can be placed which will not place them in uniform, and which they will not particularly enjoy?

Colonel KEESLING. That would be very possible.

Mr. MARTIN. Then why can he not leave the uniform stand for honorable service?

Colonel KEESLING. My frank idea was that these men would not wear the regular uniform. The Luce bill provided that they would not wear the regular uniform.

Mr. MARTIN. I know you have taken some prisoners, civilian prisoners and given them a chance to serve in the Army and they have made a very fine record. They have looked at that as a privilege.

Colonel KEESLING. Right.

Mr. MARTIN. And they have made a very good record on that privilege.

Colonel KEESLING. I agree with you.

Mr. MARTIN. But here you profess a plan where you will not give these boys that treatment. They are to be kept in this category and they are not allowed to go back to industry and still they are in uniform as a penalty.

Colonel KEESLING. No; what I would do would be not to have them in the regular uniform of the armed forces. On the other point, I would say very definitely that you would have sufficient leeway. The Army can discharge anybody they want to and when the circumstances are such that they feel that the man is in there erroneously, they discharge him, or if they feel that it is in the national interests to discharge the man, without in any way affecting the stabilization program, they can do so. But based on the facts of each case.

Mr. MARTIN. One more point. If you put these men in uniform, of any kind, in any capacity, I agree heartily with the gentleman from Texas, in his hint this morning, that at some future time you will find they will be accorded all the rights, privileges, and immunities, and benefits and advantages of an ex-serviceman. All you have to do is to read the history of the 24–B officers, and you will find exactly what I mean. In that case 125 officers, perhaps 2 or 3 of whom may have gotten into that category by mistake, but in trying to get back on the

three-quarters retirement, they dragged one hundred and twenty-some fellows along that the Army cannot use under any shape or form, during the war, when they are not physically handicapped and they are in the prime of life, and still the Congress by this, saw this 24–B action by this committee and the House and the Congress, increased their retired pay for doing nothing $123 a month up to $127 a month, gave them free quarters, retired pay of their rank and length of service, when they are not usable by the Army.

Now, when that group got into retired status for 10 to 15 years' service, I can picture this whole group, that you are now trying to make a special classification, coming in later and enjoying all the privileges of service.

The CHAIRMAN. Well now, that is anticipating a lot of things.

Mr. MARTIN. It is based on facts.

Mr. KILDAY. That is one of the control forms of this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. It may do it. I was against the thing just as he was, but he put that in there anyhow.

Mr. MARTIN. I know it. Before you assume that your classification will stick, please give it some thought.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, and Mr. Martin, I want to say this: I do not think the situation is analogous, because the men you are talking about went into the armed forces in an honorable manner.

However, I hope, and I want it a matter of record, that if Congress sees fit, in its wisdom, to say that these men will not get the benefits, they will ever come back and remove the stigma. I cannot conceive of Congress ever coming back under these circumstances and removing the stigma from these men.

Mr. MARTIN. We cannot word this any more definitely than we did the 24–B provision of the law, at the time that was made the law.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

Mr. MARTIN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Elston, any questions?

Mr. ELSTON. Colonel, do you know of any reason why the special service unit could not be under the jurisdiction of Selective Service?

Colonel KEESLING. There is no reason why it could not be, sir. The matter was discussed, as you well know. We were up here last spring, and General Hershey said at that time that he would be, of course, willing to take over that operation, but that he felt that these men should come under the Articles of War. At that time, he gave some confidential and specific reasons as to why he felt that was so.

There also was a question as to whether or not you could extend the Articles of War to a civilian corps. That is, permit General Hershey to enforce the Articles of War over men that would be in these corps. It also was believed that it would be desirable to have the threat of these men having to work near the honorably inducted men. This was believed by General Hershey and myself, and also the committee members, at that time.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, Colonel, I notice that this act vests in the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion certain powers. You recall, sometime ago, we wrote into the Selective Service Act an amendment which precluded the delegation of any duties of the Selective Service Director to any other department of the Government. That was to take it away from the War Manpower Commission, where it had been delegated by Executive order. Now, the Director of War

Mobilization and Reconversion, of course, has the power to delegate his powers to other branches of the Government, and while this bill imposes on him the power to certify to the Director of Selective Service, from time to time, the War Manpower requirements, there is nothing that would prevent him from just delegating that to the War Manpower Commission, and then we would be almost back where we were before; would we not?

Colonel KEESLING. The only place in this bill, thus far, without further amendment, where the Director of War Mobilization is mentioned, is in the certification of the shortages. I do not believe that Selective Service is in a position to certify those shortages, and I believe that it should be certified very definitely by somebody else.

In the first Bailey-Brewster bill, before you had set up this congressional office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, the Bailey-Brewster bill provided for an interagency committee which would advise the Director of Selective Service as a board of directors.

Now, you have set up, by legislative enactment, the coordinating Office of Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and I assume that that is the reason that it was provided that he would be the person who would, I presume, get from the War Production Board, from the Army and the Navy, and War Manpower Commission, and other interested agencies, the information as to just where these shortages were.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, who would define what an essential industry is?

Colonel KEESLING. Now, what part of the bill are you——

Mr. ELSTON. Well, I am not referring to any particular part of the bill. But obviously in the final analysis the local board, regardless of this certification, would have the final say, subject to appeal.

Would that not cause confusion, if one local board would say that a certain type of business is essential, and another board in another State or county would say that that same business was not essential? And you would have men taken out of business in one area just because it was nonessential and retained in the same business somewhere else because it was essential.

Colonel KEESLING. Under the second part of this bill, commencing on line 16, it provides:

> The Director of Selective Service shall maintain an inventory and then upon receiving certification, the Director of Selective Service shall designate the categories of persons.

And under 2, it says:

> Who are not engaged in services designated by the Director of Selective Service as contributing to the war effort.

So that would follow out exactly what you have at the present time. You have broad uniform rules and regulations which are promulgated, within which the local boards operate. Then the local boards make determinations of fact, subject to appeal.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, in this bill, we of course have denied to men who would be in the special-service units the benefits of the soldier, and I certainly can go along with that. But what about the men who are inducted, or rather required to leave what may be termed "nonessential" types of business to go into other types of business? A man

may be in what is labeled a nonessential business and he may have incurred great obligations. He may have mortgages on his business; he may have a lot of life insurance; he may have children in college, and he may have very large obligations. Now, if he is taken away from his business, and we will assume he runs the general store and maybe he is the only one that can run it, and he is placed in a war plant.

Perhaps his income is not great enough there to maintain those obligations. When we took soldiers into the service we passed the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to take care of their mortgage payments, and insurance, and so on. Now, can you not conceive of great hardships which might result in taking men from what are called nonessential types of business and placing them in war plants?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; you have this situation, though, that concerns me a little bit on that phase. You have millions of men and women that have already gone from nonessential to essential work, and it would be quite an administrative job, or it might be quite an administrative job to go and pick them up and track them down to give them their rights to reemployment. Certainly they would be entitled to it. They have gone ahead already, over and above someone that is now transferring. That is just a detail. If it could be administratively handled, well and good. But then here is another point that might be an additional factor. In the first place, in these categories that would be specified as those of the type who should go, the third description of the type says—

who are, by reason of their status, the type of persons he deems can transfer to other work with the least disruption to the civilian economy and to themselves in comparison to persons in other categories.

Then later on, even if he is designated, you have the local board having this authorization—

Unless such registrant is found by Selective Service local board, subject to appeal, to have had a just reason for not becoming so employed.

Under those two factors, you presumably are going to apply this insofar as possible to single men of the younger age groups. Manpower requirements are not going to be so tremendously large. They are going to be comparatively small, actually, in relation to the 18,000,000 people that are involved.

So, if you can get by with applying this to just a few of the single men, young men, they are not going to have any great—most of them—business interests, seniority, pension rights, and matters of that sort, or family obligations. And they are the type who can, as set forth here, best make the shift, and are the logical ones to make the shift, and can best readjust themselves after it is over. If a sacrifice is to be made they can best make it.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, I think you are going to get more of the single men in the Army than you will——

Colonel KEESLING. I am talking about the single IV–F's.

Mr. ELSTON. Yes; but I am talking about the man that is married and has obligations. Do you interpret the section you have just read as giving Selective Service leeway enough to say to a man, "In your case, your financial obligations are so great that we cannot transfer you"?

Colonel KEESLING. It is broad enough so that you can provide whatever is for the best interest of the Nation.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, how about restoration of jobs? You have provided that a soldier, who goes into the service, when he comes back, his employer has to rehire him. What about the man who has been taken from a nonessential industry under this bill and transferred to an essential job?

Colonel KEESLING. If you could administratively handle it, I think it would be a very fine thing; but I believe you would have to seriously consider the administrative load, again consider the men who have already shifted, and the job it might be to have them prove their cases so as to be entitled to job restoration. You would have to have a designation of whether they could go from this type of an essential job to another type of an essential job. I believe that you could go a long way by having existing labor-management committees, which are doing, I understand, a very fine job in a number of these communities, try to get up a program whereby labor and management would voluntarily agree to maintain the seniority rights and reemployment rights of these relatively few men whom we would be asked to transfer.

Mr. KILDAY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ELSTON. Do you think that group would have the authority to say that seniority rights have to be maintained? Does it not require legislation to do that?

Colonel KEESLING. To be absolutely positive, I believe you would have to have legislation; but I believe you could go a long way in ascertaining from the labor representatives and management representatives how far they would go without legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Ohio yield to the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. ELSTON. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. At the time Mr. McNutt first issued his directive, 2 years ago, as to essential and nonessential occupations, that was involved as a basis of my objection to the law. I think you are absolutely correct, both on the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act and on his rights of reemployment, and I have already prepared amendments, in case we do report the bill, to see if we cannot have those provisions in it. I do not see how you can go to a man who is employed in something that is held to be nonessential, and has accumulated pension rights and seniority rights, and things of that kind, and have him give up all that and have no chance to go back.

Mr. MARTIN. I certainly think those rights will have to be protected.

Mr. KILDAY. That is the basis of the difficulty.

Mr. MARTIN. If you do not protect them by legislation, you will lose them.

Mr. KILDAY. With respect to requesting a man to go from nonessential employment to essential employment, the bill should provide he should be directed; then his rights should be protected.

Colonel KEESLING. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a point here.

The CHAIRMAN. Make it as briefly as you can, Colonel.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. Mr. Kilday, I think the situation that you are describing concerns the so-called nondeferable list.

Mr. KILDAY. That is right.

Colonel KEESLING. At that time, it was about 3 months before we were supposed to go into pre-Pearl Harbor fathers, and as I recall it, your objection was that we should not take a pre-Pearl Harbor father into the armed forces sooner than the Army really needed him, merely because he would not shift to another job. But all of those men concerned with that phase of the subject were fathers.

Mr. KILDAY. That was only a portion of it. The other portion was the disrupting of a man who had been established in a business. I do not think we ought to let ourselves be influenced by people who are hanging around a pool hall, because you have a lot of men who have not been affected by the Selective Service, owning and operating business, whereas they have very valuable rights. You cannot just drag him out of that and send him off to build airplanes and ships, and let all of his insurance lapse, when he is at an age that he cannot get others.

Colonel KEESLING. I agree that if you do get into that type of fellow, that certainly you ought to give thought to his situation.

Mr. KILDAY. You have 7,000,000 in that group 38 to 45.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Mr. ELSTON. So far, Colonel, men have been taken into the Army, rather, we might say, forced into the Army, because they did not shift from one job to another at the direction of the War Manpower Commission or Selective Service. That is true, is it not?

Colonel KEESLING. Well, actually, that happens every day, because it is a matter of classification. If a man does not meet the test that is set up for occupational deferment, all the conditions precedent, naturally he is inducted, provided he is qualified physically. All this does is to say that if we set up additional conditions precedent to deferment, and he happens to be physically disqualified, we will take him into this special corps. If he is physically qualified, we can either take him into the Regular Army, or put him in the special corps.

Mr. ELSTON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Mr. Fenton?

Mr. FENTON. Colonel, why do you include men from 38 to 45 in this bill, penalize them by putting them into special-service units in the Army and Navy, when as a matter of fact, the Army and the Navy do not want them either as combatants or as special-service units.

Colonel KEESLING. I consider that they are in the same general status as IV–F's, because so far as the Army is presently concerned, under their standards they say that they are not eligible for service. They are rejected, really, for service.

The Army have said that they do not want the IV–F's. But the same situation exists as between a IV–F and the man 38 to 45. They do not want him either. So it is the same situation there, sir. It is not taking these men in to use them in a military capacity.

Mr. FENTON. Now, how do you handle the people who are cut back when a plant is closed down, during the continuation of the war?

Colonel KEESLING. Those men, quite properly, would leave that plant. They would come under the second provision of this bill, then, because they would no longer be at war work, unless they went to war work from that plant.

If they went to war work directly from that plant, then it would be a question of whether they were properly——

Mr. FENTON. Whether or not there is a war plant in the immmediate vicinity of that plant?

Colonel KEESLING. They would be shifting from class II chart to the class IV chart.

Mr. FENTON. It works out very nicely in those places where there are plently of war plants going, but in isolated spots, it does not work out so good.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. We are going to handle this by area, anyway. So if he were in a given area, and we would have to move him far distant, we would not move him if there was somebody closer to that plant who was not in war work.

Mr. FENTON. He would be then permitted to seek any work he likes?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. FENTON. Now, coming back to the IV–F's, what is the line of demarcation between a IV–F and those in limited service?

Colonel KEESLING. For all practical purposes, we no longer have a delineation or difference between them, because the Army is no longer taking any percentage of limited-service personnel. There was one time when they were taking 10 percent, and later 5 percent, per month, and therefore the men that we had classified in II–A, B, C, (L) we had some sort of control over. Because, if they left their job, without getting the authority of the local board, or went out of that to nonessential work, we could put them up at the head of the line in the 10 percent or 5 percent per month quota. But now there is no quota. The Army, as they have testified here, have all their billets for limited-service men and over-age men, filled.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Keesling, let me make a suggestion to you. You answered his question adequately in about the first two sentences. I wish you would cut your answers down a little bit so we can get along.

Mr. FENTON. I appreciate the explanation, Colonel Keesling.

The CHAIRMAN. An explanation is all right.

Mr. FENTON. I want to pursue that just a little bit further. Looking over the pamphlet for examining candidates for the Army, for selective service, I find that they have requirements for those that qualify physically, those for limited service, and those not acceptable at all.

Colonel KEESLING. We had and we still have those listed in our inventories, but, as I say, for all practical purposes, the Army are not calling on us for the I–A–L's or II–A–L's or II–B–L's, so I have lumped those all together in my charts here under the II–A (F), II–B (F), II–C (F) classes.

Mr. FENTON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead, do you have any questions of Colonel Keesling?

Mr. WINSTEAD. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any question, Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. I have a few questions.

Mr. Chairman, I want to ask one or two questions along the lines of Mr. Martin's interrogations. These men in this group, in this

Keesling Corps that we referred to, are they to get an honorable discharge?

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that question.

Mr. JOHNSON. I asked him if the men in this group which was talked about among the newspaper men as the Keesling Corps, if they are going to get an honorable discharge if they behave themselves.

Colonel KEESLING. The answer is, it is up to the armed forces and I would assume they would give them a special—that would have to be worked out—but they may give them a special form of release.

Mr. JOHNSON. I just want to call your attention to this fact that you probably know as well as I do.

The man with an honorable discharge gets a great many State benefits, in civil service, and property exemptions, and the like.

Colonel KEESLING. I believe that is a point that we should very definitely consider, and if the Army needs authority to grant a special form of discharge in this case, it certainly should be obtained.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Now, the gentleman from New Jersey mentioned the fact that the draft boards indicated the trouble we have had was due to the rules not being administered properly.

Is it not a fact, Mr. Byrnes is Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. He would supervise reconversion matters?

Colonel KEESLING. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSON. It is obvious he cannot have his fingers on the details of all these jobs.

Colonel KEESLING. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSON. What mechanics are going to be set up, or how is it going to be handled so it is handled by somebody who is personally familiar with the details of the job?

The reason I ask you that is you mentioned the fact that he was at the top, and you felt, would coordinate all the different agencies involved and produce harmony.

What are the mechanics of the things that are going to take care of the job?

Colonel KEESLING. I imagine that Justice Byrnes would coordinate the agencies and endeavor to determine which parts the various portions of the team should play.

Mr. JOHNSON. Has not he got a job that is almost just beyond the capacity of any one man to understand and know the details?

Colonel KEESLING. I believe that he is very well qualified to oversee this.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Now, do you think that an amendment, providing either as a separate law or amendment, to this law, providing that those men who go from nonessential industry without the certificate, if there were a penalization, that that would handle the situation?

Colonel KEESLING. If you have the proper type of program that does not make too much difference; it does not make too much difference what the penalty is.

Mr. Bard and Mr. Patterson have said they would go along with this type of penalty but would prefer the other. I have indicated that I would prefer this to be consistent with the administrative action we have already taken following the pattern of this committee's recommendation of last spring, which is induction into the armed forces if the man leaves his job.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mentioned a while ago the program that the War Manpower Commission worked out to prevent this turn-over in our part of the country had not worked out.

Colonel KEESLING. The idea of it and the aim was fine.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, will it work out better or work out completely, if we had a penal provision on the part of the employers and on the part of the men who go from one industry to another without having a certificate?

Colonel KEESLING. Well, that is what you are in effect doing here.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, but this is in addition to what you propose.

Colonel KEESLING. If you made it mandatory upon these men here that we are talking about and say, "You have a duty not to leave," and then say that those who are chosen by the selective-service boards, who are asked to go to war jobs, but do not, shall be deemed to have been called upon and have violated their duty, then section 11 of the Selective Service Act will come automatically into play, and that is $10,000 fine or 5 years' imprisonment, or both, in addition to induction, and hence you have a three-way penalty.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, you brought out the fact that the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion would have the right to classify and reclassify.

I am asking this question for a definite reason. At the present time printers are listed in the essential occupations, and in California there are probably four or five hundred weekly papers and printers are very, very hard to get. What is to prevent him from changing those printers and thereby practically closing all those papers?

Colonel KEESLING. As I understand it, you have certain designations to be made in here by the Director of Selective Service on essentiality. The deferment is still within the Selective Service System.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, are printers a part of that? That is what I want to know.

Colonel KEESLING. I do not know what the rules are going to be, but I would assume that the rules would probably be as they are in getting men for the armed forces or deferring men from the armed forces, namely more liberal as you get into the higher age groups and into men that have marital, business, and so forth, status.

In other words, you might have a printer who was in the age group, 26 and above, and say "yes," and you might say "no" for a printer in the age group 26 and below.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it amounts to the fact that they are at the mercy of the classification that this man wants to make?

Colonel KEESLING. Oh, I would not say so—it would be under general coordination, but you provide here in this bill the Selective Service System coming in, with the local board having the final say.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, now, today I have been informed that the Secretary of War made a statement that every able-bodied man in the country under 30 years of age would be needed for active military service this year. How many are there, and if you do not know, will you put it in the record—how many are there between 18 and 30, who are physically fit?

Colonel KEESLING. I gave you the figures this morning that between 18 and 26 there were 360,000 in II–C, and they had not had a physical examination. Those are the farmers.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, will you make some notes and put this in the record?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, I will be glad so.

Mr. JOHNSON. How many men are there between 18 and 30, how many registrants of recent date, and how many of those are physically fit. Then how many of those are in farm work; how many in industry; and how many in Government?

Now, all your calculations, I understand, are what the requirements are for the first 6 months of 1945?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Have you anything in mind as to what is going to be required for the last half of '45?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, do you not have to have some basis to work on? You are looking ahead quite a long ways.

Colonel KEESLING. I cannot say that the plans are not in being but I have not been informed beyond the first 6 months' period.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the first 6 months' period contemplates the casualties, too, I suppose?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, it does; but, as I have always cautioned before when I have been in here, this is an estimate and many things can happen to cause it to go up or down.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all.

Mr. KILDAY. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, Mr. Kilday.

Mr. KILDAY. Colonel Keesling, in 1940, when we were first considering this bill, I do not believe you were with us.

Colonel KEESLING. I came in on July 16, 1940, and although I missed some of the hearings before that date I participated in all the subsequent proceedings.

Mr. KILDAY. Well, we had quite a discussion here. The Draft Act of the last war, for the determination of the local board was regarded as final. If the man failed to report in accordance with the instructions of the local board he was nevertheless regarded as a member of military service and subject to court martial rather than proceeded against in the civil courts, and we were all very anxious that that not be true in this instance and we specifically provided for the provision of the act to be subject to trial by the United States district courts.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. And, of course, we have proceeded that way. I think we have had very few prosecutions so far under that law, but under this proposal in the bill, if the local board, subject to appeal, of course, decides that a man should go into industry and then they decide there is good reason for it, that is the final determination under this bill. He would then be condemned to the Keesling corps. But the special-service unit with all the stigma that would be attached to it, and still, it could only be an administrative determination rather than the judicial determination that we insisted on in the very beginning for the act, is not that correct?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; I remember when we had a provision in there, originally in section 11, that gave concurrent jurisdiction to court martial or civil courts, and I think it was on the floor of the Senate that they took out the court-martial part of it. However, we ran into difficulty not too long ago by reason of a Supreme Court decision. There is a technicality, I believe in the War Department Regulations; a man went through every single solitary step up to the actual point of taking the oath and then he said, "I won't take it," and there we were.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what was he, a civilian or a soldier?

Colonel KEESLING. The Court held that he was a civilian.

Mr. JOHNSON. I should think he would be.

Mr. MARTIN. Was that a unanimous opinion?

Colonel KEESLING. I do not recall.

Mr. KILDAY. It was a recent opinion. Was not unanimous. But that would be a departure from the policy we have established here.

Colonel KEESLING. Well, this situation is somewhat different than that. I am not being insistent on any form of penalty, but I did want to have the record show that we have preferred the type that is already in the bill as distinguished from the other. It is, of course, up to the committee to determine which is better. I believe we should get a record of the actual number of delinquencies you spoke of, and file that and other matters concerning civil penalties with the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel Keesling.

I was asked today by one Member of the House, and I am sure he is going to ask it of me if I go on the floor of the House with this bill, I could not answer it and I want you to answer it for me.

Assuming a plant in Philadelphia needs a thousand men and they are to recruit them either from that community or to bring them from somewhere else. Who, under the provision of this bill, would determine where they should come from? I made a guess. I want to see whether I guessed right.

Colonel KEESLING. The Director of Selective Service—starting on page 3 of the bill, line 5 [reading]:

> The Director of Selective Service shall call upon such local boards in such area—

That is, the area in which the shortages are specified—

> and outside the area if he deems it in the national interest—

In other words, if he can get enough men of the right age group and status within the area, fine; if there are not enough fellows of this particular category, maybe under 26 single, and if he feels it is

better to go outside of the area to get men of the same category rather than to go up into the businessmen or older men or printers you were talking about, Congressman Johnson, then he would go outside of the area.

The CHAIRMAN. That would save all of the expenses of transportation of a thousand men from California to Philadelphia?

Colonel KEESLING. It would remove a lot of this so-called congestion of housing and everything else that might otherwise be involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

You have given the committee very much valuable information, and we appreciate it.

Colonel KEESLING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a Member of the House here, Mr. William Colmer, Representative from the State of Mississippi, who wants to be heard on this subject. I will ask Mr. Colmer to come around and give us his statement in just such a way as you desire, Mr. Colmer. We are glad to hear you, and we are sorry to have had to delay your appearance.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M. COLMER, REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Mr. COLMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I shall be very brief in my statement, and if there are any questions that the members of the committee desire to submit to me, I would be happy, of course, to attempt to answer them.

I would like to say preliminarily that for several weeks I have been giving considerable study to this question of manpower and the necessity for a full mobilization of that manpower.

I began that prior to the President's message and began my study prior to any activity here on the Hill.

I want to say further by way of preliminary explanation that I have no pride of authorship about this bill. I might even go so far as to say that I recognize the fact that I am not a member of the Military Affairs Committee, and that I might be in somewhat the same attitude that some of you gentlemen find yourselves when you come before my committee as Members who have their own resolutions.

I do not set myself up, sir, as an expert on this problem, but I do think that I have just a little ordinary common horse sense that I have tried to exercise in preparation of this bill.

Further, I should like to say——

The CHAIRMAN. You are talking about H. R. 1159?

Mr. COLMER. That's correct. I assume that the Members have a copy of the bill before them. Unfortunately the printer was rather tardy in getting it printed, and we were just able to get it today.

I want to say further that no one is collaborating with me in the preparation of this bill, nor its presentation here; the only help that I have had in the preparation of this bill has been the able assistance given me by Mr. Morgan of the legislative counsel.

Now, just this further preliminary and I will go ahead and be brief, as I said. Not having any pride about the matter, since matters have

taken the turn that they have, I am in hopes that the committee will consider the philosophy of this legislation. That if it feels that it is a better bill than the one that you are considering, then, of course, that you would report it out. If, on the other hand, you felt that there were some phases of it, some particular parts that would fit into the legislation which you are attempting to write, then you will do that. I am just trying to say, Mr. Chairman, that I am not trying to have my bill reported out or be the author of this legislation.

Now, just briefly, the bill would set up another branch of the military forces to be known as the Supply Forces; all persons subject to the provision of selective service, who are in a deferred status, would automatically be included in a pool known as the Supply Forces, and be placed on inactive status, subject to the call of the President as Commander in Chief to render such service as is considered essential to the war effort.

When the services of such person so deferred were needed for the war effort, the President, as Commander in Chief, would call them from the inactive status to the active status in the Supply Forces.

The provision of the bill would apply to, first, those persons presently deferred because of physical disability, the so-called IV–F's who are not presently engaged in essential war work and who could pass a prescribed physical examination; second, those persons of other draft classification who are not engaged in an occupation essential to the war effort; third, those persons who are enjoying occupational deferment, but who strike or leave their jobs, where those jobs are essential to the war effort; fourth, other persons who were engaged in a job essential to the war effort who acquired a record, after the passage of this bill, of willful absenteeism for which there was no reasonable justification; and fifth, all other persons subject to the provisions of the selective-service law not herein enumerated and who are not specifically exempted under the draft laws.

The bill has another feature which I took from an old bill that I introduced a couple of years ago, in that it would provide that net profits, or war contracts, in excess of $10,000, shall be limited to 6 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. In excess of $10,000?

Mr. COLMER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Should be limited to 6 percent?

Mr. COLMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. May I ask right there what about the contracts that have been renegotiated?

Mr. COLMER. Well, they would have to be re-renegotiated.

Mr. ELSTON. They would have to be re-renegotiated?

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him go ahead with the statement.

Mr. COLMER. Well, I think that is rather a pertinent question, sir, but I am not as familiar with that provision of the bill as I might be because it is rather technical, as I think I am with the other provisions of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. You may proceed now.

Mr. COLMER. All right. Those, in the main, are the features of the bill.

Now, this bill differs, in the main, with the bill that you, Mr. Chairman, have introduced here and which is now under consideration, in that it would set up a different unit, and not call these men into the Army and Navy, as your bill provides. My idea about that was that I was under the impression that the Army and Navy had quit calling these men for limited service and said that they did not need them, and, therefore, I was trying to meet that situation and bring them into this third division.

Under the bill they would wear whatever uniform prescribed. I take it that the regular uniform would be prescribed with some designating insignia, proper insignia.

They would be subject, once called to active service, to the articles of war for disciplinary purposes. Otherwise I do not think you could very well administer the bill.

These men, so called, would be entitled to and receive the pay of like ranks in the Army. They would be entitled to the benefits of allotments, quarters, and so forth, as members of the military service. They would not be entitled to the general benefits of the veterans' legislation, such as the G. I. bill and so forth.

They would be entitled, however, to the benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. They would be called in the following manner, and I read briefly from the bill, page 5 [reading]:

> Whenever the President determines that the manpower requirements for the production of any article, commodity, or equipment necessary for the prosecution of the war, or the manpower requirements for any war-supporting activity, in any area are not being satisfactorily met by voluntary recruiting of personnel on the part of labor, management, and the Government, he is authorized to call members of the supply forces to active duty in such numbers and with such skills and at such places as he deems necessary to meet such requirements.

Then the bill provides, page 6 [reading]:

> Interference with members of supply forces on active duty—

there is a penalty there for whoever interferes with their carrying out their duties, as such, and that, in brief, Mr. Chairman, is this bill.

I have not attempted to take your time in any harangue on it to convince you of any superior features that it might have over your proposed legislation.

I would be glad to attempt to answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions?

Mr. THOMASON. A man would enter just the same as he enters the Army now?

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

Mr. THOMASON. What penalty would be prescribed for violation?

Mr. COLMER. They would come under the Articles of War and be subject to the same disciplinary action as a member of the armed forces.

Mr. THOMASON. That does not include your strike provision.

Mr. COLMER. Well, it says there that anybody that interferes with them in the performance of their duty.

Mr. THOMASON. There is nothing in the law now to cover that situation, so I am just wondering how you would proceed. Would it be by court martial for that kind of a violation?

Mr. COLMER. I am not sure I get your question.

Mr. THOMASON. I say there is no specific coverage in the Articles of War now for a strike situation except just the blanket violation of the Articles of War. Is that the section under which he would be prosecuted?

Mr. COLMER. Let me see if I understand the first part of your question. Are you talking about the man who is already inducted and called into active service and then goes on strike?

Mr. THOMASON. Yes; the man that goes into your supply forces.

Mr. COLMER. Oh, I think that clearly he would be covered by the Articles of War. He refuses to obey his orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us assume, Mr. Colmer, that there are a thousand men in a group at work under this proposed bill. Suppose a union labor leader applied to them for joining the union and paying the dues, would that be a violation of the provision of the bill or interfering with their performance?

Would they be permitted to be organized?

Mr. COLMER. I think section 206, beginning at the bottom of page 6, would, in part, answer your question, Mr. Chairman, if his duties were interferred with to the extent that he were told that he could not work there and some effort was made to prevent him from working because he did not belong to the union.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Do you plan to have it voluntary on the part of the individual whether he joins the union or not?

Mr. COLMER. Well, of course, to be perfectly candid with you, in my conception of the bill, the question of the union would not enter into it any more than with a member of the armed forces, because he is in the Army; he is in a separate branch of the Army. I do not think that question would enter into it.

The CHAIRMAN. "Whoever interferes" would include anybody?

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Any other questions?

Mr. ELSTON. Mr. Colmer, would not your bill have this effect—it would, of course, apply only after it would become a law. It would apply to those persons inducted thereafter. Under your bill, you would induct persons into the supply forces of the Army and they would be assigned to the various war plants?

Mr. COLMER. They could be; yes, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. A man would be working in a war plant under an assignment under your bill for, we will say, $50 a month. Right next to him is a fellow who has been working there for several years, or maybe for just a few days.

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Who went to work before your bill became a law.

Mr. COLMER. Right.

Mr. ELSTON. He is getting maybe $15 or $20 a day. Would there not be a great deal of unfairness?

Mr. COLMER. There would certainly be some element of unfairness there, but I would say that the answer to that is that it would be no more unfair, in that case, than it would be to take two men, two brothers, to take one of them and put him on a ship and send him over to the front to dig down into the trenches in the fox holes, or on the ships, under cannon fire, and make him work for $50, and permit the other one to work for private wages as is now done.

Moreover, this man does not have to do this under this bill; he can go on and get his $10 or $15 a day, if he will; it is only after he had not exercised that privilege that this bill would come into effect. So he is much better off than the man who is fighting at the front.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, you provide, as I read it, in section 202, that every male citizen of the United States and every other male person residing in the United States who is liable for training and service under title I in the land or naval forces of the United States and who is deferred from such training and service after classification shall, upon such deferment, be inducted into and become a member of the supply forces of the United States on inactive duty.

Mr. COLMER. That is right. In other words, his status would be just the same as it is now. He is just automatically included in there.

Mr. ELSTON. Every person who is deferred becomes a member of this group on inactive duty?

Mr. COLMER. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. Then if he is called to active duty——

Mr. COLMER. Under certain conditions.

Mr. ELSTON. He immediately gets the same pay as a soldier?

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, it is not his fault that he is deferred?

Mr. COLMER. Well, I think there is a little difference there. He has an opportunity to go out and to get into some job that is in the aid of the war effort. But if he prefers not to do that, then he would come under the provisions of this, if the President saw fit to call him.

Mr. ELSTON. I do not see any provision in here where you exempt men who are working in war plants.

Mr. COLMER. Oh, yes; they are exempted. They are called in certain order.

The CHAIRMAN. Page 5.

Mr. COLMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. But you make them all members of this supply force immediately upon being deferred?

Mr. COLMER. Yes, sir; just as any other man in this room now is a soldier on inactive service who is subject to the selective-service law.

Mr. THOMASON. If you have a IV–F man in a war plant, performing essential war work——

Mr. COLMER. Yes?

Mr. THOMASON. Would he be forced into your supply forces?

Mr. COLMER. No, sir; not on active duty, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomas, do you have a question?

Mr. THOMAS. Yes. Mr. Colmer, on page 6, section (3), which is the third classification, you say that—

Individuals who are engaged in activities necessary to the prosecution of the war but who are found by their selective-service board, subject to appeal in the same manner as is provided under section 10 (a) (2), to have a record of absenteeism for which there is no reasonable justification—

But who would determine the degree of reasonable justification? The local board?

Mr. COLMER. The local board, under such regulations as were prescribed by the Selective Service.

Mr. THOMAS. Well, would not that be hard to carry out, because you have one local board which might have a good many industrial plants in its area and it would be very difficult for them to know just who is absent with justification and who would not be.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Thomas, I do not think that would be any more difficult of administration than the question of who was qualified to be deferred because of his essentiality to the war effort; it would be a question that would have to be decided upon each case, but under general regulations, and it would, in my opinion, stop a lot of this absenteeism and a lot of interference with our war effort.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say this, if there are no further questions, in conclusion——

Mr. ELSTON. I would like to ask another question, Mr. Colmer. I know you have given that a lot of study; to get back to what I was discussing before: Suppose a man is a farmer, he does not know today whether he is going to be taken off the farm and put in a war plant or not. Now, under your bill, if he is taken off the farm and he is put in a war plant, he would get this $50 a month, would he not?

Mr. COLMER. That is right.

Mr. ELSTON. Whereas a man working on the bench next to him——

Mr. COLMER. Now, that is assuming that the President saw fit to order his call into active service?

Mr. ELSTON. Well, we have been told today that they are going to take farmers.

Mr. COLMER. Into what?

Mr. ELSTON. In the war plants. They are going to have to call on men within certain age categories to go in to war plants.

Mr. COLMER. All right, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. Now, would not your bill just practically compel every farmer to go out and seek a job in a defense plant?

Mr. COLMER. No, sir; I do not think it would.

Mr. ELSTON. Would it not defeat the very purpose of having farmers specially classified in the first place?

Mr. COLMER. No, sir; I do not think it would at all, any more than it would take men out of the war plants and put them on the farms. The whole thing is directed to keeping these men, who are capable of making some substantial contribution to the necessary war effort, on the job.

Mr. ELSTON. Well, the farmer is on the job today because he has been placed there.

Mr. COLMER. All right, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. He has been made to stay on.

Mr. COLMER. So is the man building ships or planes.

Mr. ELSTON. I know, but as Colonel Keesling said today, people are selected under the Selective Training and Service Act and are placed either in industry or other places in the Army, not of their own choosing. They are there because the Government says they can do the best job there.

Now, the Government has determined the farmers can do a better job farming than in war plants, but if the time comes when they need some of those farmers to go into war plants as they apparently do now, and you take them off the farm and put them in the factory, working next to a man who is making many times, in a week, what they would make in a month, it seems to me it would be grossly unfair and would defeat the very purpose of the Selective Training and Service Act.

Mr. COLMER. Mr. Elston, I would agree with you, sir, that if the President were to call the farmer from the job of farming into active duty under the provisions of this bill, if it were enacted, and place them into building ships or planes or something of that sort at $50 a month, it would be a gross injustice. But I do not think that the bill anticipates any such thing as that nor provides for it, any more than that the men are now called from one essential job to another. I think your fears, sir, are not well founded under the provisions of this bill.

Mr. ELSTON. They are well-founded in view of the testimony before this committee that is exactly what they are going to do. Men in certain categories are going to have to leave the farms and other occupations and go in the Army.

Mr. COLMER. Well, then, I assume that if the President as Commander in Chief found that he needed or that the war effort needed men worse in some industry than it did on the farm, that the proper notice would be given to them and they would have an opportunity to go there.

Mr. CLASON. Mr. Colmer, I would like to ask you about this profit basis, giving everybody 6 percent profit on the basis of his cost. If that is so, a man who has a tremendous turn-over on a small investment might make a huge sum of money; some other corporation which has a slight turn-over and very big and complicated machinery, would receive perhaps a very small income. He only gets 6 percent of his costs, which perhaps in connection with big machines might take a year to make and might not be able to make a reasonable return on his investment. Do you not think your section 2, there, on page 7 is going to be in the position of giving some people exorbitant profit? It is established as a fixed price and not a direction, whereas others, it might put them into bankruptcy.

Mr. COLMER. Permit me to say in all candor to my distinguished colleague that this is a provision which I extracted from an old bill which I introduced when the war first started. Its purpose is to prevent unconscionable and enormous profits. I do not now feel, nor have I ever felt, that any person should become enriched out of the innocent blood spilled in this war. I recognize the difficulties of administering such a law, so I had Mr. Morgan of the Legislative Counsel to prepare this section for me. And because of the technicalities and many problems involved I shall have to respectfully defer all questions thereon to him.

Mr. MARTIN. In your section 205 (c), page 5, you have set out there different categories that should draw the men to this active service status in this corps. All of these seem to me to be in the nature of a penalty for participation in strikes or failure to be engaged in activities necessary to the prosecution of the war or for absenteeism. I wonder, in view of that, whether you could consider creating something different than an uniformed service or a part of the Army, if you are going to make membership or active participant in it in the nature of a penalty. It goes against my convictions to make of our uniform a sort of penalty for some offense. I have always had the view that it is a privilege and an honor to wear it, and I wonder if you have given any thought to creating something outside the military service as this special organization which you attempt to create here.

Mr. COLMER. Well, sir, I think I have done that, with all due deference to the distinguished chairman and those who collaborated in the preparation of the bill that you have had before you for the last 2 days, in that we are not taking them directly into the armed forces but setting up a separate force. Yes; I have given some——

Mr. MARTIN. But you are making them subject to the Articles of War.

Mr. COLMER. I have given some thought to that, but I do not agree with you.

Mr. MARTIN. You are giving them the oath of the soldier, the discharge—it has all the earmarks of uniformed service.

Mr. COLMER. Well, they would have to wear the uniform, regardless of what you called them. Certainly under the proposed bill they would wear the uniform.

Mr. MARTIN. I have had the same question upon the proposed bill. I am not restricting my objection to your bill only.

Mr. COLMER. Well, then, if you objected to that provision in the other bill, then this should be the lesser of the two evils with you.

Mr. KILDAY. In this bill they would be entitled to veterans' rights?

Mr. COLMER. In which bill?

Mr. KILDAY. Your bill.

Mr. COLMER. No, no, only the benefits of allotments——

Mr. KILDAY. I mean after the service is terminated——

Mr. COLMER. I am talking about while he is in the service, yes, but not after.

Mr. KILDAY. After he leaves the service?

Mr. COLMER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin still has the floor.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Colmer, on page 3, I think, in section 202, you contemplate assigning Army officers and noncommissioned officers for the supervision of the work of the corps, and from that I infer that you have in mind their working under the direction and management of the Army rather than under the direction and management of any specific private employer?

Mr. COLMER. Well, the bill provides for certain training and so forth.

Mr. MARTIN. You mean the assignment of officers and noncommissioned officers?

Mr. COLMER. Yes. Well, then, of necessity there would have to be somebody assigned to organize these forces. You would have to have somebody familiar with the Military Establishment.

Mr. MARTIN. Would you consider them working for the Army under Army direction and management or for a private employer for a private plant?

Mr. COLMER. I would consider them working for the United States just as the soldier and the sailor is doing.

Mr. MARTIN. And under their direction and management?

Mr. COLMER. Right.

Mr. CLASON. Supposing these people were working for a big plant and you put 2,000 men into a plant, that is going to automatically reduce the cost of that plant, is it not, to the extent that for 2,000 persons working there, their pay roll might be 5 or 10 million dollars a year, if they were being paid the ordinary civilian rates, that automatically is going to cut the profits of that concern and might turn it from the black into the red.

Mr. COLMER. Well, my thought was that it would have the reverse effect, that that would be the criticism of it.

Mr. CLASON. No, they are going to get 6 percent of their costs under your provision under section 2, and you have automatically the Government paying these people rather than the employer paying them, reducing the cost of the article and thereby knocking all askew the contract provisions of the contract which has been entered into between the private contractor and the Government.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Clason, is not your question this, that if an airplane manufacturer has 10,000 men making an average of $200 a month and we put 10,000 of these men in at $50 a month, it would increase their profits, the difference between $50 a month of 10,000 men and $200 a month of 10,000 men.

Mr. CLASON. It would on the face of it until you find that he can only get 6 percent of his costs. Suppose they are all his employees, all 2,000, the Government pays the wages and he does not have any wage expenses at all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Colmer, will you answer that?

Mr. COLMER. Yes, that is my reaction to that, that that would reduce his costs rather than increase them and that is the thing that has given me some concern about that provision in the bill, that it might add to a large profit for the employer rather than small profits.

Mr. CLASON. You do not mean to tell me that a big concern employing 2,000 persons and entitled to 6 percent of his costs as his profit having taken out of it all of his expenses by way of pay roll is going to be in a position to make a profit on his other expenses, if he has got a large investment, do you?

Mr. COLMER. Would you answer that, Mr. Morgan?

Mr. MORGAN. I still do not see what Mr. Clason is asking.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, Mr. Colmer, if you have something to answer on that.

Mr. COLMER. Well, as I said, I do not want to be discourteous to my learned friend.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to have the answer to it.

Mr. COLMER. Well, I mean, I do not want to leave it in the balance like that. My thought is that it would have a different effect from the one that you think and I was apprehensive about it from tha point of view.

Mr. CLASON. Well, wages often are 75 percent of the cost of an article.

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Then the man has got to make his profit solely upon the cost of his materials and his taxes and other necessary expenditures and he would only get 6 percent of that. Some other manufacturer in the same business making the same number of airplanes would be entitled to 6 percent of the pay roll under your bill and he would not get any of that 6 percent.

Mr. COLMER. May I suggest that if you see fit to report this bill out, with that provision, that I will be very glad to go along with you on any language which would reach the objective sought.

Mr. MARTIN. I appreciate your effort there to avoid an increased profit with forced labor.

Mr. COLMER. Yes; that is the idea, of course.

Now, just briefly, Mr. Chairman, and I will be through——

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Colmer.

Mr. COLMER. As I said in the beginning, the major difficulty in this bill and the one you are considering is that it sets up the supply forces; that may or may not be the answer.

Another provision is that it spells out some things which I think, as one Member of Congress, ought to be taken cognizance of by the Congress.

Now, we hear Members of Congress, we hear high Government officials and others talk about strikes in war industries and that this gross absenteeism, and so on, does not interfere with war production. Well, maybe it does not, but when they testify to that, it seems to me that they usually have some difficuly in getting it out, and that they have their tongue in their cheek, so to speak.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you to observe right here that every witness from the departments, Army, Navy, and all the rest of them, shied clear away from the question.

Mr. COLMER. Yes; I have observed that, Mr. Chairman, and you might have gone a little further, but you did not. However, that is all right.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Mr. Chairman, right there, one thing, if you will pardon me. I notice in section 206, I believe, you tried to take care of the fact that if we force a man into industry no one can interfere with that man's duties and if they do, there is a penalty imposed.

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I am vitally interested in that particular phase of it, and especially in the fact that if we force him into industry, he cannot be forced against his will to become a member of some union, and I am not trying to attack the unions, but I want to try to protect the individual in his rights.

Now, let me ask you this: Your effort here is to cut the profits of the war industries, to keep them from making excessive profits at the expense of the worker, if I understand you correctly?

Mr. COLMER. Yes.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I certainly am in accord with you in that and in prohibiting anyone interfering with workers that we force into industry with this bill.

Mr. COLMER. Thank you.

I do not think that a Government which says to the virile young manhood of this country, we are going to tap you on the shoulder and send you over there for cannon fodder through the agency of the Congress of the United States, can stop there and say that we are not going to see that you get the necessary sinews of war, the planes and ships and so on to carry on, and I cannot distinguish between the service that a man performs for his Government in time of war on the battlefront and that he performs in industry. They are both essential and one just as honorable as the other, but by the same token, the responsibility of both is just as great to the Government, one as the other, and if I had my way about this war, I would see that everybody contributed, that was capable, something to this war effort.

I make this statement, Mr. Chairman—so far, I do not think that anybody in America has made any sacrifice excepting those whom we have called in to the armed services, and their loved ones who are bereaved thereby.

The average American citizen is better off; he is more prosperous; he has got more money; he is living better than he has ever lived heretofore.

We are, as far as the home front is concerned, fighting a pink-tea war. We talk about sacrifices. We have not made any sacrifices.

The only sacrifice that has been made, I repeat, is by those boys, and who put them in there? You and I. And I voted for every one of them—I voted for all these selective-service matters, but I think it is just as much my duty to vote to put these folks who are capable of doing something and want to do it, for this war effort, in a supply force, in the Army or the Navy, or wherever they can render their service.

You and I go out here to see these football games, and I am not picking on those boys any more than anybody else. We go out there and we see these giant men, supermen, as far as you and I are concerned. They have some physical defect, I take it—and I am not casting any aspersions on them, do not misunderstand me—but they are out there carrying the ball, and they are carrying it against tough opposition. Now, that is all right, under the present system, but they are not contributing anything to the war effort.

Do you mean to tell me those men cannot drive a truck? That they cannot contribute something to the war effort?

I think this Congress ought to do something more than give lip service and legislate future benefits to these veterans when they come back. And do not think that they do not know what is going on.

I talked with a man—I wish I were authorized to quote him—who made a tour of all the battle fronts and the seven seas, as a representative of somebody in this Government to find out what these boys wanted to do when they got back here after the war, and he was telling me about that. And I asked him the question. I said: "What is their attitude and what is their reaction to these strikes and these slowdowns and this absenteeism and this lack of effort on the home front?"

He said: "Without exception, they are bitter about it." And he used this expression, he said: "These boys are coming back here with steel in their eyes and they are going to want to see something done about it."

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I thank you very much for this opportunity of presenting the result of my humble labors. I hope that it may have contributed something to the cause.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Chairman. might I ask Mr. Colmer a question?

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Fenton.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Colmer, I do not know whether or not you have given any consideration to it, but have you any idea how large a force this would be?

Mr. COLMER. No, sir. I will be perfectly candid with you, Mr. Fenton, I have not the least conception about how large it would be. My thought is, that it would be rather small, because I think that they would find employment in the war effort.

Mr. FENTON. Have you spoken with the Army or Navy officials about the bill you propose?

Mr. COLMER. No, sir; I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, Mr. Colmer.

Gentlemen, the weather has been so bad that we have not been able to get General Knudsen here and it is not certain whether we will be able to get him here tomorrow, so I think we will go over to Monday when we will hear Mr. Hines, and then on Tuesday, we will hear from Mr. Murray.

Is that agreeable to the committee?

If there is no objection, the committee will be in order, and we will be in recess until Monday at 10 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4 o'clock p. m., January 11, 1945, the committee adjourned to reconvene Monday, January 15, 1945, at 10 a. m.)

68175—45——10

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

FRIDAY, JANUARY 12, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The committee met at 10 a. m., the Honorable Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Gentlemen, a few days ago the committee requested that the chairman procure the attendance of General Knudsen as a witness on the subject of H. R. 1119. The general has flown all the way from Flagg Field in order to be here, and his tasks are such out there that he has to leave as quickly as he can to get back to his job. I am sure everybody here will agree that, whatever he is doing, he is doing a good job, and I hope that you will permit the general to make his statement before you interrupt him with questions, and please make memoranda as you go along of what you want to develop by examination, and when he has completed his statement, then you can proceed to acquire further information.

General Knudsen, have you had an opportunity to read and give consideration to the pending bill, H. R. 1119?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM S. KNUDSEN, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF WAR

General KNUDSEN. I have read the bill; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will give us your statement, we will appreciate it. Tell us what you think about it and whether it is sufficient to solve some of our problems.

General KNUDSEN. I have no statement. I thought I might tell you what I have been doing here these nearly 5 years since I came down here.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be fine.

General KNUDSEN. I first was a member of the committee that President Roosevelt appointed to advise the Council on National Defense. There were seven of us, and I had charge of production, that being the field that I was most versed in. That lasted until January 1941, when I became the head of the O. P. M., so-called, in conjunction with Mr. Hillman, who was representing labor on the old committee.

I had the privilege of starting the defense program, and during the 18 months from June 1940 until January 1942 I placed $18.000,000,000 worth of facilities all over the country, and in January 1942 I was attached to the Under Secretary of War's office, and got military rank,

to stop bottlenecks in production, and I visited, during '42, '43, and '44, 1,000 factories in the United States and inspected the operations that were going on.

To give you an idea of what that involved, it involved traveling 180,000 miles by air, and last July I was attached to Wright Field, in Dayton, and given the job of consolidating the production and maintenance of airplanes. That involves some 14 depots and 6 district offices in the United States, and it employs 300,000 people, of which 16,000 are officers, 80,000 are military enlisted men that are being trained to be service groups in combat, and 210,000 are civilians. At the moment I am short of help.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us why, General?

General KNUDSEN. We cannot get the help, and when we get them they do not work steadily. That is, of course, in a good many cases due to the weather, because right now we have had pretty bad roads around Dayton, and some of them come 35 miles to work. But even in the summer we have the same trouble. They stay only a little while and then they go to some other job.

As I understand this bill, it has as its objective making the people stay on the job, and that will help materially, because absenteeism, particularly last year, got as high as 12 percent. It is back to 9 percent now, and we hope to get it down further, but normally it is 3 percent, and you can imagine the loss in man-hours as a result of that.

Before I went to Dayton I had critical jobs to look after. One of them was ball bearings. I visited the entire ball-bearing industry and went throgh the plants, and they were short of help at that time. I also had the tire job. I visited every tire plant in the United States. They were short of help. In fact, they had machines standing idle at that time. The situation is somewhat improved, but not sufficiently to carry on.

I know that at the moment there is a shortage of people in heavy ammunition, from 105 and up, and more men could be used there. So whatever your committee can do to help that shortage is going to be very constructive for the prosecution of the program.

On airplanes I am not getting very many more airplanes to make, but they are heavier, consequently the job is going to be bigger, and on the trail of that has come a prospective shortage of aluminum sheet, heavy sheet, which we are working on now. It involves some fifteen or sixteen hundred men in three plants.

So I cannot stress enough the advantage that we will gain from getting these places manned as soon as possible, and anything done that can be done to keep the people on the job. If a man quits after we have spent 6 months on him, and we get a new one, we have to start all over again and train him.

Judge Patterson told me that you would want to get some idea of plant efficiency, and I though I would quote you some figures. I have been in the airplane program from the start. I have been in every airplane factory in the United States, in every engine factory and every propeller factory in the United States, and from the start we tried to get an hour ratio per pound of airplane; in other words, how many hours it would take to make a pound of airplane. In 1940 it was 4 hours per pound of airplane. It went down until in '43 it got to be 2 hours per pound of airplane, and now it is 1 hour per pound of airplane. We made 96,268 airplanes in 1944, and 4,700 gliders, so that there were over 100,000 units that were made.

The reason for the drop in time is the lay-out, the way we manufacture the airplanes. In the beginning there was some resistance from the industry to make airplanes on the production line. I myself helped make the first one in Vultee. Today every airplane is made on a production line, and that accounts for the better time we are getting per pound.

On shells, we made lines for shells. We set the machines up in rotation, and carry the shells by the machines with a conveyor, so that the operator can check the shell, put it in the machine, and put is back on the conveyor again. That is what time has done.

On guns, small arms, we are doing the same thing. You probably remember that in 1 month last year we made 900,000 pieces of small arms. Small-arms ammunition was laid out the same way, in lines with continued production. The top in small-arms ammunition was 1,800,000,000 rounds in a month. So, you see, the time saving in manufacturing of munitions is due to making the tools and fixtures that will enable use to handle the machines with very little trained help, so that both women and men can work on the machines, and that is the story of the American production effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, I think it would be desirable to have in the record a brief statement of your previous experience in production prior to your connection with the Army, and if you will tell us about that briefly we will go on.

General KNUDSEN. I came into a factory in Buffalo as a mechanic, a bicycle factory, in fact; and in 1904 the bicycles went out of business. There was a little car called an automobile that got the public favor, and we were out of work, and we began to solicit parts business from the then budding automobile manufacturers. The first thing we made was a brake drum. We made that with the equipment we had, because we had no money to buy any more. And little by little it grew, until in 1906 Mr. Ford wanted a rear axle and crank case made out of drawn steel. We could do that, so the manager and I went up to Detroit and we got an order for axles and crank cases from Mr. Ford which put us in business again right suddenly.

After Mr. Ford got acquainted with us he filled the place up with work, so from 500 men I got to 1,500 men, and by that time I was superintendent. We moved the whole business to Detroit—the machines and workmen and foremen and everything—and I supervised that. We left in Buffalo the assembling part of the model T. I had assembled a few motorcars down there, and after we got to Detroit Mr. Ford gave me charge of all the plants he was building outside of Detroit to assemble model T cars. I had 27 of them when we got through.

In 1916 he pulled me into the factory in Highland Park and made me factory production manager. That lasted until the war. During the war he had Liberty motors to make, and ambulances and Eagle boats, and when the jobs were partitioned out I got the Eagle boat job, which was for 112 Eagle boats, called subchasers, of a British design, to be detailed right up in Highland Park. We made the tur-

bines, the gears, and the boilers, and produced 60 boats when the war was over.

I was sent to Europe, then, and opened assembly plants in Cadiz, Spain, in Copenhagen, where I was born, in Manchester, and in Bordeaux. After I came back I was production manager until 1921, in March, when I had a disagreement with Mr. Ford and I resigned, and for 10 months I ran a brass factory in Detroit and was then asked by General Motors to come into Chevrolet, which was kind of down in the dumps at that time, and I was made operating vice president for Chevrolet, and ran the production up from 77,000 in 1921 to, well, the top was 1,300,000. In 1927 Mr. Ford pulled out and made a new car and we passed him, and have pretty well stayed ahead of him ever since.

In 1933 I was taken upstairs and made executive vice president of all the body and car operations in the United States; in fact, of all operations of the corporation that were mechanical. In 1937 I was made president and I spent 3 years at that, until 1940, when the President called me down to Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, General. That is a story of a great experience, and surely in that time you have acquired a great deal of information with respect to labor problems. Now, this bill that we have here has a provision which provides for the induction of men into the armed forces that meet certain qualifications. It also would require others who do not meet military qualifications to remain in or take jobs in the production of war munitions. That is covered by a provision which provides that a man cannot leave his job or change jobs without the consent of his draft board.

Now, what has been your experience on the question of shifting of labor in plants and whether or not that interferes with production? Tell us about that, and tell us what you think about this bill on that subject.

General KNUDSEN. It surely does interfere with production to have a heavy turn-over. A turn-over of 70 percent to 100 percent a year has been common in the munitions industry during the last years. If that can be reduced, we could retain whatever skill we have given the people in the training period, and that will be a great advantage in getting more production. The war brings a bit of unrest in the workingman; the different advantages that are offered with respect to wages came along so fast. Women coming into the picture are a factor—and, incidentally, the women have done a splendid job in the work that they could do.

I might tell a story or an anecdote, whatever you call it. I was in Los Angeles when the first women were put to work in an airplane plant. They were in Vultee. The manager had hired 200 girls, and they all came in in the morning. I happened to be in the plant. The manager divided them into 20 squads of 10 girls each, so as to put them in 20 places and get them all over at the same time.

Well, he got all ready to send them out in the plant and he got cold feet. He was not quite sure what was going to happen when these women came out there, and he made a little speech to them. He called them into one room, and he said:

Now, ladies, you are now employees of the Vultee Airplane Co., and it is a darned good company. It has been in business for years—

which was not so.

We have a good organization out here, and you will be treated with every consideration.

Now, if the boys should make a few remarks when you go out there, don't mind that. They are all good fellows.

One girl stood up. She had no authority over the other girls; she was just one of them. But she said:

Mr. Carroll, don't you worry about us. We have handled men before.

He put the girls out there, and that was the first instance of it, and now we have about 800,000, I guess, that are doing light work in assembly.

But, you see, with all the newness of fixtures and things, the men rather got to looking around to see where there was a good job. For instance, in the foundries a fellow would quit and go over and get a job in an airplane plant. He would get the same money, and maybe more, and be in a nice, clean, new place with a lunchroom or cafeteria, and all that. He would not care to work in the foundry. When the time came that we wanted to get him back in the foundry there was nothing doing. That is only human. That is true.

Shipbuilding came along and offered very high inducements for men to go to work in shipyards. They work around the clock; they get good wages. All that tended to mix up the picture, sort of.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think, General, under the provisions of the pending bill, that it will operate, if properly administered, to prevent these shiftings from plant to plant and from job to job by laborers engaged in production?

General KNUDSEN. You can hardly blame a fellow for trying to improve himself and get a better job, but if he understands that the war demands that he stay on the job, I think that will help a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Mr. Sparkman?

Mr. SPARKMAN. General, I was very much interested in your comment about the decreasing amount of labor required to make a certain unit of airplane. Has that been generally true with all production?

General KNUDSEN. Yes; I think so, except in jobs that cannot be laid out in a continuous operation. There the gain would not be so much.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, as part of your job you keep up with such problems as manpower wastage or hoarding or anything like that, do you not?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Measuring production of our various products by man-hours or whatever unit you may choose, is it your opinion that labor hoarding is not in existence now?

General KNUDSEN. I think, to answer your question, that a man that faces a change in his shop is prone to keep the labor on while he gets ready for the change, because he will never get it back again. If that is labor hoarding, that is it. But I do not call that labor hoarding.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Those changes have been pretty well worked out now, have they not?

General KNUDSEN. There are changes every day.

Mr. SPARKMAN. But not in such great volume as in the beginning.

General KNUDSEN. I have a couple of airplanes coming through now that are going to change a lot.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Measuring production in the number of man-hours required to do a certain unit, do you think we are getting a reasonable degree of efficiency out of our labor?

General KNUDSEN. I think you are.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You are satisfied with it from a production standpoint?

General KNUDSEN. I could not be satisfied, ever. I do think it is fair.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You think it is about as much as we can expect under the circumstances?

General KNUDSEN. I hope to improve it still more. It has been improved during these 4 years. We do that with methods more than with labor itself.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is absenteeism still a big problem?

General KNUDSEN. Yes; it is very bad.

Mr. SPARKMAN. General, this bill, of course, as you realize, covers not only the IV–F's but it covers everybody from the ages of 18 to 45, all men from 18 to 45. Would you prefer this type of legislation, or would you prefer that we have national service to cover all men from 18 to 60, we will say?

General KNUDSEN. Well, the more the merrier; 18 to 60 would be better.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It would be better?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you think that this restricted legislation will be sufficient to meet our manpower needs, or are we going to be confronted with a situation sometime in the near future of having to extend it?

General KNUDSEN. I do not know, but it will certainly bring about an improvement, if we can stop them from circulating around.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Suppose this legislation should be limited to those registrants who have been declared IV–F. Would that meet the problem?

General KNUDSEN. I don't think so.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you think, General, that it is fair and reasonable for us to place this burden upon that group of 18 to 45?

General KNUDSEN. I did not hear your question.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is it fair that we try to place labor burdens only on a relatively small part of our total labor force?

General KNUDSEN. Anything is good that will improve the situation. If we can get some men out of it, that is worth it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. It is not going to cut down absenteeism and turnover in those above 45, is it?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I wonder if you know, offhand, roughly, the proportionate part of our labor force that is over 45 years of age.

General KNUDSEN. It is greater now than it was at the beginning of the war, naturally.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Would you say it is more than 50 percent?

General KNUDSEN. Would I? Oh, no; not 50.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Thirty or forty?

General KNUDSEN. Thirty, maybe. I am not competent—I do not know the figures. I could look it up.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Then this legislation would not affect that 30 percent at all, would it?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Short?

Mr. SHORT. General, do you not think that the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract system has not only increased costs of war materials for the public generally, the taxpayers, but that it has also contributed to waste manpower?

General KNUDSEN. I happen to know about airplane contracts that are cost plus fixed fee. There are no cost-plus contracts in this war; they are cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts as compared with firm price contracts, and the cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts have brought the poundage at about the same as the firm, fixed-price contracts. In other words, it has not cost us any more to make airplanes on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract than it has under a fixed-price contract. I do not know about other things, but where you get the job set up on a line it really makes very little difference. You cannot beat that, you know. If the job is set up on a line and you get so many an hour, so many a day, there will not be any waste. But I know for a fact that in airplanes the cost plus fixed fee has not been any more expensive to the United States Government than airplanes made on a fixed-price contract.

Mr. SHORT. And you think you have got as much work out of the labor under that system as the other?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks?

Mr. BROOKS. General, referring again to the question of absenteeism, in what age groups would you say the greatest amount of absenteeism occurs?

General KNUDSEN. In what age group?

Mr. BROOKS. Yes.

General KNUDSEN. All the way up and down.

Mr. BROOKS. It is general, then, to every age group?

General KNUDSEN. It is spread all over the organization. There are a certain number of people that are steady, and there are a certain number that just have not learned to be steady, and they are the ones who lay off.

Mr. BROOKS. You would say the man 55 to 60 is absent just as much as the young man 20 to 24?

General KNUDSEN. He might have an ailment of some sort which gives him the cause.

Mr. SHORT. You cannot cure it with legislation, though, can you?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. BROOKS. Let me ask you this, though, General: Is the absenteeism as prevalent among the men as among the women?

General KNUDSEN. There is more among the women, for natural reasons.

Mr. BROOKS. You have no figures on absenteeism in reference to IV–F's, have you?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. BROOKS. Have you any ideas that you would want to give us on that?

General KNUDSEN. What is that?

Mr. BROOKS. On the amount of absenteeism among those that have been classified under the draft as IV–F.

General KNUDSEN. I do not have that separated, because it is awfully hard to get that when you have to take the total hours lost and figure them on a percentage basis.

Mr. BROOKS. Among those deferred by selective service as essential there is no absenteeism, is there?

General KNUDSEN. Sure.

Mr. BROOKS. So you have no problem as to them?

General KNUDSEN. I have no problem?

Mr. BROOKS. You say there is no absenteeism among those deferred?

General KNUDSEN. Did I make myself clear? You asked me if the fellows that were deferred laid off, and I said, "Yes."

Mr. BROOKS. I misunderstood you, General.

General KNUDSEN. I thought you did. In other words, absenteeism is not confined to any particular class.

Mr. BROOKS. Even though a man has been deferred by selective service for the purpose of filling an essential job, you still find the same amount of absenteeism?

General KNUDSEN. I cannot tell you. There have been very few cases of that, you know, except in the rubber industry. We have no figures on that.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, now, if that is the case, what about H. R. 1119? Will that help in reference to absenteeism? With reference to the bill we are considering, H. R. 1119, will that help in any way as to the problem of absenteeism?

General KNUDSEN. I think so. It will bring home to them that we really need them now.

Mr. BROOKS. In what respect will it help, General?

General KNUDSEN. They might come to work every day, because you are bringing home to them that the need for it is so great.

Mr. BROOKS. Then you think H. R. 1119 will be of material assistance?

General KNUDSEN. I think so.

Mr. BROOKS. You would not say that that goes far enough, though, would you, at the present time?

General KNUDSEN. We can only feel our way. We have not had any way to enforce the people, to stop them from laying off. We can only fire them, and that did not do any good.

Mr. SHORT. Will you yield at this point?

Mr. BROOKS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. First, I am going to ask this one question: The mere fact that the bill provides that if they do not stay on their job they will be inducted into the military service would induce them to stay somewhat, would it not?

General KNUDSEN. I think so.

Mr. SHORT. General, from your wide and rich experience of 40 years, are you not convinced that free labor is always more efficient and more productive than forced labor?

General KNUDSEN. Sure; absolutely.

Mr. SHORT. Our American system is better than the European?

General KNUDSEN. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arends?

Mr. ARENDS. General, in your discussion of absenteeism in the plants, which you say is rather high at the present time, would you care to make a guess or a statement as to what you think might be the percentage of over-all absenteeism in war plants today? Have you any idea at all?

General KNUDSEN. Today?

Mr. ARENDS. As of today; yes.

General KNUDSEN. I would say between 7 and 8 percent. I have 9 percent over in Dayton. I had 11 percent 2 months ago.

Mr. ARENDS. Has there been any appreciable drop in absenteeism since the middle of December, when we started to have reverses?

General KNUDSEN. It dropped some when the break-through came in France. It dropped some.

Mr. ARENDS. General, many of us, as we have visited back and forth from home in our districts, have come into contact with people in various plants over the country, and I have been told so many times that we now have in these places three men doing the work that two could do. I would like to ask you one question: If you today were placed in absolute and complete control of all war production in the United States and were given a free hand, do you feel that you could step up production with the number of laborers and the number of industrial workers that you have at the present time to any degree?

General KNUDSEN. That is an engineering job that cannot be accomplished over a short period. That takes a long time, to change the methods so as to get the saving in manpower. That is not a thing that you could do just like that!

Mr. ARENDS. I realize that. Mr. Sparkman asked you the question if you thought we were getting the most efficient amount of production from those you now have. I doubt it, from what I hear from the people.

General KNUDSEN. You cannot judge by that. A fellow would tell me the same thing, see? But in the over-all, as you put them all together, take the total number of hours and what you get for that number of hours today, and what you got last month and what you got 6 months ago, that tells the story.

Mr. ARENDS. Let me ask this question: Do you think there would be any advantage to increasing the workweek in many of these plants where they are now working 48 hours, or something like that?

General KNUDSEN. Forty-eight hours is right as a top, and 54 hours is the limit. When you get beyond 54 hours you get less work.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kilday?

Mr. KILDAY. General, back in the days when you were running a plant and labor was plentiful, and there was an excess of it——

General KNUDSEN. It was not always plentiful. We had our troubles.

Mr. KILDAY. In those days you would take all of the younger men you could get before you would take a man 40 or 45, would you not?

General KNUDSEN. You would not; oh, no.

Mr. KILDAY. Was that true generally of industry?

General KNUDSEN. If you get all youngsters it is not so good. You are getting a kindergarten then. You need a few balance wheels in there. The same thing applies to the girls. I was in an airplane plant with all young girls, and the thing was like a high-school picnic. I suggested to the fellow to get some older women and spread them down through—some experienced, stable women. That helped the organization.

Mr. KILDAY. Of course you kept your experienced men that you had in the plant, but the ones you took in you preferred to take in as young men and distribute them among the older men, did you not?

General KNUDSEN. That is right.

Mr. KILDAY. And as to those physically handicapped, when you had your choice of labor you would not take them physically handicapped, would you?

General KNUDSEN. I must correct you. I worked for Mr. Ford, and he had definite ideas about labor; and where we had a shop, we will say, of 5,000 people, he would say you should equal the community curve of a city of 5,000 people. You should have so many blind and so many halt, and I was brought up that way.

Mr. KILDAY. Yes; but that was Mr. Ford. He in those days had a $5-a-day minimum, too.

General KNUDSEN. That did not last very long.

Mr. KILDAY. But that was his individual idea about it. You would not say that it was true of industry generally.

General KNUDSEN. I beg to differ with you, because I brought that to General Motors. We had the same thing.

Mr. KILDAY. Do you think that was true of industry generally?

General KNUDSEN. I think industry is pretty good that way.

Mr. KILDAY. They will hire the handicapped and pay the increase there might be in workmen's compensation due to injuries within the plant?

General KNUDSEN. I have seen a whole bench of blind people assemble radios.

Mr. KILDAY. And you know that when there was an abundance of labor industry generally would follow Mr. Ford's idea of taking the community curve. Would you say that was true in industry generally?

General KNUDSEN. I think that is generally true.

Mr. KILDAY. And industry would not hesitate to accept the older men and the men who had been found physically disqualified for military service?

General KNUDSEN. Industry has been cured of any thoughts like that.

Mr. KILDAY. Under present circumstances they would accept them?

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. You know the Beechcraft Aviation Corporation?

General KNUDSEN. Very well.

Mr. KILDAY. The day before yesterday Senator Truman, in the Senate, put a letter into the Congressional Record written to him by the president of the Beechcraft Co., in which he was discussing this proposal and very strongly opposing it on the ground that their experience had shown that if a man was forced to go into their plant to work, or forced to remain there, his efficiency decreased. He cited the fact that when it became necessary to secure a certificate of availability they immediately placed on their bulletin boards a notice to all of the employees that anytime they wanted to leave, their certificate of availability would be ready for them. I am only telling you what he said.

General KNUDSEN. That certificate of availability has not worked out very well.

Mr. KILDAY. And when they did that, they felt that there was an increase of interest and efficiency and production in the plant.

General KNUDSEN. Well, you know, Beech has got a system out there where he pays a bonus on his wages for every pound of airplanes produced in a month, and that has the tendency to attract aggressive people. It runs as much as a 25-percent bonus a month in a good month, and I would say that Welch and Gattie, who are the two men that run the shop, really——

Mr. KILDAY. Does the Government permit the payment of those bonuses?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. Is that true in industry generally?

General KNUDSEN. That is cleared with the Treasury Department. They pay a low base wage and a bonus on top of it. Grumman has the same thing.

Mr. KILDAY. There was a good deal of discussion some time ago about Jack & Heintz, and the Lincoln Electric Co. flooded us with mail about their being prohibited from paying a bonus.

General KNUDSEN. They did not link the bonus to the output. They made it a straight bonus.

Mr. KILDAY. Without requiring increased production?

General KNUDSEN. That is right.

Mr. KILDAY. You feel that the compulsion that would come from this bill would not have the effect of doing away with what Beechcraft said was their experience of increased production through the voluntary system?

General KNUDSEN. No. I think we could talk to Gattie and Welch and change their minds on it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KILDAY. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. General, is it true that these labor shortages occur only in spots throughout the country and it is not a general, over-all picture?

General KNUDSON. No; they shift.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is it true also that there are other spots in which there is even today a surplus of labor?

General KNUDSON. There might be. The so-called critical areas are the ones where you are short.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And then there are other areas where there is a surplus of labor?

General KNUDSON. Yes; where you have a few more.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We hear from time to time of unemployment compensation that is being paid. It seems a little inconsistent that unemployment compensation is being collected in some parts of the country with labor shortages in other parts of the country. Do you think maximum effort has been exerted to shift that labor from one area to another?

General KNUDSON. I am not in favor of shifting labor.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is part of the purpose of this bill, is it not, to make it possible to shift labor as the needs may arise?

General KNUDSEN. There are certain number of people that you can shift and a certain number of people where it does not pay you to shift them.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I heard General Hines say yesterday that the Veterans Administration was paying out every week a quarter of a million dollars as unemployment benefits under the G. I. bill of rights.

General KNUDSEN. That is possible.

Mr. KILDAY. I have nothing further.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clason?

Mr. CLASON. Did I understand you to say, General, that in your opinion the certificates of availability issued by the War Manpower Commission have not been successful?

General KNUDSEN. They did not wait for them. They just quit.

Mr. CLASON. You mean they left their jobs regardless?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Then you feel that that program has not worked too well?

General KNUDSEN. It has not had time enough to work, to sink in.

Mr. CLASON. If it has not worked up to the present time, the war will be over before it does work, will it not?

General KNUDSEN. Perhaps.

Mr. CLASON. Then you think another plan, a plan other than the one now employed by the War Manpower Commission, should be put into operation?

General KNUDSEN. If you are satisfied with it as it is now, it suits me, but I do not think it is working.

Mr. CLASON. If it is not working and it suits you, that does not sound good to us.

General KNUDSEN. It suits them.

Mr. CLASON. Now, with reference to work in our plants as compared to work in German plants, in the German plants today they have labor taken from occupied countries. Have you any way of telling how successful they are in getting production from that type of labor as compared with what we get in our plants?

General KNUDSEN. Well, I happen to know something about that, because I had two plants over there before the war. I had one in Wiesbaden and one in Brandenburg. Of course, they were not prisoner labor then; and after we got the same set-up as we had in the United States for making automobiles, there was no difference.

Mr. CLASON. Then you think, General——

General KNUDSEN. But I do not think you can make a prisoner, or a fellow that is imported from another country, work 100 percent any more than we can here.

Mr. CLASON. Then you would expect these persons that were required under this legislation, H. R. 1119, having been forced to go into industry, taken from the farms and from their small businesses against their will to a certain extent, to produce as well as men who have gone into the factories of their own free will?

General KNUDSEN. In line production, yes.

Mr. CLASON. If you got them off an assembly line and put them in a plant where the production was of a nature where you do not have assembly lines, what would you say?

General KNUDSEN. There skill is needed. There you have to have people that have to have more training than you have on line assembly.

Mr. CLASON. Then you would expect these persons that came in under this bill at this late date to be put on assembly lines as far as possible?

General KNUDSEN. Yes. You understand, when I say "assembly" lines it might mean a machine line, not purely assembly, but a machine line, too.

Mr. CLASON. But in such an operation that he would be expected to get out a certain number of units per day.

General KNUDSEN. He would learn that; yes.

Mr. CLASON. He would learn that right off.

I received a letter, for instance, from a constituent one day, and from another another, and they all bring up little points of their own, and they are factory employees. One of them writes me and says that he thinks all the trouble is with the Army, that they ordered cut-backs on shells and shell casings and they have ordered cut-backs on other items, that "right here in Springfield men have been laid off by the hundreds." Then he says, "You should know this." I do, because I get a lot of these letters.

Then he says they cut them from three shifts to two shifts and now to one shift. "If the Army had properly laid out its program and had not been to optimistic we would not have the trouble we have today." What would you say in answer to such a criticism?

General KNUDSEN. If he did not have the Army he would blame the boss.

Mr. CLASON. What would you say about the cutting back from three shifts to two shifts to one shift?

General KNUDSEN. Well, you know the cut-back is a thing over which we have no control. We are told by the Combined Chiefs of Staff how many to make, and if that varies we have to adjust that the best we can. I could not say, "I am not going to make any 155-millimeter shells." General Eisenhower has to say that.

Mr. CLASON. That is what I want to know, and what these people would like to know. The persons setting the total amount to be produced are the generals on the fighting lines?

General KNUDSEN. That's right.

Mr. CLASON. So it is not the generals in Washington, so to speak?

General KNUDSEN. Well, you can say that we have not distributed the load we have properly. We are always open to that criticism. I do not think there has been any case of that.

Mr. CLASON. Another man who comes to Washington a lot and is in the Government departments very frequently is satisfied that there are 300,000 persons in Washington today who ought to be out. What do you say about the practices here in Washington? Do you think that they could be changed for the better, thereby reducing the amount of employment in Government bureaus in the city of Washington?

General KNUDSEN. I am a machinist, sir.

Mr. CLASON. But you had to run an office to run a machine shop, did you not? In other words, you would not want to be quoted on that question?

General KNUDSEN. No, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Tell me another thing. Here is the kind of picture you see in the papers now in the country, where they are using soldiers to work in plants. These people that are in H. R. 1119, for the most part, will, of course, be going into employment without going into any labor unit. Do you think this type of legislation, with the kind of penalty that is contained in it, is proper? In other words, do you think that if a person does not work, as provided in H. R. 1119, the penalty should be to put him in a labor unit, or should it be by fine or imprisonment? Would it be better to leave the Army out of it?

General KNUDSEN. I think it is better to leave the Army out of it, because the service battalions we use are being trained to go overseas. That is our job, to train those kinds of people for their final use, and not to discipline a lot of civilians that cannot go abroad.

Mr. CLASON. Then it was suggested that they might be put to cleaning the bottom of a ship, doing a lot of peculiarly hard and undesirable tasks. Supposing a man falls off the ship and gets killed. Under this bill, his family gets nothing. Would you think that that was a fair proposition?

General KNUDSEN. I cannot see the illustration of putting him down cleaning the bottom of a ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Durham?

Mr. DURHAM. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. General Knudsen, at about what age range does a laborer in industry give his best production?

General KNUDSEN. I think from 22 to 34 or 35. It depends on what it is. A tool maker can be older.

Mr. MARTIN. You spoke a moment ago, in answer to Mr. Sparkman, as if you had a very real liking for older men staying within industry to stabilize it and make it more dependable, rather than for efficiency.

General KNUDSEN. The "know-how."

Mr. MARTIN. What percentage of increase has there been in the number of physically handicapped now employed in industry, during the war?

General KNUDSEN. I do not know the percentage.

Mr. MARTIN. Has it been noticeable?

General KNUDSEN. Oh, yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Has the employment of physically handicapped employees affected the efficiency noticeably?

General KNUDSEN. Not if you give them the right kind of job.

Mr. MARTIN. Industry has worked them into the production lines very well?

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. And from that we could gather that industry could use more physically handicapped without reducing efficiency?

General KNUDSEN. There would be a limit.

Mr. MARTIN. They have not reached that limit yet?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. MARTIN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. General Knudsen, has not this war been more or less accepted by labor, management, and the Government as a featherbed matter, more than the World War?

General KNUDSEN. It has since Pearl Harbor.

Mr. STEWART. That is all.

General KNUDSEN. I beg your pardon; I did not hear the "featherbed" part of it. We have had no trouble since Pearl Harbor. Before that we had much trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Elston?

Mr. ELSTON. You mentioned absenteeism as being rather high last year and that it is lower this year. Can you indicate to the committee the cause of that change?

General KNUDSEN. We have the reasons tabulated, and there are any number of them. What I said was that we had reduced it 2 percent in Wright Field in the last 2 or 3 months, and still that is not very good. The normal is 3 percent, and we are 9 percent.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you know why it was so high as 12 percent last year?

General KNUDSEN. The war was going pretty well, and there was a feeling that it was going to be all over, and the average fellow did not care so much whether he laid off a half day or not. Now the trend has changed, and it always happens when the trend changes that absenteeism improves. We are working, as we call it, on "presenteeism" at Wright Field, trying to boost the fellows that are there all the time rather than talking about the follow that is away. We have victory squads that have not lost a day in a certain time. We try to promote that.

Mr. ELSTON. I see you say the normal absenteeism in peacetimes is 3 percent.

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. It could not be zero; there is always sickness and stuff like that.

Mr. ELSTON. Would it be possible for that same percent to continue during wartime, with the different type of workmen and different types of work?

General KNUDSEN. We might, on account of the larger quantity of men employed, say that 5 percent would be normal in wartime and 3 percent in peacetime.

Mr. ELSTON. So that we are still considerably above what it should be normally?

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir. The 3 percent is actual. I know that.

Mr. ELSTON. General, were there any cut-backs in heavy ammunition during the past year?

General KNUDSEN. Yes; there was; in February of 1944.

Mr. ELSTON. In February 1944?

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELSTON. What type of ammunition?

General KNUDSEN. Heavy ammunition—75 and above.

Mr. ELSTON. Seventy-five millimeter and above?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. To what extent were cut-backs ordered in the heavy-ammunition program?

General KNUDSEN. I do not remember the quantity, but it was reduced, and it was all put back again in April.

68175—45——11

Mr. ELSTON. So that from February to April the industry of the country was working on a reduced heavy-ammunition program?

General KNUDSEN. I think that is true.

Mr. ELSTON. Do you know the extent to which it was reduced in February of last year?

General KNUDSEN. I do not remember. It as about 20 percent.

Mr. ELSTON. About 20 percent?

General KNUDSEN. About that. Then the cut was restored, and then it was trebled.

Mr. ELSTON. When was it trebled?

General KNUDSEN. In October. Now it is four times.

Mr. ELSTON. Now it is four times as great?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Do we have adequate facilities today for making heavy ammunition?

General KNUDSEN. We know how to do it. We have had to get some more machine tools and hydraulic presses.

Mr. ELSTON. But we have sufficient other facilities?

General KNUDSEN. We can handle it.

Mr. ELSTON. So that the heavy ammunition program can be very speedily built up?

General KNUDSEN. If they get the help; yes.

Mr. ELSTON. Is your principal trouble help?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. ELSTON. General, what are the principal causes of absenteeism? I am referring now to the wartime absenteeism.

General KNUDSEN. The distance they have to drive, weather, and sickness.

Mr. SHORT. High wages and lots of money?

General KNUDSEN. I talked to a fellow in Los Angeles the other day about the closing of the race tracks, and he said they should not close the race tracks; they should let the fellows go broke, and then they will have to work.

Mr. ELSTON. General, had you completed your answer before you were interrupted?

General KNUDSEN. There are a thousand reasons, but it falls mainly within those brackets. So far as the women are concerned, taking care of children, if they have children, and doing some shopping 1 day a week. I think that is perfectly natural.

Mr. ELSTON. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead?

Mr. WINSTEAD. General, in my section I have a lot of complaints from the lumbering industry and pulpwood industry on the fact that absenteeism is their greatest problem. They seem to say, some of them, that the wages are such that a number of these people can work 3 or 4 days a week and they are not interested in working the rest of the time.

General KNUDSEN. I guess that is a human failing. They do that when they get lower wages.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Do you feel that this bill will improve that situation some?

General KNUDSEN. This bill will bring home to all workers that we really need them now.

Mr. WINSTEAD. And it will effect that?

General KNUDSEN. It will stop absenteeism and lay-offs.

Mr. WINSTEAD. It will affect those of draft age.

General KNUTSEN. That is right.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Will it have much effect on those who are not of draft age?

General KNUDSEN. There are good people in all classes. I think they will be impressed by the fact that the law says you should work.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Let me ask you this question: I cannot see where we could legislate very much more than we are trying to do here, or extend the age probably up to 60, that would affect absenteeism very much.

General KNUDSEN. You might ask yourself, if we had not had all these placards and things dealing with the war, would we have got out as much work as we have? So this is another way of bringing that point home to them.

Mr. WINSTEAD. More or less stressing the need of the sitation?

General KNUDSEN. That is right.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Thank you. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harness?

Mr. HARNESS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fenton?

Mr. FENTON. General, we certainly appreciate your coming here today. We know that when you say we need more workers we need them. I was just wondering what you think about the penalty provision in this bill. The Army and Navy say they do not want them in their various outfits. You are an experienced man. What would you say?

General KNUDSEN. Well, there is a small percentage that just has to be told. The free labor that you talk about is the majority. You can talk to them. But there is a certain small percentage that you have to tell. You have to tell them to do something, and this, I think, will accomplish that. Whether that group numbers 1,400,000 I do not know. Whatever it is, it is gain.

Mr. FENTON. We realize that there would not be so many of these, or we hope there will not be so many. I am glad to have your thought in the matter.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson?

Mr. JOHNSON. General Knudsen, absenteeism means that the man just stays off temporarily, but he stays on the job. He does not leave the plant.

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. And turn-over is where he goes from one plant to another plant?

General KNUDSEN. Right.

Mr. JOHNSON. I come from the area that includes Sacramento. Which is the greater evil, absenteeism or the turn-over out there?

General KNUDSEN. They are both great evils.

Mr. JOHNSON. Down about 50 miles from there is the Mare Island Navy Yard, and they tell me the big trouble there, or the biggest trouble, is with turn-over. They move to the Kaiser plant, they move up to the air depot, and they move around.

General KNUDSEN. I think that is right. They do not have to go so far to get to the Mare Island Navy Yard.

Mr. JOHNSON. Just 50 miles.

General KNUDSEN. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think this bill would help that situation?

General ænUDSEN. I think the bill would help both situations, absenteeism and turn-over.

Mr. JOHNSON. They also tell me that the biggest job changes are in the younger IV–F's, rather than in the older IV–F's. What do you know about that?

General KNUDSEN. What was that?

Mr. JOHNSON. That the biggest job shifting is in the young men, under 30.

General KNUDSEN. That is true.

Mr. JOHNSON. Why?

General KNUDSEN. Why, they are young men.

Mr. JOHNSON. In peacetime industry you would take practically all these men that are classed as IV–F's, would you not?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. You do not consider them physically unfit for industrial jobs?

General KNUDSEN. No; unless it is a certain job like a hammer job. You would not take a man that is weak.

Mr. JOHNSON. I mean generally just minor defects like a bad eye or a finger off.

General KNUDSEN. We look them over before we hire them, you know.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you give them a physical examination?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. In peacetime?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. But they are not as rigid as the examination a soldier must take that qualifies him as I–A?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it a fact that some of this difficulty is because of the fact that the workers are what we call marginal workers, inexperienced, untrained, away from home, and they are not as good as the old stable worker that worked in the plants in pre-war days?

General KNUDSEN. That hase something to do with it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Has your training program in the air depots, as they have there in Sacramento, improved the situation?

General KNUDSEN. I am short of help. It has improved the output of the individual worker.

Mr. JOHNSON. You think the main cause for lack of production, or one of the main causes, is turn-over, and also absenteeism?

General KNUDSEN. In Sacramento it is; yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. And you feel that this bill would help the situation?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Why?

General KNUDSEN. Because it is brought home to them that the absent worker, or a quitter, is hurting the program, and it has been brought home to them from the highest authority, and I think that will have some effect.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Harness.

Mr. HARNESS. General, just one question. If we should enact this law and when we would have to induct, say, a half million men into the armed forces that are not fit for military service, how would we utilize the services of those men that are now doing some work?

General KNUDSEN. It would be bad if you put them in the Army.

Mr. HARNESS. How would we use them if they are inducted into the military services?

General KNUDSEN. I do not know.

Mr. HARNESS. We could not send them back into the plants in uniform and pay them $50 a month, could we?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. ELSTON. Will the gentleman yield there?

General KNUDSEN. You could furlough them.

Mr. HARNESS. That is the problem that bothers some of us. How are we going to utilize the men we draft into service?

General KNUDSEN. I think the Secretary testified that the Army did not want them, that they would have to be handled outside of the Army.

Mr. HARNESS. This says they are going to draft them into the military and naval service.

The CHAIRMAN. If they fail to take a job.

Mr. HARNESS. Maybe you will have one of these men at Mare Island who will say, "I am going to the Kaiser Shipyard to get a job." That is bad, as you say. So, if he does that, we have a right, then, to induct him into the service. What are we going to do with him once we get him into the service?

Mr. ARENDS. That is what the Army is wondering about.

The CHAIRMAN. Train him for industry.

Mr. HARNESS. He is already trained.

Mr. SHORT. He is?

Mr. HARNESS. I would like to get some answer to that.

Mr. ELSTON. Will the gentleman yield? Secretary Patterson testified that if this bill would bring any more than a very few thousand into the armed services it would be a failure. If more than that are going into the armed services, then the bill has not accomplished the purpose.

General KNUDSEN. Well, let us see how many we get.

Mr. HARNESS. Supposing we get 100,000, or 200,000. Then where will we be? What are we going to with them?

Mr. DURHAM. Will the gentleman yield there? Is this bill not directed more to absenteeism than it is at the new influx of men that we expect to get that have never been trained?

General KNUDSEN. If you get a lot of them, of course you will have to deal with them. It would be better if you could handle it without induction into the Army.

Mr. DURHAM. General, of course you have had a good deal of experience with handling labor. Now, for instance, I went into a plant the other day that manufactures ducks, that has a priority. I said to the manager, "You hold top priority on these people. Suppose we assign 400 to you, 25 percent of your personnel at the present time. How are you going to handle them?"

He said, "Well, I will have to train them."

I said, "How long will it take you to train a man?"

He said, "From 90 days to 6 months."

That is our difficulty, I think, with this new crowd that is coming in.

General KNUDSEN. In some industries the training period would not have to be as long as that.

Mr. DURHAM. I think you are right on that. I am speaking of a loom fixer.

General KNUDSEN. I would rather keep him on a civilian basis than try to get him into the Army, because, as I understand it, you are not going to give them the privileges of the combat force.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, General, if a thousand or a hundred thousand men were inducted under this bill into the military unit, and the Army did not want them and did not need them, they could reassign them to industry for training and use them in industrial plants, could they not?

General KNUDSEN. You mean furlough them?

The CHAIRMAN. Reassign them to industry.

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Right there; how are they going to do that? What are the mechanics?

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking the general to explain if it could be done. Suppose you get 100,000 men under this bill that the Army does not want. They are needed in plants. Could they reassign them to plants for training by industry itself?

General KNUDSEN. Yes; but I thought this gentleman here said the man would not have the job, that we would have to take him.

Mr. HARNESS. This is designed, as I understand it, to induct men when they refuse to take a job, or when they have been habitual absentees, or when they want to quit one job and take another. I understand that this bill, then, would give the selective-service boards the right to induct those fellows into the military service. Now, suppose they do induct such a man. Maybe he works 6 or 7 months out of the year. We are losing 5 or 6 months of his services as it is now. We are going to lose all of his services if we induct him into the armed forces, because you cannot assign him back into a plant to work as a soldier.

General KNUDSEN. Do you not think that a fellow who can get a job and get $5 or $6 a day, or $7 a day, or whatever it is, would prefer that to going into the Army at $50 a month?

Mr. HARNESS. General, yes; I would think so. I cannot understand why he does not want to work anyway. But I am wondering what we are going to do with them if we do take them.

Mr. ARENDS. In Judge Patterson's testimony they said they did not anticipate that very many of them would be drafted if this bill were passed. However, if it were, they simply would take them and they would put them at all the mean tasks they had in the Army.

Mr. CLASON. And none of them will go into private employment.

Mr. JOHNSON. Could I ask just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. One more.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is the absenteeism any greater in California, where it is very crowded, than in Detroit?

General KNUDSEN. Slightly.

Mr. JOHNSON. How much more?

General KNUDSEN. One or two percent. That has gone down, too.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mean the percentage per month, do you not?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. When you say 9 percent you mean you are losing 9 percent every month?

General KNUDSEN. Yes. I was in San Diego a short time ago. They have gone down to 7 percent.

Mr. JOHNSON. And that is about the most crowded place, too.

General KNUDSEN. That is due to a campaign that was instituted. Last summer California was the worst of all.

Mr. JOHNSON. Which are the bad spots in California?

General KNUDSEN. Los Angeles County.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is worse than the San Francisco Bay area?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. General Knudsen, you testified that there was a reduction in heavy ammunition production last February. Was that due to material shortage or labor shortage, or was it due to a very large supply built up at that time?

General KNUDSEN. It was the cut-back. It was not material or labor.

Mr. MARTIN. You had no way of judging the volume of need of heavy ammunition?

General KNUDSEN. We had to meet a requirement.

Mr. STEWART. General Knudsen, do you think that these IV–F's we are about to throw into industry should be compelled to join a union without their will?

General KNUDSEN. If they go into a shop with a closed-shop contract they will probably have to.

Mr. STEWART. Do you think they should?

General KNUDSEN. If he goes into a shop with a closed-shop contract he will have to do it.

Mr. STEWART. Let me ask you, further, is there any union that requires a slow-down in heavy-duty tire plants that is affecting the output of the soldiers that have been furloughed to these plants?

General KNUDSEN. I do not think so. I was in there in July and had a meeting with all the locals of the country, and with Dalrymple, the head of the union, and he personally supported the men in taking the lid off.

Mr. STEWART. Then you think the Government has a right to tap an American citizen on the shoulder and put him in industry and make him join a union and pay union dues?

General KNUDSEN. If there is a contract in the shop he will have to.

Mr. DURHAM. General, what percentage of the 9 percent of absenteeism is by women?

General KNUDSEN. There are more men than women in this show. The women are generally about 3 percent higher in absenteeism than the men, but it washes out to 9 percent.

Mr. DURHAM. What is the percentage of employment of women?

General KNUDSEN. In the airplane industry it is 37 to 38 percent. In some places it is more. I have been in one plant where it was 85 percent women.

Mr. DURHAM. And it runs 3 percent higher than men?

General KNUDSEN. On the average.

He said, "From 90 days to 6 months."

That is our difficulty, I think, with this new crowd that is coming in.

General KNUDSEN. In some industries the training period would not have to be as long as that.

Mr. DURHAM. I think you are right on that. I am speaking of a loom fixer.

General KNUDSEN. I would rather keep him on a civilian basis than try to get him into the Army, because, as I understand it, you are not going to give them the privileges of the combat force.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, General, if a thousand or a hundred thousand men were inducted under this bill into the military unit, and the Army did not want them and did not need them, they could reassign them to industry for training and use them in industrial plants, could they not?

General KNUDSEN. You mean furlough them?

The CHAIRMAN. Reassign them to industry.

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Right there; how are they going to do that? What are the mechanics?

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking the general to explain if it could be done. Suppose you get 100,000 men under this bill that the Army does not want. They are needed in plants. Could they reassign them to plants for training by industry itself?

General KNUDSEN. Yes; but I thought this gentleman here said the man would not have the job, that we would have to take him.

Mr. HARNESS. This is designed, as I understand it, to induct men when they refuse to take a job, or when they have been habitual absentees, or when they want to quit one job and take another. I understand that this bill, then, would give the selective-service boards the right to induct those fellows into the military service. Now, suppose they do induct such a man. Maybe he works 6 or 7 months out of the year. We are losing 5 or 6 months of his services as it is now. We are going to lose all of his services if we induct him into the armed forces, because you cannot assign him back into a plant to work as a soldier.

General KNUDSEN. Do you not think that a fellow who can get a job and get $5 or $6 a day, or $7 a day, or whatever it is, would prefer that to going into the Army at $50 a month?

Mr. HARNESS. General, yes; I would think so. I cannot understand why he does not want to work anyway. But I am wondering what we are going to do with them if we do take them.

Mr. ARENDS. In Judge Patterson's testimony they said they did not anticipate that very many of them would be drafted if this bill were passed. However, if it were, they simply would take them and they would put them at all the mean tasks they had in the Army.

Mr. CLASON. And none of them will go into private employment.

Mr. JOHNSON. Could I ask just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. One more.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is the absenteeism any greater in California, where it is very crowded, than in Detroit?

General KNUDSEN. Slightly.

Mr. JOHNSON. How much more?

General KNUDSEN. One or two percent. That has gone down, too.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mean the percentage per month, do you not?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. When you say 9 percent you mean you are losing 9 percent every month?

General KNUDSEN. Yes. I was in San Diego a short time ago. They have gone down to 7 percent.

Mr. JOHNSON. And that is about the most crowded place, too.

General KNUDSEN. That is due to a campaign that was instituted. Last summer California was the worst of all.

Mr. JOHNSON. Which are the bad spots in California?

General KNUDSEN. Los Angeles County.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is worse than the San Francisco Bay area?

General KNUDSEN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. General Knudsen, you testified that there was a reduction in heavy ammunition production last February. Was that due to material shortage or labor shortage, or was it due to a very large supply built up at that time?

General KNUDSEN. It was the cut-back. It was not material or labor.

Mr. MARTIN. You had no way of judging the volume of need of heavy ammunition?

General KNUDSEN. We had to meet a requirement.

Mr. STEWART. General Knudsen, do you think that these IV–F's we are about to throw into industry should be compelled to join a union without their will?

General KNUDSEN. If they go into a shop with a closed-shop contract they will probably have to.

Mr. STEWART. Do you think they should?

General KNUDSEN. If he goes into a shop with a closed-shop contract he will have to do it.

Mr. STEWART. Let me ask you, further, is there any union that requires a slow-down in heavy-duty tire plants that is affecting the output of the soldiers that have been furloughed to these plants?

General KNUDSEN. I do not think so. I was in there in July and had a meeting with all the locals of the country, and with Dalrymple, the head of the union, and he personally supported the men in taking the lid off.

Mr. STEWART. Then you think the Government has a right to tap an American citizen on the shoulder and put him in industry and make him join a union and pay union dues?

General KNUDSEN. If there is a contract in the shop he will have to.

Mr. DURHAM. General, what percentage of the 9 percent of absenteeism is by women?

General KNUDSEN. There are more men than women in this show. The women are generally about 3 percent higher in absenteeism than the men, but it washes out to 9 percent.

Mr. DURHAM. What is the percentage of employment of women?

General KNUDSEN. In the airplane industry it is 37 to 38 percent. In some places it is more. I have been in one plant where it was 85 percent women.

Mr. DURHAM. And it runs 3 percent higher than men?

General KNUDSEN. On the average.

Mr. DURHAM. This bill in no way would affect that?

General KNUDSEN. No.

Mr. THOMASON. Based on your judgment and experience, and in view of the present seriousness of the war situation, as I understand it you say that this legislation, or something like it, is necessary.

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. That is your deliberate judgment?

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. From your visits to the plants all over the Nation?

General KNUDSEN. Yes, sir; if 1,000 plants are a criterion.

Mr. THOMASON. Assuming that this bill should become law and that 330,000 men are pulled out of the factories and off the farms in the next 6 months, and in view of your great familiarity with the labor situation, do you know of any source from which those men could be replaced except from IV–F's?

General KNUDSEN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General. We are very happy to have had you here as a witness. We think you have been very helpful to the committee, and we wish you a happy and safe return to your duties. The committee will now go into executive session.

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a. m., the committee went into executive session.)

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

MONDAY, JANUARY 15, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The hearing was resumed, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May, chairman, presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee please be in order. We will hear first from Mr. Albert Hamilton.

STATEMENT OF ALBERT HAMILTON, APPEARING ON BEHALF OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY, VIENNA, VA.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hamilton, will you give the reporter your name, please, your place of residence, your business, and anything else you want to about yourself, so that we may know whom you represent?

Mr. HAMILTON. My name is Albert Hamilton. I am a member of the national executive committee of the Socialist Party and am appearing on behalf of the Socialist Party. My place of residence is Vienna, Va. I am a farmer and, incidentally, I appreciate getting on first thing this morning, because our sheep had to pick this morning to start lambing.

I have a prepared statement which I would like to submit, with some additional material that I have gathered, and I want, on behalf of the Socialist Party, to express our absolute opposition to pending manpower draft proposals, whether the current proposals to draft IV–F's or more inclusive labor-draft legislation, or simply the granting of additional "work or fight" powers to the Selective Service System.

Our criticisms of pending and proposed legislation can be expressed through three major arguments:

First, the wartime manpower situation does not warrant a manpower draft;

Second, all the yet available voluntary means to get enough manpower has not been exhausted; and

Third, a manpower draft of civilian workers for private profit is completely undemocratic and will not help but at this point will hinder production.

May I insert that I am not speaking merely "off the cuff," but I am speaking as one who has taken the trouble to gather a lot of information from Government officials and from plants and mills and factories.

I do not want to take up the time of the committee simply with rhetoric, though, frankly, that is just about all that has been heard from proponens of draft legislation. I do want to give some facts and figures gathered in Washington and in the field that must be faced if

the committee is to do anything other than simply "Yes" the Army, Navy, and administration leaders who have testified.

Let me turn to the first point: The wartime manpower situation does not warrant a manpower draft.

An Irish trade-union friend of mine summed up the situation in anger the other day. He said that labor draft legislation was like using a "shillelagh to pick your teeth." I think that illustrates pretty well the facts and figures of the situation.

Seriously, however, how many workers are needed to man the "must" programs? There is a great deal of confusion and contradictory evidence on this score. All kinds of figures have been bandied about—90,000, 150,000, 270,000; and Under Secretary of War Patterson testified that 700,000 additional workers are needed.

The other day, in stories appearing on the same page of the New York Times, there appeared two statements, both coming from the War Manpower Commission, of an urgent need for 18,000 and 80,000 workers in New England. Both stories came from the publicity office of the War Manpower Commission. Of course, both stories cannot be true. It is evidence that manpower figures have been recklessly thrown around.

The figure on manpower shortage, whatever it is, ranging from 90,000 to 700,000, is infinitesimal, compared with the number of workers in the labor force or the smaller number of workers engaged in munitions production. According to official Government sources there are some 9,000,000 workers engaged in munitions employment and about 52,000,000 workers in the total labor force.

The real need for workers is less than a minute fraction of the total munitions employment of our labor force, regardless of what figure you take or from what official source you take it. Up to the present time the job of adding millions of new workers to the labor force and the shifting of additional millions of workers around the country has been done by voluntary means. Yet, to get an uncertain, though small, percent of workers with particular skills, it is proposed to regiment millions of American citizens. This is really bureaucracy with a vengeance. This is really the "Army mind" applied to a problem capable of a democratic solution.

Actually, this "sudden" manpower crisis is of recent origin. The manpower increases now needed are mainly because of increases in the procurement program. I want to repeat that—that the manpower increases now needed are mainly because of increases in the procurement program. And hardly before voluntary methods have started to function, there is a cry for drafting of labor to meet these new needs, these future needs. Let this be in the record, that before there has been time to find out whether methods, successful in the past, can again succeed, Army, Navy, Mr. Byrnes, and the President cry "Labor draft." And the old methods are succeeding while the discussion is going on about a labor draft. The Labor Department, just this last week end, announced the addition of 63,000 new workers since the current drive started. And let me insert right at this point that in regard to obtaining new workers needed in the brass mills for munitions production, 1 week after the War Manpower Commission started its drive to get the additional new workers needed the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board reported that 7 days after the drive started they had secured 30 percent of the needed workers.

The record of production of critical items kept by the War Production Board, as I have examined it, will show that in the main production has in the past kept up and is now keeping up with increased production schedules. Recruitment of manpower has seldom been behind new facilities, available materials, and management preparations for a new program.

Let me give one illustration. Navy rockets have never been behind schedule. Government records will show that manpower has been secured as fast as production facilities have been made available. The shortages that are talked about in rocket production are not current shortages, but future shortages that may develop in future production. As a matter of record the new production facilities being erected in Arkansas for Navy rockets are still in the construction stage; and recruiting at the present time is proceeding at the rate of about 200 a day. The reason in this instance that there has been some difficulty in getting workers for swamp clearance and other construction work is that the Army has been paying only 55 cents an hour. Recently the Navy asked permission to increase this scale to 75 cents an hour. The Army demurred, and they finally compromised at 65 cents an hour.

There is considerable unchallenged evidence that many of the so-called manpower shortages have been exaggerated and that in other cases lack of production can be traced to other than manpower causes. Some authorities who rant about the urgency of these shortages apparently do not know the facts as they actually exist in the factories and mills of our Nation.

I have here an article that appeared in the New York Times of January 4, 1945, which I would like to place in the record, in view of the fact that Mr. Hines, of the American Federation of Labor, will appear here before your committee. It is a report that he issued, and it details experiences in attempting to cooperate. Actually what it reports is that in case after case, where the War Department had said that it needed so many workers for this or that plant, local union officials went out and discovered that employers had given the War Manpower Commission one set of figures, the War Department another set, and that actually they did not need as many as the figures they had given to each of the Government agencies.

I would like to put this article in the record of the committee, because I am sure that Mr. Hines will give you more details on it.

The CHAIRMAN. You may do that.

(The newspaper article referred to and submitted by the witness is as follows:)

LABOR HOARDING CHARGED BY AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

SURVEY DISCLOSED THAT SOME EMPLOYERS EXAGERRATED THEIR NEEDS, FEDERATION AIDE SAYS

[Special to the New York Times, January 4, 1945]

WASHINGTON, January 3.—An assertion that some employers are exaggerating their manpower needs in their demands on the War Department, was made today by Lewis G. Hines, national legislative representative of the American Federation of Labor.

Mr. Hines was named by American Federation of Labor president, William Green to act as liaison with the War Department and American Federation of Labor unions in an effort to help recruit the manpower required for critical war industries.

In the last few weeks, Mr. Hines, after conferring with the War Department, has sent out letters to union leaders naming 85 war-production plants which require 45,000 workers, and asking the union officials to route workers to these plants.

"The reports that I have received from American Federation of Labor representatives indicate that they realize the nature of their task and that they have already responded by obtaining sufficient workers to man some of the jobs," he said.

"However, there have also been instances which indicate that some employers are asking for more workers than they need and other cases where they are hoarding manpower."

He said that in one locality the newspapers reported that the Army had asked for an additional 12,500 men. A check developed the fact that only 3,500 were needed.

"In another case," he said, "an up-State New York concern has reported as needing 2,500 men, but the International Association of Machinists, which has a contract with that company, claimed that it had been laying off employees for 9 days.

"MR. HINES REPORTED"

"In a Kentucky war center, a company asked for 850 workers and we managed to get 700 workers from the Southern Tenant Farmers Union. After this work had been completed the company announced it did not think the War Department would place its order for material.

"I had one of my representatives investigate the request of a Philadelphia company for 350 men and he reported that this company had only asked the United States Employment Service for 50 men but had raised its estimate to the War Department."

Mr. Hines said there was no way of knowing exactly to what extent employers were exaggerating their manpower needs, but that sufficient information had come to his office to convince him that a substantial number of workers were involved in the estimates by employers to the War Department.

He conceded that while there was an actual shortage of workers in some plants, the problem in others was one either of exaggeration of needs or of hoarding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The experience in other parts of the country has been exactly the same. A report was issued last week detailing the same kind of experience, particularly in the Michigan area.

Incidentally, may I cite another example of how so-called manpower shortages are being talked about at a time when in some cases management and the War Department seem to believe that workers can be laid off even for a short period. At the present time there is a controversy going on between U. A. W. union representatives and the War Department over Studebaker's action. The Studebaker Co. wants to lay off 13,000 workers fairly soon for inventory purposes, and the union is insisting that if there is a production crisis, those workers ought to be kept producing goods, and that instead of being laid off for from 3 days to 10 days, or as long as necessary——

Mr. STEWART. What do they produce?

Mr. HAMILTON. They produce tanks and trucks and anything that the Army says is in short supply.

May I call your attention to a statement made by Senator Mead, of New York, who presides over the Senate's Special Committee on National Defense? This statement was made on December 16, 1944, and at that time he said:

There has been a misconception of the problem. Insufficient production in the United States has not up to this time been the cause of shortage of weapons and ammunition at the front. Any shortage has been due, up to now, solely to transportation overseas.

That was December 16, 1944.

While it is true that extra quantities of material have been used during the recent Nazi offensive, let me point out to the committee that this statement of Senator Mead was made during a period when high officials of the War Department talked about production shortages and blamed the shortage of weapons and munitions on lack of manpower. One high official appeared before the labor-management advisory committee of the War Manpower Commission and blamed the shortage of weapons on the lack of manpower.

May I call the attention of the committee to the following facts that can be checked independently: That as of about the middle of December officials who knew the score in the mills and factories believed that of the lag in production of critical items needed by the Army, only 6 percent of the lag could be attributed to men with the proper skills not being where they were needed in sufficient number.

Mr. STEWART. You do not know anything about shortages at the front, do you?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am not saying that I know. I am quoting other sources that I believe to be responsible sources. About 10 percent of the lag as of the middle of December was at that time due to stepping up of programs. A little over 6 percent was due to changes in design, and a little over 3 percent because of a need for increased facilities. The 6-percent lag because of manpower shortage in many instances could just as well have been traced to other factors, as in the case of cotton duck, which I shall come to in a moment, which was included in this 6 percent.

Much nonsense has likewise been uttered about turn-over of workers——

Mr. JOHNSON. What is your authority for that statement?

Mr. HAMILTON. W. P. B. records and other records of the Special Committee Investigating National Defense.

Mr. JOHNSON. All official records?

Mr. HAMILTON. They are all official records as of the time it was stated that the actual lack of production as of the middle of December was about 25 to 27 percent on critical items; and this is a break-down of the causes of that lack, with only 6 percent of the 27 percent due to lack of manpower.

Mr. THOMASON. You have not heard the Secretary of War or General Somervell approve that statement, have you?

Mr. HAMILTON. General Somervell was the man who appeared before the War Manpower Commission advisory committee at the time when W. P. B. officials were saying that it was faulty transportation, and he was the one who was talking about shortages in production. So you have got a clash of official opinion.

Much nonsense has been uttered about turn-over. We have heard about mass exodus of workers from war jobs. We have heard about how complacent workers are laying down on their jobs. There is not the slightest bit of evidence to support any of these assertions.

In fact, the quit rate, according to the Department of Labor, is lower in war industries than in nonwar industry.

Mr. STEWART. The point is that those workers are going back to their home States and are not returning to their war jobs.

Mr. HAMILTON. Many of the war workers are faced with very difficult situations in transportation and housing more so than nonwar workers.

The quit rate is lower, in most instances, than it was a year ago, when apparently we had no such manpower crisis. At the very worst the quit rate has remained stable.

Let those who are demanding a manpower draft stop the ballyhoo and bring before Congress some of the facts that are known to the employees of W. P. B. and W. M. C. as they work with the situation, plant by plant and industry by industry. And let us pay some heed to the union officials who know the situations in the plants.

Let me now take up my second point. What I have been saying is that where there are manpower shortages they can be met by voluntary and democratic methods. These methods have not been exhausted by a long ways.

Let me illustrate. Recently the War Manpower Commission failed in the Twin Cities area in securing workers needed for two plants engaged in heavy munitions production and the Gopher ordnance plant. But the Labor Division of the War Production Board stepped in, and in cooperation with the unions in other plants, borrowed workers, 70 pipe fitters here and some electricians there, and met the need that ballyhoo did not meet without the coercive methods of a labor draft.

Again, let me take up a specific situation. The War Manpower Commission recently said that 2,000 workers were needed in textile plants to produce cotton duck. The Army says that cotton duck is so important that I understand they are arranging, or have already arranged, for the release of some men from the Army to go to work in textile mills. But there did not need to be a shortage of cotton duck because of a so-called manpower shortage. There were looms that should have been producing cotton duck and that were idle. But one of the reasons that those looms were idle was because manufacturers kept their workers on looms producing fine goods instead of cotton duck. Employers refused to transfer workers from looms producing fine goods to materials the Army needed. Likewise there were two other factors why textile employers had difficulty keeping both kinds of looms busy, since they were intent on keeping the existing labor force on fine goods: The first has been the traditional reluctance of southern employers to hire Negro labor; and second, the low wages paid by textile employers in the South. Even when employers were permitted to go to 55 cents an hour, many maintained the 45-cents-an-hour wage in the industry. Third, they refused to pay decent wages and workers went elsewhere to get higher wages.

Mr. STEWART. Does it require skill to operate a loom?

Mr. HAMILTON. It requires some training, but not too much immediate skill.

The CHAIRMAN. Let each member of the committee make notes on this man's testimony and, when he gets through, question him all you want to.

Mr. HAMILTON. Here is a case in point where a manpower shortage recorded by Government statisticians was not a real manpower shortage. Here was a situation where Government and employers, despite union urging—both A. F. of L. and C. I. O., refused to take those voluntary steps that could have gotten production of cotton duck for the Army.

Let me finish this story. The Army did want cotton duck and it did intervene in the situation—not to force employers to shift workers to idle cotton duck looms or convert looms where that was possible; not to insist on the democratic right of Negro workers, regardless of color, to secure industrial employment; not to increase wages. It intervened with O. P. A. to increase the price of cotton duck, in the hope that that would induce employers to produce cotton duck.

Are all workers to be forced to pay for W. P. B.'s softness, and the mistakes of the Army and the employers? Are needed skilled mechanics and maintenance men in the textile industry to be forced through a labor draft to take the 75 cents an hour paid for their skills by the industry while employers get price increases, when these same workers could receive $1.25 to $1.50 an hour in comparable work elsewhere?

There are a lot of us who believe that there are some voluntary steps that can be taken to solve manpower shortages.

First, use wage increases wherever and whenever it is necessary to attract workers and to hold them to war jobs. If it is desirable for the Government to underwrite the private enterprise system with profit percentages higher than ever before, to get businessmen interested in war production, then there should be no compunction about paying decent wages to workers. And the Government of the United States did find it necessary to underwrite and guarantee the profits of American business to get the private enterprise system to produce for war.

Congressman Colmer, in the bill which he has introduced, while he would take civilian workers in the Army, would see to it that employers receive 6 percent.

Using wages to solve manpower problems means that we will have to break the Little Steel formula. But if you institute a labor draft and follow the President's promise that it will not mean a lowering of a worker's income, then you will have to break the Little Steel formula, anyway. For many of the industries where there have been manpower problems, and I would put that in quotation marks, are those that are paying the lowest wages. So why not break the Little Steel formula now and solve some of the most pressing manpower problems by voluntary means?

Yes, it will work. It has worked in the past.

In the superphosphate mines in Florida workers threatened to leave the mines and go to work elsewhere for higher wages. Superphosphate was needed, and the War Labor Board stepped in and wage increases were granted. The men stayed on the job and production requirements were met. Incidentally, in this case, because of the pressing need for phosphates for the Nation's farmers, the Little Steel formula was broken by the War Labor Board. When they broke it, they kept the men at work.

One of the biggest headaches in the manpower field has been the foundry industry. Here the crux of the problem has been wages. Foundry wages have been the lowest of all the industries competing for the same type of labor. Eleven percent of all War Labor Board requests from employers for wage increases have come from the foundries. Labor and management both believe that manpower can be secured if given adequate wage increases. Would not this be a better way than any of the coercive labor-draft proposals?

Second, if the Negro is good enough to be drafted, then he should be good enough to work in the war plants. There is no question but that discriminatory practices of employers and of a minority of unions have aggravated the manpower situation. It is a sad commentary on how little understanding there exists of the word "democracy" in high places; that the Director of War Mobilization, former Justice Byrnes, could list labor-draft legislation as a "must" but not deem it necessary to ask Congress for the passage of a fair-employment practices bill which would outlaw discrimination in employment because of race, religion, color, creed, or national origin. In this case it would seem that some officials are more willing to solve the national problem by taking from the many their individual freedom rather than extending some of the freedom of the majority to a minority.

Third, settle once and for all the charges that the Army as well as industry is hoarding manpower—charges made no later than December by Senator Kilgore in a report to the Senate.

Fourth, bring organized workers even more directly into the organizational efforts to secure manpower.

Fifth, American workers want some guaranty from their Government that they will not be cast off like an old shoe when they have outlived their usefulness for war. If there is demoralization on the home front, it is because the real, honest-to-goodness truth is that nothing has been done to demonstrate concretely to the American worker that he will have a job when this war is over. Business has received a carry-back on taxes practically guaranteeing normal profits for a 2-year period after the war; a surplus-property law; a 5-year amortization law, which, incidentally, the aircraft industry went on strike to secure; and Mr. Byrnes has asked that business taxes be lowered. In the face of these things, it is not enough to talk about 60,000,000 jobs, or to make hopeful estimates of what private industry may do. We have got to show that we can provide these jobs, and we have got to give these war workers more sense of security, that many of them lack at the present time.

Lastly, let me repeat: A manpower draft of civilian workers for private profit is undemocratic and will not help, but will hinder production.

Talk of compulsion and forced labor is the quack doctor's remedy. Part of this quack remedy is the big-stick philosophy, the use of jail sentences, threats, chaing-gang methods. And part is the new cure-all—draft the IV–F's. Nobody has bothered to give us the slightest bit of information about the IV–F's, other than the probable number. We do not know how many of them are in essential work or how many of them have the skills that are in short supply. Nobody has produced any evidence that IV–F's are inclined to quit their jobs more frequently than anybody else. In short, we know absolutely nothing about IV–F's, other than that they constitute a convenient and defenseless scapegoat.

It is nonsense to draw a comparison between drafting workers for war production and drafting soldiers. A soldier believes that he is fighting or working for no person's private gain, but the civilian worker knows that if he is drafted for a job, his labor, because of Government guarantees, will produce a sizeable profit to his employer. And Mr. Colmer's bill should be headlined, "Draft workers at Army pay so the boss will make his 6 percent."

Do practical people really believe that a man or woman who is forced to work at a certain job, with no guarantee of equality of pay and working conditions with other workers on similar jobs and for the profit of an emplyer, even 6 percent, will be a good worker?

And is a compulsory draft of manpower workable and feasible? Let us look just for a moment at three points in the record.

At least 7,000,000 people have been brought into the labor market who, under ordinary circumstances, would not be there. These people were brought in voluntarily.

Second, employment in munitions industries has been built up from zero to more than 9,000,000 voluntarily.

Third, no country with compulsory labor has been able to approach the record of free labor in the United States.

Does anybody seriously believe that the United States has the experience and the manpower to operate a labor draft? For a lot of reasons the United States Employment Service is utterly incompetent to do the job. And it would take another year at least to get the manpower and train them for the job.

I might cite a Washington Post editorial yesterday on the United States Employment Service which summed up some of the things wrong with it; that it would take at least another year to train a man, not to mention the length of time it would take to train the staff necessary to make a labor draft work successfully.

Do the local draft boards know anything about the exceedingly complicated problems of labor requirements in tire plants or in powder plants, foundries, and textile mills? Of course they do not. Could they do the job in the face of the workers whom they have drafted from the copper mines, the coal mines, the farms, the tire plants, whom the Army has had later to release?

Nor can a labor draft remedy the problems of production created by bad planning on the part of the procurement agencies. Take the case of Muskegon, Mich., in which are located some of the largest foundries in the world. Here the number of workers has doubled since the war. As a result of incoming workers, Government officials say that the housing situation is not critical. You cannot physically get more people into that area's available housing. At present the procurement agencies have signed more contracts than can physically be produced by the labor supply that is now crammed into that area. The chamber of commere and other civic agencies are opposed to building additional housing. They are afraid that newly imported Negro workers will stay after the war, and they have actually asked the War Manpower Commission to cease recruiting Negro workers.

Labor draft legislation will not solve the housing problem in Muskegon, Mich., nor the attitude of the "town fathers" on employment of Negroes, nor the bad planning of the procurement agencies.

A housing program, adequate wages, a fair employment practices law and adequate planning by the procurement agencies would solve the problem. Inject a labor draft law into this kind of a situation, and it simply is likely to explode in the Nation's face.

Can the Army, the administration, and others promise that a labor draft will now solve a comparatively minor problem when compared to what has been accomplished by voluntary needs? If they cannot, then is it asking too much to ask for a display of a little more trust in the democratic method of doing business? And, as my Irish friend

68175—45——12

said, "Does Congress want to use a shilelagh to pick the Nation's teeth?" Because that is what we are up against.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your statement, sir?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you stated that you represent the Socialist Party. I want to know if you have the authority of Mr. Norman Thomas to speak here?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do, yes. He could not be here today.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your statement represent his views on the question?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he have anything to do with the preparation of your statement?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes; he did.

The CHAIRMAN. He wrote it?

Mr. HAMILTON. No. He saw the statement before it was finally presented, and approved it—or he heard it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say that you were a farmer?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am a farmer.

The CHAIRMAN. In the State of Virginia?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you own a farm in Virginia?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not own a farm. I have a very complicated farm arrangement. I farm four small farms in Virginia on a share-crop and rent basis, 160 acres.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a community organization composed of sharecroppers and so on?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On a cooperative basis?

Mr. HAMILTON. No, sir. I am the sharecropper and I am the farmer.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you pay an hour for farm labor?

Mr. HAMILTON. When I have to get farm labor I pay 50 cents an hour. In the haying season we did pay 75, 80, and 90 cents an hour, this past summer.

The CHAIRMAN. How many hours do you work in the haying season?

Mr. HAMILTON. I work 10 hours a day usually, and when I have to hire help they work 8 or 9 hours a day.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not make them work as long as you do?

Mr. HAMILTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that they ought to work long enough to protect the crop?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do farm wages in your section of Virginia compare with industrial wages in the same section?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know; I cannot answer that.

The CHAIRMAN. How do they compare with the general wage scale throughout the country?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think in general you will find that farm wages break-down something as follows: In the last two summers, when farmers have been faced with peak loads during the haying season and the harvesting season, they paid almost anything they had to pay to get farm labor. One of our neighbors who runs a dairy, last summer paid as high as $1 an hour to get men to help during the haying season.

The CHAIRMAN. How many hours work per day?

Mr. HAMILTON. Anywhere from 8 to 10. That was temporary.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the average for last year for industrial workers per week, in the number of hours worked?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know. My recollection is that the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that it was somewhere around 50; but I am not quite sure.

The CHAIRMAN. The War Manpower Commission issued Bulletin No. 14 which showed 42 hours.

Mr. HAMILTON. I knew it was somewhere between 45 and 50.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, farmers work about 60 hours a week, on the average, do they not?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think you will find a statement of the Department of Agriculture which shows that the actual work day of a farmer will run around 11½ to 11¾ hours a day as a national average.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you produce on your farm?

Mr. HAMILTON. I had 30 acres in corn this year and 14 acres in rye, and I had soybeans and hay and truck crops for the cooperative stores in Washington, and I have a flock of sheep.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I believe, that the War Manpower Commission had estimated that there were 18,000 men needed in factories in the East?

Mr. HAMILTON. They gave the figures of 18,000 and 80,000, but I do not know which is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Eighteen thousand at one time and 80,000 at another. Do you know what industries were involved?

Mr. HAMILTON. I imagine they were industries involved in the W. P. B.'s critical and "must" program, which includes trucks, tires, and cotton duck. I imagine that some of the cotton-duck manpower shortages were in New England.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ever work in a cotton mill?

Mr. HAMILTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what their problems are?

Mr. HAMILTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You stated, I believe, that the difference in the needs of manpower at this time is represented by the fact that there were cut-backs or fall-offs in demand at one time, and that the increased demand for war materials is the problem rather than the number of employees?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. Let me illustrate that, if I may. In the brass mills—and you can get these figures from the War Production Board—the brass-mill production was somewhere, at its peak, around 350,000 tons a month. It was then cut back to around 240,000, and then they were boosted on a new program to over 400,000. What that meant was that during that period of cut-backs some of the labor forces were dissipated; some of the women went back to their homes, some moved elsewhere. But, anyway, the labor force that had been accumulated for production in the brass mills was no longer there. The unions in the industry at the time of the cut-backs asked for two things: They asked that the brass mills be kept in a stand-by position and that the force be kept on in the event of an emergency such as we now face, and they asked that the labor force be kept together by permitting these mills to do some civilian production. Then came the

emergency. Neither one of those two things was done. They were faced, then, with a manpower shortage.

Two things have been done. The War Manpower Commission started a campaign, and 1 week after it started, for additional manpower for this new program, which was almost but not quite double the former peak, they secured 30 percent of the workers. In the meantime the unions by agreement worked out a 7-day week work schedule for the men in the plants, actually increasing the number of hours worked in the plants.

The CHAIRMAN. The manpower problem which you have just described and the inability of management and labor organizations to control or allocate it—in spite of that, you are still opposed to any form of legislation that would involve the Government's stepping in and making both employer and employee utilize labor?

Mr. HAMILTON. The Government had an opportunity to step in——

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your position?

Mr. HAMILTON. No. I do not want to be misquoted. I am all in favor of the Government's stepping in, but I am in favor of stepping in in a way where the job can be done by voluntary methods, as it has been done in the past.

Let me remind you that the Government did not step in to follow the union's suggestion so that there would not be an emergency now in terms of the dissipation of the labor force.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, your position is that if there is a shortage of labor, regardless of the difficulties between management and labor itself, you are opposed to any form of Government authority, by legislation or otherwise, that would enable them to adjust their differences, and you want to solve it by saying that if a man has been paid 75 cents an hour he ought to be stepped up to $1.25 or $1.50 an hour, knowing that that goes into the cost of the goods? In other words, you want an expanded wage scale rather than a statute permitting it to be done on the present wage scale?

Mr. HAMILTON. In a situation such as foundries and textiles the Government finds that wages are lower in those industries for comparable work than are being paid elsewhere, and I believe, and the record will show it is true, that manpower can be gotten for those particular industries when the wage scale is at least made comparable, and can definitely be gotten when the wage scale is raised as an attraction to workers.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it not a fact that attractive wages in one plant as against unattractive wages in another plant are causing shifting of men from place to place?

Mr. HAMILTON. The War Labor should have the authority——

The CHAIRMAN. I want some information. What I want to know is whether or not that is true.

Mr. HAMILTON. Senator, skilled workers who have a chance to make a dollar an hour in one place as against 50 cents in another place are going to go to the place where they can get a dollar an hour.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think they ought to be permitted to do that, regardless of the fact that they need munitions on the battle front?

Mr. HAMILTON. I say the Government ought to use that incentive to get manpower in those places where it is needed for production, because the Government has used a similar incentive so far as employers and businesses are concerned.

Mr. THOMASON. Did you favor the passage of the selective-service law?

Mr. HAMILTON. Did I favor it?

Mr. THOMASON. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. I did not have much to say about it.

Mr. THOMASON. How did you feel about it?

Mr. HAMILTON. I was "agin" it at the time.

Mr. THOMASON. And you are still "agin" it?

Mr. HAMILTON. Not in particular. It is the law of the land.

Mr. THOMASON. Do you think it has been a success?

Mr. HAMILTON. I would have a lot of criticisms as to how it is working.

Mr. THOMASON. You were against it?

Mr. HAMILTON. I was against it at the time as were a lot of people.

Mr. THOMASON. You were against a declaration of war against Japan and Germany; were you not?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. THOMASON. How do you feel about that now?

Mr. HAMILTON. We are in war, and that is the decision that has been made.

Mr. THOMASON. It is quite serious, when the men who are running the war, like Under Secretary Patterson and Secretary of War Stimson, and General Somervell, who is looking after the Army end of the thing, and men in charge of war production say that there is at least a threatened shortage of material for the necessary munitions to carry on this war successfully, and the necessary workers cannot be obtained by voluntary methods. Just what do you propose to do to win this war and provide the boys overseas with the necessary munitions?

Mr. HAMILTON. Three things. First of all, I do not believe that the authorities you have named have shown the facts, at least as I have found them and as those men who are engaged in war production have found them, and as those farmers who are engaged in war production have found them. I do not believe that the facts show that there is a necessity at this time of our using compulsory methods.

Mr. THOMASON. If we cannot rely on those who are in authority, we are in a bad way.

Mr. HAMILTON. Maybe we are in a bad way, Congressman.

Mr. THOMASON. We have competent men like Secretary Patterson, General Marshall, General Somervell, and others, who say that something must be done about it, that we cannot get the necessary labor to produce the necessary war materials and get a lot of people who ought to be in essential work, into it. I would like to know what method you propose to adopt, since you were against a declaration of war and against selective service, for the building up of an Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. I am just wondering what you would do about winning this war in the present crisis.

Mr. HAMILTON. I tried to tell you something of the things I think can be done to get the necessary manpower. I have said, first, that I believe the record will show that if we could get 9,000,000 men in munitions production by voluntary means in the past, as we have gotten them, we can get either 90,000 or 700,000, whichever is the figure that we now need, and since the drive has been started we have already gotten 63,000 new workers, according to the Department of Labor statistics, and in the textile situation which I have been talking about, I

am told by the O. P. A. that they expect now in textiles to be able to meet the current needs with reference to cotton duck.

Mr. THOMASON. How long have you been engaged in farming?

Mr. HAMILTON. For a long time. We bought orange groves out in California, and then I was in the newspaper business, and back in farming, and I worked as a farm laborer in the Midwest during the harvesting seasons for 2 years.

Mr. THOMASON. How long have you been farming on this last hitch?

Mr. HAMILTON. About 2½ years.

Mr. THOMASON. Are you a man of family?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. I have a little girl 10 months old, who is in the hospital today with pneumonia.

Mr. THOMASON. I am sorry. What is your age, please?

Mr. HAMILTON. Thirty-one.

Mr. THOMASON. That is all.

Mr. ANDREWS. What have you to say with respect to the British labor draft?

Mr. HAMILTON. The British labor draft has been primarily a democratic system, and the labor supply has been gotten in England and is administered under the Ministry of Labor whose head is a trade-union man.

Mr. ANDREWS. It is a draft law?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir. They passed a labor draft law, but in the administration of it they have used voluntary methods.

Mr. ANDREWS. Can you give me a list of 10 large businesses that are making 8 percent after all taxes are paid?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes; I can give you a list.

Mr. ANDREWS. I wish you would furnish it.

Mr. HAMILTON. I will be glad to.

Mr. ANDREWS. You spoke of the hourly wages of farmers. Do you pay them by the hour or by the month?

Mr. HAMILTON. I pay by the hour because I only need seasonal labor.

Mr. ANDREWS. You pay all your employees by the hour?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes; because I only need seasonal labor.

Mr. ANDREWS. If you had 80 acres planted in some particular crop and there was a flood which spoiled the crop, it would change your plan?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes; I would have to plan for something else.

Mr. ANDREWS. How much military experience have you had?

Mr. HAMILTON. I have not had any military experience.

Mr. BROOKS. If you were not in favor of the declaration of war your heart is not very much in this war, is it?

Mr. HAMILTON. The other Congressman I am afraid was trying to put words into my mouth, because what I really meant to say was that I was opposed to America entering the war at the time of lend-lease and such things as that.

Mr. BROOKS. Your heart is not very much in this war, is it?

Mr. HAMILTON. I wish that I could believe that the noble things that are being professed in regard to this war were going to come out of it. But we are in it, and that is that.

Mr. BROOKS. So you do not much believe that the things we have got in this country are worth fighting for?

Mr. HAMILTON. I believe that the main thing which we have in this country, the democratic way of doing business, is exceedingly worth

while; but I think in regard to our foreign policy, in regard to our peace aims as we express them in this war, and currently in terms of the domestic situation, we should increase the application of that thing that I think is very worth while, rather than to limit it. In other words, you see, Congressman, I, as well as as a lot of Americans, have a heritage in the past that runs clear back in terms of ancestors to the people who fought in the Revolution.

Mr. BROOKS. I dare say your ancestors were willing to fight. Do you think the things we have got are worth fighting for? You have not said so.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think the things we have got are worth fighting for. I do not think we are fighting for the best we have got, if I may put it that way. I do not believe that our State Department in this war is operating in terms of those things. But this is not a foreign-policy debate.

Mr. BROOKS. Are you a conscientious objector?

Mr. HAMILTON. I am a farmer at the present time. I am not a conscientious objector or a soldier. If you mean, do I have a conscience about the war, I do, sir.

Mr. BROOK. You have a conscience, but are not fighting.

Mr. HAMILTON. I was classified by my draft board as I–A–O, which is noncombatant service, and then I was reclassified as a farmer, and I was classified by the medical board because of limited service.

Mr. BROOKS. Have you been classified as a conscientious objector?

Mr. HAMILTON. I was originally, and then I changed my status.

Mr. SHORT. First, let me say that I am certainly not a Socialist.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am sure of that, Congressman.

Mr. SHORT. The statement which you have given us is one of the most intelligent and with about as much meat in it as concerns this bill as we have yet heard. I saw unmistakable signs of Norman Thomas in it, having debated with him over the air, but I do not care where it comes from. It reflects a comprehensive knowledge of this whole problem and a keen understanding of it. I am not going to ask you about your past and whether you were against getting into the war, but I do want to ask you, without pillorying you and talking about other issues, something about this particular bill that we have under consideration. I hope I am a little fairer than some of the members of this committee have been in some of the questions they have fired at you.

The first thing is, we had a reduction in war industry employment of 10 percent from November 1943, when we reached the peak, until September 1944. Is that correct?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right.

Mr. SHORT. That reduction in the output of war material was caused pretty largely by cut-backs ordered by the Army and Government officials themselves in many of the programs in the increased output per worker in many of these war factories. It was due more to those factors than it was to any voluntary shift of workers themselves from essential industry to nonessential peacetime industry?

Mr. HAMILTON. You are absolutely right, Congressman.

Mr. SHORT. The general let-down last fall or the failure to accelerate production was due pretty largely to the widespread belief among civilians, Army and Navy officials, and even Members of Congress and other high Government officials that the war would soon be over

in Europe. As a member of the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy I listened for days to testimony from members of different branches of the Government about reconversion and about the post-war prosperity and unemployment and all the rest of it, even before we had won the war. Then the counteroffensive of the Germans began about the middle of December, and since that counteroffensive began and since we have started a new drive for additional workers in our war plants we have already secured, under our voluntary system, 63,000?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right, sir.

Mr. SHORT. You stated that several different figures had been given about the number of additional men that were needed in war plants?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right.

Mr. SHORT. That is absolutely true and incontrovertible. The Department of Labor and the War Manpower Commission figures, the last that were gotten out on December 30, 1944, just 2 weeks ago, showed that we needed 146,000 workers, and the Under Secretary of War came before this committee and told us we needed 700,000. There is quite a discrepancy between 146,000 and 700,000. I have as much confidence in the Under Secretary of War and in these generals as the gentleman from Texas has. I have great admiration for them. But I am wondering whether they are in a better position to tell us about war production than the War Manpower Commission or the Department of Labor, two Government agencies that deal directly with this specific problem.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask you to put your question.

Mr. SHORT. I will put the question.

The CHAIRMAN. And see what he has to say.

Mr. SHORT. How many discharged men are being returned each month?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know the figures, sir, on that.

Mr. SHORT. Well, it is about 50,000. Do you know how many of them enter war industries?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not think anybody does at the present time, unless the report which the Selective Service has been working on is completed.

Mr. SHORT. I understood you to say that no one knows exactly how many of the IV–F's are now engaged in war industry?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right; nobody knows.

Mr. SHORT. But it is your firm conviction that if the high wages that are paid in critical war industries are not a sufficient lure to entice them to enroll, certainly you cannot increase production by compelling them to enroll?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right.

Mr. SHORT. And you also want to know whether or not, if we had a labor draft, the men who are drafted for labor would possess the necessary skill?

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right.

Mr. SHORT. Do you think that perhaps some of the lack of production in war plants has been due to the shortage of facilities and perhaps of raw materials for new production?

Mr. HAMILTON. I gave you some figures as of the middle of December.

Mr. SHORT. Particularly at Muskegon, Mich.?

Mr. HAMILTON. No. I gave you some over-all figures, national figures.

Mr. SHORT. You were illustrating, though, the fact that you could not ship any more workers up there because they did not have housing and transportation facilities.

Mr. HAMILTON. In the middle of December the total lack in production as a result of needed new facilities was 10 percent.

Mr. SHORT. The failure, then, to produce in many of these war plants in certain areas of the United States is not due to lack of manpower?

Mr. HAMILTON. Absolutely not.

Mr. SHORT. For other reasons?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. Is it not also true that plants in tight labor markets are sometimes overloaded with contracts, while plants able to do the work in other areas have ample labor but idle facilities?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir; absolutely. A United Automobile Workers union official told me day before yesterday that an Army procurement officer in Detroit had told him, "We can now shift around."

Mr. SHORT. So that if the contracts were wisely distributed in different plants over the United States we would not suffer this shortage of production?

Mr. HAMILTON. If there was adequate planning; that is right.

Mr. SHORT. You think, then, that inadequate planning or the bungling of management is largely responsible for lack of production, perhaps as much as or more than the lack of manpower?

Mr. HAMILTON. Plus, in some instances in some of the new procurement, lack of facilities and shortages of material.

Mr. SHORT. In connection with your answer do you not think that there are certain technical difficulties that have also contributed to the lack of production, particularly in the production of heavy artillery, artillery ammunition, radar, and these new implements of war?

Mr. HAMILTON. Particularly when there have been shift-overs in production those technical difficulties have been met.

Mr. SHORT. You perhaps have read in the papers, as many of us did—and that is about all we know; we are like Will Rogers in that—that they shut down a plant in St. Louis, Mo., the largest of its kind in the world, and threw a large number of people out of employment, and at the same time they closed the Weldon Springs ordnance plant and threw thousands of others out. You also know that a Portland, Maine, shipyard at one time had 30,000 men in its force, and that it is now reduced to 20,000, and yet they are turning out more ships than ever before, due to the experience in production and to the setting up of more efficient methods?

Mr. HAMILTON. The Department of Labor will tell you exactly that—that production has increased because of greater efficiency of labor.

Mr. SHORT. America's workers are producing 81 percent more airplanes than 2 years ago. Is not that a fact?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. So we are actually producing more airplanes, more airplane frames, more munitions, and the same thing is true in our shipyards, though not to as high a degree; we are producing more of the implements of war in Government arsenals, shipyards, munitions factories, with less men than we did a year ago?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, sir; just as the farmers are producing more with less men than they did before.

Mr. SHORT. Because these industries have learned the know-how and have taught that know-how to these men employed in the plants?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. SHORT. I want to read an Associated Press story that appeared at Lowell, Mass., dated November 20, 1943 [reading]:

> The huge ordnance plant of the Remington Arms Co. which has been manufacturing .50 caliber shells for the Army since April 2, 1942, will close before December 31, the Army announced today, because the Army has enough ammunition for any crisis however unexpected.

We have heard—if the chairman will permit me just to say one or two sentences here—representatives of the Government; we had the Under Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of the Navy, representatives of the War Production Board and of the Manpower Commission and of the Selective Service Board, and we are now hearing representatives of labor, both the C. I. O. and the American Federation of Labor, and we have even listened to a Socialist—and though we differ, Mr. Hamilton, we would still die to give you the right to express your own view. But that is not the question. We are convinced that we can win this war and get out of it more quickly under our free system of enterprise and free labor than if we have forced labor or slave labor. That is your view, is it not?

Mr. HAMILTON. Absolutely.

Mr. SHORT. Since we have heard Government officials and representatives of labor I hope the chairman of the committee, before closing these hearings, will call before the committee in open hearings representatives of industry who are doing the job themselves in the various plants. I would like to hear representatives of Curtiss-Wright, of Glenn Martin, of the small-arms plant out in St. Louis, to come here and tell us how many men they have employed today in comparison with the number they employed a year ago, what orders they have today in comparison with the orders that they had a year ago, what additional contracts they have signed, how many additional employees are necessary, how efficiently and effectively they are utilizing their manpower at the present time. I want to hear from businesses, such as the National Association of Manufacturers. I would like to hear from business as well as from Government and from labor.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me observe this. Representatives of the Manufacturers' Association and others are to be here tomorrow.

Mr. HAMILTON. May I say, sir, that while I usually do not have anything good to say for the National Association of Manufacturers, I think one of the finest statements is what they have said in the current bulletin which they have published, in which they state that labor and management together can solve this problem.

Mr. SHORT. The only thing that makes me skeptical about my present position is that I have to crawl into bed with those who did their damnedest to defeat me. It is a case of politics making strange bedfellows.

Mr. HAMILTON. In this instance we all have to stick together.

Mr. SPARKMAN. According to the testimony of Mr. Short——

Mr. SHORT. You will hear more later.

Mr. SPARKMAN (continuing). It is said that we need only 146,000 workers. You did not intend to leave it as your testimony with this committee that 146,000 additional workers will be able to produce the supplies that those charged with the responsibility of supplying our armed forces say we must have over the next 12 months, did you?

Mr. HAMILTON. If you will remember, Congressman, I said there had been a lot of figures given, and I tried in my statement very honestly to give you the facts as they were settled in my own mind. I do not know from the Government statements how many men are needed. The War Manpower Commission says almost 150,000. They ought to know.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me get you right on that. Is not this what the War Manpower Commission says, that in those plants now lagging in production of war materials, there is a shortage of 146,000 men?

Mr. HAMILTON. In what they call their "must" program?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; and that does not take into account the additional facilities that are now being built and being opened up for the production of a greater program than we have had scheduled heretofore.

Mr. HAMILTON. As I understand it, sir, the estimates of manpower needs are made on a basis of the growth of the programs; that is, next month the Army expects so much, and the next month so much more, and the manpower estimates are made ahead of time on the basis of those figures. I think you are right that they are not made on the basis of the total final peak production that the Army or the War Production Board wants at that time because I think the War Manpower Commission officials operate on this assumption, if I have been correctly informed, that in the course of the developing "must" programs there are going to be other programs that the War Department is going to say "All right, you can cut back" on, and they will furnish a labor supply force for some of the others. But there are going to be cases where civilian industries now closed down will supply additional workers. So they do operate on the basis of a group of workers for an expanding program, but not for the total of a peak load, because they believe that they are going to be available.

Mr. SPARKMAN. But as cut-backs may occur, increased requirements may occur?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. As a matter of fact, is not that what we are up against right now?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. What we are up against is future labor shortages, and a small immediate labor shortage which, may I say, has been the situation ever since we started armament production. We have always been faced by those two things and we have always gotten the men needed, by hook or by crook, and by the use of voluntary methods to man those programs. There is nothing in the testimony to show that the past methods that have worked will not now work in this crisis.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me ask you about that. You say "past methods that have worked." There has been placed before us a survey by the American Federation of Labor that gives some charts, and I notice that for every month during 1944, with the single exception of April, production lagged far behind schedule on heavy-duty trucks. I

notice that the same thing is true of cotton duck, except that, in fact, not a single month did they meet requirements there. Those are the only two that happen to be given in that chart. So, have the methods worked in the past if we have actually lagged in production?

Mr. HAMILTON. One of the biggest lags, as you say, has been in cotton-duck production, in the past, as the charts have shown. But I likewise presented another part of the story on cotton duck before the committee. During this period looms that could produce cotton duck were idle. The War Manpower Commission says that when those looms are idle there is a manpower shortage, because there are not men working on them. Actually in the same factories there were workers working on fine goods production whom the employers refused to shift to the looms that were idle to produce the things that the Army needed. By one definition there was a manpower shortage. By another definition it was a failure on the part of the employer and the W. P. B. to enforce the shift and the change-over.

Mr. SPARKMAN. What would be your answer to the shortage in the heavy-duty trucks?

Mr. HAMILTON. The shortage in the heavy-duty trucks—I may say that the U. A. W. representatives can give you a more adequate picture of that than I can, but I have been told by labor representatives and W. P. B. representatives that one of the reasons that there was a technical shortage on paper, and not the total reason—by no means was it all the reason—was because of a step-up in contracts granted, because it works this way, that when the Army says, "We are going to get a whole batch more," then the manpower shortage that is shown is a manpower shortage for that additional contract.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The chart I refer to shows how they have met those production schedules. It does not show a manpower shortage, but, instead, shows that for every month during 1944 except April they failed to meet the schedule of the production program.

You indicated approval of the situation in England, and something was said about a national-service law there. That was enacted, I believe, in 1940, and, according to your statement, England has gotten along very well with her manpower problem?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. I would like to say this, if I may, that I am no expert on the English draft law. I think I read a copy of the labor-draft regulations once. I think all of us know that England enacted a labor-draft law under far more of a crisis situation than we face. I think that officials of the C. I. O. and the American Federation of Labor can give you a far better picture than I can. But what they found was that in the main they did not need to use it, because they had something which we have not yet gotten in this country; they had union participation intimately in the organizational efforts to secure manpower.

We have a Labor Advisory Committee to the War Manpower Commission which gives advice that the War Manpower Commission very often does not take, and certainly the other manpower agencies do not take; and that advice is given on the basis of knowledge, not mythical statements.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You say that labor and management can solve this problem. What is there that labor and management can do that they are not already doing?

Mr. HAMILTON. In the first place, labor and management can be given much more say or participation in the War Manpower Commission offices. Second, you will find that the programs that labor and management are now working on in brass mills, foundries, and several others, and those methods are at the present time solving problems. But what has been too true in the past, however, is that the War Manpower Commission has not really called on labor organizations and management for really effective cooperation, and did not until sometime quite a long period after they started their newspaper campaigns for more workers in the case which was cited in the Twin Cities when the War Manpower Commission's newspaper campaign got the workers that were needed.

Mr. STEWART. May I ask you again what your name is?

Mr. HAMILTON. My name is Albert Hamilton.

Mr. STEWART. I have no further questions.

Mr. JOHNSON. You have indicated that one of your objections to any form of draft is the fact that some of the workers work for employers that are making large profits. Do you make any distinction between workers working for the Government in big navy yards and those working for a private employer?

Mr. HAMILTON. I think there is an honest distinction that can be made; yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. It was presented to us here the other day that in some of the navy yards the turn-over of labor was 9 percent a month. How do you propose to stop that?

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like to know the situation, sir. I do not believe I can give a panacea answer; but I believe that there are comparable situations that have been solved by voluntary methods that would be applicable to the situation which you have in mind.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is at Mare Island, Calif. Do you think it would be proper in that case to freeze men on the job?

Mr. HAMILTON. It depends upon what you mean by "freeze."

Mr. JOHNSON. Make them stay on the job instead of moving to another plant. They move from one plant to another.

Mr. HAMILTON. It would probably be proper to do what you call "freeze" men on the job if you gave some guarantee through some kind of an appeals system that you were not going to perpetrate injustices. There are all kinds of reasons why men want to leave their work sometimes. Here is a man working over here [illustrating] whose family lives 200 miles away, and he has worked there for a year or 2 years, and he finally says, "I just can't do this any longer."

Mr. JOHNSON. Let us see if we can make this a little shorter. If it could be shown that the man had a proper place to live and an adequate house—and the houses that are furnished by the Government out there are rather good, I think—and he had no other excuse, do you think that we should freeze such men on the job in that kind of a plant?

Mr. HAMILTON. If you could show that the man received pay comparable with his skill and he had cheap housing and living conditions, I think you would not have to freeze him. The turn-over would drop to a figure which I believe would be acceptable by the War Department authorities. I think you would find that to be true, because I think you will find that the highest turn-over is in those areas where they have bad housing and crowded conditions.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am assuming that housing is adequate and that the wages are the prevailing wages paid in the community and were fixed by the Government.

Mr. HAMILTON. I would say you would not have to talk about freezing them in that situation. The facts will show that the turn-over would drop.

Mr. JOHNSON. The fact is that they moved around out there. Last summer it was 12 percent a month.

Do you not also think it would be proper, if they needed more workers in those critical places—and I am talking only about a Government-owned plant, like the Mare Island Navy Yard—to draft workers and place them in that plant who are in the selective service listed as IV–F's and not engaged in some war industry?

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me give you the order of the things you can do. That is the crux of the problem. The crux of the problem is whether or not you are going to consider housing and management and these other things; and then if you find that they cannot work—and nobody has shown that they cannot work; the Army officials have not shown that—if you find they cannot work, then let us talk about freezing and drafting workers in IV–F.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the witness answer the gentleman's question, instead of making a speech.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am trying to answer it directly. You are talking about a labor draft before you have done those things that would make it unnecessary for you to have to talk about a labor draft.

Mr. JOHNSON. I just want to get your views. Who is going to be the judge of whether the living conditions and wages are adequate, the worker himself or some agency like the War Manpower Commission in that area?

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you want me to draw an administrative set-up?

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to find out from you if you make a distinction between men that work for private profit and those that work directly for the Government in a war industry.

Mr. HAMILTON. I have got confidence in people——

The CHAIRMAN. He asked you a plain question, whether you made any distinction between men working in a plant that the Government owns or one that private industry operates for a profit.

Mr. HAMILTON. I answered that, and said that I thought there was a difference; but I was trying to answer the question which he followed it up with.

Mr. JOHNSON. You make the distinction, that is quite obvious; but who should be the judge of whether the conditions are proper, each individual workman or some governmental group like the War Manpower Commission or Selective Service?

Mr. HAMILTON. If it is necessary in a situation like that, let there be created a tripartite committee of management and representatives of the workers and of the Government. I would approve a threefold committee like that to make an honest judgment, and I think most people would.

Mr. JOHNSON. Out there the War Manpower Commission does have a committee of management and labor, and we still have not reduced it below 9 percent.

Mr. HAMILTON. Because in all instances, as a matter of fact, there is a situation that makes it impossible, when there is poor housing, for the Manpower Commission to do anything more about it. They can request improvement, and then you get into red tape——

The CHAIRMAN. You were to have a short period here, but you have had an hour and a quarter.

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to ask one or two more short questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Make them short; and if the witness does not answer them directly, we will have to excuse him.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mentioned the fact that in the cotton-duck industry there were many available Negroes who were not used. Do you have any personal knowledge of that by making an investigation or getting direct information about it?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. You can acquire exact information on that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am asking you what you know about it.

Mr. HAMILTON. I have seen the reports, at least some of them, which have come in to the Washington office of the textile union and which other representatives of the textile union have secured from the field, and I have every reason to believe that those reports are true.

Mr. JOHNSON. In the State of North Carolina how many available Negros are there who might be workers in the duck mills?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not know, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to see if you know anything about it. Tell us what you know or what specific knowledge you have from someone that does know.

Mr. HAMILTON. The War Manpower Commission says that the largest available supply of labor at the present time not engaged in essential production is to be found in the South; second, that in the South, likewise, the largest supply of available workers are Negro workers, also in the agricultural areas, and that the Southern Tenant Farmers Union has been engaged, along with A. F. of L. unions, in fostering the migration of Negroes in particular from places where they were surplus labor to critical war areas; and they have found, and the Textile Workers Union in the industry, have found that in case after case the employers would not take Negroes when there was a supply of Negroes available. I am talking about Negro workmen.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is is not a fact that the white union members in the textile plants will not work alongside of Negroes; that if you hire Negroes you will lose all your white workers?

Mr. HAMILTON. I do not believe that is true, sir. I think you will find that the union will give you the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. We have another gentleman waiting here who was to be the first witness this morning. Thank you, sir. You are excused.

Mr. HARNESS I wonder if I might ask just one question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. I am quoting from the December report of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor and the Reports and Analyses Service of the War Manpower Commission, where they say that from November 1943 to September 1944 there were 1,100,000 workers in war industries laid off.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is correct.

Mr. HARNESS. Do you know what became of that labor?

Mr. HAMILTON. I have seen a survey made by the Office of Labor Production in several areas in the Midwest, and their report is that that labor was simply dissipated.

Mr. BROOKS. Can we not get that report rather than have the witness tell us what the report shows?

Mr. HARNESS. I wanted to know whether he had gone into it so he could give me any light on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Apparently he has not.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am sorry, sir; I tried to give an answer that the workers were simply dissipated. Some returned home.

STATEMENT OF LEWIS G. HINES, LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement, Mr. Hines?

Mr. HINES. No, Mr. Chairman. We did a lot of research work right up to the last minute, and it was impossible for us to get together a prepared statement. So I am going to have to talk from the record and from some of the material we have gathered.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Mr. HINES. First of all, let me say on behalf of the American Federation of Labor that I want to thank you and the committee, and we appreciate this opportunity to be here today to express our point of view.

The CHAIRMAN. We are glad to have you.

Mr. HINES. I regret that we are not going to agree with you a hundred percent, Mr. Chairman; but, nevertheless, that is one of the great privileges of being an American. We can differ, but finally, perhaps, out of all the differences will arise something in the interest of all the people.

I would like to say that the nearly 7,000,000 members of the American Federation of Labor unquestionably are solidly united upon the war effort and are desirous of bringing about victory on all fronts at the earliest possible moment. With a million of our members serving in the armed forces, 2,000,000 of our active members of the Federation out of 7,000,000, as well as several million more of our kinfolk, sisters, brothers, sons, and daughters who are likewise serving along a far-flung battle line, many of whom are making and will make the supreme sacrifice, it goes without saying that we support wholeheartedly the aims and purposes of this legislation in what it seeks to bring about: that every man and every woman have an opportunity to serve within the armed forces or on the home front in whatsoever position they can most capably fill.

There is not any question on the part of our organization that that should be the aim and purpose of every loyal American in this country.

We are, however, opposed to House bill 1119, because we do not, for reasons that I will give you presently, believe that this is the best or more practical manner in which we can achieve the aforementioned results.

I would like to read into the record the statement of President Green, in which he says [reading]:

> Throughout the war period, the American Federation of Labor and its members have demonstrated their willingness and desire to do everything possible to increase production and promote the war effort.
>
> The results prove the soundness of the fundamental American principle that free labor is more efficient and more productive than slave labor. In no country where compulsory service is exacted from the people can the production record match ours.
>
> Organizations of American industry and agriculture have joined with labor in opposing compulsory service because of a deep conviction that it would not be practical or helpful to the war effort.
>
> Labor still is reluctant to approve or support national service legislation which provides for compulsion.
>
> We doubt the need for such legislation. We fear that it will create confusion, adversely affect morale, and hinder the smooth functioning of the war-production program.
>
> Enactment of such legislation cannot increase the manpower supply nor do we believe it will promote effective use of available manpower.
>
> On the other hand, it may result in decreased efficiency and lower individual production.
>
> The better course to pursue would be to seek ways and means by which we can improve utilization of the available manpower supply through voluntary methods. Labor will cooperate to the fullest extent in facilitating the transfer of workers from nonessential industries to critical war plants.

Now, to be a little more specific, I want to refer to one group within the American Federation of Labor which has demonstrated the advisability of the voluntary system.

We had a meeting last Friday of a number of legislative representatives, and we went over this entire program, and it was the consensus of opinion unanimously that we should oppose this legislation. It was brought out most forcefully by the members of the building-trades union—and I want you to get this, Mr. Chairman, because it is highly important—it was brought out by members of the building-trades union that there had been absolute coordination, cooperation, and collaboration between labor and the agencies involved.

Mr. Chairman, I repeat what I said before, that there has been absolute coordination and cooperation between the Navy, the Army, and all governmental agencies, and the American Federation of Labor. In every instance we have supplied and fulfilled the needs of the Army and the Navy or other groups who have called upon us.

I might go back 3 years and cite the fact that it was in the union halls of the country that the construction battalion of the Navy was formed. When they decided to inaugurate the construction battalion, known as the Seabees, they came to the American Federation of Labor, and it was in the union halls of the plumbers, electricians, carpenters, and other groups that the first nucleus was organized, and that grew until it numbered approximately 300,000. I understand they are down now to about 250,000. But, according to figures supplied by the Navy, 85 percent of those persons are holding union cards in the American Federation of Labor. Most of them are men past draft age, men who could not be called upon to serve in the armed forces, men who, if they had wanted to, could have remained at home and done nothing toward the war effort; but, because of the urgency of the matter and because these people were real Americans, they jumped into this picture, and they formed this grand organization known as the Seabees, 85 percent of whom are members of the American Federation of Labor.

In all seriousness I submit to you, gentlemen of the committee, What answer are you going to give to these people if you say to them, "Well, we are not going to continue with voluntary effort any more; we are going to substitute House bill 1119"?

Is there anybody here who can conscientiously say to those people who are doing a hundred-percent job at the present time—and they

constitute a big proportion of membership in the American Federation of Labor; you can call the officials of the Army and the Navy, and they will concede that what I say is absolutely true——

Mr. THOMASON. I am sure that every member of the committee concedes that, too. We want to know about those who are not rendering service.

Mr. HINES. Will you exempt in this bill all the building trades whose members are members of the American Federation of Labor? Do you think that is a good thing to do? At least, in justice to them——

The CHAIRMAN. If they are in the service they are not affected by the bill.

Mr. HINES. I am talking about the millions of building tradesmen who are called upon——

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you were talking about the Seabees.

Mr. HINES. To go from one section of the country to another, to pay their own transportation. I have a statement from the plumbers' and steam-fitters' union setting forth the fact that the Government ought to pay the fare of these people and their transportation expenses. The unions have been doing that. They have been transporting them to the places where they have been needed; and that is happening today.

Mr. JOHNSON. The ones that are going to the navy yards have their transportation paid, have they not?

Mr. HINES. The building trades union tell me that they have to pay their own transportation and living expenses until they receive their first pay. That is not a small item. They built all the cantonments and the bases, and we have men doing all kinds of work. It was brought out at the meeting the other day that in one instance a large number of plasterers were doing electrical-wiring work in war industries for the Government.

We recently got out a survey—and this is our monthly survey that is prepared by our economists and research department—and I would like to read a portion of it into the record. It is entitled "Call for the American Spirit," and it reads as follows [reading]:

> The German advance into Belgium plunges our country into a new war in Europe, calling for all we can give in manpower and production. Even before the Germans opened their offensive on December 16, the huge need for munitions had sharply increased production schedules. Now the need is intensified, although no further increase in the high munitions schedules of December 7 has yet been announced. Victory over Germany may not come until summer or even fall, and 1945 will probably be another year of peak war production.
>
> Labor's response to the new demands for manpower was immediate. At the American Federation of Labor convention on November 20, General Somervell called for our full cooperation to meet critical manpower needs. At once a committee of top federation officials was appointed, and Mr. Lewis G. Hines—

That is myself. I very modestly refer to this and probably I will have an opportunity to elaborate on it a little later—

> has been made responsible to act a liaison officer in Washington between the war agencies and American Federation of Labor membership throughout the country. Already requests for 45,000 workers have been referred to Mr. Hines' office, and our local unions have taken immediate and effective action in supplying these needs. All international unions and all American Federation of Labor organizers have been notified to contact local unions for cooperation in supplying manpower. They have information showing critical manpower needs. Unions are mobilizing to furnish workers.

I might say in passing that this program is working out quite satisfactorily. I brought the records here with me today, and I may take a moment to elaborate on this by pointing out that when I was handed this job I was summoned to the Pentagon Building, where I sat down with some top officials of General Somervell's group, and the question was what to do and how to do it. I insisted that a specific program be drawn up. It is all well and good to write letters and to issue propaganda and tell our people what is needed, but I wanted to know where these critical shortages were, and if they would show me where they were I would call upon the unions involved to supply the needs.

That kind of a program was agreed upon, worked out, and I was given 2 lists totaling 85 factories where there were needed approximately 45,000 workers. I immediately contacted the international unions involved, with the local unions involved.

I want you to keep in mind this fact, that in many instances you will find our people are intimately acquainted with what is going on and they know the situation and the true set-up, and we have received some very interesting facts out of this program so far. It has only been under way for the past 6 or 7 weeks, but we have supplied the needs, in many instances, where they actually existed. We found in every instance that these needs were exaggerated for some reason or other. These figures came from the Army, but I want to say, with all due respect to the Army, that perhaps the Army was absolutely sincere in supplying those figures, but we heard of a plant in the city of Philadelphia that needed 350 people. We immediately got on the job and found that the requirements, according to a statement of the company, was actually 50 people, and, according to the United States Employment Service, they only needed 50 people.

We have the instance of a request for 2,600 people in Buffalo, N. Y., in an airplane factory, and we asked the International Association of Machinists to get on the job and go in there and help in recruiting those 2,600 people, and lo and behold, finally, according to the statement issued by the president of the International Association of Machinists, these people were seeking to close down for 9 days.

We just cannot understand why there is such a critical need of 2,600 people, when the plant is going to close down. Not only is that plant going to shut down, but two more are going to close down. The number of man-hours going to be lost as a result of these shut-downs is tremendous.

We asked, Why is this? We were told that it was necessary to take an inventory, and that the inventory is sanctioned by the Air Force of the Army.

I do not know anything about inventories, Mr. Chairman, and it may be possible that that is necessary, but you will have an awfully hard time convincing our people that in view of such situations as that we ought to have legislation like this. We will have a hard job trying to tell our people that we need this kind of legislation.

We have a plant in Louisville, Ky., that needed 800 people, and as a result of our efforts, in conjunction with the Farmers' Union, we supplied 700 persons for that job.

Mr. SHORT. What about the one in Cincinnati?

Mr. HINES. That contract did not come through. It was an Army contract.

These are just a few of the things that we are running into daily, and I submit to you that the method employed in this matter is not as substantial or as authentic as you could get from the machinery already established today, namely, through the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board.

We firmly believe—and I am sincere about this, with all due respect to you, Mr. Chairman—that the people are becoming informed as to the purposes of this bill, and we believe that when there is a full realization on the part of our citizens as to what this bill actually means, they will rise in righteous indignation, and the bill will be defeated in Congress. I am pretty sure about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You are pretty certain of that?

Mr. HINES. Yes, sir. I am going to tell you why.

First of all, the bill proposes that all of the machinery we have established over the several years, through the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board, shall be abolished and eliminated or set aside.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is there a provision in the bill that does that?

Mr. HINES. Where it turns over to the Selective Service the right to induct a person into the Army or direct him to go into a war plant.

The CHAIRMAN. They have had the right to induct from the beginning; have they not?

Mr. HINES. That is right. It is changed in this respect, that apparently the Selective Service groups are going to make the determination of where people should go. We have the machinery, as I say, today, that informs us the need of these plants. All that you have got here is a provision that when the War Department or the Navy Department says, "We need so many people over here in this particular plant," Selective Service is notified and an effort is made to direct people in there by Selective Service.

I submit to you that the Army and the Navy and the Selective Service cannot do that job as well as it is being done by the War Manpower Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. What agency is there in every county and community in the United States that has been more efficient than the Selective Service?

Mr. HINES. I am not questioning their efficiency when it comes to the military end of it. I think that is where they should stay, right then and there. But when it comes to their supplying information as to the needs in war industries, I do not think there is any comparison between them and the War Manpower Commission, who, along with the labor advisory committees, are in position to know the needs.

Let me show you what is happening in Philadelphia at the present time. The labor unions in Philadelphia, along with the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission, have worked out a plan that has been approved by all the various agencies. It will not meet all the requirements; that is true. But the plan is a very simple plan. Because of its very simplicity I was afraid it would not be accepted by those who thought, because it was so simple, it was a wonder we had not thought about it before. But if a plant needs 10,000 or 15,000 people, they go to the plant that has a surplus—and

I submit to you that there are surpluses today in industry. I have an article here from the Philadelphia Record which indicates that the workers themselves are complaining because there is so much manpower wasted.

This plan in Philadelphia provides that the men are loaned to one plant or another. The relationship to the company is not disturbed in the slightest. They stay on the company pay roll. There is no question of nonaffiliation or of jurisdiction, but they are moved over to this plant [illustrating] for a certain period of time to fill the needs of that particular plant, and they can be shifted around from one industry to another.

That is something that has not been tried here. We know that there is a shortage in this particular plant of a certain type of mechanics and a surplus over here [illustrating], and we know that there is a reluctance on the part of this company over here, and we have an abundance of evidence that they would not let their more skilled men go for fear they would not get them back again. If you can work out something that will assure a company that they are coming back and will assure the worker that his status will not be changed, that he will get his pay on Saturday night, then I think it will work satisfactorily. I think that demonstrates the fact that labor and industry, working together with Government officials, can solve many of these problems.

Mr. KILDAY. A moment ago you said that the selective service would not be in a position to handle the matter. This bill does not give that agency the power to do it. It places the responsibility upon the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion. What is your opinion as to his ability?

Mr. HINES. It is to be assumed that if the Director of War Mobilization is not satisfied with the people who are doing the job now, he is going to utilize the facilities of the Selective Service System to do this job. If that is not the case, you ought to set it out in the bill.

Mr. KILDAY. I was very much interested in the observation that selective service cannot do the complete supervising that is required to be done to meet the manpower requirements of war in each industrial area.

Mr. HINES. That is right.

Mr. KILDAY. I should like to have you, for the purpose of the record and for our information, discuss the ability of Justice Byrnes properly to evaluate those needs.

Mr. HINES. Justice Byrnes—I have to call upon somebody I presume—is not, as I say, satisfied with the job done by the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board today in this connection, so it is assumed you can get the job done by selective service. But I am not quite sure, Mr. Chairman, whether Justice Byrnes, with all due respect to him, has the thing very clear in his mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment. Irrespective of what you think about him or the clearness of his mind, or anything of that kind, do you not think, as asked in the question proposed by Mr. Kilday, as to the advisability of having it centralized in a single person who can reach out and determine the manpower condition throughout the country, that it would be better to have it in his hands than have it centered in one of these other places?

Mr. HINES. You could do the same thing without these punitive phases of the bill if you were to give congressional or legal permission for rules and regulations that might be developed by the War Manpower Commission to handle this thing. They have done a pretty good job.

The CHAIRMAN. The reason why there are "hung" juries and no verdicts in the courts is that there are fellows who will not come to the point. We want you to stick to the point.

Mr. KILDAY. You assume that Justice Byrnes would call upon selective service to make determinations?

Mr. HINES. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. Why not assume that in the position he occupies, which is at a higher level than any other agency, he would utilize the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. HINES. Why don't you spell it out in the bill? Why don't you yourselves do the job and not leave it to the assumption that Justice Byrnes will do this or that?

Mr. CLASON. He is doing that very thing at the present time. Under the present law, he is telling the War Manpower Commission and the Selective Service. He is already telling the War Manpower Commission, and they have failed to make good.

Mr. HINES. I do not agree that the War Manpower Commission has failed to make good; I think it has done an excellent job. I happen to serve on the War Manpower Commission at times. I do not have a clear knowledge of what they have accomplished, but I believe from what I have seen and already know that there is no question that the War Manpower Commission can do the job 100 percent with the voluntary cooperation of labor and industry.

I was interrupted a moment ago while discussing the question of the hoarding or the excess of labor. I will not accuse anybody of hoarding labor; I do not want to do that. I think it is a natural inclination of an employer to be a little reluctant to let people go if he feels he is going to need them later on.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with that statement, do you not think there are numerous large plants all over the country where different considerations enter into the operations that might make it necessary for an employer to keep some surplus labor around at times?

Mr. HINES. I believe there is certain justification. As I said, I do not want to utter a condemnation of employers generally in that respect, because I think it is the natural inclination on their part to want to keep men, in the anticipation of using them later on. However, there are some instances where the employer is not in a position to do anything about it, such as when his contract is changed or his contract is terminated, or another contract is put in there and he cannot use the particular type of men he has.

I have reference to the Jacobs Aircraft Co. in Pottstown, Pa., which has been making airplane parts.

The gentleman says: "We are going to make a rubber plant out of you."

All those employees, who are mechanics, toolmakers, and so forth, who are not rubber workers, whose services cannot be utilized, are going to be thrown into the market. Presumably in that district they will be absorbed.

Does it not seem ridiculous to sell out all the machinery and throw all the people out of work and then put in a new program without a sufficient number of help, while putting the other fellows out who are just as capable of doing the other kind of work?

Mr. HARNESS. You heard the question I asked the last witness about the Labor Department and the War Manpower Commission report in December, which shows 1,100,000 workers have been laid off during the period of time from September 1943 to November 1944, and we have the break-down here.

They must be available on the market somewhere.

Mr. HINES. Of that, 600,000 were drafted and not replaced. That is according to the statement made by Mr. Krug; 500,000—about half—were women who went home. The other half went into other industries. They can come back.

Mr. THOMASON. In that connection, is it not true that those who wanted to work have been placed in other employment?

Mr. HINES. I am not competent to answer that; I do not know whether they have or not.

This article, from the Philadelphia Record of Friday, January 12, is headed: "Forced to Loaf on Job, War Workers Protest."

I am not going to read it all; I will place it in the record, merely pointing out that there is going to be an investigation as to the utilization of all employees, and this is going to include the navy yard, Frankford Arsenal, Quartermaster Corps depot, Marine Corps depot, Signal Corps, the Naval Aviation Supply Depot, the Naval Aircraft Material Center. Apparently they are going to come under the scrutiny of the War Manpower Commission on the theory that they have more people than they need.

Forced labor is not the answer. No blanket measures can meet this situation. Each shortage, each plant behind schedule, must be examined by the W. P. B. and the procurement agencies to discover the cause and correct it.

I might say on that particular point that this bill has been referred to as a IV–F bill or a work-or-fight bill. It is nothing of the kind. This is a limited national service bill; to make it all-complete, just jack the age up to 60 and include women, and there you have it.

Mr. SHORT. If we are to have conscription of labor, do you not think we should have a universal draft bill to conscript not only labor clear up to 60 years but also to conscript capital?

Mr. HINES. Well, there is no question that if you do not conscript capital but force labor to work in industry where the profits are guaranteed, you cannot expect labor to be happy; they will not be happy.

The persons falling within the confines of this bill come within three categories: IV–F's, those who have been rejected; those who have occupational deferments; and that group between 38 and 45 years, who have been barely touched. In the early stages of selective service, some of the latter group were taken, but more recently they have not been touched.

So you cannot say that this is anything other than an all-out national service bill for that particular group as well as for those between the ages of 18 and 45.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to hear your further discussion on this point. You say labor would not be happy if forced to work in plants

where the earnings were guaranteed to the owners of the plants. What would be the difference if the Government likewise guaranteed to the workers their salaries?

Mr. HINES. There is nothing in this bill that spells that out, in the last analysis. You are going to take the fellow——

Mr. SPARKMAN. Suppose it did. Suppose we had a national service law making all people, both men and women, from 18 to 60, liable for work. Let us assume, as you stated, that the Government does guarantee to the contractors engaged in manufacturing the product certain earnings. Suppose we did spell out in the same bill that the Government should guarantee to the workers who were placed in the plants wages which were the same as, or commensurate with, what they would get if they were working in that plant voluntarily.

Mr. HINES. Mr. Chairman and Congressman, may I say this: You are talking about something now that is entirely different from what we have before us. The only thing wrong with what you suggest is this: That workers do not have free choice or free selection as free workers to go where they want. I am just wondering if you will agree that there is no group of people in this country who are competent to administer such legislation—administer it in an unbiased way and in fairness. Is there any group of people you know who are competent to do that? I do not think any Government agency or group of men can be got together to do justice to men whose liberties were taken away; to act in all fairness and achieve the results that are being achieved today with this free, voluntary system that we have.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Is there any question about the fairness or the competence of our people to do that same thing with respect to those who are drafted into our armed services?

Mr. HINES. I do not think we ought to make any comparison between those drafted into the armed services and those working in industry. The statement is made that if Uncle Sam has the right to tap a man on the shoulder, and say that he is henceforth to be in the Army, by the same token he has the right to tap a man on the shoulder and put him into industry. There is no analogy there at all, Mr. Chairman. If it is the last thing left, and if our system of free and voluntary labor fails, then we will have to expect to adopt the system of the totalitarian countries, and all of this talk about fighting for freedom and fighting for democracy will just go out the window. So there is no analogy at all between tapping the fellow for military service and forcing him into labor for war production.

The CHAIRMAN. No; there is no analogy, because one group is going out to die and the other is going to high wages.

Mr. HINES. I object to that.

The CHAIRMAN. You can object to it, but I am going to let it go into the record.

Mr. HINES. I object to the term "high wages," because those conditions exist in only a very small percentage of the cases.

Mr. STEWART. Do you think these men who would be affected by this bill—the IV–F's are any better than the men who are dying in the service of their country—soldiers and sailors?

Mr. HINES. I think I made our position plain. I said, Congressman, that every man in this country should be given the opportunity to serve in the armed forces or to serve in some capacity where he can help the war effort. Of course, he is no better, but it is our position that he ought to be placed or have an opportunity to be placed somewhere where he can give his utmost toward the war effort. The only question is whether or not it should be done this way or be done through the voluntary method.

The CHAIRMAN. How much longer will your statement be?

Mr. HINES. Mr. Chairman, I was to be here at 10 o'clock this morning. I came about 3 to 5 minutes after that and found another fellow testifying. So he has taken up a good portion of my time. I want enough time. I have a mass of data here.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to give you time.

Mr. HINES. I want to supply you with some figures.

The CHAIRMAN. I just want to set a schedule of operations. I will give you all the time you want.

Mr. HINES. I will come here this afternoon or tonight.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to make the announcement that we have another witness. I do not know which side of the matter he is on or what his views are. He will probably take considerable time. That witness is Mayor LaGuardia, of New York, whom I requested to be here in connection with this matter. I agreed to hear him at 2:30 this afternoon.

Mr. BROOKS. I have to be on the floor in a few minutes. Will the chairman excuse me?

Mr. PHILBIN. May I suggest that the witness be permitted to proceed to the completion of his statement without further interrogaion by members of he committee? I think that might facilitate maters.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; if he will talk more to the point.

Mr. HINES. Mr. Chairman, I was interested in a matter brought up this morning which had to do with heavy trucks. The witness was asked a question and, unfortunately, he did not have the material with which to answer it. We have gone into that question and have found that the failure to keep production up to schedule is not one of manpower shortage but is rather No. 1, that many manufacturers place orders with the same foundries and those foundries are making both war goods and civilian goods. We have here some figures to show the number of people involved in civilian production and those involved in war production.

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that there are many angles that ought to be explored in connection with this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. Go right into that briefly, Mr. Hines.

Mr. HINES. For instance, we have in a very brief time, increased our production from a little over a billion to 81 billion dollars a year for materials. At the same time, we have increased our annual peace production from 81 billion up to 105 billion. From 1939 to 1944 our country increased war production 1¼ billion to 85 billion. We also did what no other country has done. While creating the greatest munitions supply in history, we also raised the living standard of our people. We increased production of civilian goods from 87 billion dollars to 112 billion dollars in this same 5-year period. Is it possible to siphon off from civilian production a number of employees to meet the shortages in war goods as they occur? I think that is quite possible. I think that is something we ought to look into.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the question came up today relative to low wages, and the witness was asked if he believed that we ought to increase wages and he said that we ought to increase wages to induce

people to go into industry or into particular jobs. I think he led with his chin when he said that, because I notice the reaction of every member of the committee. Sticking strictly to the patriotic duty that devolves upon everyone, I say this: That there are certain spots where wages should be increased.

Mr. SHORT. That is what he said, I think.

Mr. HINES. But the thing tended to take the position that workers, if given higher wages, would flock into those industries. That is not our position. We ask for an increase in wages, and we ask that the Little Steel formula be upped, and we believe it should be. We do not believe, for instance, that men and women should be asked to go into foundries to work at some of the wages that are prevailing in certain foundries. One of the difficulties we are experiencing is the natural disinclination of men and women to work under such conditions and for such low wages, and they cannot be expected to do so. It is not fair for us to ask them to do it.

It has been pointed out, I think, previously—at least we have information to show—that, while wages can be raised in the cotton-duck industry to 55 cents, in many instances it is only 40 cents. That is unfair to our people and we protest against it.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me for interrupting you, but I wish you would discuss in your proposal the factor that production be increased.

Mr. HINES. These are all factors, Mr. Chairman, that enter into this question.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but I want you to deal with the factor of increasing the weekly or daily hours, for instance, regardless of wages as they are.

Mr. HINES. Mr. Chairman, I submit—and it is the position of the American Federation of Labor—that with the machinery at hand we can meet all the requirements that are to be needed within the next 6 months, requirements that have been presented to us by the Army. We can do that, as I say, though the existing machinery that we have in the War Production Board and labor-management committees, and with the cooperation of all hands between labor and industry.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it be understood that as far as I am concerned—and I am sure the whole committee concurs—I do not question the patriotism and good faith of either labor or management or the war officials with whom you collaborate daily or weekly, or at whatever time you meet. But will you explain to us, if you are all in a coordinated effort down there, and in agreement about everything, why it is that the upper officials of the services have come here and told us that this problem is on their doorstep and that they want this legislation?

Mr. HINES. I am not going to impugn the sincerity of their opinions.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither am I.

Mr. HINES. Let us go back a few months. The war was in the bag in Europe. There was nothing to it. It was going to be over. It was a beautiful picture that was painted for us. There was a tendency on the part of the people to let down in their war effort. The most natural thing occurred. Workers were lured by the advertisements in the papers every day to "Come work with us. You will have a steady job after the war is over."

The workers left industry and there was a pretty rosy picture. We were all getting ready and laying plans to buy new automobiles, for the gasoline shortage would be over.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, just a minute.

Mr. HINES. This is important.

Mr. CLASON. I think he should be permitted to continue his statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I know those are factors involved, but I asked him the simple question why it was the higher officials were up here, if they were in agreement——

Mr. HINES. I am going to get to that.

Mr. CLASON. I ask that he be permitted to continue without interruption.

The CHAIRMAN. I am chairman of this committee. I do not want to be discourteous to this witness, and I have not been. I have asked him a simple question. He could have answered the question and then made his explanation.

Mr. HINES. Mr. Chairman, I am going to answer your question by stating to you——

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead and answer it.

Mr. HINES (continuing). That these people are making certain statements now that they did not make 5 or 6 months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. What statements?

Mr. HINES. The same people who are now urging this kind of legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean the war officials, such as the Under Secretary of War?

Mr. HINES. Yes, and Mr. Byrnes, if you please, and some more whom I do not care to mention because I do not want to inject a political note into this situation.

The CHAIRMAN. We are not in agreement, then?

Mr. HINES. No. We were not told at that time anything about what we would be confronted with in the future. I think it is a reflection upon the intelligence of those people—I do not want to say it is a reflection upon their integrity, but it is a reflection upon their intelligence—that they could not have foreseen what is happening at the present time. The war was not over by any means, but we were led to believe it was; consequently, there was a let-down. Now, all of a sudden, the thing goes against us a little. The war goes against us. The Dutchmen get a little bit tough, and they break through. Now, this is the psychological moment to do this very thing.

You are not kidding us, Mr. Chairman. I do not mean you personally; I mean nobody is kidding us. We know that this is an attempt by certain people in this country to get complete control of this picture.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are they?

Mr. HINES. The Army and the Navy; and I submit to you that the Army and the Navy are not competent to do the job under this bill.

I want to show you something, Mr. Chairman, that appeared in the paper. I shall have to cut my testimony short by reason of the fact that I am being pressured, so that I cannot get it all in.

The CHAIRMAN. No, no.

Mr. PHILBIN. I should like to have it understood right now whether we are going to give this man an opportunity to complete his testimony

without interruption, so that he may make a fair presentation in behalf of the trade organizations he represents.

The CHAIRMAN. He is going to get all the opportunity he needs, so you need not criticize.

Mr. PHILBIN. I did not intend any criticism; but, speaking as a member of this committee, I should like to have this man give his testimony without badgering and interruptions.

The CHAIRMAN. I will interrupt when I think it is the proper time to do it to get information, and you can do the same thing.

Mr. PHILBIN. I do not intend to. I think we ought to proceed here judicially and courteously and listen to what this man has to say.

The CHAIRMAN. The record will be so unspeakably long that we will never be able to have it printed.

Mr. HINES. With due respect to yourself and the members of the committee, I am going to be as concise as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. HINES. There appeared in the Washington Post Saturday, January 13, 1945, an article dealing with the whole picture we are discussing here, and it said, among other things:

> It became known yesterday also that the advisory committee of the Office of War Mobilization, which conferred with Byrnes before he agreed to approve the May-Bailey bill, was not in agreement with the measure. The advisory committee is composed of the heads of labor unions, top-ranking industrialists, farm leaders, and public members.

I may say that if you will refer to Public Law 458, Seventy-eighth Congress, which was passed at the time Congress created the position of War Mobilization Director, you will find that there was set up in that law the committee referred to here, whose members are to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. So it would seem to me that this committee is a very important committee. It is in disagreement with Mr. Byrnes; in fact, I am told that they are 100 percent in disagreement with Mr. Byrnes. This is what I understand they have told Mr. Byrnes:

> The board advises the Director that it favors the principle that persons not drafted but subject to draft are under obligations to serve in the civilian forces wherever their services are most needed, but it feels that any act of Congress embodying that principle should contain adequate safeguards to insure the placement of all civilian workers in the interest of the War Manpower Commission and the War Food Administration in their duly constituted labor, agricultural, and management committees and that the selective-service boards should determine only whether the individual is to be inducted into the military service.

Now, that is the opinion of Mr. Byrnes' advisory board, and I am told it is a unanimous opinion. I am not in a position to say what Mr. Byrnes' reaction to that recommendation was, but it would appear from this that there is some good, substantial opposition to this bill at the present time. That is the position the American Federation of Labor takes. We take the position that the job of selecting people for industry comes under the War Manpower Commission; that the job of selecting people or inducting people into the armed forces comes under Selective Service; and that the two should not be tied in in the manner in which this is done here.

Now, if eventually it comes to pass that the board's recommendations are adopted, that means that the first half of this bill is out the window.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not quite get what the board might do.

Mr. HINES. This is the advisory board to Justice Byrnes that is set up and constituted in the law. If the opinion of that board is accepted, that means that the first half of this bill is out the window. The Army and Navy have told you they do not want the second half. So it looks like the whole bill ought to go into the wastebasket.

I just submit that, with all due respect to you. As I stated in the beginning, we are appreciative of the opportunities given us; and although we may differ, I think we both understand how we feel on the basis of what is for the best interests of the people of this country.

I could go on here, Mr. Chairman, and tell you much about our experiences with this whole program, but I feel that I ought to conclude now by stating that we believe the present agencies, the present machinery can do this job with the assistance of labor and management. We believe labor and management know more about the placement of workers and the needs of industry than the Army does.

I want to take one exception to some things that have been said here, Mr. Chairman. I have a very high regard for the Assistant Secretary of War, but he has stated right in this spot here the other day that we needed this legislation to assure our boys over there that the home front was not going to let them down, or words to that effect. I object to that. I object to it on the ground that somebody is letting them down. The Army and Navy Journal I am told, is going to try to circularize the parents of the boys in order to have the boys write to Congress for the enactment of this legislation. That hurts the morale of the people of this country, Mr. Chairman. Is there anyone in Congress who will get up and say that the people of America are not overwhelmingly behind this war effort; that they are not giving everything they possibly can? There are a few individuals, of course. Surely. But is there anyone who is going to say that we are not giving full measure of support to this?

Mr. STEWART. What about strikes?

Mr. HINES. I am glad you mentioned that because somebody has proposed that you write some legislation here dealing with strikes, on the ground that strikes retard the progress of munitions and hold up the production of munitions and of other things needed at the front. I challenge any man in or out of Congress to show me a single instance where we have not been able to handle the strike situation just as we have handled the manpower situation. We do not condone strikes, of course; but I challenge the Congressman or anyone else to show me a single instance where a single article has been kept away from boys at the front on account of strikes. We have ample statements from no less a person than General Marshall, who has said what I have just said. You heard the Assistant Secretary of War. There are some people who just seem to have fed you on this question of strikes. Did you not pass the Smith-Connally Act and did not our good chairman tell us on the floor of Congress that this was going to be the thing to solve this question of strikes? Did not most of you men vote for it because you honestly believed in it? I know you did not, Congressman, but a lot of people were misled into believing that this was going to be just the thing to stop strikes. Strikes are essentially a matter of relations, and industrial relations are human relations.

Mr. STEWART. But what would be the result if the soldiers should strike?

Mr. HINES. They would be shot. It is like being tapped on the shoulder to go into the service. You have two different situations, Congressman. I am surprised you do not understand that. You have as one thing men placed under military draft to perform certain duties as soldiers; you have other groups of people who are supplying the needs of the country. Up to the present time we have done a magnificent job in controlling strikes.

Mr. STEWART. Should civilians have any better chance than men drafted at $50 a month?

Mr. HINES. I do not get your question.

Mr. STEWART. Should the man in production have a greater advantage than the man who is doing the fighting?

Mr. HINES. Of course he should not.

Mr. STEWART. You said the man on the firing line would get shot if he struck. What should happen to the man in production?

Mr. HINES. If you want something drastic, and you think this is the thing to have and that it will do the job better than it is being done now, then that is what we ought to have. I contend, however, that no legislation can be passed that will do the job more effectively than it is being done now through the various agencies set up to handle these things. There are so many angles to this, that I would like to have more time at a later date to go into them with you.

I am going to conclude now, but let me say this. We do not believe this bill is necessary. We want an opportunity to continue in the way we have been. I do not know what is going to happen to our cooperative efforts. I have told you what the building trades have done. I have shown you that there has been 1,000 percent cooperation between all of the elements involved in the building trades. Are you going to say to those unions and the members of those unions, "Despite all of that, we are going to give you this"?

I do not think, in justice to those people, that you can do that. I do not think you can, in justice to the workers generally throughout the country, who have increased their capacity about 300 percent in the last 2 or 3 years. We will show you here by charts how production has gone up and how employment has gone down. I do not think you can say to people who have done that magnificent job, "You have not done enough." That is our opinion, Mr. Chairman. We hope the committee will weigh it very carefully. I do not like to take issue with Mr. Byrnes or the other gentlemen, the Assistant Secretary of War and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. They do a fine job in their respective spheres; but I submit they do not know a thing about labor relations as compared with what the men on labor-management committees, doing the job in industry, know. They are the specialists who ought to do it. They are the folks who ought to do this job. I think, if you will look at the record, you will agree that they are competent to do it, for they have done a magnificent job.

The CHAIRMAN. I merely want to call your attention to a matter here, to get your explanation of it, and see if you can give us some information about it. I am general headquarters for all measures like this and receive criticism and approval from all sides, and sometimes from no side at all.

A firm in St. Louis wrote me a letter under date of January 11.

(The letter will appear in the revised hearing.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you approve of that kind of system?

Mr. HINES. Mr. Chairman, you are going on the assumption that the employer's statement is correct, that they are not needed. I do not agree with that. Here is an instance where the employer perhaps feels that he has a contract that is unduly burdensome and is going to use your committee now as a means of airing his grievance and trying to unload that contract. If you want to go into the question of relationships in the amusement industry between workers and employers, I will be very glad to do that for you, but I do not agree with that employer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know what kind of union this is?

Mr. HINES. Oh, yes; that is the Stagehands—Theatrical and Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that A. F. of L.?

Mr. HINES. That is a member of our organization. I presume it is a member of our organization, if it is a regular union; if it is not, it may belong to the C. I. O. Now, let me read you a letter.

We received from the War Department notice that the Omaha Steel Works at Omaha, Nebr., needed 200 people. We immediately contacted the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, and Helpers. The letter I received from their international president says:

> Further in connection with the above subject, I assigned our representative in this area to go to Omaha and contact the Omaha Steel Co. for the purpose of assisting them in recruiting the 200 workers alleged to be necessary for the construction of heavy shells.
>
> Upon contacting the general manager of this plant, our representative was told that they had no knowledge of any such contract.

The CHAIRMAN. Whose letter is that?

Mr. HINES. This is from the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship Builders, and Helpers. This is one of those instances where I had delegated our people to help in recruiting the people. This is typical of several of the answers that we have gotten back. I am not critical of the War Department about this, but there is something wrong somewhere.

Mr. STEWART. I wish you would put more of those instances in the record. We want data and information. Put all of them in.

Mr. HINES. I have here a telegram from the State, County, and Municipal Employees. They are the people who man the offices in the War Manpower Commission—the employment service offices. They belong to the American Federation of Labor. I would like to include this. They say they are opposed to this bill because they believe that voluntary methods are the best and most effective. They have firsthand knowledge of what is being done. These are people doing the job. I do not think they have any motive for opposing it. They are very sincere and honest in their belief that they do not think this is the right way to do it. We have a number of instances of that kind.

So I think before we go into anything as drastic as this, we ought to clear up this situation, this question of the hoarding of labor, if it does exist; and if it exists, we ought to find out to what extent it does exist.

This question of low wages should be investigated. I am going to submit to you a suggestion that you call before you the representatives of the War Labor Board. Recently I read in the paper where in order to relieve a situation in the foundry industry the War Labor Board had agreed to a 10-cent-an-hour increase in wages. Everybody believed it, particularly the 140,000 members of the iron moulders' union. When their international president came down here, he sat down with the officials of the War Labor Board to ascertain what this meant. He found at the conclusion of several hours conference that it would affect about 15 plants in the country. When he asked for a list of those plants, they said "We cannot give them to you, because we will have to revise the list, and there may not be that many before we get through."

There is something highly important, if you want help in the morale, that is to see that these workers' pay is increased or that they are given an opportunity to have their wages increased. I say in fairness to them that that is the thing that should be done. Remember, gentlemen, these are not some people who are separate and apart. These people whom we are talking about today, the IV–F's, strikers, and so forth, are not people separate and apart from the armed forces; these are the fathers and the brothers of those men who are in the armed forces. Do not forget that. As I say, we do not condone strikes; but for every striker on strike, you ought to go into the reasons for the strike. I think you should do that before you start to impose penalties. I think you should find out what is wrong. Strikes, of course, are at a minimum in this country and have not serious interfered with the war effort. But in fairness, you ought to go into the reasons why we have strikes, particularly in view of the fact that these people are kinfolk of those dying at the front and in the battle lines.

Mr. THOMASON. I would like to talk for a moment about the other side of the picture, and in approaching the question I want to say that I do so without the slightest feeling, because that is the way I think this important question ought to be discussed.

Mr. HINES. That is right.

Mr. THOMASON. I commend you and your great organization for the splendid job you have done. You belong to a great organization that has contributed much to the war effort. I think that the record will show that I am and have been a good friend of labor, beginning in the Legislature of Texas and continuing in the Congress of the United States. However, I just want to get your reaction as to what is the best thing to do in what I regard as a very serious crisis. I do not approach it simply because I have a couple of boys in the Philippines, but I am thinking of 12,000,000 boys and men of the United States who are fighting all over the world, and then in view of what happened in the German counteroffensive last month and the casualty lists that are now piling into the office of every congressman. As I understand it, the figures will be staggering when we get the reports for last month; and then follow that up with statements from no less a person than your great friend, the President of the United States; the head of the War Department; and the head of the Navy Department. They are the people charged with the winning of this war, men like Secretary Stimson, Under Secretary Patterson, and General Somervell, who I understand is now overseas and who I predict will come back saying there has to be more production of munitions; coupled with the statement of General Eisenhower about the losses on the western front. I think we

are all agreed we are in a dangerous, and some may say a doubtful, war.

Mr. HINES. I will concede that, congressman.

Mr. THOMASON. Let us get down to this proposition. If you concede that we are in that kind of predicament, unfortunate as it is; that the very life of our Nation and the lives of our 12,000,000 boys are at stake; then how are we going to meet this problem? As I say, I am being perfectly frank and speaking as a friend of labor, without any feeling of bias or prejudice, because this is the time to talk patriotism and not have any feeling otherwise.

As I see it, with this fine job you have done and that your organization has done, that you mentioned in such glowing terms, both in the Army and the Navy, especially in the shipyards and war plants of the country, I undertake to say that not a single one of your men who have done this fine, voluntary job in the war plants is touched by this bill. They have voluntarily gone on in their patriotic duty of conducting the greatest job in the annals of history. Those men who have voluntarily gone into war plants and are engaged in any sort of war work are not even touched remotely by this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. THOMASON. There are literally hundreds of thousands of men in this country—and I cast no aspersions on many thousands of IV–F's who tried to get into the service who could not. But there are literally hundreds of thousands of men in this country who are not engaged in one single minute's essential war work. I do not refer just to the race-track men or the crooners or the night clubbers, the professional football players, baseball players, and boxers. You can go into any town in America. You don't have to leave the city of Washington or the departments in Washington, where you can find them. If they will not do as the fine, patriotic men of your organization have done, and voluntarily go into something that will help produce more munitions for the 12,000,000 boys in the armed services, I would appreciate your dispassionately and calmly telling the committee what kind of war work you are going to get out of those men, because, as I repeat, there is not one human being in your organization who is doing the work you have so well described before this committee who is even touched by this bill. This committee is trying to deal with several hundred thousand who have not performed or do not desire to perform even 1 minute's service to the Government in this greatest crisis of history.

Mr. HINES. I spoke a moment ago about conditions prevailing in this country last fall. That was the result of a feeling on the part of many people that the war was over. We have got to have a swinging back of the pendulum. It must come back to the other side. There must be an awakening, sir, on the part of our people, and I think we are capable of doing it.

Mr. THOMASON. That is the thought of all of us. I was one of those who hoped they could see their sons coming home last year. I dare say every man in the House felt that the end of the war in Europe was approaching.

Mr. SHORT. I was not one of them.

Mr. THOMASON. Many of us thought it was not too far off. But there is not one of us now who does not realize the terrible seriousness of the German counteroffensive and what it has meant in the wiping out of regiment after regiment of our boys.

68175—45——14

Mr. HINES. May I give to you as an individual my reaction to this whole picture at the present time and make some suggestions? I was invited over to the War Department to see an exclusive picture not so long ago. I came away sick at heart after seeing the things shown in that picture. I think I came away determined that I was going to make a more strenuous effort than ever before. I think there is an awakening on the part of our people as to the seriousness of conditions today, but they want to see something done.

Mr. THOMASON. That is what we are trying to do, and we want you to help us.

Mr. HINES. I would suggest, first of all, that there be a reexamination of all those people who have been deferred. There are many people who have occupational deferments. They could be taken into the Army, for one thing, if the Army wanted them; it has the right to take them now; it does not need any legislation to do so.

Mr. THOMASON. We have probably lost 100,000 men on the Western Front in the last month. Where are we going to get replacements for them?

Mr. HINES. I will tell you how the Army can do this job. They can induct every man in this country today between 18 and 45, and they won't have to put them in work units.

Mr. THOMASON. I do not want to put them in work units, but I want them to do something to help get this war over.

Mr. HINES. Already the Army has released 10,000 people to work in war plants. They give them deferments; they do not change their status as soldiers. I do not know by what authority they do it, but they are doing it. What is to prevent the Army if they want to approach this seriously, from drafting everyone between 18 and 45, putting them in the Army and furloughing them?

Mr. THOMASON. They have gone to the bottom of the barrel already, except for the men who have patriotically gone into war plants and those who are 18 and are just coming along. So I just want to ask you, where are we going to get them?

Mr. HINES. I am telling you how.

Mr. THOMASON. I am not criticizing you; I want to know.

Mr. HINES. Immediately draft every man between 18 and 45 and examine his status.

Mr. THOMASON. What if he is not physically fit?

Mr. HINES. Put him in the Army and then put him out in a plant. You are doing it today without any act of Congress.

Mr. THOMASON. You want to draft them all up to 45, physically fit or not, and throw them into the plants?

Mr. HINES. If the Army wants to make a serious approach to this thing, it can draft everybody in this country between 18 and 45. They can reexamine the deferments they have given. They can then place them under control of the Army, put them in the Army as full-fledged soldiers, and furlough them to plants where they are needed.

Mr. THOMASON. That is a lot worse than this bill we are considering.

Mr. HINES. I do not think it is. If the Army has the power to take 10,000 people and furlough them and place them in various critical plants in this country, it can do it with 110,000 or 210,000.

Mr. THOMASON. I did not know you favored taking them up to 45.

Mr. HINES. That is what they are doing.

Mr. THOMASON. They are putting them into plants voluntarily?

Mr. HINES. That is what the Army is doing. I think if the people were given an opportunity to go into the plants voluntarily they would do it.

Mr. THOMASON. That is true of thousands of men in your organization who have done it. But you have not answered my question: How are you going to get into the plants the untold thousands who will not go in?

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Do you favor that kind of plan?

Mr. HINES. I have said that is being done now. You have asked the question; I am making the answer. That is being done by the Army.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Does your organization favor it?

Mr. HINES. I am not going to put my organization on record either for or against it; but I am not taking a position against it.

Mr. SHORT. It is the law?

Mr. HINES. It is being done. And it is the law, and there is nothing we can do about it.

Mr. SHORT. As far as Bowery bums and pool-hall loafers are concerned, it is impossible to legislate patriotism.

Mr. THOMASON. But we can get some work out of them.

Mr. HINES. Coercion will not do this. You may think that is the answer. I do not believe it is, because I know our people, and I know what they are thinking. I know what their thoughts are. I do not think all the propaganda and all the pressure and all the suggestions by the Army and Navy Journal that parents have their boys write back home urging this thing upon you will do the trick, if this is finally passed.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think a legislative act has no influence in the country when it provides that men who are not engaged in some productive war effort, who are able-bodied but who are doing nothing toward that effort, shall be either in a war plant or in the service? Do you not think such an act might help a little, call it work or fight or whatever you want to call it?

Mr. HINES. I will make a suggestion to you. You will agree, will you not, that industry and labor have a terrific stake in this thing?

The CHAIRMAN. I certainly will.

Mr. HINES. Will you grant that industry and labor know more about this problem than any other group?

The CHAIRMAN. I will admit that they know plenty.

Mr. HINES. I will suggest to you and to your committee that you sit down with representatives of management and labor to see if you cannot work out some bill that will do this job satisfactorily.

The CHAIRMAN. What will we do for men while we are studying the bill and delaying it a few months?

Mr. HINES. I do not think it is necessary to delay it that long. I think that the results of such a conference will be more satisfactory than forcing this thing through.

Mr. THOMASON. Suppose the conference did not work. It is these slackers I am talking about now.

Mr. HINES. That is the thing we ought to work upon—what we are going to do. Let us sit down and work out some program.

Mr. THOMASON. I am disturbed about this war, wondering what I can do about bringing these thousands and thousands of slackers and nonessential workers into war production.

Mr. HINES. We are disturbed; we have people in the war.

Mr. THOMASON. Of course you have; but this bill does not touch those fighting men.

Mr. CLASON. I have been very much impressed by the testimony of Mr. Hines, and until these later questions were asked I did not understand that the sole attempt of this legislation was to get at slackers, IV–F's and persons of that kind.

Mr. THOMASON. It is not the sole purpose.

Mr. CLASON. I thought its purpose was to direct into industry persons who may be very honest, hard-working, patriotic citizens, anxious and willing to work for the Government, but who up to the present time have not been properly channeled into essential war effort.

Mr. THOMASON. That goes along with it. The object is to bring into useful war work thousands upon thousands who are doing absolutely nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. It does not affect men already at work anywhere.

Mr. THOMASON. It affects where he works and how he works.

Mr. HARNESS. It affects every laborer in this country, because the Director would have power to take him from one plant and put him in another.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. CLASON. It is your understanding, Mr. Hines, that this bill covers not only persons who are doing no work at all, who are slackers, but covers every American citizen who is not engaged in essential war effort, in the words of the War Department, at the present time?

Mr. HINES. Every male between 18 and 45, regardless of where he is.

Mr. CLASON. As I understand your testimony, you feel that regardless of what may have been the testimony here, the War Manpower Commission up to the present time has not failed to carry on its job successfully?

Mr. HINES. That is particularly true because they have brought in the people who support labor and management, who help to direct the activities of the War Manpower Commission.

Mr. CLASON. At the present moment, it is your understanding——

Mr. HINES. May I interrupt? You asked if they have done the job. I have some information here that indicates—and this is information that can be verified—that in the aircraft industry the employment record and the production record have been 95 percent. In the explosives industry—aircraft has 438,000, by the way. In the explosives industry it has been 93 percent. In the ammunition and loading it has been 95 percent. In heavy shells it has been 92 percent; or a total of 92 percent productivity. Now, there is always an allowance or tolerance of at least 5 to 7 percent. That varies, of course. This is a record of what has been done.

Mr. CLASON. Just as good as it would be in peacetimes?

Mr. HINES. Absolutely.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Those percentages below 100 are for turn-over and absenteeism?

Mr. HINES. That is right.

Mr. CLASON. It is your understanding or your belief that the War Manpower Commission has shown itself as capable of handling the job up to the present time and, to the extent that more men are needed, it can tighten up its present procedures to such an extent as to accomplish any necessary purpose?

Mr. HINES. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Now, until this question of slackers and IV–F's not engaged in essential war effort was brought into the picture so strongly, I had in mind asking you if in your opinion it would be possible to cut down on two other causes of lack of production which have been stressed very heavily here by prior witnesses. One of them was turnover and the other absenteeism. To what extent, in your opinion, can there be a cut-down on those two causes, if you believe them to be particularly important in the production figure?

Mr. HINES. I heard the Congressman over here answer that question or refer to a plant where there was constant turn-over, coming and going. When we speak about turn-over, we want to speak in terms of people who quit their jobs and of people who are laid off because of cut-backs. The quit rate, according to the latest figures available by the Labor Department, is 4.12. In other words, only 4.12 percent quit their jobs in the munitions industry. That would be higher or could be higher as the result of lay-offs, due to cut-backs, changes in machinery, and so forth. But of the people actually quitting for one reason or another, that would be the women, perhaps, going home to take care of their children, or men getting sick; it would include perhaps the accident rate—people who are forced to lay off because of accidents. This is a very small rate in comparison with the total. So the reference you made to the one plant is an exceptional case. I do not know what is wrong there, but I would be interested in knowing why so many people are quitting and going back and forth.

Mr. CLASON. One way to decrease these causes of lack of production would be by stirring up those people to realize the seriousness of the country's need at that particular moment?

Mr. HINES. I would say so.

Would you be interested, speaking of comparisons, in knowing what Great Britain has accomplished with a National Service Act? Would you be interested in knowing that we have outstripped Great Britain? That absenteeism in Great Britain is 10 percent, while in the United States it is 6 percent, according to the latest figures we have?

Mr. HARNESS. And they have a national law?

Mr. HINES. They have a National Service Act.

Mr. CLASON. The longer we go the poorer becomes the physical condition of the people who are engaged in the war effort, since they will be going without vacations and without relief from long hours, so you would normally expect absenteeism to increase; would you not?

Mr. HINES. I would say so; yes.

Mr. CLASON. So you would feel that up to the present time the record has been pretty good in the United States?

Mr. HINES. The record has been magnificent. I think everyone concedes that, even some of the gentlemen who testified here. If you will refer to labor's monthly survey, you will see quotations from some of the gentlemen who testified in favor of the bill, namely, Mr. Krug and Mr. Hay. Judge Hay represents Paul McNutt. They

in their previous testimony before the Mead committee a month or a little over a month ago, testified to the effect that there was no need for this. Of course, when the pressure gets hot, as Congressman Short said the other day—I think he put his finger on the thing—opinions change.

Mr. CLASON. Also the Under Secretary of War, the Under Secretary of the Navy, and others, have indicated that it is their personal view or personal wish that that part of the law or the proposed law which provides for establishment of labor units—labor service units—should not be in this legislation. If you take that out and Selective Service no longer brings in these persons for labor battalions, to what extent does this bill differ from the present system of allowing the War Manpower Commission to run the thing?

Mr. HINES. None at all. I said a few moments ago that if you did that the bill is automatically out.

Mr. CLASON. As I understand it from other witnesses who have preceded you, there was a cut-back of 20 percent in the production of many items of equipment and supplies for the Army and Navy. When was it first brought to your attention that there was to be a great change in conditions which required that there be a sudden step up in production? When was that first brought to your attention?

Mr. HINES. It was not brought officially to my attention until General Somervell spoke at the American Federation of Labor convention.

Mr. CLASON. When was that?

Mr. HINES. That was in November, after the election; along in about the latter part of November.

Mr. CLASON. Then, as I see it, right up to election time, nothing was brought to the attention of the American Federation of Labor, which has been working hand in hand with the Government, about any need for an increase in labor or, for that matter, any great increase in production; is that true?

Mr. HINES. Well, I do not know. Now, we received no official notification of any change until we heard the Somervell speech.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we leave the election out of this.

Mr. HINES. That is satisfactory with me, Mr. Chairman.

May I give you some figures for 1 week in December just past, which indicate that there were 7,590 people laid off as a result of cut-backs and cancelations of contracts? That is for 1 week.

Mr. CLASON. For what week?

Mr. HINES. That was for the week of the 16th through the 22d.

Mr. CLASON. 1944?

Mr. HINES. That is right.

Mr. CLASON. So as late as last month they were laying off people on account of cut-backs in war work?

Mr. HINES. That is right. The General Electric Co. in Erie laid off 154. I could go on. The Fort Pitt Bridge Co., of Canonsburg, making, I presume, standard steel railroad-trestle units, laid off 200. The General Electric at Fort Wayne, making turbosuperchargers laid off 450. The Savage Arms Corporation, making Browning machine guns, laid off 700.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make a statement for the record. It is common knowledge throughout this country, and particularly fresh in the minds of this committee, that all during last year there was a program under way for converting from war production back to peacetime production; that as a result of that general effort throughout the country and by legislation in Congress, debates in Congress, and urgent requests from heads of important departments in the Government, the people were lulled into a feeling that the war was about to end. As a result of that, there was a terrific set-back in production. Regardless of who is to blame for it or what is to blame for it, it is here and it is a subject we are dealing with now. We are trying to correct our errors and the errors of the public.

Mr. SHORT. I think our chairman has given an absolutely accurate statement of the facts. Our let-down in production was due to the feeling that the war in Europe would soon be over; it was not due to a shortage of manpower.

The CHAIRMAN. The point I am making is that we have got the problem here. What are we going to do about it, regardless of how we got it?

Mr. HINES. Would you be interested in this information? We have 14 industries in which the problems are critical. They are: Aircraft, tanks, air-borne radar, naval ordnance, cotton duck, dry-cell batteries, combat leaders, field wire, heavy-duty trucks, naval ship repair, heavy-artillery ammunition, heavy artillery, tires, and foundries. In only one single industry is the failure to meet production needs due to a manpower shortage, and that is in the foundries. In every other single industry it is due to technical changes and other things, but not manpower. There are 14 leading war industries and only 1 of them, foundries, has manpower as its major problem. Foundries have always been a sore spot and will continue to be a sore spot.

Mr. SHORT. Because of the low wages paid?

Mr. HINES. Because of the low wages paid and the undesirable conditions. If the Army would spend just a fraction of what it is spending in the prosecution of this war and would clean up these foundries by putting in shower baths to make the places desirable to work in and make it possible to work in comfort, they would do a lot to change the psychology of the people who are there and would induce other people to come in. That, of course, is in addition to paying more money.

Mr. CLASON. Can you tell us how many men, in your opinion, are needed to do the essential war work on contracts that are going to be in production, not including some factory that is going to be built in the future. What are the needs right now?

Mr. HINES. We estimate that there are needed at the present time 150,000 persons and that there will be needed an additional 150,000 through June. These are figures that have been compiled by people who know. They were released by the War Manpower Commission. Increasing productivity will take care of approximately 600,000—the equivalent of 600,000—persons. There will be cut-backs and further cut-backs. We will continue to cut back. It is happening every day. When I send out and ask our people to get people for these factories, they want to know why they are being laid off over here. They don't understand that it is a change in the type of ammunition.

Then, there are 100,000 veterans who will be released during the next period. That will account for 350,000. There are young persons becoming of age, chiefly women. That will account for 400,000. So

to meet the needs of 150,000 now and 150,000 in 6 months, we have a pool of 1,450,000.

Mr. CLASON. Would you expect that the present system of placing labor in essential industry out of that pool would be enough to insure that there would not be any lack of workers during the entire period from now until next June?

Mr. HINES. There is no question about it. May I add that in addition to all these people we have a million handicapped workers in this country who probably, for the most part, would make a constructive contribution to this.

Mr. DURHAM. This group you are speaking of, are experienced, skilled men—most of them, are they not?

Mr. HINES. Yes; they are skilled to the extent that they operate machines.

Mr. DURHAM. The group that this bill covers are not skilled; is that correct?

Mr. HINES. Sir?

Mr. DURHAM. The group that this bill covers are not skilled?

Mr. HINES. No; this bill covers everybody, skilled and unskilled.

Mr. DURHAM. But to a large extent those who are covered in this bill are unskilled workers?

Mr. HINES. The bill covers everybody; it does not differentiate.

Mr. DURHAM. But, I say, those workers are to a large extent unskilled? There you have your pool of 1,400,000 skilled workers?

Mr. HINES. Skilled and unskilled.

Mr. DURHAM. The bill covers a group of unskilled workers?

Mr. HINES. The bill covers skilled and unskilled. The bill covers both.

Mr. DURHAM. What is worrying me about this bill is whether or not these workers that we are trying to cover in here are skilled enough to produce the job we want them to produce. In my mind, and especially in duck, which you have covered here, that we have been on ever since this war started, it is due primarily, I think, to the cutback. You go into a duck plant, and you have 2,000 workers, and you tell your man he has got to up his production 25 percent, and you hand him 400 IV–F's. There is a question in my mind whether we are going to get any increased production or not.

Mr. HINES. Well, you may have something there. One of our unions, the International Ladies Garment Workers is doing an excellent job in supplying manpower for those factories. They have recruited any number of people and taken them out of nonwar activities and placed them in these war plants.

Mr. DURHAM. Of course, I think you are right in saying that these technological changes have brought about a lot of the difficulties. To my mind, it is a question whether a lot of them have been necessary. We have been changing clothing continually since the war started. I do not know whether you have the information to enable you to talk about that or not—whether or not you think it is absolutely necessary now. That has caused some trouble in our duck, because we put these men on Army clothing under one priority, and put them on another kind of clothing under another priority. A continual change in our uniform has caused a great change in the industry.

Mr. HINES. There are so many angles to this, Congressman. It is awfully hard to tell our people or anyone else that there is such a shortage in this material or that material, in view of the fact that we are told that there is at the present time and probably will be upward of $105,000,000 in surplus goods ready to be disposed of. They want to know what has happened if something goes wrong. These are just some of the questions that are being raised. I do not offer that as a criticism. It is something that is in the minds of our people.

Mr. CLASON. Several million dollars' worth of essential war products are being sold today.

Mr. HINES. I read an article the other day where they are taking bandages—I do not know how many——

Mr. SHORT. Eighty-five million.

Mr. HINES (continuing). And selling them for dusting cloths. Doctor, you ought to know something about this. It seems to me they could stretch a point and use them for bandages.

Mr. CLASON. What would you say would be the effect of this legislation upon the present labor market so far as the labor markets in the large areas are concerned?

Mr. HINES. I think it would have a demoralizing effect, Congressman. Let me tell you what is going to happen. I referred to the building trades doing a 100-percent job. There is absolutely no need for any kind of legislation there, but you are going to impose that on them like with everybody else. We have our own arrangement. I am working with the Army at the present time. I am just a little afraid that if you pass this legislation and I continue to proceed to ask our people to do this on a voluntary basis, I will not get the response that I feel I would get, and I feel I have a right to expect, when we are doing it on a basis of a voluntary, free system.

Mr. CLASON. I will conclude by asking you about this advisory board set up by law to assist Mr. Byrnes. Of whom does it consist? I do not care for the names of members.

Mr. HINES. The law creating this board says:

> There is hereby created an advisory board which shall consist of 12 members who shall be appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the members of the board shall represent the general public and the public interest; but in order that the board may have the benefit of experience in the matters it will deal with under this act, 3 members of the board shall have had experience in business management, 3 members shall have had experience in matters relating to labor, and 3 members shall have had experience in agriculture. The President shall designate 1 of the remaining 3 members as chairman of the board.

Mr. CLASON. The board is created by appointment of members by the President of the United States and their names are confirmed by the Senate?

Mr. HINES. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. That board, as I understand it, is 100 percent in opposition to this bill?

Mr. HINES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say that?

Mr. HINES. Yes; here it is in the Washington Post.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a statement by yourself?

Mr. HINES. No; this is a statement in the Washington Post. It was learned by the Post; but you take it from me, Mr. Chairman, that they are opposed.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to ask why, in the face of his own advisory committee, Mr. Byrnes is pressing for this legislation, particularly

as he is the top man interested in the bill, and he is the only one that is not here.

Mr. HINES. Mr. Chairman, did you not hear me read the recommendations of the board?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I heard that.

Mr. HINES. You did not take it too seriously, though.

The CHAIRMAN. I just do not understand that they took a position either for or against this. I understood they made a recommendation to Mr. Byrnes there probably may be—I do not know what it says exactly—contrary to the bill; but they have expressed themselves as opposed to H. R. 1119?

Mr. HINES. I would take it from this.

Mr. CLASON (reading):

> The board advises the Director that it favors the principle that persons not drafted but subject to draft are under obligations to serve in the civilian forces wherever their services are most needed.

Mr. HINES. We are for that 100 percent.

Mr. SHORT. Everybody is.

Mr. CLASON (continuing reading):

> But it feels that any act of Congress embodying that principle should contain adequate safeguards to insure the placement of all civilian workers in the interest of the War Manpower Commission and the War Food Administration in their duly constituted labor, agricultural, and management committees, and that the selective service boards should determine only whether the individual is to be inducted into the military service.

I take it that that means that everything remain in status quo.

Mr. HARNESS. What is the date of that?

Mr. HINES. January 10.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, now. How does that conflict at all with the very first section of the bill, on pages 1 and 2, down to and including line 6 in the bill? That merely says that when a man is engaged in a war activity—farmer, or whatever he may be—he must not change without the consent of his draft board. That would help to solve the situation.

Mr. HINES. In the early part of my testimony I called attention to the fact that the Selective Service and the draft boards were going to supersede the War Manpower Commission. You did not agree with me. But now it is very clear that the draft boards will have determination whether they can stay or will have to go.

The CHAIRMAN. This bill provides that they have to have the consent of their draft board to get them their jobs, too. Tat is what you are arguing about?

Mr. HINES. That is right. But the recommendation of this board to Mr. Byrnes says that such matters should be determined by the War Manpower Commission.

Mr. CLASON. Do you think we could gain any valuable information as to the position of Mr. Byrnes and this advisory board by calling either Mr. Byrnes or one of the members of that committee before this committee?

Mr. HINES. I do not know, Congressman; I am not in a position to make any statement.

Mr. CLASON. I would suggest that that be done for the benefit of the committee.

Mr. HINES. I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, as to my suggestion that you call labor and management together, that you are going to have labor here for a few days, and I understand the president of the National Association of Manufacturers is going to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we are calling all of them. We have invited Mr. Murray to come here if he wants to come.

Mr. HINES. It demonstrates that America is a big country when people with different views, such as the manufacturers and the representatives of labor, can agree on something. I think we can agree most wholeheartedly. I believe that if you were to call them together—you and your committee—and ask us just how those things can be done, we will find it out.

The CHAIRMAN. We have only one method of doing that, that is to have them here as witnesses. We have agreed to hear you today and to hear Mr. Murray tomorrow. We will also hear Mr. John L. Lewis, if he desires to come. We understand that you are speaking for Mr. Green.

Mr. HINES. I am speaking for Mr. Green.

Mr. CLASON. As a matter of fact, you do not think this legislation necessary, and that if we continue under the present program, all needs until June 30, 1945, will be met insofar as labor is concerned.

Mr. HINES. Absolutely. If you enact this legislation you are going to hurt the morale of our people.

Mr. MARTIN. I am very much impressed by your quotation from the Byrnes advisory board and your 100-percent agreement with it. I wonder in your suggestion to the committee that we consult industry and labor with the idea of working this out whether you have in mind that any particular legislation or suggested new legislation may develop from that type of conference; or is it your opinion that what we have now is wholly adequate and that our conference would result in such a conclusion?

Mr. HINES. I would not want to make any suggestions at the moment. I am impressed with some of the arguments advanced as to what we are going to do with the slackers and the other fellows who evade their responsibilities. We are committed 100 percent to proposals that everybody do something to help in the war effort. We believe the voluntary method is best. It may be possible that we can agree on something in the way of tightening up controls. For instance the other day the War Manpower Commission had just issued orders to the field forces to impose ceilings on plants. That gives them the right to go into a plant, and if, in their opinion, with the approval of labor and management, a man employing 100 people can get along with 80 people, they impose a ceiling. Remember, that is done with the consent of the labor-management committee in that area. I think that is an excellent way of handling this thing.

Mr. MARTIN. Conceivably, such a conference as you suggest might develop some method of approach to get those people who are not now employed in the most needed war production.

Mr. HINES. I would suggest that something may come out of this in the way of rigid controls, subject to appeals—rigid controls that will give both employers and workers a chance to appeal from any decision.

Mr. MARTIN. Would you expect a system of that kind to bring about quick results? For instance, emergencies to arise very quickly and

suddenly and we have to meet them almost on the spot, or else we miss our opportunity. The system you are suggesting now would be devised with the idea of the speediest kind of action?

Mr. HINES. Meeting any and all situations that might arise.

Mr. MARTIN. Last year we had a real emergency in the matter of farm machinery. It was a serious emergency with the shortage of manpower on the farms. Rooted back to the 20 percent level of farm manufacturers, there was created in this territory a very serious shortage of farm machinery, until Donald Nelson made some radical changes and brought it back to 80 percent. A year ago I was told that for the first time materials were no longer really causing that shortage and that it was from there on a matter of manpower. I got that from every Government agency interested in that field, and there is quite a group of them. Now, in late May we had a very serious emergency planting in the Middle West in agriculture. We needed farm machinery. But I could find no way of jarring loose that matter of manpower in the farm machinery plans; and that was the angle they told me was the shortage, and not the materials. We did get through. We struggled through by the benefit of good weather. There was no accomplishment by any agency in charge that caused us to come out as well as we did. If we had had a bad harvest season we would have come out worse. As a matter of fact, food production is a very basic factor in our war program. We do not know what we are facing this year. We are still faced with a very serious farm machinery shortage. We have already had testimony that it has not yet been met and that we may not be in a position to meet it, because there is talk now that in addition to the shortage of farm machinery that we had last year there will be the further problem of manpower on the farms. I want to put in a word now that some of us are watching that particular factor. I am wondering whether or not you have in mind any plans for an approach to that that will settle it within the time it must be settled. We cannot plant a corn crop in June during many years and get a good corn crop.

Mr. HINES. I do not think this bill would meet that situation, but it could be met through consultation of farmers, labor, industry and the governmental agencies responsible for the allocation of those people.

Mr. MARTIN. If your conference of industry and labor develops some weakness in our present railway system, that I found was a real weakness a year ago, we could not ship anything in there that would bring real relief to the farmers. If it were found at such a conference that some drastic legislation was needed to bring about real results, you would go along with a program of that kind?

Mr. HINES. I do not suppose we would have very much to say about it. If we cannot demonstrate that the thing can be done, I do not suppose we will have very much to say about it.

Mr. MARTIN. If we had such a conference as you are proposing, you would go along with the program if you knew it did involve some drastic approaches?

Mr. HINES. I think we all have to realize that we have to have a tightening up all around.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Philbin?

Mr. PHILBIN. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harness?

Mr. HARNESS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I wonder if Mr. Hines has any statististics to show how many of the 50,000 men being discharged from the Army every month are being given jobs in industry?

Mr. HINES. Well, here are the best figures. In October there were 80,000 applied. Presumably that was the number let out. Sixty-three thousand of those were placed. In September 73,900, and 60,000 were placed. In August, 74,000, and 62,000 placed. The ratio is running about the same all the way through. In July there were 65,000 released, and 50,000 placed. In June, 57,000 released and 41,000 placed. I presume that the difference between those placed and those applying after being let out represented those with physical defects.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they all employed in industry?

Mr. HINES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. War industries?

Mr. HINES. No; employed in all industries, and in agricultural pursuits.

Mr. HARNESS. If we can count on 50,000 men a month going into industry from the services, is not that going to ease the manpower situation somewhat?

Mr. HINES. I read some figures here before to indicate what our needs were and what our resources were.

Mr. HARNESS. Do you include in that the discharged servicemen?

Mr. HINES. Three hundred and fifty thousand of them during the next 6 months.

Mr. HARNESS. I understood you to say we needed only 300,000 through June?

Mr. HINES. That is all. Yet there are 350,000 veterans who will be released. Cut-backs will account for another 100,000. Young persons coming of working age will account for another 400,000. If you go along increasing productivity at the rate you have been going, you will account for 600,000 workers. That is a remarkable thing. I do not know whether you gentleman of Congress realize the productivity of the workers of this country, but there has been a constant climb in things produced and a decline in the number of persons producing them.

Mr. DURHAM. Did not the Selective Service appear here with figures showing that 700,000 would be needed in the next 6 months?

Mr. HARNESS. It was variously estimated from 780,000 to 900,000.

Mr. SHORT. That is the reason why I asked, on the first day of the hearings, if any census had been taken or any scientific survey made.

Mr. HARNESS. Here is the report of the War Manpower Commission and the Department of Commerce, a joint report that I have referred to twice before. They say that in the last year there were 1,100,000 workers let out of work in war industries in this country. All those 1,100,000 did not just evaporate into thin air; they are still here and are available for these jobs, except those, probably, who have gone into the service?

Mr. HINES. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Those who have not are the ones we are asking for.

Mr. HARNESS. I do not think you will have to draft them back. I think perhaps a great number of those men and women would go back if they were not led to believe that the war is almost over.

Mr. HINES. Sixty-three thousand of them, Congressman, went back in December.

Mr. HARNESS. In that connection, I want to place in the record an article by George E. Sokolsky.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let it go in.

(The article referred to is as follows:)

SOKOLSKY THESE DAYS

SOMEBODY'S WRONG

By George E. Sokolsky

The President, in his message, stirred the country to a consciousness of the manpower shortage. Mr. Byrnes seems to be all excited by the manpower shortage. But the Department of Labor says there is no manpower shortage. Somebody is either in error or else facts are twisted to fit occasions.

I quote the December, mark you, report published jointly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States Department of Labor and the reports and analysis service of the War Manpower Commission:

"Appraisal of current manpower needs in the munitions industries and of the personnel demands of the armed forces indicates that there is no general manpower shortage, but there are urgent needs for workers in certain types of war production."

Apparently the President is utilizing the distress over our difficulties in Europe to press for a national service act, whereas these figures would show that there is sufficient manpower in this Nation of 133,000,000 people, but that some very serious errors of judgment or intent appeared last summer on the eve of a Presidential election. For, says the report:

"The decline in employment in the munitions industries of approximately 10 percent between the peak in November 1943 and September 1944 was due largely to downward revisions in many programs and increased output per worker in many industries; there is no indication that any appreciable part of this decline was due to voluntary shifts to nonwar work. The critical production shortages from now until the end of the war in Europe will be due in most cases to rapidly increased demands for certain products."

Also, "the total labor force, including the armed forces, expanded in the 12 months ending in September 1944 by half a million more than the normally expected increase. During every month of 1944 the number of women in nonagricultural activities was greater than that in the same month of 1943."

It is difficult to understand hy November 1943 should mark the peak of output and employment in the munitions industry. Certainly our Government should have known then, as it knows now, that the war was in no prospect of being over. The New Deal is a planed economy. It has established cotnrols over the American people on the assumption that a planned economy is superior to the hit-and-miss methods of what they call laissez faire.

Well, what kind of planning is it that permits output of munitions to begin tapering off just before the really significant and important battles of the war? Production, according to the report I am quoting, tapered off 5 percent from November 1943 to September 1944. Why? Who planned that idocy? And during that period employment dropped 10 percent from 10,400,000 workers to 9,300,000 workers? And what happened to the laid-off workers? The report says:

"* * * The more than proportionate decrease in employment was due primarily to the increased output per worker as a result of improved utilization of labor and growing experience in munitions production * * *."

But the President apparently believes that all the shortages in shells and other munitions of war are due to the manpower shortage. Has someone told him wrong again? In the airplane industry, the decrease in employment for this period amounted to 15 percent, although output remained h'gh.

Then this report says: "* * * Attainment of many of the scheduled goals in the critical items may well be considered problemattical in view of shortages of facilities and needed components for new products which are wanted in large volume. Numerous technical difficulties also stand in the way of sharp increases in the production of specific items needed. These problems are now hampering the production of such items as heavy artillery, artillery ammunition, aerial bombs, and air-borne radar. * * *"

Do you mean to say that, after all the years we have been at war and all the money we have spent, there are still "shortages of facilities"? Where has the money gone to? Certainly this official Government report is unrelated to the President's speech, to Mr. Byrnes' importunities and to what seems to be the news of the day. Who is wrong? Who is bluffing?

Mr. HINES. I may say, in connection with productivity, that from January 1942 to September 1944 the average output of every munitions worker increased 4 to 5 percent.

Mr. HARNESS. This report shows, I think, that they had a 5-percent increase.

Mr. HINES. We go further, and we find in the airplane industry at least 300,000 people, or 15 percent of the total number of those employed, and we increased the production 5 percent.

Mr. HARNESS. In connection with the figures for the General Electric Co. in Fort Wayne, Ind., you say they laid off 450 men?

Mr. HINES. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Will you give me the date those men were laid off and the source of your information?

Mr. HINES. Yes; I will give you that.

Mr. HARNESS. The reason I am asking for that is that just Monday I was in the War Manpower Commission office, where they were talking about needing 500 men for General Electric in Fort Wayne.

Mr. HINES. That is right. This comes about as the result of our trying to get those 500 men.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you do when you get them and they are laid off?

Mr. HINES. They are turned over to the United States Employment Service, which endeavors to place them in other plants.

I do not have that material, Congressman.

I will give you an illustration of what we have been able to do out in Minneapolis. The Twin City ordnance plant had a cut-back. They laid off approximately 10,000 or 12,000 workers. They suddenly got an order. Those workers had been scattered around in other plants. They went to other jobs whenever they could. It was up to the union to try to get, not only the 12,000 back but to bring 15,000 workers into that plant. We placed men on that to do the job. One of our representatives reported to me about a week or 10 days ago that he had completed the job and had filled the plant up. That entails going back and getting the people who had been laid off and gone into other industries and putting them back into this particular plant again.

Mr. HARNESS. How do you account for the War Manpower Commission calling on you for 400 men for the General Electric plant in Fort Wayne, while, at the same time, that plant laid off 400 others?

Mr. HINES. The figures I gave were not from the War Manpower Commission; it was the Army. I have an arrangement with the War Department, or with General Somervell's office that he will supply me with the names of these plants, the type of work they do, and the number of people needed, together with the unions covering that plant. So in this particular instance, when we notified our people to get these men in there we found that, instead of needing them, they were laying them off, just the same as in these other instances I have cited, like in Philadelphia, where they were supposed to need 150 in one plant but actually needed only 50. I do not blame that on the War Department; I do not think they are responsible. I think some-

where along the line they juggle figures. It may be that instead of needing men they have a few extra men.

In Philadelphia there has been put into effect a plan where people may be transferred between plants. In this instance there is a perfect willingness, instead of a reluctance, on the part of the employer to let 10 men go for 60 days while still retaining their status in the company.

Mr. HARNESS. I understand you are opposing this bill because it applies to all labor between 18 and 45. If legislation were proposed that would reach only slackers and men and women who have sought work or who refuse to work, what would your attitude be?

Mr. HINES. Let me have that question again.

Mr. HARNESS. If this legislation were directed only to those men who are referred to as slackers, who thus far have refused to work in industry or to contribute anything to the war effort, would you be more inclined toward it?

Mr. HINES. Without attempting to commit the American Federation of Labor to such a program, I would say we feel so intensely about this thing that I cannot see where there could be any objection raised to placing a man or assisting a man or woman to be placed where they can be required to work through some system of control.

Mr. HARNESS. Do you think that can be done administratively now under existing law?

Mr. HINES. Oh, yes; yes, I think so.

Mr. HARNESS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead?

Mr. WINSTEAD. A few moments ago you gave a list of the critical war industries. I think you stated there was no shortage of manpower in any of those industries except one.

Mr. HINES. Foundries.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Would you give us the reason why those are listed as critical industries, if there is no manpower shortage? What is the cause of those industries being listed?

Mr. HINES. In aircraft it is design change. In tanks it is design change. In air-borne radar it is design chance. In naval ordnance it is a stepped-up program. In cotton duck it is a stepped-up program. In dry-cell batteries it is a stepped-up program. In combat leaders it is a stepped-up program. In field wire it is a stepped-up program. In heavy-duty trucks it is components; we need parts not available. In naval-ship repair it is components. In heavy artillery ammunition it is facilities. I presume they do not have sufficient facilities for manufacturing. In tires it is facilities. In foundries it is manpower.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I may say, Mr. Hines, that I think your organization has done a wonderful job in this war, but we all know that there is a strong feeling in this country among many people, including servicemen, that strikes have affected the war effort. But the testimony from most of our witnesses has been that strikes have not severely affected the war effort.

Mr. HINES. You are speaking of strikes?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Yes. I wonder if you have here the number of hours lost through strikes in these industries?

The CHAIRMAN. I have a table on that for last year.

Mr. HINES. We have all that material in the office, Congressman; I do not have it available here. However, as compared with the man-hours worked, I think it is a negligible figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a table issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Mr. HINES. Is not the figure less than one-half of 1 percent?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not remember the percentage, but I know it was 1,600,000 days.

Mr. HINES. Here it is: For September 1943, nine one-hundredths of 1 percent; in August, twelve one-hundreths of 1 percent; and so on down the line.

The CHAIRMAN. What are those percentages based on?

Mr. HINES. Man-days worked—the total.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the total of man-days worked in each month?

Mr. HINES. This is a percentage of the man-days lost as against those worked as a result of strikes.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the number of man-days lost?

Mr. HINES. I do not have that here.

The CHAIRMAN. I have it full and complete. I will give it to you, Mr. Winstead, or else place it in the record.

Mr. HINES. Here we are, yes. We have that. We have 660,000 man-days lost, representing nine one-hundredths of 1 percent of the man-days worked. That figure of 660,000 sounds very big, but when it is compared with the total it is very small in percent. It runs down to September 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it for last May?

Mr. HINES. Last May? No; we do not have it, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DURHAM. Do you have the number of absentee hours?

Mr. HINES. There were 1,325,000,000 man-days worked.

Mr. DURHAM. Is that the number of absentee hours?

Mr. HINES. One billion three hundred and twenty-five million man-days worked.

Mr. DURHAM. Total?

Mr. HINES. Total.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Do you have also a check on the absenteeism in those particular plants?

Mr. HINES. We have no figures on absenteeism other than a percentage.

Mr. Chairman, I have here a telegram from the Railway Labor Executives' Association. They represent the brotherhood. This is a protest that they wish to enter against this bill. May I file it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. I think they have a witness coming, but I am not sure.

(The telegram referred to is as follows:)

[Western Union telegram]

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 11, 1945.*

Hon. ANDREW J. MAY,
Chairman, House Military Affairs Committee,
Washington, D. C.:

Railway Labor Executives' Association wants to be recorded as opposed to H. R. 1119. We can state no better reason than that uttered by the great labor leader, Samuel Gompers, years ago. It is even more apropos today, and the continuance of that fundamental principle of voluntarism will quicken the win-

ning of this war. I quote Mr. Gompers: "So long as we have held fast to voluntary principles and have been actuated and inspired by the spirit of service, we have sustained our forward progress and we have made our labor movement to be respected and accorded a place in the councils of our Republic. * * * No lasting gain has ever come from compulsion." The record shows that labor has done its job and done it well; and it will continue with enthusiasm, giving the best it has. Why diminish the spirit, intent, and morale of the loyal and patriotic workers by the enactment of compulsory legislation? Will you kindly make the above statement a part of the record of the hearings?

J. G. LUHRSEN,
Executive Secretary, Railway Labor Executives' Association.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Mr. HINES. We do not have those figures available.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I have one other question, Mr. Chairman. The manpower situation has been a problem in the past, but production has been stepped up to such an extent that we will need to put additional manpower in those plants?

Mr. HINES. Yes.

Mr. WINSTEAD. You think that this situation can be met without this legislation?

Mr. HINES. I am sure it can.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Did I understand you to say that you think the problems can be best solved without this legislation?

Mr. HINES. Yes.

Mr. WINSTEAD. But if you thought this legislation would improve the situation you would favor it?

Mr. HINES. I said in my opening statement that we are for what this legislation seeks to achieve, namely, the placing of everyone or the assisting of everyone to do his utmost either in the armed forces or on the home front. If there is no other way, and this is necessary or something else is necessary, then, as good, loyal American citizens, we are going to favor it. But we do not believe it is the way.

Mr. WINSTEAD. There is another point, namely, that the bill involves some confusion. I understand you are opposed to the legislation; I am not so certain that I favor it. But there is a type of people whom I have in mind at this particular time, who are absolutely opposed to becoming members of, we will say, the A. F. of L., or the C. I. O., or some other labor union. In saying this, I am not trying to stir up friction. I do think, if it becomes necessary to enforce this legislation, and if strikes have not severely affected the war effort, that in fairness to the whole country we ought to get that across to the people, because there are many people who do not see the situation in that light.

If we say to a man, "You must go into this plant," and we force him into industry, we will say, you force him to join a union and you say, "strike," he is forced to strike. I do not think that would be fair to that individual. If he is conscientiously opposed to becoming a member of any organization, I do not think that we should pass legislation forcing him into industry under such conditions.

Mr. HINES. Somebody asked me what became of the fellow who was going to answer that question. I do not know what became of him, but he had not answered the question yet. I was interested in knowing what the answer was going to be, but we did not get it.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Let me ask this question, if I may: Do you feel that it would be fair to that individual, if he conscientiously opposed becoming a member? There are some people in this country, you know, who

believe that it is not right to be forced into labor organizations in this country.

Mr. HINES. I do not know that I get your question.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Do you think it would be fair for us to pass legislation to force him to affiliate with whatever union is in charge?

Mr. HINES. I think that question should be handled on this basis: That he goes into the plant under the conditions that prevail in the plant—the wage rate, working hours, labor relations, or whatever the conditions are in that plant. If he has some conscientious scruples, if he belongs to some sect—we have in this country some religious sects whose members do not join unions or do not take the obligations—I think something can be worked out. I know that our unions do that with respect to their beliefs, and so forth. We can work something out in that case. But I think that if a person should be detailed to a plant, he should go in under the conditions existing in the plant.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Mr. WINSTEAD. That is all.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Chairman, I do want to make an observation. I think Mr. Hines has done a fine job today. It is the answer to why we in Pennsylvania had him as our secretary of labor and industry a few years ago. I think there is no man more capable than Lew Hines testifying on a bill of this kind.

Mr. HINES. My only regret, Congressman, is that I am not in favor of the bill proposed by my good friend the Chairman. I wish I could be for the bill instead of against it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not the only man responsible for this bill. I introduced it.

Mr. SHORT. I do not think he is too hot about it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am for it, tooth and toenail. I have no apology to make for it.

Mr. FENTON. In connection with your statement showing why our production program is critical, I notice in the second paragraph of the section relating to schedules of heavy artillery ammunition that new plants are required to be constructed for that purpose.

Mr. HINES. Are there new plants?

Mr. FENTON. You say in this section that there are.

Mr. HINES. Well, I understand there is an appropriation of $500,000,000 to be used for that purpose.

Mr. FENTON. Is it not a fact that large plants have already been constructed, though not a pound of ammunition has been produced?

Mr. HINES. I attended a meeting last Friday, and there were numerous instances cited. I did not compile the data. We are bound to make mistakes during the war. But it is a fact that this has happened; there is no question about that.

Mr. FENTON. Well, it is also a fact that in the conditions that now confront us, the public is being blamed for its apathy. I am not in thorough agreement with that theory. As a matter of fact, it looks as though it is a cover-up for the things that have been overlooked and have not been thought of before. I happen to know something about that, particularly the ammunition shortage at the present time. They cannot blame the people for that. Neither can they blame the Congress. Congress has done everything it could toward helping improve that situation. It has appropriated all the money that has

been asked for. Yet the whole tendency is to blame the people, to get them more conscious that we are in a war.

Mr. HINES. And to exaggerate the shortages at the front.

Mr. FENTON. That is correct.

Mr. HINES. The chairman asked the Under Secretary of War the other day if ammunition was rationed. I presume he had in mind that story they tell about how they were so short of ammunition that they rationed it at the front.

The Secretary said, "We always ration ammunition."

I presume he meant that with every gun there goes a certain quantity of ammunition under ordinary circumstances. That would have been a fine opportunity to develop the story as to whether or not there really are ammunition shortages at the front.

I remember one radio commentator telling a story about a colonel at an advance position who ordered artillery fire.

The answer came back, "We have used up our ammunition quota"; and the colonel came in and bowed his head.

That just sounds to me like so much propaganda.

Mr. FENTON. Yes.

Mr. Hines, it is a fact that in questioning one of our high generals, I asked the question, facetiously, however, when he was going to get into Berlin.

He said, "Doctor, you send us over the ammunition; we will get there"; indicating to me, sir, that there was a shortage of ammunition and also that they are rationing ammunition.

Mr. HINES. It is conceivable, possibly, that there might be a shortage due to transportation facilities; or the enemy may destroy a column advancing to the front.

The CHAIRMAN. Or ammunition dumps.

Mr. HINES. There may be temporary shortages. Let me read here, speaking of the boys on the battle front, what General Somervell told the Mead committee.

> None of them have suffered from lack of supplies. The boys at the front have had everything that we could possibly bring to the front. But there is every reason for having a spot shortage at the front unless manpower deficiencies are met.

Of course, that is logical.

Mr. HARNESS. Supplementing what Dr. Fenton has just stated, he and I were members of the committee which has just returned from the combat area, where we investigated the shortage of ammunition. From General Eisenhower down to artillery sergeants we determined definitely that there was a shortage of heavy ammunition, 105 millimeters and on up. As far as we have been able to learn, that was not due to any particular individual or group. Probably they were too optimistic about the war and did not lay up sufficient stockpiles of it when they had production facilities to do so. But there is definitely a shortage of it.

The CHAIRMAN. The record ought to be clear here that there is a shortage only in the higher caliber ammunition and not in the lower caliber; and the record ought to show also that it is due more to our own transportation lines and over this land, as compared with the German lines of supply within 300 miles.

Mr. HARNESS. I think it was due more to optimism on the part of those running the program.

Mr. HINES. Mr. Harness, may I answer a question you asked previously? The number of man-days lost as a result of strikes in relation to the man-days worked was the question, was it not?

Mr. HARNESS. I did not ask that.

Mr. HINES. Someone asked that question. In September 1944 there were 1,325,000,000 man-days worked; there were 660,000 man-days lost as the result of strikes.

The CHAIRMAN. You gave that once. I asked you about the month of May last year. I asked how many man-days were lost; I did not ask how many were worked.

Mr. HINES. If our very efficient research people here have the information, I will supply it.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. I think we would all like to have the voluntary system, but one of the things that has worried me is this: The testimony of Mr. Knudsen before our committee on Friday was that the loss due to turn-over of labor, especially out in my part of the country—California—was 9 percent, while the ordinary turn-over in industry in peacetimes was 3 percent. In one plant out there, one big navy yard, the turn-over in 1 month was 12 percent. The entire refill system has not worked out.

Mr. HINES. I would have to know more about the individual case, particularly in view of the fact that I quoted figures here to show that the quit rate was 4.12 percent. You see, in the turn-over you may include people who were laid off.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. No; there was nobody laid off. They are trying to increase there all the time.

Mr. HINES. It is quite possible that in a plant employing 30,000 or 40,000 persons that there might be turn-over and a lay-off.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. No.

Mr. HINES. I cannot answer that specifically; I would have to look into that case to find out what it was all about.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Another aspect of it was the absenteeism. That was where they did not quit but stayed off on Monday, stayed off on Saturday, and so forth. That rate is very high in our area. Is there any way in which these voluntary groups can control that?

Mr. HINES. We went into the absentee question to quite an extent before the Naval Affairs Committee about a year ago, and there was abundant evidence produced to show what the causes were. I know this, that our labor-management committees have made tremendous contributions toward reducing absenteeism by working out plans for better housing, better transportation, and other factors that have a bearing on absenteeism.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Has there been any decline in absenteeism during the last year—1944?

Mr. HINES. Oh, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. How much?

Mr. HINES. I do not have the figures here, but we have a report on that. We have watched that very closely, and we have reports from the various agencies concerned, including the Bureau of Labor Statistics, that indicate that there has been a drop in absenteeism.

Mr. SHORT. There is too much high-powered wine in California. [Laughter.]

Mr. HINES. I want to say this—that it was testified before this committee that those people had "Monday pneumonia," the inference being that the worker was making a lot of money and that he spent the money and abused himself on Saturday and Sunday. I do not think that holds true.

The CHAIRMAN. Who said that?

Mr. HINES. I think pretty generally the worker has put his money to good use. He has bought bonds and better food and clothing and shelter for his family. Of course, a certain percentage of the boys will always go over to see Tony, or somebody, and feel a little sick on Monday. I do not care whether or not you have a draft law; you cannot keep some of them out of Tony's; and if you close Tony's they will go somewhere else. Would it not be a good idea for this committee to study causes and effects?

Mr. SHORT. We have a War Manpower Commission; that is their specific job.

Mr. HINES. It seems to me that this committee should go into those things, so that it would have the accurate facts before it as to what is responsibile for all these things.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Hines, do you mean to say that this committee had charged the men with having pneumonia on Monday?

Mr. HINES. No. I said that at the hearings before the House Naval Affairs Committee, when this question was first brought up, we had a lot of inferences and wiscracks made by individuals that absenteeism was caused by "Monday pneumonia," the inference being that the workers drank too much on Sunday. We answered all those accusations.

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to get clear the fact that this committee did not make those accusations.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Has your group determined how many workers who have been cut back from war industries go into other war industries? Or do you try to place them in other war industries when they are needed?

Mr. HINES. Let me say this again—I think I ought to emphasize this: I was very much interested in compiling some figures the other day as to the number of our people serving in a voluntary capacity with the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission. Among our 7,000,000 members throughout the country, there is quite a group of them serving in official capacities with all the various agencies involved and interested in solving this problem. You have asked what we are doing. I would say that we are taking a very great interest and an active part.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. But you are not answering my question. How many people who leave a war plant that is cut back go into other war plants?

Mr. HINES. I cannot answer that for you definitely. We do all that we can do. We try to get them in. Most assuredly we try to get them in.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hines, the committee is very happy to have had you here as a witness. I hope your testimony will be constructive and helpful, and I believe it will be. You have had exactly 2 hours and 25 minutes time.

Mr. HINES. I want to tell you how much I appreciate your giving me that time.

The CHAIRMAN. If you feel that you want to make some additional statement before we finish the hearing, and we can give you a little time, we shall be glad to hear you further.

Mr. HINES. I think I have completed my statement on behalf of that great institution, the American Federation of Labor; and I want to say to you and to the committee that we are very grateful for the kindness that you have displayed to us in giving us this time. I hope that, in my humble way, I have converted at least a few of you to our way of thinking.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I think the American Federation people have done a magnificent job in the way of production; but I would like to say that we have stil la bigger job. That is what is disturbing the committee; that is what is disturbing me.

Mr. HINES. We are going to do that big job, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, Mayor LaGuardia, a distinguished former Member of the House of Representatives, and now, and for many years, mayor of the city of New York, has asked permission to be heard on this measure. The mayor is here.

Mayor LaGuardia, we have not yet had lunch. You were scheduled for 2:30, as I recall it. If it will not inconvenience you, I shall reconvene the committee at that time, when we shall be happy to hear you.

(At 2:05 p. m. a recess was taken until 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m. upon the expiration of the recess.)

STATEMENT OF HON. FIORELLO H. LaGUARDIA, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, AND PRESIDENT, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The witness is Mayor LaGuardia of New York.

We are glad to have you as a witness, Mr. Mayor, and to have you give your comments on H. R. 1119.

Mayor LAGUARDIA. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I appreciate this courtesy. I know how pressed you are for time. This is not the first time I have appeared before this committee in connection with the consideration of legislation pertaining to military service and manpower. The situation, I understand, is critical, and men are needed in industry as well as for the armed forces.

I need not point out to this committee, I am sure, that along with fighting men and necessary weapons, material, and supplies for the armed forces, a part of the machinery of war is the home front, found particularly in local government—protection of life and property, transportation, fire protection, water supply, food, caring for the sick, and above all, the maintenance of the public health. If those things are permitted to be impaired, it will affect production directly and will also affect the very purpose you are seeking to achieve in keeping an efficient, well-supplied Army and Navy at the front.

The cities have reached the point, gentlemen, where this appearance is necessary. I pointed it out some 4 years ago when I first appeared, and I pointed it out on several occasions before this committee and the Senate committee what would happen if the service law would fail to be all-comprehensive. Everything that I feared then has happened.

I sincerely hope that in the face of actual conditions and the experience we have had, that Congress will no longer meet the manpower situation with piecemeal legislation. What it has failed to do in the past must courageously now be done, though it may be difficult and unpleasant. Everyone must realize by now that service in the armed forces, manpower for war industry, State, county, and local government, along with civilian needs, must all be treated, studied, and approached as one subject. It must all be well balanced and apportioned. It is extremely difficult to take but one-third or even less of the whole problem and require services in the armed forces by compulsion and leave all of the rest to choice, preference, and convenience. A great deal of the present predicament could all have been avoided, had proper allocation been made from the very beginning to each of the war activities and to civil requirements. I can well understand the attitude of the Army resenting that any military service should be a matter of punishment for those able to work and who refuse to do so. I therefore recommend the reversing of the plan provided in the bill now before you. Every man of military age or the age now wanted by the Army, should be inducted into military service. It could then be provided that those who are able to work in shipyards and war industry might be deferred from active service while they are so employed. They would be subject to call at any time when they fail to efficiently, willingly, and cheerfully perform the services to which they have been temporarily assigned and have voluntarily accepted.

The whole manpower situation: Selective service, war industry, agriculture, transportation, local government and civilian requirements, must be evaluated and placed in centralized control. Specific conditions and requirements for every person must be written into the law. I fear that the magnitude of the present war is such that the construction of the law and its administration, interpretations, and discretionary powers cannot be left to thousands of draft boards throughout the country. Each board has its own interpretation and each board has its own approach and even boards within one city or within one county apply the law differently. There should be rigid provisions of law and rules, specific, so that there may be very little if any variance throughout the country. There must be an entire elimination of any possibility for favoritism or prejudice. To do this is not at all difficult. I always said, and I say now, that the administration of selective service from the head office in Washington has been most unimaginative. There is no use crying over past mistakes but we should at least learn from experience and correct past mistakes. There are thousands, yes, hundred of thousands of mothers in our country who wonder why her neighbor's boy is not in the service while her's is. Some of the cases are extremely hard to explain. This can all be easily avoided.

My purpose in coming before you today is to inform the committee on the situation confronting the Government of every city in this country. It is something I warned Congress at the time the first

military service legislation was before it. We have reached a point not that the matter can no longer be ignored. I need not point out to the committee that the home front is of equal importance in the winning of the war as the battle front. Particularly is this true in modern warfare. Armies must be provided with everything that it needs when it needs it and where it needs it. Modern warfare is a gigantic industrial contest. The Nation or group of Nations that can produce the most and the best and continue to produce the most and the best in arms, ships, planes, equipment, material, supplies, food, and transportation is the Nation or group of Nations that will win the war. The very purpose of the bill now before you is to keep up the flow of material, munitions, and supplies, to get men to the factories and shops and yards at once, and to provide replacements for the dead, wounded, and missing in the ranks of our fighting forces. I am sure Congress will realize that. So again I am here to ask you not to ignore, not to forget another very important factor in this picture. That factor is local government, charged with the protection of the life and property and with the maintenance of public health, with the care of the sick and injured, with the avoidance of the spreading of disease, with policing and fire protection, sanitation, water supply, distribution of food, shelter, and transportation.

Every large city must have an efficient system of transportation just as it must have a sufficient supply of pure water. The situation in my city is no different than that in any other city. Our numbers are so much greater and therefore the need of replacement is so much greater and perhaps more difficult to find. In giving figures today, showing the plight of essential functions of municipal government, charged with the protection of life and property, maintenance of health and transportation, I want to make it clear that the percentages and the situation are exactly the same in every other city. I quote the figures from my own city because they are within reach this morning.

Permit me to hurriedly state just a few of these figures. The police department of the city of New York, charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order in a city of 7,300,000 people, with nearly a million transients in and out of the city every day, has an authorized strength of 18,790. We are now 4,195 men short in the uniformed force. 923 are in military service. The remainder is due to retirements, resignations, but mostly retirements. Men take advantage of the 20-year retirement privilege at this time when employment may be obtained and the retirement pension enjoyed. Oh, yes, you are quite justified in asking me why is this permitted in time of an emergency? The answer is: I tried to stop it but the court of appeals of my State held that it was a contractual right; that neither the mayor nor the police commissioner could defer or postpone retirement even though we were waging a war, if the right to retire had accrued.

Of course I do not agree with this decision. I think it is wrong. I shall continue to say it is wrong. Yet there is nothing I can do about it. When young men are forced into armed service to fight and die, surely the State has the power to postpone the retirement of men still in their forties and some in their early fifties. These men, if you please, should be required to work in factories and shipyards and not be permitted to take cushy jobs as watchmen and guards,

work that may well be done by men past the sixties. We have sought in New York City to appoint older men in the police force as temporary patrolmen for the duration of the war. We pay these men $2,000 a year. We have been able to date to get only 275 and these are included in the 14,595. Bear in mind, please, that every city is confronted in time of war with additional police duties and responsibilities. Strategic points have to be guarded. Special detective work must be carried on. Control of alien enemies, increased vigilance in and around war plants and waterfronts all make an unbearable drain on a reduced force.

Let us now take the fire department. We have a normal peacetime strength of 8,973 men; 1,640 are in the military service; 1,207 vacancies through retirements, leaving but 6,126. We have been able to obtain 104 temporary firemen. We have shifted from a 3-platoon to a 2-platoon system. Yes; I am ashamed to admit that some of the firemen of our city took the case to court. They contended that war or no war we had no right to make them work additional hours. The court, in this instance, sustained the city. Let me call your attention to the fact that of the 6,126 men in the fire department, 4,815 are of military age. If these are to be taken indiscriminately, I cannot assume the responsibility of protecting Government property and war plants against the hazards of fire. New York City is the greatest port of embarkation in the entire world. Ask the officers of the Army and the Navy of the fire protection which the city of New York provides—not only within the confines of our own city but along the water front of the State of New Jersey as well. We respond to fires along the water front whether in our city or outside of the city if Government property or war shipping is in danger.

Let me at this point read a letter from the mayor of Seattle. It happened to come into the office only yesterday. The situation is exactly the same. Mayor Devin, of Seattle, writes:

> We are quite concerned here with the manpower situation in our fire and police departments; also as to nurses in our public health department. We shall be able just barely to get by under the practice as it has been, but if the President or Congress begins to take more men for the armed services and war industries and not permit any addition to our vital services, the safety of our city will be endangered.

That is from Mayor Devin, of Seattle, Wash. I can assure you he is not exaggerating.

I know that the job of cleaning streets, disposing of garbage and treatment of sewage is not dramatic. It is not spectacular. Yet, gentlemen, do you realize that in every large city, street cleaning, disposal of garbage, and maintenance of sanitary conditions is vital to the health of millions of people? I am just at my wits' end to know what to do in maintaining proper sanitation in New York City, and again, I say the same is true of every city. We need at least 14,000 men in the sanitation department of New York City. We are down to 10,970, but that is not the whole story. We cannot get equipment. Some of our new equipment and snow removal machinery was taken away from us by the Army the early part of the war. We did not complain, but we have reached a point where we cannot get spare parts; we cannot get tires; and, on top of that, our skilled personnel in the maintenance and repair of this equipment has been reduced and our men are enticed to other employment. Some United States Government agencies show a wise-guy attitude by encouraging men to leave city service. Equipment is run down. It slows up the work. We have less trucks in operation. Here, too, we have tried to get temporary help—men above the age. We have only been able to get 388. I need not say that they are not as efficient as our regular men. If street cleaning and garbage disposal are reduced anymore, I can tell you right now there will be a definite health menace. This department must be protected. In connection with this and in direct responsibility of the maintenance of health and cure of the sick, every city has its department of health and its hospitals. We are reduced to a point where it is bordering near the miraculous that we can afford any kind of service or care. The city hospitals in its 26 institutions maintain 20,000 beds. We have a normal nursing strength of 6,200. We are now 3,500 short, and even a greater percentage short in maintenance and untrained personnel.

Mr. THOMASON. How many beds did you say in those 26 hospitals?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Twenty thousand.

Mr. THOMASON. And how many nurses do you have?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. We are 3,500 short, out of 6,200.

Mr. SHORT. Is it reasonable to say, in that connection, that a good many of those vacancies are filled by the so-called American Nurses Aide Association?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. No; we have the American Red Cross volunteer nurses aides.

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. We get some help there, but you cannot expect a volunteer to work all night, and there are a great many duties of a nurse that you cannot expect a volunteer to do. They render only limited service. Help in feeding and such work not requiring medication or treatment.

Mr. SHORT. You receive some aid from the nurses associations under the Red Cross Volunteer Nursing Aides?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. That helps, but you get into a city hospital and that is really hard work, where we have bed patients, tubercular patients, surgical cases, and we are just up against it.

Mr. THOMASON. Somebody, I think, made the statement that in one hospital you had more nurses than you had patients, Mr. Mayor.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Not in a city hospital.

Mr. THOMASON. I think I saw some comment, maybe from General Hershey, in the New York Times, where the charge had been made. I wonder if you can enlighten us on that, because we have to consider that, too.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I asked my commissioner of hospitals about that. It must be in a private hospital, and most of those nurses were over 45. The commissioner of hospitals has urged the Surgeon General to take nurses between 45 and 47, but apparently, under the rules of the Army, he doesn't want to do it. I can assure you that situation was not in a New York City hospital. It was in a hospital in New York City, but not a New York City hospital. In fact the statement has not as yet been verified.

Now, gentlemen, I am here to endorse the need of more men for the Army. I know that war industry needs more men. I am here also to say, that city government is an integral part of the whole set-up,

and we ask for help. We believe that some of these IV–F's that have been under discussion so much ought to be able to do some of this kind of work, even if it is not as pleasant and as easy as the job they are doing at this time.

The same condition is true as to water supply and maintenance of water-distribution system. I won't bore you with these figures, but I must tell you about our system of transportation. Whether it is New York City or any other city, the people must be transported from their home to work, and from their work, home. No large city is so laid out that people live within walking distance of their homes. Do you realize, gentlemen, that the subway system of the city of New York is the greatest passenger railroad in the entire world? Do you realize that we transport in 1 day more than a combination of trunk-line railroads transport in a year? Yes; we transport an average of 6,300,000 passengers a day. Let me emphasize that—a day. This system is owned and operated by the city of New York. In addition to that, we operate all the trolleys and busses in the Borough of Brooklyn in which the Army base and the navy yards are located. That borough of our city has a population approaching 3,000,000 people. We are short-handed. Our maintenance shops have been drained. We cannot carry on the necessary repairs. Yes; I realize that such is the plight of every railroad in the country, but I am sure that the railroads have had greater protection than the city of New York has had against the pirating of our employees and the attempt of private employers to entice our employees away. Many mornings we have not the personnel to take all our trolleys and busses out. Other mornings we have not sufficient trolleys or motorbusses to go out because of shortage in the maintenance and repair departments. We cannot put on untrained or unskilled people to operate subways. Subways travel fast, with 10 cars to a train, at a 2-minute headway. The lives of thousands and thousands of people are in their hands. I do not know that any human being can indefinitely bear the responsibility and anxiety and worry that the board of transportation and I have had to carry and worry about during sleepless nights. We need normally in our transportation system 31,039 trained personnel. We are 7,400 short. Gentlemen, you must protect transportation as an essential function of local government whether operated by government or private corporations. It cannot be left to the whim or ideas of local boards or to the particular viewpoint and zeal of the United States Employment Service. I repeat, that more consideration has been given transportation if operated by private corporations. Therefore, I must ask you to recognize this essential service in the law itself.

You see very often a draft board will not look at the entire picture. They need men to fill their quotas. They know that municipal employees have good jobs and that they will have a job the minute they come back. Therefore, they feel it is easier to send a man who will be sure of a job when he comes back. That may account why properly weighed comparisons of essential work have not always been made in the drafting of men.

In addition to requesting a specific provision in the selective-service law recognizing certain essential functions of municipal government—and I do not see how such a provision can be kept out of the law any longer—I can only warn you gentlemen that if it kept out,

we will be confronted with a very serious situation in many parts of the country. I want to revert back to what I asked some 4 years ago. I believe that we should provide in the law the obligation for the large number of men who are deferred to do a certain amount of home duty. Men who are deferred because they are over 38 and are not employed in essential war work, men who are deferred because of dependents, men between 39 and 45 who have easy office jobs, should all be made to perform some sort of service to their country in time of war. I again urge that these men be inducted into service—yes; military service—given a uniform to wear when on duty, paid a dollar a month, and required to render at least 24 hours' service a week to his city or county. These men could put in their 24 hours a week in easy tours to fit their employment. They could work on a Sunday or on a Saturday afternoon. They could be assigned to do easy police duty, trained to aid in the fire department, yes; even assigned to the department of sanitation or other necessarily local government work. Some may say, "Oh, that would not be pleasant." The boys in the armed forces have to do all kinds of unpleasant work. No one is spared. Why, may I ask, should a man be spared who has been deferred because of his family and who may sleep home nights in safety? All office workers should be able to render some duty of this kind. The home service proved of great value in Great Britain. These men themselves will be very grateful when the war is over if they were given an opportunity to serve.

Mr. HARNESS. How could you do that, Mayor?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Just require that they render 24-hour service a week to their community. You now take a man and induct him into the Army, put a uniform on him, train him and send him overseas to fight. No one questions that when the country is at war. Therefore, is it too much to ask for a man who has received deferment because he has a family, to do a little service for his country, to protect his family?

Mr. HARNESS. How are you going to induct him into the Army and have any kind of discipline if you are going to let him work at his job?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. The easiest thing in the world.

Mr. HARNESS. The War Department officials don't think it is easy.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I know they don't, because they have never had to do it before, but they will have to do it if local government breaks down.

I know it is not pleasant to take a man working in the stock exchange, or someone having a nice, easy office or counter job, and put a broom in his hands and ask him to help the sanitation department clean the streets, but we have got to keep those streets clean if we are going to maintain health in the city. And again I say that applies to every city in the country.

What happens now, gentlemen? The armed services have taken 18,000—over 18,000 city employees. We don't complain. These are fine, strapping young men, and they belong in the Army. But we can get no replacements of any kind. We can't get them voluntarily—just as you are considering at this time to find some way to channel them into factories and shops. I appeal to you in the name of the cities of this country to give us a source of manpower so we can maintain local government.

Mr. HARNESS. Have you tried to replace any of the men with women?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Oh, yes.

Mr. HARNESS. What success do you meet with?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. In the offices it works. We have several hundred patrol women. We use them for police work.

Mr. HARNESS. How about bus drivers and streetcar people?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Yes; we have them, hundreds of them. It is the best we can get. You don't suppose for a moment that we are not doing anything about this? We are very much concerned. We have improvised, we have utilized every possible ingenuity to keep the cities going.

Now, I would suggest one of the things you ought to check up. I would get every squaw man in this country and find out why he isn't in the Army.

Mr. THOMASON. Every what?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Every squaw man.

Mr. THOMASON. Will you go a little more into detail on that? What is it?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Yes; that is an unemployed husband of a working wife. [Laughter.] And they are all over the place in the big cities. That is what we call them, "squaw men."

Mr. HARNESS. In that connection, have you thought that the draft boards may not be properly functioning?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. No. I explained that.

Mr. HARNESS. How can there be so many of these men if the draft boards are doing their duty?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I think the draft boards, on the whole, have done a pretty good job. It is a difficult and unpleasant job. I have always recommended that, insofar as local, county, and State government is concerned, definite recognition be given to certain functions of local government. That was never done.

I also would like to make a suggestion insofar as the skilled trades are concerned. We have several thousand skilled tradesmen in the armed forces who have been on the fighting lines for a year or a year and a half or 20 months. How about calling those men back and replacing them with younger men and putting them in the shop, giving them an honorable discharge? They have served their country, and in the beginning there wasn't much agitation as to keeping a reserve of skilled trades, and the flower of our manhood you will find in those first drafts.

Mr. HARNESS. You mean those beyond what age?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I would say certainly from 34 or 35. If they have a skilled trade and have been at the front and in foreign service for any length of time, I think we ought to have an exchange.

Mr. HARNESS. Bring them back and discharge them?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Exactly.

Now, gentlemen, the pressure will be very strong for more men in the armed forces and more men in the shops, but I plead with you not to ignore the needs of local government, because we have been pushed as far as we can go.

Mr. THOMASON. How would you meet that situation, Mayor; require deferment in cities for certain kinds of essential work?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Yes; I would ask now, because the cities have all been drained, every city in the country has been drained—I would ask recognition in the law itself—fire sanitation, health, and hospitals and water front be declared essential, and freeze us as to what we have got now. But I wouldn't stop there. If we have anyone in these services under 26 years of age, give us a man for every one you take from us—men of good moral character, of course.

Mr. THOMASON. Where would you get him?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. From the men who for good and sufficient reason are not fit for military service, I mean fighting, but could be well used in essential civil government.

Mr. HARNESS. You might find some of them in the Government bureaus here, don't you think, Mayor?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Well, you would know that.

Another thing I want to warn about is a sort of new racket that has grown up about employing Government employees on part time after they are through working their regular hours. If employers and employees are honest you can't work 16 hours a day, day after day. They either sleep on our job or they sleep on the other job. I had the painful duty just a few days ago to approve the dismissal of 10 firemen who had an average of 15 years' service. They were working after hours, but the trouble was there was no time allowance between the time they were off our tour and at the other tour, and in some instances, on some days of the week, it overlapped. In the trial it appeared that they were on the job for the city, therefore they were on the pay roll for which the government was paying a private employer, and getting paid for time that they were not there or working.

We have one corporation down at Staten Island called the Oceanic Service Corporation. It is just a gyp. They have so arranged their sleeping tour—they have a regular sleeping tour there when they are supposed to be protecting property. The owner of the company is very influential politically. I can't do anything about it. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mayor, you are an experienced legislator, and you know first-hand the problem that you have in the city of New York, which is common to other large cities in the country—in fact, all the cities—and I think the committee would be very happy to have you take this bill home with you and draft an amendment at the proper place in the bill that you think would solve your problem. We promise to consider it.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. If you don't adopt it, gentlemen, come down and run my town [laughter], because I can't do it any more. I know I am good [laughter], but I can't eat all of that garbage, and I can't put out all the fires single-handed. We have a real problem there, and every other city has.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any questions, gentlemen?

Mr. FENTON. Do you think this will solve the problem?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. It will, partially. My suggestion is—yes, I think it would. We recognize the essential functions of local government, and I think you should freeze us to what we now have, or if you take any of what we now have, give us the IV–F's or someone physically and mentally able to do the work, and you won't find any objection on the part of any municipal government. And I would make them

render 24-hour service in 1 week. I don't think that is unreasonable, and it can be done legally.

Mr. FENTON. Have you any idea how large an army this would create?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I would adjust it according to needs, the needs of the municipality. I could use at least 10,000 now. That would be about 1,000 on a shift. I could use 10,000 easily.

Mr. HARNESS. Don't you have a home guard in the State of New York?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Oh, well, they drill once a week. I tried but didn't get very far.

Mr. HARNESS. Why don't you do something about it in the State, utilize the services of those men in the home guard?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I can't get the home guard. I have my own volunteer force. I will give you that in just a moment. We have 99,000 air wardens. They drill once a week. They take a tour of duty, but it has been very hard to hold the interest there because of the reassuring news we have received from the front up to recently, up to Christmas week. The interest has revived since that time and they are hard at work. They put in a tour, and they are available to call in the event of attack.

Mr. ARENDS. They are all volunteers?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. Oh, yes. In the police department—we have a volunteer city patrol—they put in two tours a week. We have a little over 4,000. It is hard to maintain that, you know. It is pretty tough. These men patrol at night—are doing a fine job.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask the mayor a question. Taking the military situation as it is around the world, and the real crisis which confronts us at this time, are you for this character of legislation in some form, with proper amendments, or against it?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I am for any legislation that will do the job. If this won't do it, let us have more. If more won't do it, let us have even more, in order to have available replacements for our Army, in order to have sufficient weapons and arms and material and planes and tanks and ships for the men who are doing the fighting, and to keep the morale and police our own country at home.

Mr. ARENDS. Are you in favor of taking them all in under a complete, over-all National Service Act?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I testified on that, I think, about 20 years ago.

Mr. ARENDS. Would you be in favor of it right now?

Mr. LAGUARDIA. At this time?

Mr. ARENDS. Yes.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. At this time I would be in favor of taking every man of military age and say to him: "You are in the service of your country. Your job today is to go into that plant, and you will get the wages of that plant, but if you go away from there, remember, you belong to Uncle Sam."

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mayor. If you have any other statement that you wish to present, we will be glad to have it.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. I would like to submit suggestions to meet the situation in the cities of our country.

The CHAIRMAN. We will be very glad to have you do that. Thank you very much.

The committee will be in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Mr. LAGUARDIA. In accordance with suggestion of the chairman, I desire to add to my testimony the following proposed amendment:

Police and fire protection, sanitation, street cleaning, health protection, hospitals, maintenance of publicly owned property, and, if owned, maintained, and operated by the municipality, water supply, sewage disposal, and transportation are for the purpose of this act considered essential functions of municipal government. Technical, field, and skilled employees but not including purely clerical employees are entitled to deferment and subject to all requirements as provided herein for employees of essential war industries.

(Whereupon, at 2 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10 a. m., Tuesday, January 16, 1945.)

68175—45——16

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

TUESDAY, JANUARY 16, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee on Military Affairs met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Brooks, Sparkman, Kilday, Durham, Sheridan, Sikes, Philbin, Stewart, Winstead, Holifield, Arends, Clason, Martin, Harness, Fenton, J. Leroy Johnson of California, and Farrington.

(Mr. Brooks acting as chairman in the absence of Chairman May.)

Mr. BROOKS. The committee will please come to order.

We have this morning, as the first witness of the committee, Mr. Philip Murray, of the C. I. O.

Mr. Murray, will you step forward, please, and have a seat there in the witness' chair?

Do you have a prepared statement, sir?

Mr. MURRAY. I do, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. If you have a prepared statement, I would suggest you just proceed with the prepared statement, and, until you finish, the members of the committee will refrain from interrupting you so that you can give your entire statement in regular order in the record.

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT OF PHILIP MURRAY, PRESIDENT, CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the C. I. O. has consistently made every effort to achieve all-out war production. At this time, when our fighting men are turning back the German counter thrust on the western front and are driving the Japanese back in the Philippines, we share the anxiety of every American that they shall have the best in arms and supplies and the most that our country's resources can give them.

Our record in war production speaks for itself and has been repeatedly praised by leaders of the Army, the Navy, the Maritime Commission, and the top officials of the War Production Board and the War Manpower Commission.

At the time of our seventh constitutional convention in the city of Chicago last November, General Somervell read a letter from General Marshall, of which I quote the first three sentences:

> You are holding your annual convention at a most critical moment in the war. The record in the greatest production race in history represents a tremendous

accomplishment. You have made possible the overwhelming superior supplies and equipment that have enabled our Army and those of our allies to wrest the initiative from the enemy in every theater of war.

General Marshall went on to say that, despite these achievements, we must intensify our efforts.

And from General Eisenhower, who cabled the following message in reply to a renewed pledge of all-out production sent from our convention:

I am indeed grateful for your renewed pledges of support to the fighting forces. All of us have complete confidence in American workers; We are anxious only that they understand the enormity of the task still facing the Allied Armies in Europe. My personal thanks to you and to your organization for your encouraging message.
Signed, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

This, in brief, is our record on war production. I cite it not in any sense attempting to minimize the greatly stepped-up needs for still greater production today. The C. I. O. is fully aware that the advance of our troops and of our allies on all fronts call for even greater efforts on our part.

We offer an affirmative program to the Nation which, we are convinced, will solve problems that cannot be met by legislation. In brief, our program is this:

1. The magnitude of the job ahead is far more manageable than Congress and the public have been led to believe. Moreover, the figures recently given Congress do not represent manpower demands at this moment but over the next 6 months. If we are properly organized, we can meet these demands as they fall due. Cut-backs are being made daily and releasing labor for other war jobs.

2. The problem we propose to lick is a series of local problems, and for the most part can only be licked locally. Also, as I shall show, the numbers involved in any one firm are almost always small.

3. We are today abreast of or ahead of most war production schedules. Where we are not, it is due to set-ups in a few lines of war products or to errors in scheduling by procurement agencies. We must correct and overcome these situations by joint cooperation between labor, industry, and the war agencies.

4. We cannot wait to get improvements. We need them now, and to introduce a system of compulsion will create general confusion and delay and reduce rather than increase our productivity.

5. We need joint cooperation of labor, management, and Government representatives in each plant and community if we are to get further increases in output. Schedules of output and estimates of needs for manpower and materials must be accurate and this requires a first-hand observation of capacity, made within the plant and the community.

In this spirit the C. I. O. urges Justice Byrnes to call a conference of labor, industry, agriculture, and Government leaders. We have proposed this conference because in our considered judgment only voluntary solutions for the current situation can give us the expanded production which is needed. We oppose proposals for compulsory legislation as not capable of solving these problems which essentially require better organization and more complete voluntary cooperation, especially on the local level.

We recite the issues to be considered by this conference, and solved by joint cooperation as follows:

1. This conference must establish the plants and areas where production is short for whatever reason.

2. It must establish whether or not there is a maximum use of available plant, materials, manpower, and management in these plants and areas of short production. It must also extend this search for full utilization to plants and areas where production is up to schedule, to discover if possible new means of increasing it still further.

3. We must have a determination now to end all unnecessary or luxury production or use of plant, materials, manpower, and management. This determination must be put into effect not piecemeal but by a decisive act that will avoid further delay and will obviate all quibbling or hesitation.

4. Where it is found necessary to shift workers from one area to another, their transportation costs must be repaid to them and they must be guaranteed against any loss of accumulated seniority or wages.

5. We must face the fact that frequently the plants and areas where production is bad are those where wages are below prevailing rates or below rates already set. This situation is particularly true of foundries, textile plants, and many other critical industries.

6. Arrangements should be perfected for the maximum utilization of all available manpower necessary for war work and the complete elimination of discriminatory practices against Negroes which prevent them from filling critical manpower needs.

7. The policies and actions of the various procurement agencies of the Government must be coordinated to avoid the present prevailing confusion and contradiction in relation to production requirements.

It may be said by some that the C. I. O. has repeatedly urged such a conference for months past. This is correct. Failure to call such a conference has undoubtedly contributed to our present situation. But we have never before had an objective situation where a conference was so sure of success or so much needed. To find employers, labor, and manpower authorities all in agreement on the need for using voluntary methods at this juncture should assure Congress and the administration of the correctness of the proposal. Moreover, nothing could so rally all groups in the United States to an all-out effort at this time as the demonstration of joint cooperation represented by a successful Nation-wide conference.

We believe that nothing could so encourage the war workers here at home or our fighters on the far-flung battle fronts as the successful outcome of such a conference. It would be a demonstration to the whole world of the vast reservoir of power in our American democracy that we can meet by voluntary means what other nations can only achieve by compulsion. Our magnificent record to date convinces us that this is the case. We should be ashamed to falter at this stage in the war effort.

As proposals for the consideration of the conference, I offer the following points:

(*a*) The local labor-management-Government committees operated by the War Manpower Commission have already proved themselves in most cities to be the best instruments for administering manpower controls. Let this conference determine whether there is any need for legislation to strengthen their operations. Certainly, local draft

boards are qualified to draft men into the armed services, but not to replace these existing labor-management-Government committees.

(*b*) Labor utilization inspection has now been set up by the War Manpower Commission on a Nation-wide basis. It should be enlarged, strengthened, and given the support needed to inspect war plants where the employer demands a substantial number of new workers.

(*c*) Ceilings on nonessential plants should be enforced by some mandatory powers, but safeguarded by appeals to local labor management government committees.

(*d*) To implement these suggestions, I want to spell out three steps that need detailed attention:

1. Careful determination of labor requirements to insure that labor is actually needed.

2. Careful selection of the workers to be shifted from nonessential civilian production to plants producing critical war items.

3. Development of transfer procedures.

I suggest that the following points be considered by the conference under these three headings, as follows:

1. Careful determination of labor requirements to insure that labor is actually needed.

(*a*) Procurement agencies to award new or stepped-up contracts only to plants which local manpower priorities committees certify as—

(*i*) having taken all reasonable steps to obtain full labor utilization, to (*a*) employ women, Negroes, and returned veterans in so far as possible; (*b*) adopt suggestions growing out of W. M. C. labor utilization surveys; (*c*) comply with F. E. P. C. rulings.

(*ii*) Having complied with rulings of N. W. L. B. and N. L. R. B.

(*iii*) Not having an excessive turn-over due to correctable factors, whether in-plant factors or community factors such as housing shortages.

(*b*) Recruitment to be initiated by the plant or by U. S. E. S. Only upon certification by local manpower priorities committee that the number asked for, and the hiring schedule, are reasonable.

2. Careful selection of the workers to be shifted from nonessential civilian production to plants producing critical war items. (*a*) Rather than stringent employment ceilings, which are blanket and undiscriminating in character, reliance to be upon labor, industry, government cooperation to locate workers for transfer; (*b*) O. W. M. R. to set quotas for specific industries of the number to be recruited from each industry and call first national, and then regional and local, conferences with labor and management to arrange for the release of the necessary number of workers; (*c*) W. P. B. to apply sanctions if company refuses to release workers; (*d*) no workers to be released until definite agreement has been reached concerning their reemployment rights.

3. Development of transfer procedures. (*a*) No workers to be released except for transfer to specific, certified job openings, with location, wage rate, employment conditions, and duration known in advance, (*b*) transfer to be entirely voluntary, with workers given opportunity to volunteer for transfer; (*c*) seniority protection to be arranged in advance by cooperative action between labor and industry; (*d*) travel costs to be paid by the Government, either directly by W. M. C. or indirectly by procurement agencies allowing reimbursement to contractors; (*e*) return travel cost, at expiration of need, to be borne by the Government. But, if worker quits voluntarily, he must pay his own transportation.

As the most recent example of our efforts to cooperate, we called last Saturday in the city of Washington a meeting of the eight C. I. O. international unions most directly concerned in the war programs described to your committee as critical by witnesses from the Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and W. P. B. in recent testimony. To this conference we invited representatives of each war agency involved in these critical programs.

To indicate the programs considered critical I quote from the statement of Chairman Krug, of the War Production Board, to the press at the time he appeared before the Mead committee of the Senate in December:

> For the war in Europe these programs include heavy artillery ammunition and heavy artillery, big trucks and tires on which they run, repair parts of all kinds, and cotton duck for tenting. For the war in the Pacific we want speedy completion of assault transports and assault cargo ships which are so necessary for military operations already scheduled, thousands of repair parts for the fleet, and we will always need more heavy long-range bombers. For all theaters more radar equipment is required, and only recently it became evident that small-arms and mortar ammunition must be stepped up. * * *
>
> While I am sure that both management and labor can help greatly in bringing these programs up to schedule, I want to make clear that these production shortages canont fairly be attributed to either management or labor; nor are they the fault of the Army, Navy, or the civilian war agencies. We have tried to find out what is holding up these critical programs. This analysis shows that about 40 percent of the critical programs are in difficulty primarily because of the steep upsurge in military requirements. About 25 percent suffer from design changes for the production of new models. For another 25 percent shortages of labor are controlling, and the remaining 10 percent reflect a lack of facilities.

I am a careful reader of the newspapers, but I must say that for over a month now I have not observed that the press has given any such impression as I derive from this statement of Chairman Krug. On the contrary, the impression has been allowed to snowball up in the minds of the American people that this is purely and simply a manpower problem and that the only possible cure for it is a national service act.

Chairman Krug estimates that 25 percent of the current problem is due to labor shortages. On further analysis of this testimony we find that about half of this shortage is due to the need for labor in the cotton-duck program where there is a bad procurement situation and has been for many months.

In short, mistakes in judgment by the procurement agencies, design changes, and rapid increase in military requirements are the major factors in our current difficulties, and in none of these problems will compulsion on labor solve the recurring difficulties.

If we turn to the actual figures on manpower needs, we arrive at a similar alteration in our understanding compared with the impression given us by the press. For instance, Judge Hay testified before the Mead committee that our manpower needs in the 2 weeks following his testimony were for 141,000 persons for war programs out of a national work force of 53,000,000, or a shift of about 3 workers in every 1,000. Even these figures he gave will not stand close scrutiny. I do not mean

to question the judge's accuracy, but only to point out the results of some checking our C. I. O. unions have done on figures furnished us by the War Department in the month of December.

We find that existing manpower needs in plants producing critical war items are relatively small. Over-all employment in war production has been on the decline for more than a year and will continue to decline despite the recent increase in schedules for particular items. The problem, therefore, is not one of over-all labor shortage but rather of specific situations in particular localities and plants.

Our surveys show:

First. That at least one-fourth of the plants—in the case of steel the proportion is closer to three-fourths—where shortages were reported, there is actually no shortage at the present time. In many of these plants there have been recent lay-offs.

Second. That in the overwhelming proportion of the remainder, where there are not enough workers, there are readily correctible factors which explain the shortage. In some cases, particularly in foundries, wage rates are below those in other plants competing for workers. In other cases, working conditions are so bad that labor turn-over is high. In still others, the companies have had labor-relations records.

Third. That in many plants, managements are unwilling to employ women and Negroes despite the fact that these workers are ready and eager to get into war jobs.

I should like to submit for the record a detailed report from each of the C. I. O.'s three largest international unions, the United Automobile Workers, the United Steelworkers, and the United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers. These reports list the plants named by the Army Service Forces as suffering from critical manpower shortages and record the results of the investigation made by the union concerned.

We made this check in order to lend every aid to the war-production program. We wanted to assure ourselves that the staff men in our various international unions were on their toes, and that they were cooperating with government and industry. We found that to be the case. We also wanted to discover whether the current methods used by the services to arrive at these shortage figures are accurate. We found, as you will see, that they are not.

At our conference on Saturday one of our union research directors who was formerly in the War Production Board recommended that each war agency should only assume that a manpower shortage exists when both the union and the company so certify. If the cases we have analyzed for steel are typical, and we believe they are, this would eliminate more than three-quarters of all complaints about manpower. This would in itself greatly reduce the burden on Government manpower agencies responsible for overcoming shortage problems.

I have made this statement in order to give the committee the benefit of the facts that C. I. O. unions have unearthed in these local situations. In addition, we have brought three representatives of C. I. O. unions in the field, each of whom has a brief story to tell. You will observe from these stories that workers are eager to work on war jobs, and that those on war jobs are interested in opportunities to do a bigger share by extra work.

The first witness will tell the story of the C. I. O. cooperation in the Connecticut brass industry, and how we are overcoming a genuine labor shortage there. The second witness will tell a story of large-scale

lay-offs in the electrical industry in Schenectady, N. Y., resulting in serious losses of production in radio, radar, and foundry production in spite of every effort by the union to prevent such lay-offs. The third witness will tell a story of similar large-scale lay-offs in the Detroit foundaries of a large manufacturer of critical aircraft and truck parts. You will note that one of these witnesses is here to describe a concrete example of labor management cooperation which has overcome real labor shortages.

These are the facts of shortages in war production, as the C. I. O. has learned them at first hand in the field.

The C. I .O. pledges its full effort throughout this critical period to coordinating our activities on these essential war programs with all other groups involved in war production.

The various Government agencies, including the Army and the Navy, have testified to C. I. O.'s record in war production. We firmly believe that the corrective measures we propose will enable us to continue that cooperation until the vectory is won.

In closing, I want to quote from the statement made by the executive officers of the C. I. O., sent to all Members of Congress last Friday, in which in behalf of my organization, I stated:

> The first step needed is an immediate meeting of the people who know at first hand what production problems are. For this purpose, the Government should immediately call a conference of labor, industry, agriculture and Government leaders.
>
> The Congress of Industrial Organizations pledges its complete support to the solutions that will be worked out at such a meeting, to the immediate use of all powers under existing legislation and executive directives and to any necessary legislation which will achieve the desired objectives and will apply all the strength and skill of 6,000,000 American workers to carry out the decision such a conference will make.

Now, I should like to place in the record, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, a detailed report of an investigation conducted by the officers of the United Auto Workers into a number of alleged critical manpower situations reported to them by the representatives of the Army and other governmental procurement agencies. It describes each situation, each plant, and the circumstances and conditions surrounding each one of those matters referred to them by the representaives of our procurement agencies here in the city of Washington.

I do not think that I should take time to read each of them to you, and if it is permissible, I should like to give it to you, Mr. Chairman, so that it may be placed in the record.

Mr. BROOKS. Very well.

(The detailed report of investigations, referred to by Mr. Murray, is as follows:)

United Automobile Workers, Congress of Industrial Organizations, report on manpower situation in critical plants, Jan. 16, 1945 [1]

	War Department manpower shortage claim	Report from regional director
REGION 1		
Continental Motors, Detroit, Local 280.	272 workers urgently needed for tank engines.	Manpower shortage verified as true.
Budd Wheel, Detroit, Local 306.	450 workers urgently needed for ammunition and heavy trucks.	Manpower shortage verified as true. My candid opinion, as to the reason for this terrifically high turn-over is that working conditions are below the standards of other plants. This is caused by terribly overcrowded conditions due to the influx of war-production contracts.
Ed. G. Budd Manufacturing, Detroit, Local 306.	69 workers for heavy trucks.	Do.
Budd Induction, Detroit, Local 306.	26 workers for rockets	Do.
Briggs Mack plant, Detroit, Local 742.	300 workers for aircraft components.	Manpower shortage denied, last 3 or 4 months laid off about 3,000.
Detroit Tank Arsenal, Detroit, Local 833.	214 workers for tanks	Hiring new workers while lay-off of old employees, old employees getting 3 to 5 day lay-offs.
REGION 1A		
Detroit Diesel, Detroit, GM Local 163.	206 workers for tank engines.	Manpower shortage caused by large turn-over, although sweepers, etc., hired year or 2 ago at 89 cents not upgraded yet. Change job classificiations and cut pay but actual work peformed not changed, so workers quit, and at same time hire new workers for jobs formerly held by demoted workers. Grinders running drill press while grinders coming from U. S. Employment Service. Workers hired from U. S. Employment Service not utilized at classifications hired. Workers sent home or placed on other jobs account of lack of material.
REGION 1B		
GM Pontiac, Pontiac, Local 653.	92 workers for foundry products.	No critical shortage now. War Manpower Comsion no longer refers workers to this foundry. Jamaicans and labor from West Indies employed. Women used where possible. Former foundry workers released from armed services in plant. Wages here below other plants in area.
Do	175 workers for heavy shells.	No present shortage. Oerlikon antiaircraft gun contract terminated. Personnel director stated 700 production and 200 nonproduction jobs will be eliminated thereby. Diesel contract reduction coming.
GMC Truck and Coac h, Pontiac, Loal 594.	545 workers for heavy trucks.	Shortage verified as true, this is only plant in city getting workers from U. S. Employment Service. Doubt whether manpower being used to best advantage. Men on jobs women could do. Replacing women with men whenever possible.
Benton Harbor Malleable, Benton Harbor, Mich., Local 880.	30 workers for foundry products.	Shortage verified as true. Wages and working conditions bad. Not using any women.
Auto Specialties, St. Joseph, Mich., Local 793.	155 workers for foundry products.	Using all available manpower, working conditions good but attempting to set up new job evaluation plan but company slowing down negotiations.
Clark Equipment, Buchanan, Mich., Local 468.	250 workers for transmissions and axles for heavy trucks.	Large turn-over due to misrepresentations by company re jobs. Company continually violating union agreement.
REGION 1C		
Reo Motors, Lansing, Local 650.	193 workers for heavy truck components.	At the present time we have approximately 5,000 factory employees, which is 200 short of desired number. This ceiling of 5,000 has been established by the War Manpower Commission. The company is making an effort to raise this ceiling.

[1] List of plants where War Department reported (Dec. 11, 1944) manpower shortage was sent to United Automobile Workers regional directors. The present tabulation is based on their replies, received between Dec. 15, 1944, and Jan. 4, 1945.

United Automobile Workers, Congress of Industrial Organizations, report on manpower situation in critical plants, Jan. 16, 1945—Continued

	War Department manpower shortage claim	Report from regional director
REGION 1D		
Mueller Brass, Port Huron, Mich., Local 44.	200 workers for ammunition and aircraft components.	Shortage verified as true; opened new casting shop. Much of the difficulty due to arbitrary and unsound labor policy which led to several stoppages.
Lakey Foundry & Mach., Muskegon, Mich., Local 403.	100 workers for foundry products.	Union doesn't believe they need 100 additional workers. Jamaicans imported recently; they are guaranteed 48-hour week while Muskegon residents on reduced schedule.
Campbell Wyant Cannon, Muskegon, Mich., Local 539.	220 workers for foundry products.	Manpower shortage denied; women now being laid off and many workers on reduced schedule (less than 48 hours).
Cadillac Malleable, Cadillac, Mich., Local 784.	15 workers for foundry products.	Shortage verified as true.
Fisher Body, GM, Grand Rapids, Mich., Local 730.	250 workers for heavy shells.	Do.
		Do.
REGION 2		
White Motor, Cleveland, Ohio, Local 32.	300 workers for heavy trucks.	Shortage verified as true, workers who came up from the South are quitting.
Willard Storage Battery, Cleveland, Ohio, Local 88.	265 workers for dry cell batteries.	Not 265 workers, 185. Shortage caused by resignations from workers who came up from the South.
American Bantam, Butler, Pa., Local 159.	105 workers for heavy trucks.	Not 105 workers, 75; and these 75 needed mainly for shipping and packing jobs, and few assemblers.
REGION 2A		
Bishop & Babcock, Cleveland, Ohio, Local 217.	90 workers for heavy shells.	Production 5 to 10 percent above maximum computed production based on machine capacity; ahead schedule by 60,000 shells. Wages not high enough for this type work.
Bauer Bros., Springfield, Ohio, Local 500.	115 workers for heavy shells.	Shortage verified as true.
REGION 3B		
Electric Autolite, Fostoria, Ohio, Local 446.	25 workers for foundry products.	Decent rate of pay and better working conditions will get all the help they need.
Ohio Steel Foundry, Lima, Ohio, Local 975.	236 workers for foundry products.	Manpower shortage, labor turn-over at the rate of as high as 800 per month in first 12 months on approximately 2,000 employees. Low wages, poor working conditions, women are not being fully utilized.
Willys-Overland, Toledo, Ohio, Local 12.	500 workers for heavy shells.	Shortage but not acute. Production doubled and going up every day. Picking up 80 workers a day. Bullet core shop which had been discontinued is now being put back into production. If this had not been discontinued but rather reduced in production, war effort would have been more ably served. Other plants laying off.
REGION 3		
International Harvester, Indianapolis, Ind., Local 226.	521 workers for heavy trucks.	Shortage verified as true. Wages not good enough for this highly mechanized foundry; output expected is very high.
Frank Foundry, Muncie, Ind., Local 242.	75 workers for foundry program.	Shortage verified as true. However, this company does not hire women.
Warner Gear (Div. Borg Warner), Muncie, Ind., Local 287.	566 workers for truck components.	Manpower shortage denied, except for 30 laborers; difficulty of obtaining workers on nonproduction jobs due to low wages. Will not hire IV–F's or Negroes. Not using women to best advantage. Union and management now negotiating for elimination of inequities between nonproduction and production wages.
International Harvester, Fort Wayne, Ind., Local 57.	320 workers for trucks	Shortage verified, union cooperating with company.
Lakeside Maleable, Racine, Wis., Local 234.	83 workers for foundry programs.	Manpower shortage basically a wage problem.
Iroquois Foundry, Racine, Wis., Local 234.	50 workers for foundry program.	Do.
Universal Foundries, Oshkosh, Wis., Local 345.	70 workers for foundry program.	Do.
American Car & Foundry, Chicago, Ill., Local 805.	139 workers for transportation equipment.	Do.

United Automobile Workers, Congress of Industrial Organizations, report on manpower situation in critical plants, Jan. 16, 1945—Continued

	War Department manpower shortage claim	Report from regional director
REGION 8—con.		
Grede Foundries, Waukesha, Wis., Local —.	30 workers for foundry program.	Manpower shortage basically a wage problem.
Dodge Engine, Chicago, Ill., Local 274.	1,000 workers for aircraft engines.	Shortage verified as true. More women who are available could be utilized here.
Douglas Aircraft, Chicago, Ill., Local 201.	1,700 workers for aircraft..	Transportation to plant very inconvenient, makes recruitment difficult, particularly during winter. Union assisting in recruiting workers.
REGION 9		
Autocar Car, Ardmore, Pa., Local 131.	360 workers for heavy trucks.	Shortage verified as true, union cooperating with management to obtain additional workers.
Mack Manufacturing, Plainfiled, N. J., Local 229.	198 workers for heavy truck engines.	Shortage denied, excessive subcontracting prevents full use of present manpower and machines.
National Tool & Manufacturing, Kenilworth, N. J., Local 253.	150 workers for tank components.	Wages substantially below standard in area.
Bell Aircraft, Buffalo and Niagara, Local 501.	1,600 workers for aircraft..	Shortage denied, 500 laid off December 19, 1944. For past 4 months management made no attempt to replace who have been resigning (about 100 per week). Poor utilization of manpower.
Harrison Radiator, Lockport, N. Y., G. M. Local 686.	200 workers for aircraft components.	Shortage believed true.
Mack Manufacturing, Allentown, Pa., Local 677.	100 workers for heavy trucks.	Not aware of shortage. This plant final assembly branch of Mack and dependent on New Brunswick and Plainfield for parts.
Mack Manufacturing, (foundry), New Brunswick, N. J., Local 824.	110 workers for heavy truck castings.	Shortage verified as true. Foundry wages substantially out of line with those paid in other departments of plant. Working conditions bad.
REGION 9A		
Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Paterson, N. J., Local 669.	1,400 workers for aircraft engines.	Supervision not giving workers proper job instruction. Union brought this to the attention o management, suggestions for improvements ignored. Work on close schedule which causes many change-overs in machines. This results in severe loss in bonus earnings. Farm out work while Wright workers idle; this causes much dissatisfaction. Workers here feel very insecure and are demoralized. Hundreds of machines and tools idle, some have not been used at all during our war-production program.

Mr. MURRAY. I should also like to place in the record a summary of an investigation that will later be implemented with the break-down of every plant covered by the steel workers and which was reported to them as critical situations in some 41 separate plants in the steel industry.

This statement is completely broken down. It covers each plant, each area, indicates the number of men that were supposed to be required for each one of these plants, and proves that 75 percent of the cases reported to our organization by the procurement agencies here in the city of Washington show that there is no labor shortage, although they were reported to them by the procurement agencies here in the city of Washington as critical situations, where there existed labor shortages.

In some instances, we discovered that lay-offs were taking place and that there was an oversupply of labor. The instances are pointed out and the record is fairly complete, and it can be implemented with additional information that we are collecting throughout the entire steel industry, and which I hope will be submitted to your committee in time for your consideration.

Mr. BROOKS. It will be made available to them?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes. In addition to that, I have available here a report submitted through the officers of the C. I. O. by the representatives of the United Electrical Workers, a C. I. O. organization, indicating the situations that were referred to by the procurement agencies here in the city of Washington, a factual report covering some 27 separate situations referred to us by the procurement agencies and by the Army over here. The report will show that in 55 percent of the instances reported to our organization, as critical, by the Army and procurement, there was an oversupply of labor. That indicates the plants and sets them out together with the names of the companies and so forth.

In addition, Mr. Chairman, for your information, I should like to call to the attention of the committee some other kind of work that our C. I. O. organizations have been doing in certain large industrial areas, to institute, or further implement the work of labor-management-Government cooperation. I refer now particularly to a matter that is under consideration in the Philadelphia area, where a substantial number of employers, together with groups of C. I. O. and American Federation of Labor unions, have gotten together and are attempting to work out a pooling arrangement where voluntary transfers can be made without incurring the wrath of either labor organizations or management, to work out cooperatively and to fill in whatever gaps may be necessary in certain alleged critical manpower situations in the Philadelphia region.

I should like to submit, for the record, merely a copy of the suggested labor-pool agreement that is now under consideration in the city of Philadelphia to indicate the extent to which labor is going in its effort to overcome these alleged manpower shortages.

Mr. BROOKS. That will be made a part of the record, Mr. Murray.

(The documents referred to are as follows:)

LABOR POOL

A. Formation and participation.

It is the intention of forming a labor pool which would be composed of employees of all skills and drawn from both essential and nonessential employers. It is the intention to use such employees for a contracted period of time, during which period there is no urgent need for their services by their original employers.

Only employers who show a willingness to loan as well as to borrow shall share in the labor pool.

The supervision of the labor pool will be through a functioning committee composed of representative of the War Production Board, the War Manpower Commission, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the American Federation of Labor, and two representatives from trade associations.

This committee shall meet at stated times to check upon the operation of the labor pool.

B. Functions and operation.

It is the intention that by the use of the skills within the labor pool to remove bottlenecks in industry which hamper the war effort.

The operation of the labor pool shall be as follows:

1. Any participating employer in need of extra labor for a definite period of time shall contact the representative of the War Manpower Commission and shall have his needs certified by an agent of the proper Government agency.

2. After proper certification to the need of the employer, the labor division of the War Production Board shall contact all parties concerned necessary to bring about the desired results, and an effort shall first be made to secure the necessary help from the same labor organization. If this is impossible the agent of the War

Production Board shall be notified and he will then contact the other family of labor for the needed manpower.

3. Participating employers and labor organizations shall have available to supply upon request, information as to manpower that may be used in the labor pool.

4. A definite time contract shall be entered into by all parties and may be extended for stated periods by the mutual agreement of all parties.

5. When pooled employees enter a plant having a labor agreement with a labor organization other than the one to which the employee is affiliated, a paid-up card shall be recognized by all unions regardless of affiliation and no such temporary employee shall be called upon to pay any dues, fees, or other payment to any organization other than the one to which he is originally affiliated.

6. No employer or employee shall enter into any private agreement for any reasons and any violation of this provision shall be reported to the supervisory committee and may bar both the employer and/or employee from the labor pool.

C. Concerning the employer.

1. No employer shall use the labor pool as a means of making a profit on the services of his employees in the labor pool.

2. An employer shall be reimbursed for the use of his employees in the labor pool for the following:

(*a*) Salary or hourly rates of pay.
(*b*) Vacation and holiday pay.
(*c*) Social security and unemployment compensation.
(*d*) Workmen's compensation.
(*e*) Insurance policies and hospitalization where in effect.
(*f*) Any bonuses, gifts, or other remuneration the employees would have received if he had continued to work in the plant of his original employer.

D. Concerning the employee.

1. No employee willing to assist through the labor pool shall suffer any of the following:

(*a*) Loss of seniority, and he shall receive credit for all time spent in employment through the labor pool on the seniority list of the original employer only.
(*b*) Any bonuses, gifts, or other remuneration the employee would have received if he had continued to work in the plant of his original employer.
(*c*) Loss of any rights due him by seniority rules or company regulations.
(*d*) Loss of time from employment due to job transfers under this plan.
(*e*) Loss of draft status or deferment. The War Manpower Commission shall act as liaison agent for deferments. Extra gasoline or any other need of the employee shall be handled through the War Production Board.
(*f*) Any reduction in the hours of employment.

E. Financial considerations.

1. Where any employee enters into the employ (on a temporary basis) of any company having a lower rate of pay or lower standard of working conditions, he shall receive the same remuneration and all privileges enjoyed in the plant of the original employer.

2. Where an employee enters into the employ (on a temporary basis) of any company leaving a higher rate of pay or higher standards of working conditions than those enjoyed in the plant of the original employer, he shall receive for the length of time spent in the temporary place of employment all benefits enjoyed by the other employees of the temporary employer.

3. Where due to extra time spent in traveling or other inconveniences experienced by the transferring employee because of his services in the labor pool, arrangements shall be made for compensation for travel time and traveling expenses.

4. Every effort shall be made for weekly or monthly bonuses or other forms of compensation for employees of a borrowing employer whose employees receive less favorable working conditions or rates of pay for such periods of time as temporary employees are employed.

5. No regular employee shall suffer any reduction in the workweek because of the use of pooled labor by the temporary employer or withdrawal of pooled labor from the original employer.

6. A certificate or label, badge, or pin shall be given to each employee willing to and having served in the labor pool.

Mr. MURRAY. Now, I am at your mercy, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Murray, as I understand it, your statement is that you feel there is ample manpower in the United States and that the proper way to handle it is by the voluntary method and in handling it by the voluntary method, you would utilize the boards already set up; is that it, under the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; and implement them where necessary, and strengthen them through the voluntary means.

Mr. BROOKS. Give them more vitality if they need it?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; through a voluntary system.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, now, I received this letter, and the letter probably indicates the feeling of a great many persons in the United States. It comes from a man who is an IV–F, classified so by Selective Service, and in the letter he mentions the fact that half of one hand had been lost, and he said that he felt now was the time for him to get a long-time permanent job, which would hold over in peace, and if he leaves this position now—and it is nonessential, according to the standards set by the War Manpower Commission—if he leaves it now, after the war is over, he will be seriously handicapped because a part of one of his hands is gone and he is unwilling to leave.

Now, in cases of that sort, how would the boards deal with those cases? How would the situation be handled?

Mr. MURRAY. It would be handled in the usual way. I think that you cite there, Mr. Chairman, the exception rather than the rule.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, the IV–F's are the men who are not physically perfect, and they are not physically able to carry on active military service. Consequently, you find, in that group, a great many men who are physically substandard.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I should say that, in dealing with the problem of the IV–F's—and I have a great deal to do with these problems—that we have no more difficulty—and that is not much, I should say—in dealing with that phase of the situation than we have with other segments of our population.

The overwhelming majority—and I should say that they run well over into 90 percent, at least I hope, of these so-called IV–F's—when they are rejected by the Army, go into critical industry; either into some war activity back home, and their status and way of living is in nowise different from the balance of the working population; it is just about the same. We have not experienced any particular difficulty at all in getting IV–F's to go into war industry. As a matter of fact, they want to. It is a natural thing for the people to want to do.

Mr. BROOKS. Now, I could understand, of course, that man's feeling, that if he was subnormal physically, he would be at a handicap when this war is over. He would go to the steel plant and ask for a job at the plant and they would say, "Well, half of your hand is gone. We can't use you." But now, at the present time, he is usable, because you need him.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, of course, our C. I. O. organizations, in most of the industries, war industries throughout the Nation, have established in conjunction with veterans' organizations, local rehabilitation committees. We try to get the fellow back in fairly good physical condition. We try to find him a place in the plant. We try to find the kind of work that he is able to do. We ask management to cooperate with us in that direction, and I am living in the hope that

when peacetime comes, and management recognizes the need of that fellow being given a job, it will cooperate with labor in having him placed.

Mr. BROOKS. Then, let me ask you another question: In paragraph 3 on the second page of your statement, you refer to the necessity of eliminating unnecessary luxury production.

How would you do that? How would you eliminate that unnecessary production or unnecessary industry as you referred to it in that statement?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, there, I suggest a means, Mr. Chairman. I suggest that it is fundamentally necessary that a conference of all the interested groups be brought together here in the city of Washington, if need be, for the purpose of applying themselves diligently to the solution of not only that problem but every other vexing problem that relates to it.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, would you do that by just denying manpower to that industry, or would you do it by——

Mr. MURRAY. I think that arrangements of a cooperative nature can be perfected that would completely eliminate all of this unnecessary luxury production. I do not think there is any question about that. There is simply no question about it.

When consideration is given the remarkable if not altogether miraculous record that has been obtained in the field of war production in the United States, due to labor-management cooperation—and it is directly attributable to that—we believe that any kind of an interference, unnecessary interference with an operation of that description, particularly one that reflects compulsion—and that will break down labor-management cooperation—will hamper war production rather than help it.

Mr. BROOKS. What industries do you regard as luxury?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I do not know. I have no interest as president of the C. I. O. in any luxury industries, at the moment I do not know of any C. I. O. unions engaged in producing luxury things, but it has been alleged on the floor of Congress, it has been booted around in the public press that there is a great deal of luxury production going on in the United States.

Mr. BROOKS. Is that correct?

Mr. MURRAY. I am not aware of it, Mr. Chairman, but if it is there, let us look into it and find out what can be done through voluntary means to correct it.

Mr. BROOKS. I was interested, Friday, in the stateemnts regarding absenteeism, showing the percentage, I think, of 9 percent absenteeism—some witness made that statement.

Do you have any figures to indicate whether that absenteeism is in the organized crafts or in the unorganized groups?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I should say, in the first instance, that I think the figure is exaggerated.

Mr. BROOKS. What do you think it is, Mr. Murray?

Mr. MURRAY. And when one dwells in the realm of mystical things, one cannot discuss these matters too intelligently. Absenteeism is attributable to many things. It has got to be broken down into the causes for absenteeism. I think that the most interesting story that will be told about the causes of absenteeism in the course of this war, will later be related by some governmental agency, describing the terrific toll of life and limb that has been taken in the course of this speeding up of production during this war; sickness and many other things that trail in the wake of these war situations, all of which are put together and thrust into this general field of absenteeism.

Now, a casual investigation of these matters around any of the large war plants in the United States will certainly prove that there is no desire on the part of the overwhelming majority of workers in this country to lay off work when they can work. To the contrary, there is an extreme desire on the part of the average individual to give every day's work and every hour of work that he can give to his country in the course of this war.

Mr. BROOKS. That is all I have.

Mr. Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Murray, with reference to the luxury production, some witnesses before our committee in the last day or two made a statement that there were looms capable of making duck that were being used for making other types of cloth.

Do you know whether or not that is true?

Mr. MURRAY. Our Textile Workers International Union, which assumes jurisdiction over that field, has a rather illuminating and very educational document prepared upon the whole subject that I should like to forward to this committee. Unfortunately, I did not bring it with me here today. However, the paper is ready, and I should be pleased to present it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, I knew that one of your unions was interested in that particular field, and you said you were not aware of any luxury productions that your unions were connected with and I just wondered whether you agreed that some types of cloth were being produced that we could very well do away with so long as there is a shortage of duck.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that our international union of textile workers has directed that matter to the attention of several agencies over here in the Government, and I do not have all of the facts; in fact, I do not have the facts before me and I would prefer, under these circumstances, if the committee is willing, to have the record that has been made by that organization with relation to the manufacture of duck presented to the committee.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You will forward a copy of that to the clerk of the committee for filing with the record?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, Mr. Murray, there are labor shortages in some particular areas, or in some particular types of industry; is that not true?

Mr. MURRAY. Oh, I am quite sure that there is some labor shortage here and there. There is no question about that, and that is attributable to many factors.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Are there some industries in which labor shortage shows up more acutely than in others?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I should not say that it applies so much to industries as it does to specific plants.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Localities?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; localities and specific plants. The labor-shortage situation in the United States is not an industry-wide problem. It is rather a specific situation in a given locality.

68175—45——17

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, is it your contention that in other localities there may be a surplus of labor?

Mr. MURRAY. And it is my contention that there are also, in these given localities, where certain alleged shortages exist at given plants, an ample supply of labor and a witness who will appear before you today will indicate, in the course of his testimony, a supply of 20,000 women in the city of Detroit who are available for work and cannot get jobs, although it is alleged there are critical situations in that community.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, are those critical situations in plants or in connection with the type of work that those 20,000 women could do?

Mr. MURRAY. The women could do the work; they have been recently laid off; they are competent, they are qualified, and they are able to perform the work, and they cannot get it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Have they tried?

Mr. MURRAY. Oh, yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, why can they not get it?

Mr. MURRAY. Because they have been told that there is no use for them.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You mean, those particular plants simply refuse to work with women?

Mr. MURRAY. That is right. That has been a policy in many plants, not only in the city of Detroit, but in many sections throughout the United States. I might say that the same applies with equal force to the use of Negroes in many localities throughout the country.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I notice in your statement, you make reference to the shortage in duck, and you say that on analysis of the testimony of Chairman Krug, that about one-half of the shortage that he referred to in duck is due to the need—or rather, you say that about one-half of the shortage that he referred to was due to the need for labor in the cotton duck program. Then you state that there is a bad procurement situation and has been for several months. Will you elaborate a little on that?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I can only elaborate so far as I know about the situation. I am reliably informed that in the duck program, in the South, some several months ago there were several lay-offs, and the people were encouraged to leave the plants and go elsewhere in search for employment. There was no demand—at least, obvious—so far as the workers were concerned for that particular commodity at that time, and then, in conjunction with the lay-offs that took place in the manufacture of duck, there was this famous wage case pending before the National War Labor Board, and substandard wages were also at that time brought to the attention of the Congress or a congressional committee, it being argued that to alleviate the shortages of manpower in the textile industry, that it should become necessary for the Government of the United States to recognize an upgrading of the wage standards which are now very low in that industry. That case is still pending before the National War Labor Board and has been a very important factor in the depleting of working forces in many sections of the United States where textiles are manufactured, a very important factor.

Mr. HARNESS. Will the gentleman yield? That, Mr. Murray, is not the problem of the Congress but N. W. L. B.; is it not?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I direct it to the Congress because the Congress, in giving consideration to the enactment of compulsory legislation must needs look into the factors that have to do with the alleged shortage of manpower, and here is a factor. It is a bread and butter factor. It is a factor that affects the lives of women and children. It is a factor that affects housing, and medicine, health, sickness. It is a prime factor. It is something to which the Congress of the United States, in consideration of legislative programs of this description, should necessarily give consideration.

Mr. HARNESS. But the problem of correcting the substandard wages is one of administrative rather than legislative action; is it not? It is entirely up to the War Labor Board at present; is it not?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I am not so sure, about the substandard phases of the wage situation, that it is not a congressional problem; there was a resolution, I believe, before the Senate here sometime ago, introduced by Senator Pepper, which sought the institution of a so-called 65 cents minimum, and that resolution was directed, of course, against these low wage rates in all substandard industries, and it was argued, in the course of the hearings before that Senate committee, that much of the trouble that we are having with regard to the production of essential war materials, is more or less attributable to these low wage standards; there have been extensive hearings about that.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Murray, with further reference to the case that is pending now before the War Labor Board, as a matter of fact there is only a very small pecentage of the total textile industry affected by that, isn't there? Is not that true?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it affects important——

Mr. SPARKMAN. Are there not only 23 mills involving 35 plants out of a total of nearly 900 plants? Only about 5 percent of the textile industry; is it not?

Mr. MURRAY. No; I think that the figure is a great deal higher than that. I think that what you are talking about, perhaps, is the so-called minimum labor rate paid to approximately 23 percent in a certain number of mills.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; that is true.

Mr. MURRAY. And in certain geographical areas. But in addition to that, there are substandard rates directly above the so-called common-labor rate, and the semiskilled phase of the industry that broadens the scope of the complaint of the workers insofar as their demand for higher wage rates are concerned.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, let me ask you about this: Recently, and at different times, the Army has furloughed men to come back into production. I believe right now a great number have been furloughed 90 days to go into duck production.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And a great many have been furloughed for the same length of time, or perhaps 120 days, to go into the production of heavy tires.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I believe that at another time, men were furloughed to do stevedoring work or perhaps were assigned by the Army to do

that type of work. Now, your unions have jurisdiction in all of those fields, I believe. Has that been a satisfactory arrangement?

Mr. MURRAY. There has been no complaint from our unions about the furloughing of soldiers and bringing them back into war plants where necessary. But let me point out what happens in that regard: Instances have been recorded of where soldiers have been furloughed and brought back and put into war industry. They go in there, they take the jobs, and while these soldiers are working in the plants who have been furloughed, the draft board in this community is still operating and taking other workers out of that plant.

Now, you put that under your hatband and think it over.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, of course, it is not taking very many, because there are not many left there within the age brackets that Selective Service is now operating under.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, you read in the newspaper about them taking some 700,000 out of these war plants within the next 6 months or out of American homes in the next 6 months, most of them in these age brackets.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, if these men that the Army has taken and put in uniform come back on an arrangement, such as has been used, and that proves satisfactory, why do you think that if the IV–F's were taken and furloughed back the same way that that would be unsatisfactory?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, of course, you fail to make the distinction there, in this situation. Certainly, our labor organizations can have no objection to anything that is necessary—and I emphasize the word "necessary"—to win the war, and speed up production, but when you incorporate a provision in a bill that distinctly offers discrimination against a portion of the civilian population as against the other part of it, then the legislation, in character, is discriminatory. It is bad.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, what part of the population is that discrimination against?

Mr. MURRAY. Those ranging between the ages of 18 and 45, as I understand it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, then, you would agree to go along on one from 18 to 60?

Mr. MURRAY. I would not, sir, because I am here to render my opposition to any form of compulsory legislation, believing in my heart that it is not necessary.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, you believe that the situation can be remedied without the need of any legislation?

Mr. MURRAY. I say, sir, that it can and I am quite sure of it. We have met every single solitary production problem that the Nation has had to meet since the beginning of this war. We have overproduced, in many particular types of materials, to the point where the Army has been required to inflict serious cut-backs. That happens almost every day. Now, I assert that most of the trouble that occurs with reference to critical situations is more or less attributable to changes that take place with reference to the production of certain commodities that are needed from time to time, and I further assert that compulsory legislation does not cure a situation of that description. Putting a collar around the necks of the population, 130,000,000 people, does not cure that evil. It aggravates it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, of course, I do not think you give quite a fair picture when you say it would be putting a collar around the necks of 130,000,000 people, because the only people that the collar would be put around would be those very, very few who refused absolutely to cooperate.

Mr. MURRAY. Now, there, Mr. Congressman, is where you and I can get together, I believe, when you say very, very few.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; I believe there are very, very few.

Mr. MURRAY. And the use of that term, "very, very few," you see, implies that there is no need for something being done of this nature affecting so many people when it will only apply to a very, very few.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, I am not so sure of that. I was impressed with a little news item in the paper this morning, for instance, Mr. Murray, that during the last week more nurses have volunteered than did during the whole months of November and December. Some 4,000, more than 4,000, I believe. Now, I am considering if the very fact that it was known throughout the country that we were on the verge of considering legislation to draft nurses, did not have a considerable effect in that stepped-up volunteering?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it is not for me to make any prognostications concerning the psychological reactions of people to what appears in the newspapers or what Congress is considering, but I do say this, that when the American people get to understand what these problems are, they will do just what the nurses have done.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, we are right up against a situation, though; we are not able to devote a great deal of time to making the people aware of these problems.

Mr. MURRAY. Why, you see, that is perhaps where we may have a difference, there, as to the time element. I think that we have time to do these things because it is so important that we do the thing right; that in our rush to do things, we thrust this time factor into it, and we oftentimes do the thing that operates to the detriment of the Nation and the welfare of its people.

Now, I know that since the beginning of this hysteria—and I refer to it as a hysteria—over here in Congress particularly, I say it is hysteria—that the War Manpower Commission, in almost every area throughout the United States, through the use of voluntary means, has brought more men into critical industry in the past few weeks than it has in the past few months.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, I understand that since we have started considering legislation, the Employment Service offices throughout the country have been flooded with applications of people wanting to get into wartime jobs.

Mr. MURRAY. All right. Now, let us see you get them in, now, which I am quite sure you are going to do—all of us are going to do it. We are all working together trying to do it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Just two more questions and I am through.

We have been told that we were going to need 700,000 additional workers during the next 6 months. Do you agree with that statement, or do you think that it is too high?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not agree with it, for the reason that I believe it is a guess. I believe that any estimate made with regard to that in the next 6 months is foolhardy, because my experiences during this war have taught me that, in a given area, where some ten or fifteen

thousand people are going to be needed tomorrow, that 30 days after tomorrow those ten or fifteen thousand (or an additional 15,000) may be laid off.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, your idea is then, that the 700,000 does not take into account those that are laid off for reason of cut-backs during that period of time?

Mr. MURRAY. And the necessary transfers that take place during these cut-backs.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And of course we are told the armed services need 900,000 men. If they take 900,000 men, we must get replacements for those; you cannot question that.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, let us analyze another phase of this problem, briefly; out of 281 plants in the State of New Jersey, in which we have conducted an investigation due to Army procurement agencies contending that there were those 281 separate critical situations—these plants will be enumerated to you here by a representative of our union in the course of his testimony, the plant and the number of people affected—our agents went to each of those 281 plants and we said to management and to the local committees: "Did you work New Year's Day?" "No." "Why?" "Well, they told us we weren't needed New Year's Day." "What is your working schedule around these 281 plants?" "Well, we work about 5½ days a week. Some days we work a full Saturday, but we never work Sundays." "Are the people available for work in these 281 plants on Sundays?" "Oh, yes; ready and willing to work."

Now, there were 281 allegedly critical situations referred to a labor organization that we investigated and discovered these factual discrepancies in the operations of the plants. The facilities were there; the equipment was there; the men and the women were there to do the work and the work was not made available.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you mean the additional work could have been put in without the need of additional manpower?

Mr. MURRAY. Unquestionably.

Mr. SPARKMAN. What would have been your workweek in that event?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, whatever may have been necessary to get out the needed materials.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, do you not reach a certain point where it becomes inefficient?

Mr. MURRAY. Unquestionably so, but that sort of a condition did not prevail in those communities according to the report submitted to my office.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you think there is labor hoarding to any extent in our plants?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; more in governmentally controlled plants than in any other plants in the United States, I should say.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Does your organization cooperate with management in trying to keep down labor hoarding?

Mr. MURRAY. Oh, yes; unquestionably.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is all.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Arends, do you have any questions?

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Murray, I think I understand your testimony clearly, but just for the record, we have before us H. R. 1119. You

stand in direct opposition to the enactment of this legislation, do you?

Mr. MURRAY. That is the May-Bailey bill, as I understand it.

Mr. ARENDS. Yes.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, I am opposed to it.

Mr. ARENDS. In other words, you feel no legislation on the matter is needed whatsoever?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not think that any compulsory legislation is needed at this time, Mr. Congressman; no.

Mr. ARENDS. I was very much interested in picking up this report which you have made available for the record, and the report of some of the unions in the electrical plants and I hope we all have the opportunity to go through this carefully, because there is some factual information in here which I think is rather good.

Mr. Sparkman just asked you, and I think you emphasized that you feel there has been some hoarding on the part of the Government in questions of manpower.

Mr. MURRAY. I did not understand you, Congressman.

Mr. ARENDS. Well, you said to Mr. Sparkman that you felt there was some hoarding on the part of the Government, in governmental plants, of manpower.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. ARENDS. This testimony, then, that we have heard from the various witnesses who have been before the committee, you would say, more or less has been completely in error?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I would not say that any individual, or any group of witnesses are completely in error. I should say that——

Mr. ARENDS. To a large part, in error?

Mr. MURRAY. I would say that in specific situations errors have been made. Now, it may have been that these governmental witnesses do not make reference to the specific situations to which I alluded. The ones, for example, that have been covered by Senate investigating committees, such as the one allegedly investigated by Senator Kilgore out in the State of Ohio recently, where it was alleged there were some 12,000 employees in a given governmental plant, and no more than 6,000 were necessary, while 12,000 were on the pay roll.

Mr. ARENDS. Then you do feel you could get more efficient production out of the available manpower at the present time if certain things were done voluntarily?

Mr. MURRAY. My answer is that this country of ours can get along a great deal better without compulsion; there is no need for it. So far as I am aware—and I can only talk about the very substantial number of management representatives and industrial people that I have talked to—I do not know of any industrialists in the United States that want compulsory legislation. I do not know of any farmers that want it. At least, I do not know of them. The leaders of the farm groups seem to be opposed to it.

Mr. ARENDS. In other words, if properly handled, you feel production can be stepped up in this country with available manpower?

Mr. MURRAY. Unquestionably so. I think our people can meet their obligations under the voluntary system.

Mr. ARENDS. I want to read from a letter I have at hand. Here, of course, all Members of Congress get the same thing in untold numbers,

but this is a rather interesting letter because I happen to know the individual. He says:

For the first time in 20 years, I am working in a factory. The so-called labor shortage has gotten under my hat. I wish you could go to work with me just one day to see what shortage of help we really are supposed to have. You would see young punks by the score running around with pencil and paper making nuisances of themselves. Safety engineers trying to justify their jobs. Technicians sitting around wondering what they are technicians of. Operators keeping out of the boss's way. I could go on and on far into the night. Even in our department we have a bunch of one-wire electricians who take plenty of time to figure out what to do with the rest of the wire. The work in our plant could be done by a third less people if workers turned out an hour's work for an hour's pay. Another reason is our cost-plus contract. I was told by fellow employees that I haven't seen anything. Believe it, it would be a wonderful thing if our Congressmen could get jobs in war plants for a week or so and see these conditions at first hand. I started at work in June, but was not allowed to turn a hand before almost October 1 because the place was still under construction. We were made to sit around and to walk around the place while the contractor also kept an electrical maintenance crew to do the work which we were hired to do.

Now, that is just typical of letter after letter that we get, so I am pretty much in agreement with the statement you make that much improvement could be had in this manpower business if some way could be worked out where it could be organized.

Yesterday a bill was introduced in the House by one of our colleagues, and I have not had any time to go through the bill, but I want to read a short résumé of what Congressman Barrett of Wyoming intends to do with this problem.

He introduced a bill yesterday on this subject, Mr. Murray, and I might ask if you will listen to it; if you have any suggestions, you might make them: [reading]

The purpose of my bill is twofold; in the first place, I intend to find out how many men between the ages of 18 and 45 years of age would voluntarily agree to work wherever they are needed in the war effort provided they are not already employed in defense, essential industries, or working for the civilian economy. In the second place, I want a comprehensive investigation made of the effectiveness of the use made of our manpower in defense, industry, and government for the purpose of allocating them to essential work in the war effort or a voluntary basis. My bill is intended to do the following: First, the draft boards will go over the IV–F's and find out those that are not employed in war activities or war-supporting activities and all those who are not engaged so and physically qualified, to state in writing they will respond to a call for the utilization of their services in war work, or perform in a civilian capacity, service now rendered by men in the armed forces. I think it is wholly unfair to assume the IV–F's are unpatriotic. I think if they are asked directly, they will voluntarily go into this type of work and that they will respond 100 percent. All they need to be told is what they should do and in my opinion they will do it in a big way.

Second. It will require the various draft boards to reclassify every male from 18 to 45 except those in I–A and IV–F for determining the men engaged in war activities including agriculture or war-supporting activities or any occupations necessary for the civilian economy of their community or in the Government service necessary to the civilian economy, proper administration of the Government or the war effort, and those who are not so engaged, to state in writing that they will respond to a call for the utilization of their services in war work or to perform in civilian capacity services now rendered by men in the armed forces of limited duty.

Third, We will require the draft boards to make a survey of local plants and governmental institutions to employ men and to determine the full use made of the men so employed.

In other words, this man is trying to get at the objective that you stated a moment ago.

Mr. MURRAY. I might say there, Congressman, that I believe it is the War Manpower Commission who has at the moment set up a national system of plant inspection and it is the function or duty of these plant inspectors to go into the plants and find out if there is labor hoarding, if there is an overutilization of labor and to submit to the proper authorities, upon the completition of the examination, a report of the facts as they found them, both at the plant, and the local area, to War Manpower Commission and to all of the interested agencies in that particular community.

Now, that work is under way, as I understand it, and is progressing satisfactory to the point that these transfers to which this gentleman alludes, are already under way. I mean, it is being done for all practical purposes.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Kilday, do you have any questions.

Mr. KILDAY. Yes. Mr. Murray, a moment ago, Mr. Arends remarked about the testimony from some who have been here and asked if you thought it was entirely wrong. I believe our difficulty on that has been that we have had so many diverging opinions and conclusions, and for that reason I want to compliment you on bringing us an analytical and factual study of the situation.

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you.

Mr. KILDAY. There are many who have appeared both for and against this legislation stating opinions and conclusions rather than an analysis of it.

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you.

Mr. KILDAY. Would I be correct in stating that your view is that rather than a factual shortage existing, there is an uneconomical distribution and utilization of available labor?

Mr. MURRAY. That is right, and it not only applies to labor; it applies to facilities as well, and the letting of contracts, and things of that description. I have in mind a particular situation of which I am quite sure the committee is aware, and that is the building of a huge air plant down in San Diego, Calif., where 8,000 workers are going to be needed; the plant is being built in one of the most critical labor areas in America, where there is and has been a shortage. That plant could have been located in another part of the country where the supply of labor could have been made available without transport or housing or other difficulties.

And that is one of the great, big serious problems to which I believe, as a citizen, the Congress of the United States should direct its attention.

Now, labor and management will work out all right. They will work these problems out with Government; they are willing and they are anxious to do it, but will the Congress of the United States see what it can do about getting a coordinated system of operation in our procurement agencies under way over here in the city of Washington?

Mr. KILDAY. I am afraid you expect too much of us, Mr. Murray.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I am asking that. I think it is absolutely essential and necessary.

Mr. KILDAY. Your idea would be to take the plants to the workers rather than take the workers to the plants?

Mr. MURRAY. Unquestionably so.

Mr. KILDAY. Now, of course, as I understand your position, you are opposed to all types of compulsion. The first section of this bill refers to the man who is deferred in industry, who leaves his plant, farm, or whatever he is engaged in, where it is recognized he was necessary and for that reason deferred.

It provides then that if he leaves there without permission of his draft board except for good and sufficient reasons, that he would be classified into a classification immediately available for service.

I have proposed an amendment that would take out of it the idea of sending him to the armed forces or a work battalion and substitute the penalties of the Selective Service and Training Act. Whatever restrictions you might place upon him, do you feel that we should not require the man who has been deferred because he could do the most for the war effort in that plant, that we ought not put any restriction upon him as to leaving?

Mr. MURRAY. I think that citizen is just as susceptible to the voluntary ideas in the United States as any other citizen in this country of ours, and that he should not be taken out and put in a select group and legislation of a compulsory and very discriminatory nature enacted to oppress him.

Mr. KILDAY. Well, of course, this would apply to men not currently being subjected to compulsory induction into the armed forces.

Mr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. KILDAY. That is, those above 38 and up to 45?

Mr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. KILDAY. But could there be any discrimination as to those within the age currently being taken, and compelled to go into the armed forces? In other words, a man within the same age bracket and same reasonable classification, being required to do the thing he could do best?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that it is taken as a matter of course that everybody is required to do his part in this war effort, and I am not laboring under any assumption or any delusion when I say to you that the people of the United States, and particularly those employed in war plants, have been doing that kind of a job and they are going to keep on doing it. If they are asked to do more they are going to do more.

Mr. KILDAY. Of course, the vast majority will, there is no doubt about that; they will do it from patriotic impulse; but as to those who do not, do you feel we should not compel them to the same extent as a man in the Army?

Mr. MURRAY. I feel that any sort of a compulsory measure will have a discouraging effect upon the state of mind of the American people and will tend to hamper or hinder the thing that we are trying to do rather than help it.

Mr. KILDAY. On the face of it, turn-over is one of the major factors in the situation and this first portion of the bill will control turn-over only; is that a major factor in the distribution?

Mr. MURRAY. I did not get the question.

Mr. KILDAY. I say, is turn-over in plants a major factor in the uneconomical distribution and utilization of manpower?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, the turn-over, of course, is contingent upon many things. I should say it is always a major factor, and a large part of the turn-over, in American industry, is attributable to changing

factors that have to do with the operation of the war itself; changing demand for the manufacture of certain types of products. A product that is essential today is nonessential 60 days from now, or 30 days from now.

When the Army steps in to a particular situation in a given community and says: "We have got all of that particular type of material we need now," then a turn-over takes place.

Mr. KILDAY. Of course, that is all classified as turn-over. The thing which I am referring to is the situation the gentleman from California referred to here the other day as to a plant in his district where people were leaving the plant, not because of any cut-back or reconversion or anything like that, but just voluntarily leaving—I believe he said 10 per cent a month.

Mr. JOHNSON. Ten or twelve.

Mr. KILDAY. Ten or twelve.

Mr. MURRAY. I am not familiar with the figures in that situation.

Mr. KILDAY. It is that turn-over I am inquiring about.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, in that phase of the situation, it is one of the things to which I believe the groups to whom I have referred should immediately direct their attention.

Mr. KILDAY. I think you submitted a report here of some investigations that your unions made. I notice here some cases in which quite a large number of workers are called for for specific, necessary war work, and your investigations have shown that actually there was no necessity for them. Here is one, "hiring new workers while laying off old employees"; "old employees getting 3- to 5-day lay-offs." Then there are a number of others, which indicate that a great many people would have been leaving while they are still calling for new ones. Can you explain why that situation exists? Why do they ask for them? Is it the fear of an impending shortage, or what?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not know, Congressman, unless it is a confusion that has developed in the course of these investigations. Let me point out a particular situation: In the city of Buffalo, about 5 weeks ago, one of our very fine gentlemen attached to a procurement agency in the city of Washington called me and said that they needed 1,500 men in the Bell Aircraft plant in the city of Buffalo, and they wanted to see what it was that C. I. O. could do to help them get the men in there. Well, I promptly referred the matter to our local area director, and I said, "You go out and investigate that." This is only 24 hours later—and our director went out to the Bell Aircraft plant in the city of Buffalo and discovered that on that very day 1,500 workers in the Bell Aircraft plant were being laid off.

Mr. KILDAY. Well, I believe that is one that you have in this list.

Mr. MURRAY. It may be there, but, nevertheless, it is a typical situation.

Mr. KILDAY. That is the thing I am getting at. What is the cause for a request of that kind under those conditions and what is the remedy for it?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that the remedy lies—a great deal of it, at least—and I do not say all of the remedy lies there—but a great deal of the remedy lies in having our procurement agencies over here in the city of Washington work together. The best information obtainable concerning the work of the procurement agencies in Wash-

ington is that one procurement agency never knows what another procurement agency is doing.

The result is there is confusion and some critical situations develop, and labor—we have got to have a bill to correct something. That is it.

Mr. KILDAY. Just so we can get along, Mr. Murray; I was interested in what you had to say in your prepared statement with reference to the utilization of labor and placing it in different plants, and the necessity for protecting a man who leaves one plant and goes to another, in his reemployment, pension, and seniority, and so on. Back in 1943, in the matter of nonreferable classification, I took the position that the War Manpower Commission could—that a man who had seniority rights should be able to get them back even though it were in nonessential industry, and in October 1943 I offered a bill which would give men who left a nondeferrable classification, to enter a deferrable classification, the same rights to reemployment, and so on, as the man drafted under the Selective Training and Service Act, and also the right to benefits of the Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act as to his existing obligations to the extent that his ability to discharge them was impaired by the shift in occupation.

I have already proposed such an amendment to this bill which we are considering now should it be reported out.

Now, those provisions would be as adequate as we are able to make them to protect these people, would they not?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; I think so, and your effort in that particular regard is greatly appreciated, Congressman, I should say, and manifests a great interest in the whole situation.

Mr. KILDAY. You do regard those as being absolutely essential if there is any compulsion whatever?

Mr. MURRAY. There are certain essential requirements that, in absolute fairness, should accompany any system of compulsion, such as those that have been established in Great Britain and elsewhere.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Clason, do you have any questions?

Mr. CLASON. Mr. Murray, this legislation is, of course, most troublesome to all the members of this committee and I presume to all the Members of Congress. I believe you are aware that this is not congressional legislation; this legislation comes down from the top and does not arise within this committee or within Congress. You realize that, I presume?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; I have a slight realization of that fact.

Mr. CLASON. Well, now, it is supposed to have the blessings of President Roosevelt and Mr. Byrnes, and even though we are told here in the committee by witnesses that Mr. Byrnes' advisory board is 100 percent opposed to it. I wonder if the position of this advisory board, which is set up under an act of law, has been brought to your attention?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, unfortunately for me, I did not get a chance to attend the last meeting of the advisory board, although I am a member of it.

Mr. CLASON. I see.

Mr. MURRAY. I do not know what it is that the advisory board did at its last meeting. I am told that the members of that board expressed opposition to the enactment of this type of compulsory legislation, I mean the May-Bailey bill. Since my return to Washington, I have made certain representations to the chairman of the advisory board concerning the opposition of our organization to this type of legislation and I have communicated with Justice Byrnes, as I have indicated in this paper presented to the committee this morning, that my whole desire is for a conference to be convened for the purpose of giving the whole subject matter an over-all discussion, leading toward the perfection of an agreement between the interested groups, in the hope that we would be able to effectuate a solution in that way.

Mr. CLASON. Well, do I understand, then, Mr. Murray, that up to the present time, you have not brought to the attention of either the President or Mr. Byrnes directly, the information and the advice which you have given to this committee here this morning?

Mr. MURRAY. Not in whole, I have not. Although I have addressed a communication to Justice Byrnes asking for a meeting for the purpose of discussing these problems that I have presented to the committee here this morning.

Mr. CLASON. Then, I understood, from your statements here this morning, that in your opinion the War Manpower Commission, while it has not done perhaps a perfect job, has operated successfully?

Mr. MURRAY. I should say yes, sir, that the War Manpower Commission has done a very good job. It has made its mistakes just like I make mine or everybody else make theirs, but by and large, I should say the War Manpower Commission has done a very good job in the United States.

Mr. CLASON. Well, do you believe that by improving its present methods and perhaps having a little better work on the part of its employees, it would be able to meet all of the labor requirements of our people during the remainder of this war?

Mr. MURRAY. I can only speak for the moment, Congressman, as I see conditions today; I say yes. Yes; I feel that the War Manpower Commission is amply equipped—and if not sufficiently equipped, certainly its functions can be implemented—to make the whole system work out satisfactorily in a voluntary way.

Mr. CLASON. What would you say, Mr. Murray, is the number of men and women needed at the present time to meet any manpower shortage which, to your knowledge, exists?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I cannot answer that directly, and I am quite sure accurately, although a number of our organizations have been making an investigation of it in the industries over which the unions assume jurisdiction, and the number required, according to our best estimate, is very small compared to these exaggerated statements that have been made to this congressional committee by other witnesses; very, very small.

Mr. CLASON. I believe one witness put the present needs at 150,000 and not more than 150,000 additional by June 30, 1945, with a backlog or pool of manpower from which this number could be obtained, amounting to not less than 1,100,000 capable persons. Would you say that those figures were accurate?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I am sorry, I cannot be helpful there. I wish I could, but I could not give you the facts, I mean to the real facts, and I could not take an oath as to the accuracy of a figure of that description.

Mr. CLASON. But you are certain, in your own mind, that there is no need for 900,000——

Mr. MURRAY. Oh, absolutely and unquestionably,

Mr. CLASON. Now, back early in the spring of last year, as I understood it, there was a 20-percent cut-back in production due to information received or requests received from Army and Navy commanders. Is that your understanding?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I do not know that there was a 20-percent reduction. There was a very substantial cut in many of the materials that were being produced as of that time, but as for an over-all cut in production amounting to some 20 percent, I cannot say.

Mr. CLASON. Well, during the summer, Government agencies undertook to discuss the question of reconversion of some plants, industrial plants, to peacetime products, luxury products, with reference to the war, you might call then.

Mr. Murray, at that time, did you believe that that was a wise thing to do?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, at that time there were a great many predictions concerning the ending of the European phase of the war. Some of our outstanding leaders predicted the end of the war by Christmas time. Others said that it could not last any longer than the spring of 1945. I think that those calculations or prognostications created a great deal of confusion at home here and it resulted in employers rushing over here to Washington to see what it was that they could do to get tools and machines to prepare themselves for the reconversion period.

It created a great deal of confusion among workers because they were very apprehensive about their future and they were moving out of these portions of industry where cut-backs were taking place, and looking for so-called peacetime jobs.

Undoubtedly a transition took place there and whatever it amounted to was more or less attributable to the fact that our very learned leaders had said that the war was going to end very shortly.

Mr. CLASON. Well now, when was it first brought to your attention that these learned leaders were in error and that we must expect to resume not the former production, but twice that production, and at present five times that production in many items?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I do not know. It became more obvious that demands were being made for increased production about the time that Von Rundstedt got into the bulge on the western front. It created a great deal of apprehension, of course, and very naturally so. Well, I might say that these things going on with regard to the production of war materials today, have been going on since the beginning of the war. They happen constantly. I doubt that any particular group has any control over it. For example, about a year ago, one of our large manufacturing plants in the steel industry closed down one of the largest tank factories in the country over at Berwick, Pa., where some 8,000 people were employed. It was a gradual lay-off and in the course of a few weeks there were some 5,000 out of 8,000 employees laid off. They were told to shift for themselves, to go find work. There was no particular manpower problem, and many of them had moved into the community of Berwick, had established their homes and families there, and so on. Well, in the course of 3 weeks thereafter, the Berwick plant was reopened and the workers were brought back and they went again into the production of tanks. Only 3 weeks ago, a procurement agency called me about a serious shortage of tanks. The tank program was falling off. On the very day they called me, I called one of our representatives in Schenectady, N. Y., where there is a very large tank factory and he reported to me that 600 of our tank workers were laid off that day.

A demand here for more tanks and lay-offs taking place in a plant at the same time.

I am told by responsible leaders of the United Auto Workers that the tank program in the city of Detroit, the Chrysler tank program, has fallen off due to an evident lack of interest in the production of tanks over there.

And you get this situation here where lay-offs are taking place, and then over in the city of Washington, you get demands that more people be put into particular plants where people are being actually laid off.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, there is this other picture that you brought up. You say that in your opinion the worst offenders are perhaps Government-controlled plants.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I say that because I think that it is commonly known that there is an overutilization in most of the Government-controlled plants.

Mr. CLASON. When you speak of government-controlled plants, you mean the shipyards and arsenals owned by the Government, or manufacturing plants?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, that is right, or other plants that are directly controlled or operated by Government.

Mr. CLASON. Well, if, then, the Army and the Navy, in controlling those plants, are securing a poorer production per manpower perhaps than other plants outside the Government-managed and controlled plants, would you expect the Government to gain any great advantage from this bill by placing in the hands of the military authorities the control of the labor in these plants under this bill and taking it away from the W. M. C.?

Mr. MURRAY. I certainly would not.

Mr. CLASON. Do you think any legislation at all is necessary in order for us to carry on so far as you can forsee the future.

Mr. MURRAY. I do not, sir; I do not see any need for it.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Durham, do you have a question?

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Murray, I want to congratulate you on your factual statement. At the present time, how many men is your organization composed of?

Mr. MURRAY. My organization has a combined membership now of approximately 6,000,000.

Mr. DURHAM. Do you think all the labor in your organization is being used at the present time in aid of the war effort?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not think that all of the labor in my organization is being utilized.

Mr. DURHAM. Have you any surplus labor?

Mr. MURRAY. I think that we have enough labor, providing it was put to work, 48 hours a week, in our plants—universally speaking, I mean now—to provide all of the equipment essential to the successful prosecution of this war.

Mr. DURHAM. That is all.

Mr. BROOKS. Any more questions? Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Murray, in response to Mr. Clason, you stated that it was your opinion that the first ammunition shortage loomed after General Von Rundstedt's push.

I recall General Somervell's speech on that subject, before the National Association of Manufacturers, came in the latter part of November; he had had considerable warning about the ammunitions shortage prior to his speech. Is it not true that you had knowledge of the pending crisis in ammunitions some time before the German push?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, what I meant, when I made reference to the Rundstedt push was that it became more obvious to the American people.

Mr. MARTIN. To the public?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. But as far as——

Mr. MURRAY. But as to my own knowledge, I am aware of that condition 24 hours a day, 7 days a week since Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

Mr. MURRAY. I mean it is nothing unusual to me. I am in constant contact with the procurement agencies, the War Production Board, War Manpower Commission; so I live in a state of awareness so far as war production is concerned.

Mr. MARTIN. I am glad to have that correction of your statement because I was under the impression you were aware of it.

Mr. MURRAY. I was undoubtedly aware of it because General Somervell addressed our C. I. O. convention in the city of Chicago.

Mr. MARTIN. He made the same point there?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. BROOKS. How would you correct that situation, Mr. Murray? If they say that is due to a manpower shortage, how would you get the troops the ammunition they need?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, Mr. Chairman, I should say to you, sir, that insofar as I know, up until this present moment, our troops have been given everything that they need. Now, if there is any evidence of shortage of a particular kind of war material, I do not think that that condition is attributable to either lack of proper interest in the situation on the part of either labor or management. I say that these situations develop overnight and that within a few weeks thereafter, when the problem has been solved, there is no further need for the exercise of these continued pressures.

I can imagine nothing that would be more nonsensical in the estimation of the American people than a piece of compulsory legislation standing on our legislative books over here, and a phase of the war ended with compulsory national service hanging over the people, and several million unemployed people walking the streets of the United States looking for jobs.

Mr. BROOKS. That is all I have.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Murray, with reference to your concern over ammunition, as to Pearl Harbor, you will find my concern went back quite a little prior to Pearl Harbor concerning ammunitions supply.

Mr. MURRAY. I hasten to assure you, Congressman, that I had the same interest in this country's welfare as you had before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MARTIN. I do not question that. But I did not want you to stop in consideration of this ammunition shortage at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURRAY. No.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, have you made a study of the military IV–F's and about what percentage of them would be classified as industrial IV–F's?

Mr. MURRAY. No; I cannot say that I have made a study of that, Congressman.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you not think such a study would be helpful at this time?

Mr. MURRAY. I believe it would be extremely helpful. It is one of these projects that could be very well considered and studied through labor-management-agriculture at a conference such as I have called for.

Mr. MARTIN. If you have need for a psychologist, and you had one available who har a national reputation, you could probably use him even though he is a half inch under height, could you not?

Mr. MURRAY. Oh, I suppose you could. I imagine we could, and if we——

Mr. MARTIN. My question is based on an actual case.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that whatever it is that has to be done with reference to these war-manpower and war-production problems, that the people——

Mr. MARTIN. But you have no study of military IV–F's, as to how many of them are industrial IV–F's?

Mr. MURRAY. I have made no study, but I assume our people, our research department, may have gone into it. I am not sure as to that.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, you spoke a moment ago about an overproduction in many lines.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Have you made a study as to whether there is any overproduction of farm machinery?

Mr. MURRAY. I have some little knowledge about it.

Mr. MARTIN. What is the condition in farm machinery?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I should say that there is a scarcity of farm machinery.

Mr. MARTIN. Why is there a scarcity?

Mr. MURRAY. Pardon?

Mr. MARTIN. Why is there a scarcity?

Mr. MURRAY. For perhaps the same reason that there is a scarcity of butter.

Mr. MARTIN. What are those reasons?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it is not for me to hire a hall and explain the reasons about why butter is scarce and farm machinery is scarce. I am aware of the scarcity.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, then, I will ask you this question: Is the scarcity due to a scarcity of materials or manpower?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I should say that it is due to a scarcity of materials, largely. It is the type of materials needed to manufacture farm machinery that is essential for war purposes that creates the scarcity of farm machinery.

Mr. MARTIN. And that scarcity of materials is still the reason?

Mr. MURRAY. My dear Congressman, there are scarcities of so many things these days. You take it out the realm of farm machinery——

Mr. MARTIN. But a farmer needs a more specific answer than that.

68175—45——18

Mr. MURRAY. Of course; there is no one that has been more cooperative, might I say, with the farmer and farm agencies than I have been and more sympathetic to their problems.

Mr. MARTIN. But I want to know why I am having so much trouble getting an adequate supply of farm machinery for my farmers.

Mr. MURRAY. Well——

Mr. MARTIN. I have had it explained to me by any number of governmental agencies that up until a year ago it was partly materials and partly manpower, but starting a year ago, when we were preparing for the crop season last year, we were told that it was no longer material shortages but entirely manpower. I am wondering whether you agree with that.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I should say that by and large insofar as the farm-machinery problem is concerned, it was not necessarily—I mean the production of farm machinery was not necessarily a manpower problem insofar as I am aware; it was a question of materials. The allocation of materials to particular plants for the production of farm machinery has been a very important question.

Mr. MARTIN. Is that statement based on an analysis of the situation?

Mr. MURRAY. It is based both upon an analysis and many discussions that I have had with war agencies about it.

Mr. MARTIN. Can I assure my farmers that the shortage now is not because of a shortage of manpower?

Mr. MURRAY. Insofar as my knowledge goes, sir, I think you could say that. If it is at all relevant and has any competency.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, we are talking about drafting a great many more men out of agriculture and industry and I am facing the loss of a great number of farm workers.

The farm machinery shortage will become a more serious factor if it is allowed to continue. I am glad to have your statement here that you will go the limit in your cooperation in bringing about an end to those emergencies because I rate farm machinery as a very necessary factor in overcoming a further shortage of farm labor and I rate our food production as rather an essential factor in the military effort.

Mr. MURRAY. You can have no disagreement with me about that. As a matter of fact, I spent 2 hours with our American farm leaders yesterday, in conference with Mr. O'Neal and Mr. Patton.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you think you are getting a solution to this shortage of farm machinery?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it was only one of many problems discussed in the couse of the meeting.

The farmers, like everybody else, I suppose, have a great many troubles these days; many, many problems.

Mr. MARTIN. Did you compare the availability of manpower for military service, service in industry or in labor, as compared with that in agriculture?

Mr. MURRAY. Had I known that you intended to press me about these matters, I might have brought a lot of very interesting material about farm problems along to you.

Mr. MARTIN. Can you assemble that material for me?

Mr. MURRAY. I think that I can get it for you sometime, I hope, in the very near future, Congressman.

Mr. MARTIN. I would be very pleased to have it.

Mr. MURRAY. I would be delighted to give you whatever information I have about it. We have a fairly competent research organization over in our headquarters that looks into those matters.

Mr. BROOKS. Any more questions?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes; I have more questions.

Now, suppose there is an emergency similar to that that developed last year, with the extremely late planting season. Can we expect this cooperation of industry and labor and Government, to answer that emergency a bit quicker than they did a year ago?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I am wondering, Congressman, if you are implying that I have a single solitary thing to do with that agricultural situation.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I think you are advocating——

Mr. MURRAY. I do, I join with your people.

Mr. MARTIN. In answer to our emergencies, for cooperation between industry, labor, and Government, rather than legislation.

Mr. MURRAY. I assure you, sir, I supported every important farm measure brought up.

Mr. MARTIN. And we did not get very far last year in facing the late crop planting.

Mr. MURRAY. It was not for lack of cooperation on our part; I want you to know that.

Mr. MARTIN. That situation that developed a year ago led me to think that we should look to some measure a little more effective than we had in operation at that time; not necessarily to draft everybody, but to have some power in reserve, available to fall back on, in the way of rather drastic action to get results; the results we did not get last year in the matter of farm machinery.

Now, if we had such a bill enacted into law and held in reserve, I would like to know whether you would be opposed to such a thing.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, of course, to ask me if I would be opposed to or for such a bill is, without knowing the substance of the bill in itself, distinctly hypothetical in nature.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, let us take H. R. 1119 and get down to specific facts.

Mr. MURRAY. All right, I should like to read it, and I want to assure you——

Mr. MARTIN. The bill now before the committee.

Mr. MURRAY. All right, and I want to assure you, Congressman, that a work closely with the leaders of the farm organizations over here in the city of Washington, and I express a wholesome desire to continue to work cooperatively with them.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I appreciate that assurance very much indeed, because we do need some help.

Mr. BROOKS. At this point, I would like to consult with the members of the committee. Mr. Murray is a very busy man. I know he would like to finish his testimony before we recess. Is it the desire of this committee now to go on until 12:30 and finish with Mr. Murray before we recess, or do you desire to recess now and meet this afternoon? In either event, I think we will have to meet this afternoon.

Mr. STEWART. Let us go ahead.

Mr. BROOKS. If there is no objection, then, we will proceed with the testimony until 12:30, and we will try to finish with Mr. Murray

before that time so as to release him, because we know he is very busy.

Now, Mr. Sheridan, do you have some questions?

Mr. SHERIDAN. Mr. Murray, I believe one of our contentions is that there has been sufficient factual matter submitted in these appraisals submitted by other witnesses, and that if such factual matters were submitted, the entire concept of the thing might be changed. Is that true?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that is true. I am in agreement with you about that. I do believe that the people are interested in getting facts. They want to get information and, God knows, there is not a thing that I can do that can be helpful to this committee that I would not do to get the facts and the proper information before them.

Mr. SHERIDAN. In line with that thought, then, Mr. Murray, do you have, in your research department—you referred to the textile industry, whereby some of the goods are actually luxury items—do you have any matters regarding luxury items to submit to the committee, which you believe could be eradicated in actual war production?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not know at the moment. I assume we do, and I should like to ask our research department if we have such material available. If you will point out the particular type of material that might be needed—I assume we have it, because we have a very comprehensive study made of all those matters, and the material, I assume, has been prepared—but if it has not, it is in the course of preparation.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I assume that it is because of that that one of the recommendations you make is elimination of luxury items?

Mr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Now, Mr. Murray, you referred to a pooling of labor that is in effect in the Philadelphia area.

Mr. MURRAY. It is not in effect; no.

Mr. SHERIDAN. That is what I wanted to ask you. Is that the one that John Philip and Jim McDevitt are suggesting between labor, management, and the Government?

Mr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SHERIDAN. It has not had an opportunity to demonstrate its effectiveness, has it?

Mr. MURRAY. Not as yet, because the entire program has not been worked out with management over there.

Mr. SHERIDAN. That plan, you believe, if put into effect in the critical areas, would solve this labor shortage?

Mr. MURRAY. It is my opinion that it would; a plan such as that, made effective all over the United States, would solve the labor shortage.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Now, in the Detroit area, where you say there are 20,000 women whose services are available to the various industries, in looking over your statistical report there, I feel they might be used; do you have any factual matters as to where they applied and their services were not accepted?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; we have the plants.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Can you provide that?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; we can provide that information to you.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Also, in the cotton duck plants you say there were lay-offs? Where, when, and how many did they have?

Mr. MURRAY. Again I must take recourse to the record which we have, and which I promised to submit to you from the Textile Workers' International Union. They have the material.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Offhand, you do not have any recollection of it?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not have it with me today.

Mr. DURHAM. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERIDAN. Yes.

Mr. DURHAM. Do you know whether that cut-back was the reason for the lay-off?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; it was attributable to a cut-back when it occurred.

Mr. SHERIDAN. When it was cut back, did that labor migrate to other areas?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; it resulted in the migration of labor from that territory to other areas.

Mr. SHERIDAN. In line with that thought, I believe you referred to a cut-back in tank production. Were you referring to Bangor, Pa.?

Mr. MURRAY. Berwick.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Rather, Berwick.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SHERIDAN. The recent one was in Schenectady with the same company.

Is it not true, Mr. Murray, that at the particular plant, where 8,000 were employed, other contracts were put into the American Car & Foundry which would absorb that labor?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, there was considerable discussion about other contracts being put in there. I came over to talk to Mr. Donald Nelson at the time about it. I talked to a number of the leaders of other war agencies over here about it.

There were some temporary contracts of another nature put into that plant, and later they went back into an almost full tank program.

Mr. SHERIDAN. But the 8,000 employees who were temporarily taken off tank production were not available then for other critical war production, were they? They were mostly absorbed by a substitute contract?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it took some time to work it out.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How long?

Mr. MURRAY. In the meantime, a considerable portion of those men left the Berwick area in search of employment elsewhere.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How many, do you recall?

Mr. MURRAY. I cannot recall the actual number. I believe it was approximately 2,000 of that number who left. And we had to help them find employment elsewhere.

Mr. SHERIDAN. The same policy was invoked at Baldwin's, was it not, at the same time?

Mr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Was there any lay-off there, that you recall, of the employees?

Mr. MURRAY. A very substantial number of the employees were laid off there.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Do you know where they were absorbed?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, they wandered and looked for work, and the organization had to assist them, together with the War Manpower Commission, in getting them located elsewhere.

Mr. SHERIDAN. They were not absorbed in the Philadelphia area?

Mr. MURRAY. No, at least not adjacent to the places where they were employed. They may have been employed somewhere in the Philadelphia area.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I believe one of your recommendations was to the effect that we have these conferences between labor, management, and the Government agencies, that the labor distribution could be equalized and thereby solve our problems.

Mr. MURRAY. That is right.

Mr. SHERIDAN. You have had vast experience with conferences, have you not?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Over what period of time do you think a result could be obtained?

Mr. MURRAY. Here? Speedily. I think much quicker and more effectively than it might be attained otherwise, particularly through compulsory legislation.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Would you say 90 days, 30 days?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, if a conference such as I have described were convened within the next few days, it would not take us very long to get to work and provide the ingenuity and facility to expedite the action and get it in motion. You know, the people who can get at these things quickest——

Mr. SHERIDAN. That is not wishful thinking, is it?

Mr. MURRAY. No—are the people who work right in the plant—management and labor. At the beginning of the war, I was fortunate in a degree, in a sense, that I suggested to Mr. Knudsen, who was with the Office of Production Management, later to Mr. Nelson, and later to the President of the United States, that the problems of production in our country, in the course of the war, could best be served through those interests working together—namely, labor and management—and I take no small credit, at least for the part I played, in the institution of labor-management committees in this country of ours.

It was an extremely difficult task at the outset. We met with a considerable amount of management opposition, but later it was accepted, and it is now a part of the whole national war picture, and this method of cooperation is gradually progressing, and I attribute these miracles of production in the United States, substantially, at least, to the joint work of both labor and management, and I think that a good, sane, sensible, sound America, will leave it there, because that is where it belongs.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I think you will agree, Mr. Murray, that many of these shortages in labor in certain geographical areas can be based upon miscalculation and misconception of necessary items in the over-all war production problem. In line with that you recall a statement by General Eisenhower whereby he would be using February ammunition in November, and I think, at least I shared the opinion, that perhaps it might have been inferred by the public that labor had been short in its production of the over-all critical war production program and I asked Ike Eisenhower that very question, when visiting with him in France, because I had been asked that by members in my district and my district produces much of that type of war production, and he said not at all; he did not blame labor at all, but rather a misconception and underestimate on the part of those who had to put over this program and formulate this program, and not labor.

I asked whether it was the Army or Navy Department, and he said it might be perhaps in some respect, but perhaps the War Labor Board could share that responsibility. So that when we now want to use compulsion to compel labor to do something they have already done, I would like to see examined minutely those who have the responsibility for the war program.

Mr. MURRAY. I am in perfect agreement with you on that, Congressman.

Mr. HARNESS. Mr. Chairman, I have a question. You referred, a few minutes ago, to the hysteria in Congress regarding this legislation.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I have perhaps done so mistakenly, by implication.

Mr. HARNESS. Speaking as one Congressman, I am not convinced that such legislation is necessary, and I have not been advocating it. I think if there is any hysteria for such legislation, it cannot be placed in Congress. It must be placed where that rightfully belongs, downtown, with the people who are advocating it.

That is all I have.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Philbin, do you have some questions?

Mr. PHILBIN. No, I would like to compliment Mr. Murray for his very fine and very fair-minded statement. I take it, Mr. Murray, that on the whole broad picture, you believe that cooperative measures between management and labor and Government, can work out this problem much more effectively than compulsion?

Mr. MURRAY. I certainly do.

Mr. BROOKS. Dr. Fenton, do you have some questions?

Mr. FENTON. Well, Mr. Murray, as I have said before, to other witnesses, we, down at the tail end of the table, have the advantage of listening to all the other questions, and there is not much to be asked, except I do want to make a few observations, however.

First of all, you stated that no legislation is needed, compulsory legislation. Do you think any type of legislation is needed?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I do not know, Congressman; I say in my statement, let us have this meeting of these interested groups that represent substantially all of these segments. That is the farmer, the industrialist, and laborer, and if, out of the crucible of discussion in a meeting of that description, it is agreed that some legislation should be necessary, then I would readily subscribe to it. But at the moment I cannot see any need for any.

(At this point Chairman May resumes the chair.)

Mr. FENTON. Now, I believe Congressman Kilday has dwelt on this. I was going to ask you how long it would take for this conference that you suggest between Government, labor, and management to decide this question?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it should not, as I have already stated, take too long. In fact, it should take a short time to decide the question, providing the interested parties could be brought together under proper governmental auspices. I have suggested that such a meeting be arranged by Justice Byrnes at the earliest possible date, and the question is largely one, now, of bringing the people together and letting each group express its convictions about how the problem can be solved, and how to work it out.

There is such a large community of interest in this; there are so many people interested in it that I think the people who have a critical stake in this situation should be given the opportunity to get together to try to (and I am quite sure they will) work out a sensible solution to this problem.

Mr. FENTON. I believe you stated that one of the causes for this dilemma is the improper distribution of plants. Now, there were some of us in this Congress who believed that a number of years ago, particularly myself.

We have always advocated taking the plants to the regions in which there were plenty of workers, and not keep bleeding various areas by migration to areas that were teeming with war plants. That is particularly true of my area. I was also interested in your statement concerning the situation at Berwick; Berwick happens to be a town about 25 or 30 miles from my home town, and I can remember very distinctly when the people from my town, my area, went over to Berwick for a job, and they needed jobs at that time. They were so glad to go that they came from one area to another. They had established a radius of 10 or 15 miles, where there were no jobs for them. So I can sympathize with those people who, having moved to Berwick and having had to find homes, are now out of jobs. It seems to me that they could have placed the plants much more equitably than they have.

Of course, while that is not the responsibility of Congress, it is the responsibility of those who were charged with the war effort, placing those plants so that people could be available to them, in their home areas. I dislike very much to think of some of the people who have gone down to Philadelphia—for instance, in Chester—in which the beds they sleep in are working three shifts. I do not think it is right. I think that had that condition been taken into account, such conditions would not prevail today.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stewart, do you have any questions?

Mr. STEWART. Yes. Mr. Murray, did I understand you to say that any compulsory measures would have a discouraging effect upon the American people?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir; that is my opinion.

Mr. STEWART. The closed-shop contract is compulsory; is it not?

Mr. MURRAY. It is not. The closed-shop contract is an arrangement that is perfected between employers and labor unions on a mutual and voluntary basis and has been in existence in the United States since before my birth.

Mr. STEWART. Well, it is compulsory to us Oklahoma farmers who want to work in one of your plants until we join your unions.

Mr. MURRAY. I would not put it that way, Mr. Congressman, because there is a measure of joint responsibility for the protection of the closed-shop contract and the joint responsibility runs to the employer as well as the labor union there. It is a mutually advantageous agreement perfected between two interests who want to make that sort of an arrangement, the company and the union.

Mr. STEWART. The maintenance of the contract is also compulsory, is it not?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, would you not want a contract maintained through some compulsory elements provided in the contract that provide for the sustenance and the maintenance of it? The idea of negotiating a contract, including a requirement, and compelling one to live up to it is just as old as human beings, you know.

Mr. STEWART. Then how do you reconcile that with being opposed to compulsion?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, because it happens to be an agreement. It happens to be a contract negotiated between an employer and a union.

Mr. STEWART. But it does not seem so to those without the union.

Mr. MURRAY. It is a condition of employment that is mutually agreed to and voluntarily agreed to between the union and the employer, and the agreement itself does not in any sense reflect compulsion. The agreement, the perfection of the agreement, I mean, because the agreement is voluntary in nature.

Mr. STEWART. But suppose that the union was not able to supply a thousand men in one of your plants and a thousand of us, who did not belong to your union, were willing to work; could we work at a closed-shop plant without first joining your union?

Mr. MURRAY. If the contract so provides. Let us get back to the basic thing now. Let us not wander away from the contract, because I assume that you, likely, as a good citizen, believe in the maintenance of our contractual obligations. That is an assumption. That is a reasonable assumption. If you and I enter into a contract to do something, we expect each other to live up to the terms of that contract. These contracts are therefore negotiated between the employer and the union. They stipulate certain conditions under which that contract will operate for its life. It may be for a year, it may be for 6 months, it may be for 2 years; at the expiration of that wage agreement either of the two parties, in the exercise of their own judgment, can, if they want to, refrain from indulging in the perfection of another agreement of that nature.

Now, the point that I want to make, Congressman, is this: The distinction that I want to make is that there is joint responsibility in the perfection of a collective bargaining agreement, and all employees working in a given plant by virtue of the nature of the agreement itself are required to comply with the provisions of that agreement.

Mr. STEWART. Now, how many contracts have been voided by the Federal Government with all kinds of persons? All kinds of voided contracts by the Federal Government with all kinds of institutions?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not know.

Mr. STEWART. They go in by eminent domain and take your home if they need the land.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, of course, I do not know too much about that, and I would not profess to have too great an understanding about that.

Mr. SHERIDAN. That is the sovereign right of the Nation.

Mr. MURRAY. When you talk about this so-called closed-shop agreement, you are talking about an instrumentality that has been in use in the United States before your birth or mine and I think it was known many, many years ago. It reflects a type of understanding, a type of mutual agreement, arrived at between an employer and labor in a particular union, because in most instances, the employer believes that he will get greater efficiency, greater productivity, and a more sensible solution to his profit situation.

Mr. STEWART. The man, though, that is inducted into the Army, or the man that is told to go to work or be put in the Army, has no voice, has he?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, yes it is assumed——

Mr. STEWART. Other than to do as he is told.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it is assumed that he has a voice. He has a voice in the operation of that contract when he enters the plant. He has a voice in local union affairs. He has a vote in his grievance machinery. He has the right to participate, in every respect, in the operation of that contract, while that contract is in existence.

Mr. STEWART. But he is compelled to join the union if he works in a closed shop?

Mr. MURRAY. If the contract provides. Why is it that this question is so often raised with a labor union, and a friendly employer appears before a congressional committee that wants that kind of a contract and never is there a finger pointed at that employer?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murray, let me interrupt, with the suggestion that this is incidental.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I wish the chair would not pass judgment upon my line of interrogation.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not passing judgment on you, I am trying to say that that is merely incidental to what we are trying to do here. We are trying to get manpower, and the question of whether a man should belong to a union or not belong to it is already fixed.

Mr. STEWART. I might suggest to the chairman there are only 8,000,000 men possibly involved in this, as to whether they join the union or whether they are free.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you and I do not differ in our beliefs about the union very much. But I think that is incidental to this proceeding, and we have had that brought out by other witnesses who have testified that if it is a closed shop, he should join the union, and if it is an open shop, he should act accordingly, and I think the law fixes that by determinations of the Department of Labor.

Mr. STEWART. We do have a right to change the law.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, we do that, if we can get together on it. Anything further, Mr. Johnson?

Let me make this statement, Mr. Johnson, there is another witness that wants to be heard and who has to catch a train.

Mr. JOHNSON. We are always confronted by that suggestion of the chairman that we have to curtail our examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, go ahead; I am not going to stop you.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Murray, I was impressed by your statement in this particular, that most of these matters are localized situations, and that if somebody can gather the facts which are indisputable, then you can put the heat on and solve them.

Now, before you were here, before our committee, it was brought out that one of the things that they were short of was ammunition; but they really are not short as far as the use of the ammunition today is concerned. However, they are afraid they are going to be short this month and next month. Now, I wish you would detail, for the record, in a general way, what the industries and crafts are that are engaged in the manufacture of ammunition from 105 caliber up. What are some of the industries that are in there, and some of the crafts?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, of course the production of heavy ammunition has been thrust into heavy industries since the beginning of the war.

Mr. JOHNSON. Will you name a few for the record?

Mr. MURRAY. Steel is an example.

Mr. JOHNSON. Steel?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes. The auto industry, which ordinarily manufactured automobiles, produces heavy equipment now.

Mr. JOHNSON. Are foundries involved in that?

Mr. MURRAY. Heavy ammunition, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, in the group of industry that are to manufacture this ammunition, in which ones are there conditions that ought to be remedied, or in which ones are there shortages of men?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that I have directed, in the nature of material which I presented to the committee this morning, and which unfortunately I did not have a copy of for each member of the committee to look into, the three most important or four most important industries over which our organization assumes jurisdiction; namely, the electrical industry, the steel industry, the auto industry, and the textile industry.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we can eleminate the textile industry.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, yesterday it was brought out that in the foundries there was a situation where there was an apparent manpower shortage, but where the conditions were such that if there were available men, they could not be attracted to it. Do you concur in that?

Mr. MURRAY. I heartily concur in that because it is the saddest, most underpaid industry in the United States, and it is the dirtiest work and the hardest work in connection with the war effort.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, as I get your testimony, it is not a matter of being short of men, but a matter of using those men in the right places at the right times; is that correct?

Mr. MURRAY. That is correct. It is a matter of proper utilization of the available labor.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, does your organization have an over-all picture of the different skills, so if there is a shortage of one particular skill, say, in Cincinnati, you can direct workers from Pennsylvania, or Cincinnati, to meet that?

Mr. MURRAY. We cooperate with the area War Manpower agency in every situation, wherever it may be.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, one matter that has disturbed me, which I think has affected production, is the matter of the men leaving one plant and going to another. We have out on the west coast what is called the west coast plan, the referral system, and Mr. Knudsen, among others, testified that it had not worked, and therefore that there was considerable loss of manpower, man-days, by the lag between leaving one plant and going into another.

Now, can we correct that without any legislation, in your opinion?

Mr. MURRAY. I am quite sure that it can be corrected if there is diligent application to its solution. There should not be too much difficulty in correcting it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, just how would you do it?

Mr. MURRAY. By the interested parties getting together and working out the necessary solution, wherever it may be, in any particular locality.

Mr. JOHNSON. Of course, the Manpower Commission is supposed to have handled that job and devised that plan.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; and let me advise you, sir, that insofar as the west coast is concerned, there has been more diligent application to the solution of the west coast manpower problems than perhaps any other part of the United States, and that is due entirely, to the tremendous migration of workers from all over the United States to the west coast where there are such huge developments.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I was home last year, in the summer, and it was rather critical then.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, you know that last summer, even on the west coast, due to tremendous cut-backs, that were allegedly going to take place in the production of aircraft, there was a great deal of apprehension, that the particular type of aircraft that was going to be produced was going to be changed; other workers were going to be brought in and a number were going to be laid off and that created, temporarily, on the west coast, a situation of apprehension between both employers and laborers that resulted in a great deal of transition.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you think that discussion which was rather widespread about cut-backs and revival of industry for civilian uses, that that sort of created the panic that we had here or are having here now?

Mr. MURRAY. I think it had a psychological effect upon the thinking of people, both employers and laborers.

Mr. JOHNSON. And the reverses on the western front added to the flames?

Mr. MURRAY. I think that was a contributing factor from a psychological standpoint.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, take the matter of ammunition. Do you know whether or not there are any actual shortages of material in any phase of the manufacture of those implements?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I am not aware of too many shortages of the materials that go into the manufacture of those products. There may be some, and by the way, I regrettably enough did not bring that information along to the committee this morning, although I have it in my office, of where there are shortages of certain types of raw materials, that are in no way attributable to lack of manpower.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, in the matter of shortage and transferring of workers, you mentioned the fact that they should be paid their railroad fare from their homes to their place of work; is that being done in the navy yards?

Mr. MURRAY. I think the Navy is doing it, but it is not being done in American industry and no one suggested it, as a matter of fact, except Congressman Kilday and a few of his friends here.

Mr. JOHNSON. You feel it is a matter of justice if you take a man away from an area, to another, to work, that you ought to pay his fare?

Mr. MURRAY. I think it is a matter of common justice that the fellow who is subject to these transfers should be provided with some equitable, reasonable treatment.

Mr. JOHNSON. I agree with you. It is just a question of what is equitable. Do you think that that has retarded the transfer of workers that are needed?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it would have a tendency to retard the transfer of the workers.

Mr. JOHNSON. Your idea is that compulsion will reverse itself and instead of helping production, it will retard production?

Mr. MURRAY. I am quite conscientious in that belief.

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to ask you about one question which is not directly to the point, but illustrates the difficulties the employers have to contend with. I notice that there is a movement on in Washington to place Negro workers on the streetcars here and the F. E. P. C. is trying to get the company to put those men in there who are capable of handling the job, and they have trained some, and the answer that the company gives is that if they do then the white men will walk out. How would you handle those situations in certain parts of the country? Where I come from, whites and Negroes work side by side without any friction.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that that is a very disturbing phase of the whole war effort.

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you not have to have a little compulsion in this type of a case?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, you have got the F. E. P. C., which has a form of compulsion under law.

Mr. JOHNSON. They do not have any statutory background.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, there is opportunity there to exercise the influences of that agency and utilize the services of those idle people. I think that one of the things that I think is really disgraceful is to hear so many complaints about labor shortages while so many able-bodied women and Negroes are idle and want to work, and cannot get work in particular localities throughout the United States.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mentioned about the women. Now, is that true, that matter of discrimination against workers who are not white? Is that true to any great extent?

Mr. MURRAY. You mean about the colored situation?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes.

Mr. MURRAY. It is true, broadly speaking; yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. In what parts of the country?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, it is true particularly in the South. It is true in many sections of the North, and we can cite innumerable examples.

Mr. JOHNSON. Is it true in any place in California that you know of?

Mr. MURRAY. I cannot say that it is in California; no.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead, any questions?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Mr. Murray, do you feel that the freezing of war workers on their jobs would be helpful or has been helpful?

Mr. MURRAY. The freezing of a war worker on his job as being helpful?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Yes.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I do not know that you could apply the term "freezing" to what has happened with reference to a war worker up to the present moment. I should say that—and this further remark is addressed toward the compulsion of a legislative nature, designed to not only freeze, but to move at will, on the part of either the Army, or any civilian adminitration of the situation—would have a very definite tendency to demoralize the individual, and hamper the production of war materials.

Mr. WINSTEAD. What I had in mind was that we do have certain workers in this country who are so-called frozen to their jobs. Whether or not it would be of any use to say to this group of 18 to 45, "You must go into a war plant and you must stay on the job." I cannot see a great deal of difference between a worker going out, who received

employment on a job, and this other group between these age levels who do not go into war plants and want to go their way; it seems to me it would be just as bad to say to that individual, "You must stay in war work" as to say to this other individual, "You will have to go where we want you to go until the war is over."

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think again the distinction must be made there in the application of the term "freezing," under the existing regulations, and as to what the conditions of actual freezing might be under some sort of a compulsory legislative mandate. For example, whatever transpires with reference to the use of war workers in American industry today, grows out of directives largely issued by the War Manpower Commission. What is it that constitutes the War Manpower Commission? You have a Director, you have a lot of subagencies, and at the top of the War Manpower Commission, you have an Advisory Committee. That Advisory Committee is representatives of labor, industry, and agriculture. Those three segments of the national population usually agree with the Director of the War Manpower Commission as to what it is that should be done with regard to the issuance of new directives, shifting of the population, the transfer of workers, and the so-called freezing of men on their jobs.

But, there, that system is worked out through voluntary processes, and it is worked out so satisfactorily that every single, solitary agency that I know anything about over here in the city of Washington has said to labor, and may have said to agriculture, and may have said to business, "You have performed a miracle in the field of production. You are doing a remarkable job."

Now, in the light of that kind of a set-up, the War Manpower Commission, the administrative directives that flow from the War Manpower Commission, its democratic administration, has had such a compelling influence upon these three substantial groups that its directives and its orders have invariably been made workable.

Now, if all of that has to be changed because somebody says we should have compulsion, and all of these labor-management committees that have been created throughout the United States of America since the beginning of the war, and to whom all of the people ascribe such perfect workability, and such great success should be done away with, does it mean that the country is going to endure the hazard of changing the entire situation with regard to the administration of manpower in the United States?

And, even during that time, while facing that hazard, will we encounter newer and greater difficulties in the field of war production?

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Mr. Winstead?

Mr. WINSTEAD. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murray, let the chairman express extreme regret that he has not had the pleasure of hearing your entire statement; I had to be absent during your testimony, and for that I apologize, although I may say I have been acting under compulsion.

I would, however, after reading your statement, like to ask you a few very simple questions, and I am sure I will get very frank responses. I do not think anybody minimizes the great part that organized labor has taken in this war effort, without which we could not have carried on this war program, and I am sure that you, as a great American and a patriot, are wholeheartedly behind this war effort. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. MURRAY. I hope it is, sir. At least, I have tried to display that sort of an interest in our national war effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. As a matter of fact, you, in your group, together with the A. F. of L., and with all the major groups of the country, have long ago signed a pledge to not interfere with, but to support loyally the war effort.

Mr. MURRAY. That is right, sir; we have.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are still in that very attitude; is that right?

Mr. MURRAY. Still committed to it; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, if there are men around the country who are not engaged in essential war work, who ought to be engaged in essential war work, you do not oppose drastic measures to put them into war work, do you?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not oppose the implementation, if necessary, of any measures that may exist, with particular regard to the voluntary methods and means of getting those people to do that work.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, you are in harmony with the intent of this legislation, but you merely differ as to how it ought to be done, is that not it?

Mr. MURRAY. I would not put it that way, Congressman; I should not say that I am in harmony. If you mean by "intent" to get out more war production, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is the only intent of it.

Mr. MURRAY. All right; well, I am in harmony with that intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I notice you quoted here statements by General Marshall at your national convention this year, and also, I believe, General Somervell. One is Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and the other is the Chief of Service and Supply. Now, you agreed with them, and their addresses and their statements at your national convention, on what labor had done and you were, in fact, in harmony with them in trying to keep up the prosecution of this war?

Mr. MURRAY. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if they came to you and sat down in a serious frame of mind, in a conference, and told you that the situation was not only serious any more, but very grave, and that we had to have immensely stepped-up production, you would be for that too, would you not?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; I would be for having immensely step-up production; and might I add at that juncture, because I believe it is deserving of a more lengthy answer, that no one holds higher, in their individual estimates, the achievements of the people who run our Army than I do, particularly our Chief of Staff, and General Eisenhower, and General MacArthur, and our naval commanders as well.

However, might I insert at this point a statement that I think is worthy of consideration?

Ascribing all of these great, rare qualities to those very distinguished leaders which they deservedly should have, on the other hand, I do believe that a little bit of credit, with reference to knowledge of all of the highly technical and very involved proceedings regarding the production of war equipment in the United States, should be given the people who have the best understanding of that.

Now, to differentiate at that point, one must understand that I never profess to be a rocking-chair general and I cannot, because I

would be a very bad one if I tried to. On the other hand, I am quite sure that not too many of our leaders in other phases of activity know too much about the intricate and highly involved problems incident to the production of war materials, at least not as much as do the people who are directly acquainted and who are putting their every effort, every day throughout life, toward the solution of the manifold problems that grow out of the production of war materials.

It is to that phase of your question, Mr. Chairman, that I should like to direct your interest; and one, and perhaps the only, reason that I appear before the committee is because of my deep devotion to my country and my responsibility to this agency of the Government, the Congress of the United States, to provide with such knowledge as I may possess, which perhaps is not too much, such guidance and such information, and with the use of such logic as I can give them, to be helpful in the production of legislation that may be of assistance to the war effort.

The CHAIRMAN. You agree, then, that General Eisenhower, General Marshall, Admiral King, General MacArthur, know the problems of the battle fronts better than you do?

Mr. MURRAY. Oh, yes; unquestionably, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I will concede that you know labor problems better than they do. But now, when they come up with the responsibility on their shoulders of carrying into effect the declaration of war that the Congress of the United States voted unanimously with the exception of 1 vote, in which they pledged manpower resources and wealth and profit of every citizen of the country, do you not think it is your responsibility to see to it that their recommendations are carried into effect, and particularly the responsibility that the Congress has directed them to assume under the necessity of war?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, again, Mr. Chairman, I perhaps indicate a degree of density here this morning and inability to comprehend what it is that you are driving at. If you mean by your question that the Chief of Staff is asking for compulsory national service over here, and that for that reason, without any other reason, that the president of the Congress of Industrial Organizations should support it, then might I make this statement——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I do not mean that. I mean, do you agree that it is your duty, and my duty, and the duty of every man in this country to stand back of the war effort if you are told that it is critical by the war leaders?

Mr. MURRAY. No one need tell me that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I want you to put it in the record. I want you on record on it.

Mr. MURRAY. I shall unhesitatingly put it in the record, because I am interested in the successful prosecution of the war, and I am anxious to do everything that is humanly possible to make a speedy victory attainable, and I am willing to cooperate to the utmost degree in the promotion of any constructive, intelligent process that will lead toward that inevitable conclusion, a speedy victory to our country and its armed forces.

There is no quibbling or qualification about that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. Now, what would you do, then, with about 330,000 men that are around the country, neither in the war work, organized or unorganized, and not doing anything in industry? What would you do with those fellows?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, sir, let us see; since the beginning of the war we have brought 53,000,000 people into American industry.

The CHAIRMAN. Brought that many in?

Mr. MURRAY. Fifty-three million; that is, we have altogether now 53,000,000. We did not have 53,000,000 in war industry before the war.

Might it not be the best way to answer that question by stating that, number one, should it become necessary for the Federal Congress to enact compulsory national service legislation because of the alleged delinquencies of some 330,000 citizens out of 53,000,000 workables, or 53,000,000 who are actually at work——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, let me ask you this: Suppose the 53,000,000 patriotic as they are, are unable to turn out the war equipment essential to the further prosecution of this war, would you agree that the other 330,000 ought to be utilized also?

Mr. MURRAY. Well now, there we are dwelling in the realm of supposition.

The CHAIRMAN. No; there is no supposition about that.

Mr. MURRAY. But let us answer it in this way: Everybody, I assume here—and I am quite correct, I believe, in this assumption—is anxious to do the thing that will best serve the interest of his Nation. He is anxious to do the thing that will get the best results and get them speedily.

I think I have indicated to the committee here this morning that I believe there is a sufficiently large number of available labor, now employed in American industry, who, if their services were properly utilized, would prevent, or would not necessitate, the consideration of any compulsory legislation. My remarks this morning have been substantially directed to a lack of the proper utilization of present available labor at work in war plants.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURRAY. Now, I have therefore suggested that in the light of those circumstances, and based upon such factual observations, investigations, as we have been privileged to undertake in our own organization, that there be a convocation—that there be a meeting—of all the interested parties, brought together—the prime leaders, dragged out of these segments of our society, industry, labor, and agriculture—and that the problems be thrust on the table there, with men who live with those problems day in and day out, who are thoroughly acquainted with them, who know the facts, plant by plant, and there place upon them the responsibility of working out these things as America has always worked them out and particularly since the beginning of the war.

An agreement, an understanding, that all of these important segments of the national population will work togther to attain this common end for our country, and for our soldiers, and for the future of our Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. All right now, Mr. Murray. As a matter of fact, your group contains how many men, in your organization?

Mr. MURRAY. I said approximately 6,000,000—that is what we have in the country today—and a million and a half in the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. How many in the A. F. L., would you say?

68175—45——19

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I am told approximately 7,000,000. Of course, I am no authority on the A. F. L. figures.

The CHAIRMAN. Seven million. In the U. M. A. approximately 670,000.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a total of 13,000,000, which, taken from 53,000,000, would leave you 39,400,000. Now, if there is anybody in that 39,400,000 that is not at work, properly at work, and some kind of controls by legislation or otherwise can be employed to keep them at work, you would favor that, would you not?

Mr. MURRAY. I am in favor of every able-bodied citizen getting to work and doing his part in this war, Mr. Congressman. Let me ask you——

The CHAIRMAN. I think you have made that clear.

Mr. MURRAY. Let me issue a rejoinder here at this stage of the proceedings by asking you this: If the Congress enacted compulsory service legislation, how many men would you take out of other allocations to police it?

The CHAIRMAN. How many what?

Mr. MURRAY. How many men and women might you take out of other activities to police it?

The CHAIRMAN. I never did get it; I am sorry.

Mr. MURRAY. If the Congress of the United States enacted national service legislation, how many men and women do you suppose you might take out of other activities to police that legislation in the United States?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we would not require anything additional to the present system under the Selective Service Bureau and the War Manpower Commission set up; and that leads me to ask you this question: It is a fact, is it not, that—during the last 2 or 2½ years—that you, representing the C. I. O.; Mr. Green, representing the A. F. L.; and others, representing other groups of labor, have met continuously with the War Manpower Commission from time to time, with Mr. Byrnes as Director of War Mobilization, and still you have this problem. Can you tell me why that is?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, let me rejoin, Congressman, by asking you ——

The CHAIRMAN. No; I want you to answer my question.

Mr. MURRAY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not arguing with you at all; I am just attempting to get the information.

Mr. MURRAY. I know; and I am not attempting to argue with you, but I am trying to provide an intelligent answer by means of a rejoinder, by asking you: Would all of our troubles in the United States cease when you pass compulsory service legislation? Would that reflect Utopia?

The CHAIRMAN. No; our troubles will never cease in the United States until we all either get licked in this war and go one way or die and go on to Heaven. We will have troubles so long as we are here, and national service legislation will not cure that, but—and I will say to you I am not very strong on national service legislation myself; I do not believe in that except as a last resort. That has been my position all the time. All I am trying to do, and all the Congress is trying to do, is to aid you gentlemen who have done such a magnificent job from being interfered with while you are at it by

fellows who do not go to work when they ought to work and who do not stay at work when they ought to work.

Mr. MURRAY. I have here, Mr. Chairman, a message containing a statement attributable to Maj. Gen. L. H. Campbell, Jr., Chief of Ordnance in the Army Service Forces, and might I quote it for the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; you may.

Mr. MURRAY. He states [reading]:

> It is not true that the people on the home front, the production front, have failed miserably. Shortages have come from a revision in the over-all planning, and thinking of revision based on actual battle experience; shortages did not come from the failure of the plants to produce what was originally set as a goal of production. Shortages resulted because our combat forces indicated clearly that by greatly increasing our expenditure of ammunition, by using our artillery more than in any way to date, we can lay down such a curtain of fire power that infantry can advance with fewer casualties.

Now, to implement that statement, and I think I talked about this before your arrival, Mr. Chairman, there is not a day that passes, in the course of this war, that there is not a shortage of some particular type of war material indicated. If it happens at a particular plant over which my union assumes jurisdiction, it therefore becomes my responsibility to investigate that. The Army procuremnt people ask me to do so, or the naval people ask me to do so. Some other war agency gets into it and asks that it be done.

It therefore becomes our bound responsibility to immediately enter that picture and look into it. Where shortages occur at a given plant, we do many things. We agree with management to work on a Sunday where they have been laying off on Sundays. We agree with management to work on holidays where there had been no work on holidays. We agree to do innumerable things to point that production up to the highest possible point.

Now, that sort of a program is the thing that has brought such huge success to our armed forces and to our national war effort, particularly in the field of production. It is that we spot the situation, the plant. We look into that condition. We investigate it. We cooperate, and we work with the Government, with the Army, with the War Manpower Commission, and with management, to solve it. We always solve it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. All right. Now, you stated that these problems ought to be left to labor, management, War Manpower Commission, and other Government agencies to work out for themselves without legislation.

Now, I want to read to you, on page 2, lines 7 to 13, of this bill we are considering [reading]:

> The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion shall certify to the Director of Selective Service, from time to time, the manpower requirements of war or war-supporting plants and activities, within each industrial area, which, after consultation with the appropriate officials of management, labor, and Government, he determines will not be met by stabilizing manpower in the manner heretofore provided.

Now, under that provision you could meet and discuss things and that would not interfere with your meaning, would it?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, the point that I am making in connection with the meeting is this, Mr. Congressman: forget congressional compulsion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not the question. You have admitted you have been collaborating with Government, and you have your labor groups, and you have been cooperating for 2 or 3 years, and you have still got this problem. Now, we have put in a provision asking you to do that very thing. You do not object to that, do you?

Mr. MURRAY. I do not object to anything we have been doing, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not want to be required to do anything else other than you have been doing?

Mr. MURRAY. Get this point: You, or Congress, let us say, enacts a law. It has to do with the operation of the war. It becomes the bounden duty of the labor organizations, not necessarily the bounden duty, but labor recognizes it as a national obligation, to police that law; to police it; to make it effective. About a couple of years ago, a little over a year ago, the Congress of the United States passed the Smith-Connally Act. It did so in a rush because it wanted to do something about something or other, whatever it was, it wanted to do it and did it. At any rate, they enacted some legislation.

This legislation was ineffective. The only effective instrument that made possible the workability of that legislation were the declared commitments of organized labor that in the course of the war its leaders would not stand for strikes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then you did have strikes though.

Mr. MURRAY. We have had very few compared to the whole, Mr. Congressman. We implemented, we fought to keep our people at work, just as we are doing today. The end responsibility, usually, lies in these situations, with management and with labor, working together with Government. I tried to point out to the committee that since the beginning of the present war we have created thousands of labor-management committees all over this Nation. I say that the enactment of compulsory legislation endangers the perpetuity of these labor-management committees' existence.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Mr. Murray——

Mr. MURRAY. That threatens their future; it threatens their life.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean to say that this bill is compulsory as to any man who is at work and stays at work where he ought to be?

Mr. MURRAY. I say that legislation subject to all sorts of interpretations, legislation particularly of a compulsory nature as this, can be bedeviled, can be used for any number of purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. It can be, but does this bill provide for it to be?

Mr. MURRAY. You see, I oppose the bill because of a deep-seated conviction that its enactment will not serve the purposes for which the sponsors of the bill are seeking its passage. I do not think it will make the kind of a contribution that all right-thinking citizens want to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, this question occurs to me. Labor groups do not necessarily require legislation, other than what they have already gotten, to enable them to meet an act. But Government cannot function without legislation. There could not be a Manpower Commission without a Congress act; there could not be the President operating the White House unless he was a multimillionaire, unless Congress made an appropriation.

Government would not function at all without Congress. Now then, if we say here, that we rely on labor, management and Government to participate in conferences to mobilize manpower, what objection have you got to that?

Mr. MURRAY. You see, I have a fundamental objection to the enactment of legislation of this sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think you have stated this.

Mr. MURRAY. I think it is definitely dangerous. I think it establishes a kind of precedent for the United States that will not make the kind of a contribution to our national well-being that every sincere citizen wants to make. I think that, Mr. Chairman, in the light of the remarkable, if not altogether miraculous, record that has been made by labor and management in the course of the present war, that it would be extremely dangerous for Congress to even consider the enactment of legislation of this description under existing circumstances.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask you this question, then. Do you think that Congress should pass compulsory legislation to draft men into the Army to fight and die on the battlefields and then not draft any other compulsory legislation that it thinks is necessary to keep them supplied with the arms and equipment that they have to have to win the war? You agree to the compulsory on one side and you oppose compulsory on the other; is that your position?

Mr. MURRAY. You see you put that question in such a strange way to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I intended to put it in a simple way and I hope you understand it.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, I know; but it hit me right square on the top of the head because, I will tell you, I should never want my position to be misunderstood concerning my devotion to my country.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not questioning it.

Mr. MURRAY. All right. I am for the thing being done that will best serve the interests of the United States of America, and all of its citizens. In good conscience, I tell you that the enactment of this legislation, so far as I am able to foresee, will not serve that kind of a purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Durham has a question.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would like to call Mr. Murray's attention to this: The chairman called your attention to the bill. He apparently neglected to read line 14 of that paragraph, which says:

> He may designate certain men for work for labor shortages which cannot be met for stabilizing manpower in manner herein provided and by voluntary recruitment by management, labor, and Government.

In other words, we retain to a limited degree at least the voluntary recruitment. Would that not save the bill, in a way from your point of view?

Mr. MURRAY. No; it will not, because the other portions of the bill destroy the effectiveness of that voluntary recruiting.

Mr. JOHNSON. What portions?

Mr. MURRAY. The compulsory portions of the bill.

Mr. JOHNSON. I wonder if you have really read the bill. I do not know how I am going to vote on the bill, Mr. Murray, but on the

face of it, all it is is a bill to draft men into the Army, but, as Mr. Patterson says, if it succeeds with its apparent purpose, it will be a failure because we just want the threat of a draft to drive men to essential industry.

Now, that is the purpose of the bill.

Mr. MURRAY. You see, the implications of the bill, Congressman, are about these: The implications of the bill are that the people are falling down here; they are not doing their job.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I would not say that.

Mr. MURRAY. I know you would not. I know you would not, but impliedly the bill would say that. Now, that is the sort of a devastating effect that it is having upon the people throughout this country, particularly those employed in war industry.

Mr. JOHNSON. But, Mr. Murray, do you not think there is a great misconception about the real purpose of this bill, and the people that it affects? I was in the Selective Service organization before I came to Congress, as chairman of an appeal board, and we passed on hundreds and hundreds of appeals. I can tell you that there are all kinds of excuses that certain people use to get out of the service. And all this bill wants to do is to put the finger on the ones who are, you might say, at least some of them, who are not in the proper kind of work, and try to induce them to go to a war plant.

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I have expressed my differences about this, and my convictions about this bill, Congressman.

Mr. JOHNSON. I appreciate your views, in many ways I concur with you.

Mr. MURRAY. They are very fundamental.

Mr. JOHNSON. What we do not like in the bill, Mr. Martin and myself, is that it looks as though they are going into the Army as a punishment.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you very much, Mr. Murray.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Mr. Murray, do you feel there is sufficient legislation on the books today? We all agree we all need legislation to operate the Government of the United States, but do you feel there is sufficient legislation on the books today to continue the operation of the war-production program?

Mr. MURRAY. My personal conviction is that there is. And I have added there this, and put it in the record, that if at the suggested conference of these interested groups, there could come out some legislative suggestion upon which agreement could be arrived at, there would be no question about our support of it.

Mr. SHERIDAN. The practical application of legislation by voluntary conference between labor, management, and Government would meet any critical situation; is that your opinion?

Mr. MURRAY. That is my confirmed judgment as I see it today.

Mr. SHERIDAN. The prime purpose of the bill, speaking of compulsion and noncompulsion, I think it must be admitted that the prime purpose is compulsion to put these 330,000, which the chairman refers to directly, into the war effort if they do not go in voluntarily; is that true?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, I think that everybody is interested in getting——

Mr. SHERIDAN. I mean there may be some dispute as to the figure, but I am using that as a hypothetical case.

Mr. MURRAY. Yes; well, I think everybody who has any interest in their country wants to see everyone make some sort of a contribution to the war effort. There is no question about that. Everyone wants them to make the fullest kind of a contribution to the war effort. But I do not know how to break down this 330,000 or the 141,000 referred to by Judge Hay, or the 700,000 or 800,000 referred to by somebody else, into which particular category these groups may fall, how they are physically, and what their equipment is, mentally or otherwise.

I should like to be provided an opportunity to look into those things, as could all other right-thinking citizens, of course. And, I am quite sure that the conference that I have suggested will attain that end, if it is given the chance to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Philbin, have you any questions?

Mr. SHERIDAN. One further question, by the way. Your previous discussion referred to the hoarding of labor in Government-controlled factories. Does your research department have any statistical data in that respect, and specifically on what agencies?

Mr. MURRAY. I think that we do.

Mr. SHERIDAN. It would be very helpful.

Mr. MURRAY. I am not too sure about the number of specific instances we have at hand, but I think we do, at any rate, I am quite sure that information of that kind is already in the hands of congressional committees over here, that have investigated the operation of these Government-operated plants throughout the country, and it is very illuminating, very illuminating.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Since that is one of the primary questions before this committee, I would like to have it.

Mr. MURRAY. All right; if I have it, I will be glad to give it to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Philbin, any questions?

Mr. PHILBIN. Do you think, sir, you can cope with and effectively deal with all these shortages of manpower by the existing voluntary means, and that no additional legislation is required at this time?

Mr. MURRAY. That is my opinion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one other question, Mr. Murray. Are you a member of the Advisory Committee of Mobilization Director Byrnes?

Mr. MURRAY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had a meeting recently on that, sir?

Mr. MURRAY. I explained to the committee, that unfortunately I could not get to the last meeting. I am not fully informed as to what transpired there.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know that they agreed on a directive supporting this legislation?

Mr. MURRAY. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know that they agreed upon a directive or resolution supporting this legislation?

Mr. MURRAY. No; I am not aware of that. In fact, I have been advised to the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I think we will have the facts about that

Mr. MURRAY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Murray. I hope we have not kept you too long. It is hard to be able to get by a congres-

sional committee without being kept too long, especially if you are well-informed. Thank you on behalf of the committee, and we appreciate your coming up here.

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is Mr. Harrington here?

He has stated in a note to me here that it would not take him over 10 minutes to give his testimony.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. Chairman, I mentioned to the committee that we had other witnesses here, and I did not give their names.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sorry.

Mr. MURRAY. Mr. John J. Mankowski, of Bridgeport, Conn., representing the mine, mill, and smelter workers.

Mr. Leo Jandreau, of Schenectady, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, to save you the trouble, will you just leave them with the clerk?

Mr. MURRAY. Well, they are here to testify.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it was my intention, Mr. Murray, that you would appear for your organization, for all of the groups, and we had that agreement with the A. F. L. in order to save time.

Mr. MURRAY. They had a number of specific situations here, in their own localities. It will not take them any more than about 10 or 15 minutes apiece to get out of the way.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will take that under advisement.

Mr. MURRAY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a gentleman here that wants to catch an early train. We will have to hear him first.

What is your name?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Rev. Donald Harrington.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you live?

Mr. HARRINGTON. New York City.

The CHAIRMAN. Whom do you appear for?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I appear for the Workers' Defense League.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are they?

Mr. HARRINGTON. The Workers' Defense League is a national, nonpartisan organization, which exists for the protection and defense of the rights of all labor organized or unorganized.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a minister?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes; I am a minister of the Community Church of New York.

The CHAIRMAN. And you belong to this organization?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I belong to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. All right, sir; you may proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF REV. DONALD HARRINGTON, IN BEHALF OF THE WORKER'S DEFENSE LEAGUE

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman and honorable members of the committee, I think perhaps the sole justification for my adding the remarks of my organization to what has already been said is the fact that the Workers' Defense League represents not only labor groups but large numbers of church and middle-class people, and consequently as we have an interest in this problem, I thought you would all like to hear this broader point of view.

I want to thank you especially for your graciousness, Chairman May, in accommodating yourself to my necessities.

I shall try to be very brief and not to cover any of the ground that has previously been covered, although a lot of the material which I have brought has already been presented.

May I say, in behalf of the Worker's Defense League, that we are opposed to this legislation, H. R. 1119, and also to any broader National Service Act.

I have listed, in a statement which I have prepared, 10 reasons as to why we are opposed to this legislation, and I will, with your permission, put that in the record.

If you will allow me, I will briefly mention, for about 1 minute a piece, the 10 reasons why we are opposed to this legislation.

In the first place, we feel that adequate defense has been presented that it is not really necessary. That is, that legislation as drastic as this is not necessary to meet the exigencies of the present situation, and we would like to remind the committee that this is drastic legislation. That is unprecedented in the history of the United States, and, therefore, that it should require an exceedingly great emergency, much greater than any for which evidence has yet been presented to require any such legislation as this.

I am not going to go on to present the evidence to support this statement, although I have such evidence, because I feel that most of it has already been very ably presented by Mr. Hines and Mr. Murray. I would like to emphasize only one aspect of this whole problem, and that is the fact that we have a vast potential pool of labor in the Negroes of this country that is not being used.

Mr. HARNESS. Mr. Chairman, might I interrupt the gentleman right on that point? The first thing you said was you were opposed to this because the evidence thus far had not convinced you that it was necessary.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Is that the main reason you are opposed to it?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No; that is just one of them.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, these hearings are not over. Suppose evidence is submitted here that would show it was necessary to win this war. Would you change your mind about it?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, it would be all according to the evidence. I cannot answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the question is, if it did appear, what would you say?

Mr. HARRINGTON. The only thing that I can say is that from all of the evidence that I have seen, it would not. In any case, I would be very reluctant, and I think the organization would be very reluctant, to take as drastic and unprecedented a step as this.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. HARRINGTON. With regard to the question of the potential supply of Negroes, I do not have to remind you, because Mr. Murray has already said, that this supply is at hand but is not being used.

I just want to present one bit of evidence to support the contention which Mr. Murray advanced, that I know about personally. This is an affidavit by a young negro in the city of New York, who states that on July 3, 1944, she applied for employment at the United States Employment Service. She is over 21, but in her twenties, is compe-

tent, educated; ready and willing to take work, but since that time she has received absolutely no information from the U. S. E. S. as to any need for her services, as to the fact that there is any manpower shortage or that there are any war jobs available, and if I may, I would like to put this affidavit in the record and suggest that others could be secured in other centers.

The CHAIRMAN. The affidavit will be made a part of the record.

(The affidavit referred to is as follows:)

JANUARY 11, 1945.

I, Adelene McBean, a legal resident of New York City, have lived continuously in this city since April 9, 1944, at 35 Mount Morris Park West and have been registered with the United States Employment Service at 10 East Fortieth Street since July 3, 1944, for employment.

I have not received any form of communication from the United States Employment Service, written or oral, requesting me to take any form of employment or referring me to any other office of the United States Employment Service for employment; nor have I been informed by any person in the United States Employment Service that there was or is any serious manpower shortage nor that there were or are war jobs available or nursing schools open to me.

I am over 21, competent, educated, and experienced; am in sound health mentally and physically but have been forced to seek employment outside of the United States Employment Service and am at the present time unemployed. I have not visited the United States Employment Service since I registered July 3, 1944, because I assumed that I would be called if Negroes were wantd.

I, the undersigned, do swear that the above statement is true and was made of my own volition.

ADELENE MCBEAN.

Witnessed by Martha Hohman, January 11, 1945.

Mr. HARRINGTON. The second reason for the opposition of my organization is that we feel that this legislation would not produce the desired results, because of the fact that those who would administer the legislation would have to supply, as Mr. Murray has put it, perhaps very well, a large degree of manpower to enforce it and to administer it.

There was a very interesting discussion of this whole problem over the radio last Friday on the People's Platform, at 6:15 over WABC in New York, and at that time a New York industrialist and publisher, Mr. Eldridge Haines, stated that he had information that it had taken the British, who have a national service act, 17 months to get it operating smoothly. It had taken them 17 months, and that with the cooperation of labor right in the administration of the government, in the British Cabinet.

The third reason for our opposition is that this legislation has the united opposition of both labor and management, and as it has that united opposition, we cannot conceive that if it were forced through it would dangerously jeopardize the presently miraculous production of our war industries in the United States.

I am just sketching these because I realize the time is late.

The fourth reason we are opposed to this legislation is because it creates the impression and has in it the definite inference, so far as we can see, that labor is at least primarily responsible for the present situation. It grants the labor "baiters" major premise, that labor will not produce voluntarily and therefore must be forced. We submit that there is already enough hard feeling, and I think misunderstood feeling, between the men on the fronts and the men here at home in the factories, and that this legislation will create more hard feeling by substantiating or seeming to substantiate the contention that labor has not been willing, voluntarily, to produce.

The fifth reason for our opposition is that we feel it is exceedingly dangerous. We have, in Germany, the horrible example of what can happen to people who even voluntarily, give up small amounts of their freedom, a little at a time, and never get it back again.

I am going to skip the sixth point because I think it has been covered and the seventh.

The eighth point, in line with the one I have just made, is that we feel that this would be one more step—perhaps we might say stride—toward a totalitarian type of system, and we would remind the committee that one of the major emphases of totalitarianism that exists in Europe today is the compulsory service of labor and the forcing of labor to serve industry for the private profit of industry. We would hesitate to see the United States take this step, which has such strong characteristics of totalitarianism.

And, ninth, we are opposed because we believe not only in the theory of freedom but in the practice of freedom. We believe that freedom is not only a good theory, a good idea, but that actually it can produce, and that as free labor in America has outproduced man for man, machine for machine, forced labor in Europe, so also free labor in Europe will outproduce, man for man, machine for machine free labor in America.

We feel that voluntary means will get cooperation. There is an old saying, "You can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink."

I think it is also true that you can get, if you will present your case adequately, the voluntary support of American labor for this great task, and these IV–F's, if the situation is presented to them adequately, and they are given reasonable assurances of security, of transportation to and from where they are wanted, and so forth and so on, that they will cooperate.

I might liken the whole situation to the question of an opening of a door. I can remember the experience, if you will allow me to be personal a moment, in my childhood, where a man became angry at a meeting at one of our churches and he left the room in a huff. He came up against the door and it did not open; he twisted the knob and he pushed and still the door did not open. He stepped back to give it two or three swift kicks; still the door did not open. Then somebody stepped up and pushed him aside, and pulled the door open. He was trying to open it the wrong way. He was trying to push the door open when it actually needed just a little gentle treatment, for the door knob to be turned, and the door to be pulled the other way.

I think there is a similarity between that illustration and the situation which we face today and that we can get the voluntary efforts of labor, management, and the present governmental agencies to solve this problem. There is a key to this door, in other words. The key is voluntary cooperation and intelligent planning, and not force.

One other reason that we are opposed to it, and that is the last, and that is that it is our conviction that the essence, the heart of all religion, is the concept of the supreme worth and value of the individual personality. We are convinced that the individual personality cannot achieve this supreme value and worth except in an atmosphere of freedom and where it has an opportunity to exercise freely chosen alternatives and responsibilities.

I think that we have the illustration in Hitler. Why has Hitler made war upon the church? Because he realizes that religion is interested in freedom and that is one of the things he is not interested in. It is the opinion, I believe, of a vast majority of the religious leaders of this country, and, in the support of this, I would call again to your attention the statement of 118 religious leaders to Congress opposing the Austin-Wadsworth bill of about a year ago. It is their opinion that anything that threatens the freedom of human beings in this country shakes the foundations of religion.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that complete your statement?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes; I want to thank you all for your kindness.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you just two or three questions. What is your age?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thirty.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty. How are you classified in the draft?

Mr. HARRINGTON. IV–D.

The CHAIRMAN. IV–D. Not a IV–F?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No, IV–D. Do you know what the IV–D classification is, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Conscientious objector?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No; the IV–D classification is for ministers and theological students.

The CHAIRMAN. Ministerial classification?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes. Incidentally, I am not fully in agreement with that. I see no reason why we should be set apart.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with you, too. We put it in the act, you know, ourselves. Now you are opposed to all forms of compulsory legislation?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You were even opposed to the Selective Service Act, which is compulsory, were you not?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are still opposed to it?

Mr. HARRINGTON. May I make one thing clear right here, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you can answer my question.

Mr. HARRINGTON. That I am not speaking here for myself; I am speaking for the Worker's Defense League. They did not oppose, as I understand it, or if I remember correctly, the Selective Service Act. At any rate, the Worker's Defense League is not opposed to the all-out production for the war effort. I think a distinction should be made between my personal opinions and the Worker's Defense League in this particular regard.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have said here that you believe in freedom, and I am sure you do, just like all of us do. Can you tell us what constitutes the greatest threat to our freedom today that there is in the world?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Yes; I think the greatest threat to our freedom is the totalitarian system wherever it appears, which takes upon itself the absolute control of all phases of men's lives.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is more dangerous than the present German Army and the Japanese Army?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I think that there is perhaps a close relationship between the two, but I think it is more dangerous than either of those armies. They are simply the aspects of that totalitarian system.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the imminent threat, though, is on the western front, is it not?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, I suppose that there is an imminent threat on the western front.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. All right. Any questions, Mr. Martin?

Mr. MARTIN. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sheridan.

Mr. SHERIDAN. When was the Worker's Defense League formed?

Mr. HARRINGTON. In the year 1936.

Mr. SHERIDAN. What was their policy prior to December 8, 1941?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I am sorry, I do not remember.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Were you associated with it?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I was not active in it at that time.

Mr. SHERIDAN. When did you become active?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I became active 3 years ago.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Right at the time of this Selective Service Act.

Mr. HARRINGTON. No; it was after the time of the Selective Service Act.

Mr. SHERIDAN. When did you first voice your opinion against the Selective Service Act?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, Mr. Chairman, I do not see what this has to do with the testimony that I have presented.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Perhaps the committee might have some determination. Perhaps you had better leave that to us.

Mr. HARRIMAN. Well, Mr. Congressman, do you want my personal opinion?

Mr. SHERIDAN. Just answer my questions.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Now, you are taking up with me, then, a question of my own personal religious conviction? That is clear.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I am asking you when you formed that opinion.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I have always held that opinion since I was old enough to think and reason. If I were to guess the date, it was the year 1931, when I graduated from high school.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I just wondered whether you would base that opinion on one affidavit, sued of one Negro in New York City of the age of 20. By the way, did you question his draft status?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No; this was a woman.

Mr. SHERIDAN. A woman, 20 years of age, and on one affidavit you have formed an opinion that there was a supply of Negro labor in New York?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I do not base it merely on this one affidavit.

Mr. SHERIDAN. What do you base it on?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I base it also on the discussions which I have had with the Negroes and with white people in the city of Chicago, and the city of New York.

Mr. SHERIDAN. What factual matters, or what factual statements have you, Reverend, that there is this potential supply of Negro labor in Chicago?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Statements by the National Association for the Advancement of the Colored People, and I am sure that you can secure

many not only from that organization, but from the National Urban League, from the C. I. O., and the A. F. L.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I am asking you where you obtained your information.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Well, that is the source.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Now, on this statement about the National Association for the Advance of Government, of which I happen to be a member, was their statement as to the potential supply of colored labor available?

Mr. HARRIMAN. I do not have their exact figure.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Have you seen it?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I have had it quoted to me.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Have you ever seen it, I am asking you?

Mr. HARRINGTON. No.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Now, you also referred to hard feelings at the front. Upon what factual basis do you make that statement?

Mr. HARRINGTON. Discussion with a great many men who have come back from the front.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How many have you discussed it with?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I have been preparing a talk——

Mr. SHERIDAN. Just answer the question. Then you can elaborate on it.

How many have you discussed it with?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I would estimate somewhere between 20 and 50 men who have returned.

Mr. SHERIDAN. And you say every one of them has hard feelings toward labor at the front?

Mr. HARRINGTON. The vast majority have felt, through the sources of information that they have, that labor has not been supporting the war effort adequately. I have been preparing a talk on this subject, Mr. Chairman, that is why——

Mr. SHERIDAN. Now, as to your personal reference to opening a door. Do you realize that a door should open out as a fire hazard? Perhaps in your church they did not.

Mr. HARRINGTON. In our church they do open out, Mr. Chairman, but I happen to live in a housing project that is fireproof.

Mr. SHERIDAN. All doors are supposed to open out, Reverend, so there was a mistake there.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harness, do you have any questions?

Mr. HARNESS. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Philbin, any questions?

Mr. PHILBIN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

We will adjourn until 2:30.

(Whereupon, at 1:45 p. m., an adjournment was taken until 2:30 p. m., the same day.)

The committee reassembled at 2:30 p. m., pursuant to recess.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order and we will continue the hearings on H. R. 1119. The next witness is Mr. John J. Mankowski. Will you tell us whom you represent, Mr. Mankowski, then proceed with your statement?

STATEMENT OF JOHN J. MANKOWSKI, EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER, DISTRICT 6, MINE, MILL, AND SMELTER WORKERS UNION

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I am executive board member of district 6 of the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers Union.

The CHAIRMAN. In what place?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. In the East; the 13 Original States is the jurisdiction which I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you live, in Pittsburgh?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. In Connecticut.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had occasion to study H. R. 1119?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I have read it; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a memorandum here that you represent many of the mine, mill, and smelter workers. Is that correct?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a subsidiary of the C. I. O.?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. It is one of the international unions within the C. I. O.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may proceed with your statement.

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Chairman May and Congressmen, I have a specific subject that I would like to bring to your attention, and that is on the manpower question as it relates to the strip brass which the Army has asked us to increase in production. This past December we had representatives of W. P. B. and the Army come into Waterbury, where our office is located, and they asked us what we could do to increase the production of strip brass from these mills that are located there—and, incidentally, the largest of the rolling mills that roll this strip brass are, I think, located in Connecticut. During this conversation with the W. P. B. representatives and Colonel Harshman of the Army I suggested to them that the best way to get a solution to this problem is to lay down the facts to our people who are working in these mills. I said: "If you could meet with them and explain to them just what you want, I am sure the problem could be met." Colonel Harshman agreed with me, so we called a meeting of all the union representatives in all of these major brass mills in that area in December. It was addressed by Colonel Harshman, and he explained just what he wanted as far as the Army was concerned and as far as the strip brass munition program was concerned.

At that meeting all of our people agreed that we should get into this wholeheartedly, and out of that meeting a steering committee was set up with one representative from each of the branches, each of the companies, and we also set up a program on recruiting some manpower—assisting in recruiting manpower.

The question of how to go about this among ourselves came up, and after some discussion we came to what we thought was a proper solution of this problem. We made up a questionnaire which we called the pass-the-ammunition questionnaire. We appropriated the title, and it has worked out very nicely.

This questionnaire was mimeographed, and each one of the steering committee members was given as many as he had employees within his particular shop. The steering committee was then instructed to meet with the local management to see if we could not arrange to go through the mills to find out definitely if we could not get the people

within the mills to work extra hours, and also to find out if they didn't have some people in mind whom they could suggest to us for a visit, possibly, in order to convince them to come into the war plants.

The first report on this came back here to me a week ago, and it was most successful.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me for interrupting you. When did you say you started your questionnaire program? Let us get those dates.

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Our meeting was held on December 18, the original meeting, and subsequently this was put into effect.

Mr. ANDREWS. When was the first date in December to which you referred?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. December 18 was when we held our meeting.

Af course, the local unions in that area had been assisting right along in recruiting manpower, but we felt that on account of the importance of this ammunition program, posssibly from within the mills, we could convince our people to work extra hours to get this ammunition production out in the three unions of the shop which we have under contract. In one of them our stewards visited only two departments, in which 333 people indicated that they would be willing to work extra hours to produce this strip brass. That was the equivalent of 5,647 hours per week. In another unit 509 men indicated they would be willing to work extra hours to get this production out. That was approximately 2,050 man-hours daily.

In another unit 854 men—I should say employees—indicated they would work extra hours.

Mr. ANDREWS. Let me ask one question there. Suppose right now we said to those two plants, "You go in there and take 15 percent of your able-bodied young men who would be eligible for military service and let them right out of there." What would you do?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I wouldn't know how many that 15 percent would constitute.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, say there are 333 men. Suppose we go in there and take 50 young men out of those plants and out of key positions. They are fit for military service, and we lift them right out of there, take them out. What are you going to do then?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. If you lift 15 percent out of there?

Mr. ANDREWS. You spoke of a plant having 333 employees.

Mr. MANKOWSKI. No; this isn't the total number of employees.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, any one of those plants. Suppose you knew there was quite a large percentage of important employees in those plants that are now going to be taken by the military services, men who are in so-called key positions today, young, I–A for military service. The Government says, "We are not going to leave those men in that plant any longer. We need them for military service." What are you going to do then?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I think we would still have to follow out this program of finding people to work extra hours. In this last plant I mentioned there were 854 people who indicated that, and there were over 3,000 man-hours daily that we found were willing to work extra hours.

The reaction of management to this program, their support, has been very good. They have indicated that they would work along with us, along this man-hour program, and as a matter of fact, one of the plants desired to make a survey along these lines of the whole

plant so they could find out where they could place these people in other ammunition jobs, in other sections of the plant.

Mr. HARNESS. What kind of ammunition do they produce in those plants?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Some of these plants do not produce the actual amunition. Some of them just roll strip brass, and it is sent to other plants for cupping, and so forth.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the average number of hours a person works, one of these who signified his willingness to increase his working hours? What are his average hours worked in the particular plant?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Eight hours.

Mr. ANDREWS. A 48-hour week?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. A 48-hour week.

Mr. JOHNSON. How much were they to step up their hours?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. The management, according to the report they received as to indications of how many would want to work, would arrange their schedules so that they could place these people in the most advantageous positions.

Mr. HARNESS. Was this all done because there was a shortage of labor there in those plants, or was it done to increase production and meet an increased schedule?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. It was done to help the ammunition program, to increase their production. We were given figures from the W. P. B. and from Colonel Harshman himself, telling us just what the Army expected of these plants.

Mr. HARNESS. In other words, they wanted five times more ammunition than those plants were turning out?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. They wanted more than five times, if they could get it. According to these figures, these units would have to increase their poundage per month in the Copper Division of W. P. B., which has given us some of these figures, they indicate that within our own unit—that is, all over the country from these figures—and they are not the total, accurate figures—that is, they are quick additions that I made here—we are expected to produce about 15,000,000 pounds of brass strip for ammunition per month. Now, under the W. P. B. schedule I find by quick addition that this program requests five-hundred-and-some-odd people—that is, all over the country in these plants which we have under contract.

Mr. HARNESS. I am not sure that I get the reason for the survey. Assuming they had 500 people in the plant and they were meeting the schedule of the War Department in producing the shell casings. They stepped that up, you say, more than five times, five times as much as they had in the beginning. Now, after getting this new schedule, five times more than they had been producing, can the same number of employees meet that schedule?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I was just coming to that section of it.

Mr. HARNESS. That was the basis of your survey, wasn't it, to see if you could meet that schedule with those employees?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Increase the production; yes. In some of the plants, after the survey was completed, and when the committee met with the management to put this into effect, we found that there was some shortage of metal. Whatever department or what division was responsible, we don't know, but the management told us that in some

68175—45——20

cases the casting shops were working at capacity, that is, their producing capacity, and that the rolling units were able to take care of everything that they produced, but if they intended to increase the production they would have to get castings from outside; that is, they were taxing their own facilities to the limit. So, in some cases where there were two shifts operating, we asked under this program, as long as enough people indicated they were willing to work extra hours, to start a third shift up, but now we find that because of the casting problem we will not be able to put this into effect until that problem is met. That is another thing that has cropped up since this study.

In Torrington, in one of our units we find that the rod mill up there, which is also an important problem, also produces something of importance to this war effort, they are going to 40 hours a week, not because of manpower shortage, but because of shortage of metal.

Mr. HARNESS. That is from 48 hours to 40 hours?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Yes. I was just notified of that in the past few days. As far as the program itself is concerned, one of the management has expressed to us the statement that under this plan they could meet the requirements which the War Production Board has asked them to get out.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they could or could not?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. They could, so far as this particular program is concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your plants were fully manned until you got these additional requirements, from the service for production?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. The plants in that area did not indicate too serious a shortage because, as I said before, in computing these figures of W. P. B., I find that there are only 571 men that could be required under this ammunition program for all of the plants that we have under contract, extending from the east coast to the Middle West.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is the only requirement to meet the labor shortage?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. On this particular program.

The CHAIRMAN. You can increase the hours of work and meet that condition?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That is right. The people in these plants have indicated that they would increase their hours of work to meet this ammunition shortage.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do management and labor both agree on increasing the hours of work?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, above the 48-hour week?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. How does it happen that one plant reduced their hours down to 40 hours a week?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That was not because of manpower shortage. As I said before, it was because of inability to get certain types of metal.

Mr. SHERIDAN. What plant was it in which you said you were making a survey? That was in Waterbury, Conn.?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Yes.

Mr. SHERIDAN. What plant was it that you were making the survey in up there?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. This survey was completed in the American Brass Co., and there are three units, Ansonia, Waterbury, and Warrington, Conn.

Mr. SHERIDAN. One branch is what they call the West End branch up there, isn't it? That is where they make the shells up there?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Yes: that is right. We are meeting with that management this week. We have not met with them yet.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How about the Chase rolling mill up there?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Chase is going through their plant this week with us.

Mr. SHERIDAN. They have not made a report yet?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. No; not yet.

Mr. SHERIDAN. So the only plant so far would be the rolling mill over on the West End?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. American Brass. That is right. But actually, though, there is no question but that the same thing will happen in the rest of these plants as has happened in that one, because throughout all of these local unions, each one of them has indicated that they will do whatever they can to increase the production of strip brass.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How many shifts are they operating up there?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. In some case two.

Mr. SHERIDAN. None of them are operating three?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. In some cases there are three.

Mr. SHERIDAN. West End is operating three, aren't they?

Mr .MANKOWSKI. No; two shifts.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How about the Chase plant up in Waterbury?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I couldn't say how many shifts they have.

Mr. SHERIDAN. That is right close there. That is the biggest one up there.

Mr. MANOWSKI. That's right.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How about the Scoville plant? They only do the drawing of the shells, casting, and rolling out there?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Yes; they do.

Mr. SHERIDAN. The casting and rolling plant is on the West End. That is the only one that has any extensive contracts?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. We have contracts in all of them.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I mean with respect to the application of this survey. You have them with the Waterbury Manufacturing Co. They have a big rolling mill over in Bath. That is the one that you made a survey in this week, isn't it?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. The Chase plant is making the survey this week, and will meet with the Scoville also.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How about Rome & Atlee down in the south end of the town there?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Blume & Atwood have received their copies of this. Bristol Brass Co., where we have a contract, the stewards up there have received theirs.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Is that incorporated in your figures there?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. No; this was just one unit which was completed.

Mr. SHERIDAN. You include the west-end plant in Waterbury, one in Torrington, and what else?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Ansonia.

Mr. SHERIDAN. That is American Brass?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHERIDAN. That is a smaller unit. Is that the one in which you say there were three-hundred-and-some-odd?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. No; in the Ansonia plant there were approximately 4,000 people employed, but in making this survey we confined it to two departments, the department in which the rolling is done, and we surveyed the other people in there, and these 333 people have indicated—for instance, in one section of the brass mill there are eight-hundred-and-some-odd people, and in the copper mill, where there is some sheet rolling done, there is another five or six hundred.

Mr. SHERIDAN. And in the over-all of the employees of which you made a survey, 333 indicated they would be willing to work extra hours?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That is from two departments, though, not the entire plant in Ansonia.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Wouldn't that policy or plan apply also, or be proper to interrogate the other departments about, to see how many men might be taken out of there and used?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That's right, of course. That was the first plant that was surveyed, you see.

Mr. SHERIDAN. And it was only partially surveyed?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That's right. We then went into the Waterbury plant.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Why didn't you complete it at Ansonia? Why didn't you complete your survey in Ansonia? Why did you make it in just two departments and then move on to Waterbury?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. In the ammunition program the management and the union felt that, as long as the survey was going to be conducted, they should conduct it in that department in which this work would necessarily be done.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Why did you go into two departments only and not go through the entire plant before you got on a truck and shipped away to another plant?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. The management has indicated to us that they have sufficient help in these other department to take care of this, but it is on these rolling units and annealing furnaces that they need help.

Mr. SHERIDAN. All your survey was for was to find out what surplus labor was available to work extra hours to meet this additional program of 5,000-percent increase? Wasn't that the purpose of your survey?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Yes, to try to.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Wouldn't it have been better to go into all the departments at one time and make a complete survey and find out how many were willing to work extra hours, instead of having a partial section of the whole?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. The survey, as I said, was put into effect in Ansonia first. From there we went to Waterbury and took in the whole plant rather than part of it.

Mr. SHERIDAN. That is the very point of my inquiry. You took two departments in Ansonia and then went to Waterbury and tied up the entire plant there. Why didn't you complete the survey in Ansonia first?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. As far as the Ansonia plant was concerned, the management there said that on this ammunition program they would require approximately 30 people in order to meet the demands of W. P. B. and the Army.

Mr. HARNESS. In this one section they had to get the extra hours to make up 30 men? They had enough employees in the rest of the line to carry out the program? Is that it?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That's right.

Mr. HARNESS. So there was no necessity for asking the other sections to work additional time.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I am just wondering whether that 333, which represents less than 10 percent of the 4,000 employees, would not have been actuated more by patriotic duty than by any effort on the part of the union to determine from their membership how many additional hours were available by longer hours of work there. I think it is logical for this committee to assume that at least 10 percent of 4,000 people would volunteer without any effort on the part of your survey, to give extra hours in an over-all work program.

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I don't know whether I have made myself clear on this thing.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Perhaps I don't get you clearly on it. That was my conclusion.

Mr. MANKOWSKI. It was intentional that we did not survey the other sections of this plant, you understand. In the preliminary meeting with the management, the management said: "Let us survey the department where this work is being put out now."

Mr. SHERIDAN. Would it be reasonable, then, to assume that the situation in the two departments you did survey was indicative of the other departments, too?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That is right, if we went through that plant.

Mr. SHERIDAN. You are reasonably sure that that would be the case?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Oh, yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Did your survey show that the shortage you report in manpower could be made up by lengthening hours of those employed in the plant, in those sections of the plant?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. The concrete example that I could give you is one of the units whose management has indicated to us that through this survey and putting it into effect they could meet the requirements of W. P. B. and the Army in the ammunition program.

Mr. MARTIN. Without any increase in the number of employees?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That's right.

Mr. MARTIN. And what was their indicated shortage?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. W. P. B. wanted a million extra pounds a month from them.

Mr. MARTIN. There was no estimate of the shortage of manpower except as shown by your survey?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That is right.

Mr. MARTIN. Just your efforts to meet the added production program?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Correct.

Mr. MARTIN. You made the statement a moment ago that you could take care of the entire program, over-all in the plants in which you are interested, by the addition of a certain number of men, 500 or some such number?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Those are the figures from this sheet. I roughly estimate that there are 571 which these companies have indicated they need—that is, the companies that we are dealing with. I am not taking other companies.

Mr. MARTIN. Is that shortage distributed so that it could be made up by increasing the number of hours, or must we consider adding new employees to make up the manpower needs for the increased production program?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Well, let us put it this way: If this program were put into effect with the indicated numbers of people that have indicated they would work these extra hours, I think the shifts could be arranged so that the ammunition program would not require any more people.

Mr. MARTIN. And the entire shortage, if it were distributed throughout the territory you are covering, that reasonable increase of hours could make it up?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I think so.

Mr. MARTIN. In other words, there is no one spot that is wholly short of manpower, that you would have to move manpower into?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Of course, in the Waterbury area you have the Chase plant, the Scoville plant, and the American Brass plant. They are all big plants there. We haven't touched the Scoville or the Chase. We haven't had any reports on those so far as the survey is concerned, but in the American Brass plant in Waterbury, I think that with this program we could meet the requirements.

Mr. JOHNSON. Did any of the people that you interviewed in the factories say they didn't want to work the extra hours?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That we did not make a record of. We asked—we contacted the stewards.

Mr. JOHNSON. Did any of them say "No," regardless of the number? Can you tell us that?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I think that in asking that question of our stewards, there were various reasons given why they could not work.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mean like having small children and such things as that?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Yes. There were questions of transportation involved, too.

Mr. JOHNSON. But there were some that either could not work or did not want to work longer hours?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I would not know the exact reason for that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Has your union had any experience with working men over 8 hours a day during the war?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Oh, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Do you get as much out of that extra hour as you do out of the other hours of the day?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I think so.

Mr. JOHNSON. Production does not depreciate during that period of overwork?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Of course, there is this to be said, that if you work them continuously on a certain lengthened schedule, it will begin to affect them.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are contemplating working only 1 hour extra a day?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Actually, the union and the company would have to arrange whatever schedule was agreeable to both of them. You could not expect that because a man has indicated that he would work extra hours you could work him, for instance, 12 hours for any length of time.

Mr. JOHNSON. But isn't it correct that he would work 1 more hour a day, work one-eighth more each day?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. I don't know whether that is correct or not, because it would be almost impossible to arrange a schedule where it would take care of that. You see, in these rolling units there is a certain amount of experience that is required, and you just can't put a man in for an hour and replace him with another man for an hour.

Mr. JOHNSON. But the man would work 9 hours instead of 8. He wouldn't replace anybody, would he?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. That's right. He would be willing to work that; yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, in working that extra hour, was there any difference in the rate of pay? Would they get a larger amount for that hour than for the other hours of the day?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. Most of our contracts call for time and a half for overtime.

Mr. JOHNSON. Would that raise any complications with the employer, who had bid a definite amount on the contract, based on the assumption that his men would work an 8-hour day?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. As a matter of fact, in the survey which we have just completed, that question did not come up.

Mr. JOHNSON. That would complicate the situation. In your opinion would that raise some difficulties to get the employers to agree?

Mr. MANKOWSKI. The employer in this particular case has agreed to this.

Mr. JOHNSON. Would that be true of employers generally?

Mr. SHERIDAN. I believe the extra amount that they have to pay under a condition of this kind, for the extra time, is provided for in all Government contracts.

Mr. JOHNSON. If that is the universal rule, then that answers the question.

Thank you very much, Mr. Mankowski. We will now hear Mr. Jandreau. Will you please give your name and whom you represent, for the record?

STATEMENT OF LEO JANDREAU, GENERAL VICE PRESIDENT, UNITED ELECTRICAL AND RADIO MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, C. I. O., SCHENECTADY, N. Y.

Mr. JANDREAU. My name is Leo Jandreau. I am general vice president of the United Electrical and Radio Machine Workers of America, an affiliate of C. I. O.

The CHAIRMAN. You live where?

Mr. JANDREAU. I live in Schenectady, N. Y.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed with your statement.

Mr. JANDREAU. Mr. Chairman, I am appearing on behalf of eleven hundred thousand war workers in such plants as the General Electric Co., Westinghouse Co., R. C. A., Sperry Gyroscope and the electrical

division of General Motors, and thousands of other war plants under contract with our union.

I welcome the opportunity to present certain facts that our union has developed as the result of a thorough investigation of the status of war production in certain of our plants leased by the war agencies, requiring manpower in order to meet critical production schedules. This investigation emphasizes the urgent necessity of Mr. Murray's proposal for an immediate conference of labor, industry, agriculture and Government leaders to gear our production at the highest possible level.

This investigation conducted by our union has demonstrated a number of factors that are impeding the shipment of war material in our industry. These factors are as follows:

1. Our companies need war contracts, not manpower.
2. Some of the large companies have been devoting their energies for the last few months to post-war planning at the expense of critical arms production.
3. The procurement agencies of the Government have failed to integrate sharp decreases in certain types of war equipment with new and stepped-up demand, so as to fully utilize existing facilities.
4. Wage rates of 50 cents an hour, prevalent in the vacuum tube industry, do not encourage workers to accept employment.
5. Rate cutting exists within plants and within areas where cutbacks create unemployment and require the transfer of employees to other departments or plants on new types of production.

With regard to the first point, lack of work, I would like to know how national service legislation will remedy this situation. I have found that one of the critical plants in Fort Wayne, Ind.—I quote from a telegram:

> We, the undersigned employees of the Farnsworth Television and Radio Corporation and members of the U. E. Local 916, have pledged that our main job is to produce all out until victory is ours. As skilled workers in the production of radio and radar equipment, we cannot understand how we can face a lay-off of 200 employees this weekend, and hundreds more in the next few weeks, when Government and military leaders have announced a critical shortage of vitally needed radar equipment. Our sons and brothers on the battle front need radar equipment. We can build the best. We urge you to prevail upon responsible Government agencies to get work in our plants so we may continue producing without interruption.

I might add that employment will drop to 150 by the middle of March from a peak of 975, 2 months ago unless this company obtains more work.

Mr. ANDREWS. What is the date of that telegram?

Mr. JANDREAU. January 12. I would like to know how you expect national service legislation to remedy the situation we have in Schenectady. We find that the General Electric Co., in line with post-war plans, have transferred radio work, equipment, and engineering personnel from its Schenectady plant to the city of Syracuse, where a large expansion program is being conducted by the company. We also find this company transferring equipment and engineering personnel to Erie to manufacture refrigerators.

In accordance with its plan made last fall, indicated by the construction of post-war plants, since January 1, 1944, employment at the Schenectady works has decreased approximately 8,000 employees.

The largest proportion of this decease was in the radio and radar departments. However, it is listed by the W. P. B. as one of the companies that are unable to meet their radio and radar production schedules because of lack of manpower. The union conducted a survey in the plants on existing facilities and equipment, and we found in the radio division that approximately 50 percent of the space and machinery is not being utilized.

The War Manpower Commission, in a statement in the New York Times on Sunday, January 7, points out that the Schenectady area has a surplus of labor, and records a critical shortage of labor in the Syracuse area, where the company is routing the radio Government orders to be manufactured.

We also find that in the Schenectady plant of the G. E. Co. the employment in the steel foundry has decreased by 50 percent in the past 12 months. The tonnage of steel castings has dropped off accordingly. The founders in these plants are equipped to produce castings from ounces to several tons. As late as last week experienced molders and coremakers were notified by the supervision to find work in other departments of the plant if they expected to be continued as deferments by Selective Service. At the same time we find the company subcontracting for foundry work in the city of Buffalo, where a serious labor shortage exists, and where it was necessary to place several hundred Jamaicans to man the foundries in that area. Furthermore, the General Electric Co. operates a foundry in the city of Elmira, where it brought in Jamaicans in the past 12 months because of lack of manpower, although in the past it was a practice of the company to transfer work into Schenectady when there was a surplus of work in Elmira, or to transfer any surpluses in Schenectady into Elmira to have the work done.

A year ago there was a total of 28,000 employees in the Schenectady works, whereas today there are 15,000 on the first shift, 4,000 on the second shift, and 783 on the third shift, a decrease of approximately 25 percent. And this decrease, so far as the union knows, is due to cut-backs in war production.

I should like to point out at this time that the facilities and equipment and the 15,000 employees on the day shift are not being fully utilized, and we found out that employees on the second shift in a number of departments were working less than 40 hours a week.

Mr. ARENDS. You say they are not fully utilized, and not working 8 hours?

Mr. JANDREAU. Some are working less than 40 hours a week, and some are working 5 days a week.

Mr. ARENDS. And getting paid for a 40-hour week?

Mr. JANDREAU. They are getting paid for what they work. It depends on the schedule of work in that department. As a matter of fact, in the foundry, several weeks ago, after 50 percent of the personnel had been laid off, the remaining personnel was working less than 40 hours a week in the steel foundry.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one question there. I think your testimony up to this point discloses that the company has been shifting men back and forth from plant to plant.

Mr. JANDREAU. No; that is not true. My testimony up to now seems to have a bearing on the company's post-war program to get rid of

surplus help, to get rid of war orders, to decrease their inventories at the expense of the war effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think then, that you have made a case here for national service legislation that would enable the War Manpower Commission or the Director of Mobilization one or the other, to control that kind of situation?

Mr. JANDREAU. No, I don't think so. What I am pointing out is the need of the companies to get more war work and keep the personnel that they have at the present time employed, rather than to notify them that there isn't any work, and release them. It seems to me you fellows who are advocating a national service act are doing it for one reason, and that is that the War Production Board or the Government agencies that are responsible for getting requirements for the Army services say, "We can't meet our schedules. We can't get the production," and the companies say, "We haven't any manpower." And you look over the surplus of people in the country and find out that they are not working in essential industries, and you come to the conclusion that you have to force them to work. Now, I am trying to make the point here that the employer, industry, has not tried to fully utilize the people that they have available. For example, we didn't hear when we got production awards from the Army and Navy in 1942 and 1943 that there was a manpower shortage, or we didn't hear anyone say that there was a need for a national service act. We had the work and we were producing and meeting the schedules.

The CHAIRMAN. National service legislation would control both the employer and the employee. If we should pass that kind of drastic legislation it would meet the very situation you speak of.

Mr. JANDREAU. As Mr. Murray pointed out this morning, it seems to our organization in the electrical industry that ways and means can be found through cooperation, voluntary cooperation, to meet the situation. I know that if employers will supply the jobs, and if Government will give them the work, they will meet the schedules. And I have another point later on, to lay some of the responsibility at the door of the procurement agencies, saying that they haven't done a good job, and it seems to us that if the companies will have the jobs to do, the people will fill them and do the work. This is deliberate, Congressmen, on the part of the companies, so far as I am concerned, because it was only a short time ago when the president of the General Electric Co. made an announcement on the basis of a plan of decentralization, and I will assure you it is being carried out at the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think somebody ought to stop him from doing that? What is your answer to that question?

Mr. JANDREAU. I think he can be stopped, and I don't think it requires national legislation to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. How are you going to do it without some kind of legislation?

Mr. JANDREAU. I don't know. He tells the union that there are cut-backs due to cancelations. If a Government agency stepped up and said, "Here are the jobs, and we want them done," I think they would comply.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe he is lying about it, and if he is, the National Service Director would find out about it. I think you are making an argument for national-service legislation. I am not dedicated to that legislation, but I think you are presenting a situation that needs control by national service.

Mr. KILDAY. You spoke of transferring work from Schenectady to Syracuse. It is your idea that the General Electric Co. is decentralizing by moving this work to Syracuse from Schenectady?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes. They are building what is known as an electronic park in Syracuse.

Mr. KILDAY. That is a post-war development?

Mr. JANDREAU. A post-war plant of the company. The company has just divided—well, they have created, let us say, a new division with the company known as the electronics division, headed up by a new vice president, and they are going to concentrate in Syracuse all radio work formerly done in Bridgeport, Schenectady, or anywhere else in the allied plants. That will all be brought into Syracuse. It so happens that the Syracuse area right now, according to the War Manpower Commission, is in a very critical state so far as the labor supply is concerned. So we find that the post-war planning of the company is only making this situation worse and not better.

Mr. KILDAY. Does that critical situation exist in Schenectady?

Mr. JANDREAU. The report I get is that there is a surplus of labor in Schenectady.

Mr. DURHAM. They make radar equipment, too.

Mr. JANDREAU. As a matter of fact, further along in my report I point out that at the present time they are taking up equipment and machinery in Schenectady and sending it to Syracuse.

Mr. DURHAM. Do they have a foundry there that is not operating at full capacity?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes; they have.

Mr. DURHAM. And they make castings for what, trucks?

Mr. JANDREAU. We make castings.

Mr. DURHAM. For heavy trucks?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes. We can make castings for anything.

Mr. DURHAM. That is one of the critical shortages, and one of the most difficult to meet.

Mr. JANDREAU. In the First World War we made ammunition and lots of it in the Schenectady works with the present equipment. Some of the boys that are working there at the present time made ammunition in the First World War.

The General Electric plant at Schenectady is not a war baby. Aside from being tooled for the production of radio, radar, airplane motors, and miscellaneous types of critical war materials, the G. E. plant is tooled for the production of small arms and munition which was produced by that plant in substantial volume during World War I. Vacuum tubes, another critical item of war production, are being handled similarly in accordance with the company's decentralization program for post-war.

The company has established plants in areas such as Utica, Buffalo, Poughkeepsie, North Hampton, where they intend to manufacture radio tubes. This, I may say, was done within the past 12 months. This results in a displacement of workers in the Schenectady works while machinery formerly used in the manufacture of vacuum tubes there is being crated and shipped to the newly established plant. The shortage of radio tubes is one of the most serious bottlenecks in the radio and radar industry.

In the General Electric Bridgeport plant we found a month ago that the company began to concentrate its force on the peacetime production of radios and home appliances, in which this plant specialized, so that it would be able to go back into peacetime production at a moment's notice. The company is now being forced to lay off people for lack of work in the radio-radar division and on the rocket program, as a result of its failure to secure scheduled additional war work.

In the Westinghouse Co. we found a similar attitude with respect to war production. On October 20, 1944, our union received a letter from a responsible official of the Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co., stating that:

> The U. E. agreement dated April 1, 1944, has several provisions established for the war emergency. The anticipated progress of the war and return to civilian production on a limited basis makes it necessary that an understanding be arrived at as to what constitutes the war emergency.

Our union replied to the Westinghouse Co. as follows:

> As far as this union is concerned, the heaviest fighting of the war is still ahead. On the basis of the information available to this union, there is still a terrific demand for manpower in the country; there is still tremendous pressure to exert every effort to increase war production for victory. Under these circumstances we are a little surprised to receive this communication requesting that we set a date for reopening the contract, in order to declare that the war emergency no longer exists.

We have suffered several large lay-offs as the result of the company's failure to replace contract run-outs.

Again we find that the National Cash Register Co. in Dayton was releasing manpower, and would have laid off over 5,000 people by January 1 if it had not been for the vigorous efforts of our union in exposing this situation of idle facilities and manpower to every war procurement agency in the Dayton area and in Washington. As the result of our efforts, the company now has undertaken several large orders for the Army and Navy.

With respect to the third factor, procurement policy, our survey showed a number of instances of the harmful effects of the war effort, resulting from the failure to integrate cut-backs with new demands for arms and ammunition. Some of the smaller companies listed today as critical in terms of manpower by the War Production Board, showed, upon investigation, that they had suffered heavy cut-backs and were actually awaiting war work. In one company, the Sperry Gyroscope, we have been faced on the one hand with continual lay-offs as the result of cut-backs in the Brooklyn plant of the company, while it is seeking manpower to meet critical programs at its Nassau plant in Long Island. We have just been informed of an additional lay-off of 400 people within 2 weeks in the Brooklyn plant of this company. The union has represented to the company that it could remedy this chaotic situation by transferring work from its Nassau plant to the Brooklyn plant.

We found in the radar industry, where design changes are constantly developed, cancelations may be followed by new contracts which require 3 or 4 months of engineering work before they are ready to go into production. However, workers cannot afford to stand by during these 3- or 4-month periods before new work is available, and must seek jobs elsewhere. So a turn-over in trained workers is constantly occurring in these plants.

With respect to our fourth factor, our investigation showed valid manpower shortages in certain plants of our industry, primarily concentrated in the radio-tube companies. However, we found in this industry unorganized starting rates of 40 to 50 cents an hour, which does not attract the large volume of women workers that are needed. These rates have no relation to the cost of living in those communities, making it practically impossible for a woman to work and maintain herself and her family in health and decency. In the National Union Radio Corporation, in Newark, there is a hiring rate of only 50 cents an hour, with no guarantee of a 48-hour work week. The same situation exists in the G. E. plants in the Syracuse area. In the Tung-Stol Corporation the company hires approximately 200 employees a month, and at the end of the month only 100 of them remained. At the end of 2 months not more than 50 have remained. The reasons for this heavy labor turn-over are poor pay, overcrowding on the day shift, poor ventilation, no decent facilities on either shift, and very poor transportation on both shifts.

The survey also reveals another serious problem jeopardizing war production caused by cut-backs requiring transfer of employees from one department to another. The rate offered may amount to $15 to $25 less a week than their current wages. Workers generally refuse to accept the lower rates which often require a learning period up to 12 months before comparable earnings can be obtained. Therefore, this low transfer rate is causing an exodus of workers from industry where cut-backs have taken place to other industries where higher rates can be obtained. However, the last week has shown an immediate response of labor to the challenge of the stepped-up war production. The U. S. E. S. offices are being swamped with men who are seeking war work. Eighteen thousand in 3 days reported in Chicago, 2,300 in Cleveland in 1 day, 2,000 making applications in Detroit, 12,000 applicants in 5 days in Baltimore. This was printed in accordance with this report in the Wall Street Journal of January 13. Let us hope that the Nation's war requirements will elicit a similar response on the part of the management.

President Murray submitted this morning two similar reports on our investigation, the plants report by the War Department, and the War Production Board, as in need of manpower, as evidence of partial utilization of existing manpower and machinery.

These cases will find no solution in the legislative proposal being considered by your committee. We point again to grievous failure to organize properly the resources of this Nation for the changing requirements of the war. This union is again, as it did in 1941 and 1942, supplying lists of idle tools to the procurement agencies in the hope that they will see fit to use these tools before trained manpower now available is dissipated through cut-backs or contract run-outs.

In our efforts to achieve orderly shifts of workers from one plant to another we have found unfortunately a tendency on the part of the Government agencies to sit back and see what the unions could do by themselves. If we are to solve these problems we must have at long last the cooperation of labor, management, and Government in accordance with the proposals submitted this morning by President Murray.

I want to say this, Mr. Chairman, that our union has no objection to conversion, if conversion is in order, provided it does not harm

the war production schedule. In other words, we do not want conversion at the expense of the war program, and I think—at least I have attempted to point out that companies like General Electric are actually putting their post-war planning ahead of their responsibility to meet the requirements of war production.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the unions able to control that situation in General Electric?

Mr. JANDREAU. We found, Mr. Chairman, that with General Electric the biggest fear is publicity.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't ask you that. I asked you if you could control the situation.

Mr. JANDREAU. I am trying to answer the question, if you will give me the opportunity. It seems to me that in such a meeting as President Murray proposed, that industry, Government, and labor would come to it, and in that meeting one would have their say, and such conference would be given the fullest publicity. It has been my experience in working with General Electric for the last 10 years in labor relations, that they would be more than glad to comply like the others, or to comply at the request of Government agencies, and the labor movement is ready to do their share in the war effort.

The CHAIRMAN. However, they have not complied with the request of your unions in various plants. I asked you the question whether or not you were able to control the situation through your unions, your workers that work in the plants.

Mr. JANDREAU. We did call on the War Production Board——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Can't you answer my question? Have you been able to control it?

Mr. JANDREAU. No; we have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what is the suggestion you have that would control it, other than national service legislation?

Mr. JANDREAU. That the Government would arrange a conference.

The CHAIRMAN. What would a conference do with it?

Mr. JANDREAU. The conference would expose this stuff, and that is what the companies worry about mostly.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have already exposed it.

Mr. JANDREAU. I am sorry, but we have not exposed it, not on the basis of what a conference would do. We have talked with the companies; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you have had several conferences with the War Manpower Commission and with the Mobilization Director and everybody downtown; have you not?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right. You see, we have another problem, Mr. May.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been having conferences?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes; we have reported to the War Manpower Commission. We have sent letters to Washington, to the War Production Board. We have met with the companies through our labor-management council.

The CHAIRMAN. And still the results have not followed?

Mr. JANDREAU. It still has not. But we have not given it publicity, and I want to say here for the benefit of the record it is the responsibility of the union leadership today to handle situations very carefully, for if they do not, it would result in labor trouble. It does not take much to rile up a group of workers. Workers enter my office every day and say: "Jandreau, what do you mean, War Production Council? What do you mean by continuously trying to find out short cuts on these production schedules, when here I have been sent home for the next 10 days because no work?" All I have to say is that the company is doing a job on us, and we will have a special meeting on it. They will ask for a special meeting. Now, we don't think that is the way to do business.

The CHAIRMAN. How will you get any pressure out of a meeting?

Mr. JANDREAU. I am sure that if Justice Byrnes called a meeting on the question of discussing war production and trying to meet the schedules, the war schedules, and invited industry and labor and all those agencies in Government that are responsible to do a job of war production, that the General Electric Co. and other companies would comply with whatever came out in the form of recommendations from such a conference, and such conferenec would receive the widest publicity.

It seems to me that you need a coordination of thought. It seems to me that at this time everybody is having their own way and doing it as they see fit, and no small segment of either group is going to be able to do a job. You have got to call them all together for a purpose.

Mr. KILDAY. Have you completed your statement, Mr. Jandreau?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes; I have.

Mr. KILDAY. You have spoken of these cut-backs and reconversion programs of the company that have resulted in men being laid off. Can you tell us how many unemployed persons you have now in your union?

Mr. JANDREAU. We have 8,000 people since January 1, 1944, laid off in our union that are either getting an unemployment stamp or a withdrawal card.

Mr. KILDAY. That is 8,000 electrical workers who have been released from former employment and have not been absorbed in other employment?

Mr. JANDREAU. I am referring specifically to the General Electric Co. now, in Schenectady.

Mr. KILDAY. Those 8,000 are all from General Electric?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes.

Mr. ARENDS. That is since January 1, 1941?

Mr. JANDREAU. January 1, 1944, the past 12 months.

Mr. KILDAY. You say they asked for a withdrawal card. What is that?

Mr. JANDREAU. We give them a withdrawal card to go into the steel industry or shoe industry or some other industry.

Mr. KILDAY. That means that 8,000 withdrew from your union, presumably to go into war work of a different character?

Mr. JANDREAU. No; they withdrew from our union because of lack of work.

Mr. KILDAY. Having been let out of the General Electric Co. they took a withdrawal card, but you can't tell us how many of them have been absorbed in other portions of the war effort?

Mr. JANDREAU. The union is in the process of making a survey now, and the purpose of this survey is to find out the type of help that is available to come back, should we get the work.

We have given each one of our members a questionnaire asking if they know of someone who has formerly worked in the company, that would be willing and available to work, to come back at a moment's notice, should we get word that there is work. How many there are, I don't know.

Mr. KILDAY. That means a net decrease of 8,000 in membership in the General Electric plants in a period of 12 months?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right.

Mr. KILDAY. Do you have some figures for any other plant?

Mr. JANDREAU. This is typical. This is a typical situation as we find it as the result of our survey.

Mr. KILDAY. I believe you mentioned a while ago that 23,000 have been released.

Mr. JANDREAU. We submitted this morning a detailed report on specific figures. Mr. Murray did, on the electrical industry, which will quote the figures I have given you.

Mr. KILDAY. Do you have any members of your union who have been let out and have not asked for withdrawal cards, maybe are waiting for more employment in their own line, that are unemployed members of your union?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. Could you give us the figures on that?

Mr. JANDREAU. I don't know. The survey that I mentioned will give us some specific information just on that point.

Mr. KILDAY. When will that be available?

Mr. JANDREAU. Within the next few weeks.

Mr. KILDAY. That's all.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Jandreau, do I understand you right that some of the blame belongs to management, some to labor, some to those down here at the head of War Manpower, and so forth? You think everyone has some part of blame for the conditions you face at the present time?

Mr. JANDREAU. Well, in the company that I mentioned, certainly labor has no control of it, because labor wanted to work. For example, among these 8,000 people that were let go, we found employees, many of them, with 4-year service, who had become eligible for full vacation plans, insurance plans, bonus plans, and what have you. They were not willing to leave, but they were notified "There is no more work on your job." A labor union cannot provide work. The best a labor union can do is to assist anyone who is willing to try to correct the situation. We asked management, "Let's go to work. Let's see the War Production Board officials. Why don't we try to convert to ammunition if we haven't got radio?" Well, we find that the War Production Board is saying "We need radio," and they find that the company is saying "We have no manpower," and that is so ridiculous because of the thousands, practically 6,000 were laid off from the radio department alone, experienced hands, assemblers, testers, machine operators of all descriptions, people who have learned their job and were getting the full rates.

Mr. DURHAM. How many men were laid off from the foundry?

Mr. JANDREAU. We had approximately 750 people working in the steel foundry.

Mr. DURHAM. And they were all laid off?

Mr. JANDREAU. Today there are 350 people, approximately, working there.

Mr. DURHAM. That is a reduction of 50 percent.

Mr. JANDREAU. Fifty percent. And the tonnage has dropped off accordingly. We can produce in the Schenectady steel foundry castings that require floor molding or machine molding or pit molding—any type of molding.

Mr. DURHAM. What is that being used for now?

Mr. JANDREAU. Half of the foundry, is just lying idle. One of the furnaces is lying idle.

Mr. DURHAM. What are the molders used for?

Mr. JANDREAU. Right now they are used for electrical apparatus.

Mr. DURHAM. That was not due to pay scales, that shortage of foundry work. Out in the Midwest we were told there was a shortage of work due to the fact that they got such a low wage scale—I believe it was raised to 60 cents an hour throughout the production there in those foundries. Your trouble was just a shut-down?

Mr. JANDREAU. That is right. In our plant we have a contract on wages which requires them to pay good wages in the foundry as well as in the machine shop. The scale covers the entire plant, regardless of type of production.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to ask the witness some questions. You favor the General Electric keeping its plants centralized in one or more large plants, rather than decentralizing into small units?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes; I do, particularly at this time, because I think they make a better contribution to the war effort.

Mr. CLASON. The General Electric has opened up a plant in my district, in East Hampton, and as I understood it you favor closing the East Hampton plant, which would meet with great disapproval by those in my district who are interested in that concern. You feel that the East Hampton plant could be closed to advantage?

Mr. JANDREAU. Of course, it is very difficult to try to clear up a situation in a State, I would say. I will say this, that it should not have opened up the East Hampton plant if it required displacement of labor in existing plants, and I say the only time there should be the opening of another plant is when there is an overflow; otherwise you can't fully utilize the available manpower and available equipment.

Mr. CLASON. Well, we will pass that for the moment. You understand that this bill is a "must" bill on the part of the administration?

Mr. JANDREAU. A "must" bill?

Mr. CLASON. In other words, it is a bill which has Presidential backing. Mr. Byrnes is behind it, and apparently your leaders have not been consulted with regard to whether or not it should be brought forward and pushed through Congress.

Mr. JANDREAU. We are opposed to the bill.

Mr. CLASON. But you understand, nevertheless, that it is backed by the administration, do you not?

Mr. JANDREAU. I understand that it was.

Mr. CLASON. Now, what effect, in your opinion, will its passage have on the members of your union?

Mr. JANDREAU. It seems to me that our people will not like it. There is no question about that. And it has been my experience

68175—45——21

that you can get much more out of an employee by voluntary action than you can by driving him, making it compulsory for him to do it.

Mr. CLASON. What, in your opinion, would be its effect on production?

Mr. JANDREAU. Our people are pretty much aware of the responsibilities in war production, and I am sure that they are going to hold up that responsibility regardless, because we have been, as you probably know, up against quite a few limitations and directives since this war started, and even though they registered quite often very sourly, we continued to march on, and I don't think, even though someone makes a mistake in legislating a law that is no good, that we will throw up our hands and say, "to the devil with the war." We won't do that.

Mr. CLASON. I appreciate that. On the other hand, you don't believe it is necessary and you feel that better results could be accomplished by an extension of the present method of agreement between labor, management, agriculture, and Government officials?

Mr. JANDREAU. I know they can do it better. As a matter of fact, I would like to cite a case. At the outset of the war in the turbine manufacturing business—it is quite a highly skilled job, as with most every occupation—we didn't have a surplus of people that could manufacture turbines. It required the existing people to take on the job of training people. In the turbine department the age is on the average about 42 years, and we put in, by working it out on a voluntary basis, an 11½-hour work schedule. It required, on the average, approximately a year to train an average turbine employee, and those fellows kept at that 11½ schedule for a period of 12 months. Not that they liked it—and they go off of it as quick as they could—but merely to establish a third shift. They did establish a third shift. Now, I am sure that if someone came around and said, "You have got to do it," we would not have been quite so successful. What we did was, we picked out leaders from that department, brought them over to the central committee of the labor-management council, have a fellow come in from the Army and explain the whole thing, explain the schedules of production, show us where we had to meet this production, and they said "O. K. If it has to be done, we will do it." And it was done, and done successfully.

Mr. CLASON. In speaking of the fact that one-half of the foundry capacity of the plant at Schenectady is idle, do you know whether or not General Electric has received orders from the Government for products which could be produced in those foundries, in that part of the foundry that is now idle, and which ought to be under production at this time?

Mr. JANDREAU. We have questioned the company on why they did not get more orders on foundry work, because we read in the papers that there is a critical shortage of foundries, and they say that they have only received cut-backs and they haven't anything available at the time, but they are in the process of trying to get more work. But the record shows that since last January there has been a gradual decrease and continuous decrease of employment and output.

Mr. CLASON. Is the type of foundry work which is possible at Schenectady such that it doesn't meet the requirements of the production now sought by the Army and Navy officials?

Mr. JANDREAU. The plant foundry at Schenectady is geared to make most any type of steel castings in any size.

Mr. CLASON. It is interesting to note that this whole subject was under discussion by a special subcommittee of this Committee on Military Affairs, and as far back as April 24, 1944, the committee was indicating, as I understand it, that it was too late, in their opinion, to shift to a National Service Act, but I am interested to note that Mr. McNutt, who is now out of the country, made two or three observations, one of which was in answer to a question which he apparently put to himself:

> Should the authority of the War Manpower Commission be augmented by the power of compulsory assignment of workers to meet emergency demands?

He answered:

> I have assumed the retention of the manpower processes which have been applied up to the present time. I would be unalterably opposed to abandonment of those processes which we should continue, to put their emphasis on voluntary and cooperative action, to preserve the plan for cooperation between management, labor, and agriculture, through committes representing those interests. It would be nothing short of tragic to throw away the work done by these committees and set up a plan of manpower utilization which puts the emphasis on direct control and compulsion, rather than upon cooperation of management, labor, and agriculture.

Does that state fairly accurately your position here today?

Mr. JANDREAU. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't get the answer.

Mr. JANDREAU. I say yes, that agrees ith me; keeping it on the voluntary basis is about right.

Mr. CLASON. Of course, you realize that the Army and Navy officials come in here and give us testimony to the opposite, and then in the long run you know we are all in the war together and ultimately, of course, we have got to do whatever is necessary to keep the men in the front lines supplied, but it is your position as it stands that this can be accomplished under a voluntary system today, and that there is no real need, so far as any information that has come to your attention is concerned, for an extension beyond the voluntary system?

Mr. JANDREAU. I don't see that there is any need for it. Another thing, too, as chairman of the draft board we manage to keep the people in the jurisdiction of that draft board pretty well in essential industries.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you chairman of the draft board?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, I am. What we do, when a fellow is working as a bartender in a grill or some less essential job, we send him a letter if he is within the draft-age limit, and tell him it is necessary for him to get into essential employment, and in 30 days if he don't, he gets the I–A, which brings him in ninety-nine times out of a hundred. Then when he comes in we tell him again that the rules of the Selective Service are to either be on deferment in essential industry or go into the Army.

Now, it seems to me there are already ways and means of keeping people employed in the proper places, and as I understand it, here last week from General Hershey's office we get information that the draft boards in Selective Service with the new rule of determining whether or not that fellow is employed in essential industry, before a person can be released, after getting his release from War Man-

power, he must then go to his draft board and get a release, or he is not released from his present position.

So I think there are all kinds of rules and regulations existing already to keep those people that are working in essential industry employed, as well as trying to persuade, let us say, these people who are not working in essential industry to go there.

Mr. HARNESS. I wonder right there, have you recently sent out these letters to men advising them that if they don't get a job in an essential industry, you are going to reclassify them?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes. We don't do that.

Mr. HARNESS. In spite of the fact that you have got 8,000 people that are out of jobs? Why don't you put them in the Army?

Mr. JANDREAU. My local draft board doesn't cover that entire situation.

Mr. HARNESS. But you have knowledge of it. You are a draft board member.

Mr. JANDREAU. We don't just arbitrarily draft a man if he is not working in essential industry.

Mr. HARNESS. If he is within the age of 18 to 26——

Mr. JANDREAU (interposing). Just a second—we try to find out why he is not working in essential industry first. If he is registered in U. S. E. S. and he has applied for work, it certainly would not be the proper thing to draft that person, particularly if he has an occupation needed in war production.

Mr. HARNESS. I have been on this draft deferment committee here for 3 years, and I thought the policy of the Selective Service was to take every man between 18 and 26 into the Army, unless he was absolutely essential in industry, and he had to be deferred on the theory that he could not be replaced.

Mr. JANDEAU. That is not the policy of Selective Service.

Mr. HARNESS. You have not been following that up there?

Mr. JANDREAU. No; that is not the policy of Selective Service. If it was, you would cripple war industry.

Mr. HARNESS. You mean by telling a fellow that is working in a beer garden or tavern that he must get a job in industry or be deferred, rather than go into the Army?

Mr. JANDREAU. That is not what you said before, Mr. Congressman. You said if anyone is not working we should draft him. I agree with you that if a fellow is found on a job that is nonessential industry, and plans on staying there, something should be done, and Selective Service is expected to do something about it.

Mr. HARNESS. Maybe we misunderstood each other about the original statement.

Mr. JANDREAU. Lots of times, due to change-over in design and getting new production ready for work, there are 3 or 4 months' unemployment periods. Now, suppose you drafted those people. That doesn't make sense, because then you would be causing a bottleneck in some real critical war production because Selective Service didn't use their heads.

Mr. HARNESS. I have always felt, and I have thought the policy was, that if a man is between the ages of 18 and 26—it used to be 30—and he was not in a key position in industry, that the Army needed him and they were going to draft him into the Army. If he is in industry and doing a job, if he can be replaced, they even draft him, if he is of military age and physically fit. But if you are sending out letters to men who are physically fit and between the ages of 18 and 26 and saying "Get into industry, get yourself a job in industry or we are going to draft you into I–A—I didn't understand that that was the policy?

Mr. JANDREAU. The purpose of setting up local draft boards and dividing cities up into many various draft boards is to get the people who know the local situation, or get people that are as close to the local situation as possible, so they can weigh up the particular situation.

Mr. HARNESS. I understand that if he is beyond the age of 26, he is beyond the age that the Army wants; I think they have been following the policy "you get into industry or we are going to take you anyway, in spite of your age."

Mr. JANDREAU. Up to 26 the Board don't have any jurisdiction anyway. Selective Service defers them, if they are going to be deferred.

Mr. CLASON. Those men would ordinarily stay in what class, if they are not in critical employment?

Mr. JANDREAU. II–B.

Mr. CLASON. As a matter of fact, are there many of them?

Mr. JANDREAU. Oh, yes.

Mr. CLASON. You have quite a few of those?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes; a few.

Mr. DURHAM. You don't object, then, to action by Selective Service, at the request of Mr. Byrnes, inducting these men, regardless of their physical status, provided they are not in a war job?

Mr. JANDREAU. I say that if industry is given the work and they offer jobs, I am sure that these jobs are going to be filled by people who are on deferment as IV–F's or people who may not be working as II–A's, or people who may not be working in essential industry at all. The reason I say that is this: In 1943 we met the production schedules. We got our production award from the Army and the Navy. In departments where they were on the up-grade production schedules, we still met them, where there was sufficient labor supply. If we did it then, why do we have to have compulsory legislation now to meet those schedules?

Mr. DURHAM. This is not compulsory; that is, the first part of this bill. That is the Byrnes directive for Selective Service, just recently in issue.

Mr. MARTIN. Over what period of time was your analysis made?

Mr. JANDREAU. The latter part of December 1944, and right up until the last few days.

Mr. MARTIN. Had you made any previous analysis along that line?

Mr. JANDREAU. No, we have not. We did not.

Mr. MARTIN. This is your first approach to it?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes. The reason for it was because the thing is we have been getting a lot of pressure from the people in the shop. It is the talk of the day in the city of Schenectady. With no work you wouldn't know the war was going on.

Mr. MARTIN. What led you to make this analysis in December?

Mr. JANDREAU. One of the primary reasons, so far as I am concerned, is the pressure from the rank and file, the members of our union, as to why isn't there work.

Mr. MARTIN. Because production was not keeping up, or because there was a need for employment, or what?

Mr. JANDREAU. Because production was not keeping up, and there were cut-backs, and no materials to replace them.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, Mr. Clason quoted from the statement of Mr. McNutt. I got the impression, although I was not on that special committee, but I got the impression that he thought he had the matter well in hand under the voluntary system last April. You would not say from your investigation or study that conditions have improved to such an extent that we have built up our production program to match the war needs from April up to December, would you?

Mr. JANDREAU. No; I would not.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, what has led to our not keeping up, if we are following this general voluntary system of cooperation, advocated by Mr. McNutt last April—and we presume that he followed that system and did not abandon it. Now you are advocating practically the same system that he advocated last April, and still I have reason to believe that the situation is worse at this time than it was last April. In other words, that system has not kept up with the needs.

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right. And I think there is one cause for it that I can recollect. It was only a short while ago, a relatively short while ago, that I was reading in the paper about conversion, gradual conversion, release of certain critical materials for commercial work, and believe me, the companies snapped it up, and as a matter of fact the companies were quite away ahead of the publicity. I have seen refrigerators started in Schenectady. I have immediately seen the plan for sending it to Erie. I have listened to Mr. Wilson's statement on decentralization, and seen the ground bought up in Syracuse, seen an appropriation by the Syracuse council of thousands of dollars to run water out there, buildings starting to go up, and I think that in itself had a tendency to soften up, we will say, the tempo that existed prior to that.

Mr. MARTIN. In other words, the overoptimism that prevailed, and the effort to reach out for reconversion, led to some break-down in the operation of the voluntary system?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, suppose we enter into another wave of optimism, have you a suggested plan to counteract it successfully, or are you going to take the same program that Mr. McNutt has been following for quite some time back, and give it another chance?

Mr. JANDREAU. Well, quite often, believe it or not, in order to jog people's memory and bring them back to their responsibilities, we in the labor movement quite often have to call meetings and say, "Now, here, we started out a while back, under no strict pledge, if you will, but we started out way back to do a certain thing. We did the job, but since then we seem to have become lax, for various reasons." We state the point. Now we think the time is appropriate to renew our pledge with vigor and start over again. The original way was the right way. We did a job, so let's buckle up our belts and do it over again, and do it right, and we think that by such a proposal as Mr. Murray makes that can be accomplished. At the same time it can put the slackers, whether on the industry side, or the Government side, or the labor side, on the spot, so they will do a better job.

Mr. MARTIN. They have not been on the spot before?

Mr. JANDREAU. They have not been on the spot at all in the past year.

Mr. MARTIN. And it is your plan, through publicity and through more vigorous determination in carrying out your voluntary or cooperative system, to face the possible wave of optimism that may come over us again a little more sternly?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right.

Mr. MARTIN. And you have confidence that that will meet the situation satisfactorily?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right.

Mr. MARTIN. And if it does not, I gather that you and the rest of the members of your organization would not be opposed to Congress looking into the matter with a view to taking drastic steps?

Mr. JANDREAU. When the voluntary methods fail, Mr. Congressman, I am sure that any member of organized labor will be willing to sit down and discuss anything that will accomplish the job.

Mr. MARTIN. You would be willing to go along with drastic steps?

Mr. JANDREAU. We are willing to do the job, but I say first let us use the means that seem to be, in our mind, the democratic way of doing it, the free way.

Mr. MARTIN. The reason I am questioning you along this line is that I realize you are advocating here a plan that has not worked so far, and last April, when Mr. McNutt was before the committee, we criticized the delay in the effective operation of that system. I don't know how long our enemies are going to give us to go through a succession of trials and observations. That was back in April, and this is January, and that is a long time to delay in getting actual results. We have got to produce or else. Now, Congress is going to be blamed if we become soft in the matter and ask for another trial, and then 10 months from now that has proven ineffective, and then we have another period of delay. How long are the people going to tolerate that type of approach by Congress?

Mr. JANDREAU. I don't think national-service legislation is going to remedy this situation. I agree with you that our enemies will not wait for us to get properly prepared for the job, but I am quite sure that national-service legislation will not bring about the needed supplies that we are after. It seems to me that first the companies will have to accept their responsibilities and take on the jobs or take on the work, and I am sure that if the people are given a chance, they will fill them. And that doesn't take too long to do.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Do you feel that labor was ineffective in respect to the program, or rather perhaps some of the Government agencies in the distribution of the over-all war contracts?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes; they were partially at fault.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I think in one of your earlier statements you said that it was your position, or one of your duties, or a duty that you took upon yourself, to call the attention of the various procurement agencies to idle tools that were available for further use. How many procurement agencies did you disseminate that information among?

Mr. JANDREAU. Mainly the War Production Board, the Army, and the Navy.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Could you give us any appraisal of how many?

Mr. JANDREAU. No; but I could give you a specific number and give you specific companies, if you would like to have them. We have that in the office.

Mr. SHERIDAN. I feel that there are too many various procurement agencies, that the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing. By the way, was the Syracuse plant in existence before they started at Schenectady?

Mr. JANDREAU. That has been a war baby. It was built in 1941, and expansion has been going on continously ever since.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Have they cut back at Schenectady and built up the Syracuse plant so that the facilities are available to absorb the Schenectady operation?

Mr. JANDREAU. The cut-backs in Schenectady created, let us say, a large part of the expansion that is going on in the Syracuse plant.

Mr. SHERIDAN. What was the degree of cut-back in Schenectady? Was there any at Syracuse?

Mr. JANDREAU. No. That is where the expansion is going on. In a critical labor-shortage area the company is sending work in there and expanding it, taking it out of the place where there is a surplus of labor, Schenectady.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Has there been a large expansion in building additional buildings in Syracuse?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes; a tremendous expansion. I have here listed, just a spot check last week covering about 30 percent of the Schenectady work, of machinery, heavy machinery, such as milling machines, lathes, boring mills, screw machines, many types that have been listed as critical, and we find 697 pieces of machinery, and idle man-hours per week of 58,392. So we have facilities there, you see.

Mr. SHERIDAN. By the way, some reference was made to the statement made by Mr. McNutt back in April. I believe Mr. McNutt had not arrived back in this country in April.

The CHAIRMAN. That is really not part of this bill.

Mr. SHERIDAN. The witness has been asked about statements by him.

The CHAIRMAN. He may have been asked about it, but that doesn't make it material. But go ahead and ask him about it if you want to. I think Mr. McNutt should be brought up here while we are considering this bill.

Mr. HARNESS. I was very much interested in your statement about these 8,000 men and women who have been laid off from General Electric. Have you, as a member of the union, done anything to get them placed in other General Electric plants?

Mr. JANDREAU. We only could by advice as to where there is work, where they were employing people at rates that were comparable with the earnings they had been receiving.

Mr. HARNESS. Has this situation been reported to the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. JANDREAU. Oh, yes; we have had a special meeting with the area director.

Mr. HARNESS. How long ago?

Mr. JANDREAU. Three weeks ago.

Mr. HARNESS. This thing is most confusing to me. I spent a day in Mr. McNutt's office just a week ago Monday. It just happens that General Electric has a plant in Fort Wayne, Ind., and that adjoins Huntington County, which is in that area. Huntington County is in my district. It is in a critical labor area, according to the War Manpower Commission, and they want to cut back and cancel contracts

in the Huntington County area, shell contracts, because General Electric needs employees in Fort Wayne for top critical items, such as radar and others, yet yesterday Mr. Hines, from the American Federation of Labor, testified that they laid off 450 men at General Electric in Fort Wayne.

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right.

Mr. HARNESS. Do you think the War Manpower Commission is doing a good job?

Mr. JANDREAU. Well, I don't know.

Mr. HARNESS. Doesn't it look a little bit confusing?

Mr. JANDREAU. The thing doesn't confuse me, but it sort of burns me up, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. HARNESS. It does me, too.

Mr. JANDREAU. To think of these companies just having their own way and not accepting any responsibility, you see. I talked to an area director of the U. S. E. S. and he told me that of course there is another question of responsibility, and that is the equal division of people in the work in a community that would not be classified as manufacturing, such as restaurant workers, office workers, and different jobs like that. And they are all to be on an equal basis. We don't want to swamp a city with a large group of defense workers and throw the whole thing out of proportion, because this would bring community problems, such as housing, and so forth. This sort of outlook is not conducive to meeting the demands of the war. You have got a plan, as I see it, to produce the things that you want. If you need housing, you have got to put housing in there, and if you need other facilities, you have got to put them in. You just can't say: "We will utilize that plant on the basis of an existing condition in a community." If we did that, we would never expand anywhere.

Mr. HARNESS. What you need in the General Electric plant there in your town is war work?

Mr. JANDREAU. Correct.

Mr. HARNESS. So you can employ those 8,000 people?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. But if they are not taking on war work and have got another plant in Fort Wayne, where they are drawing men away from other plants in that area, why can't they shift some of that labor?

The CHAIRMAN. They haven't got a National Service Act so they can do that.

Mr. HARNESS. I am just wondering about that.

Mr. JANDREAU. You don't have to shift labor. You shift work. You see, Fort Wayne builds induction motors. So does Schenectady. Schenectady built induction motors first, before the Fort Wayne plant was established.

Mr. HARNESS. Then they can shift some of that work out there.

Mr. JANDREAU. They can place some orders in Schenectady and we can do them and employ these 8,000 people, and you don't need a National Service Act to do that. You just need the companies to do planning in behalf of the war effort rather than in behalf of postwar conversion.

Mr. HARNESS. Would that be partially due to procurement agencies in their placing of contracts?

Mr. JANDREAU. The procurement agencies could say, "We want to know where the job is going to be made, manufactured." The pro-

curement agencies have not been interested in that in the past. They just say, "Here is an order for General Electric." To give you an example, we sent a fellow down to talk to the labor advisory committee in the radio industry, and he told them, "Here we have five or six thousand people in radio who have been released because of lack of work, experienced people." A person from the Army or the Navy, I don't know which it was, said: "We are releasing a million dollar order to General Electric, and you are going to have lots of work. That is going to Schenectady." Well, the fellow came back and called a meeting of the radio division and told them: "We are going to have a lot of work. I have just been so advised in Washington." Well, the order came in to Schenectady, to the home office of the company, but it is going to be done in Syracuse. We are not going to do it all.

Mr. HARNESS. What area are you in, according to the records of the War Manpower Commission?

Mr. JANDREAU. The Albany area.

Mr. HARNESS. Is that a critical labor area?

Mr. JANDREAU. No, it is an area that has a surplus of labor, according to the War Manpower Commission. That was published in the New York Times on January 7.

Mr. HARNESS. Does General Electric do any nonwar manufacturing there now?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, most of the items that are being manufactured by General Electric are war production.

Mr. HARNESS. You mean it is for the war?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, for the war production.

Mr. HARNESS. But are they doing any nonwar work?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, refrigeration.

Mr. HARNESS. How about washing machines?

Mr. JANDREAU. Those are made in the Bridgeport plant.

Mr. HARNESS. That's all.

Mr. FENTON. What was the pre-war figure for General Electric's 1937 Schenectady work?

Mr. JANDREAU. It was 15,000 people, exactly 4,700 ahead of it right now.

Mr. FENTON. They have increased that much?

Mr. JANDREAU. We increased to 28 000, but right now we are just 4,700 ahead of our pre-war employment.

Mr. FENTON. Have those people gotten out of Schenectady?

Mr. JANDREAU. We are in the process of finding out where they are right now. The union is making a survey of people within the area where the people formerly came from, Albany, Mechanicsville—within a 15-mile radius. We are making a survey now to find out if they are there and if they are willing to come back to work, should we get more orders.

Mr. FENTON. Has Syracuse been a critical labor shortage area for some time?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, it has been, and it is at the present time, a No. 2 area.

Mr. FENTON. There were 8,000 people laid off last year?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes.

Mr. FENTON. How long do they stay on unemployment compensation?

Mr. JANDREAU. In New York State I believe there is a 15-week period of unemployment compensation, but many of these people found work elsewhere and are not eligible for unemployment insurance.

Mr. FENTON. None of this increase in the General Electric plant in Schenectady came out of Syracuse?

Mr. JANDREAU. None of our increase?

Mr. FENTON. Yes.

Mr. JANDREAU. We haven't had an increase.

Mr. FENTON. I mean during the war effort.

Mr. JANDREAU. You mean in the early days of 1941? No, the Syracuse plant was purposely established to get the overflow from the existing plants that could not handle the work. That was the point of establishing the Syracuse plant. Now we find that it is getting the prime orders and the original plants, we will say, that were not war babies, are not being given the work, and displacement of labor is being caused in those plants.

Mr. FENTON. Can you tell us how many people have been laid off in Schenectady, outside of the General Electric plant, during the past year, or are in war work?

Mr. JANDREAU. In Schenectady there are only two major plants that employ practically everybody in Schenectady. That is the American Locomotive and General Electric Co.. Schenectady only has a population of 90,000 during normal times. Now, you want to remember that many of the people that worked there during this period came from surrounding communities.

The CHAIRMAN. Haven't we had enough testimony on the subject of these plants and their offices and things on that particular situation, this one company?

Mr. JANDREAU. Are you asking me a question?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I was just trying to get through here. Mr. Murray told me he wanted about 15 minutes more. You have had now an hour and a quarter. We have three other witnesses waiting, and I would like to get through.

Mr. FENTON. I just want to find out if there is a labor shortage in Schenectady.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he has told us that there is not a shortage of labor but there is a shortage of work.

Mr. FENTON. Have you finished your answer?

Mr. JANDREAU. Will you ask the question again, Mr. Fenton?

Mr. FENTON. How many people are idle in Schenectady?

Mr. JANDREAU. We have a survey going on now to determine how many people are available for work, and the type of occupations they have experience in. Now, the War Manpower Commission says that in the Albany area, which includes Schenectady, there is a surplus of labor. That is what they say.

Mr. FENTON. They don't say how many?

Mr. JANDREAU. I couldn't say how many, no. The figures are available at the U. S. E. S. office.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Roe, have you any questions?

Mr. ROE. I would like to ask you this question: You have mentioned the lack of use of facilities in the big plants. How about the small, subcontracting plants in Schenectady?

Mr. JANDREAU. There are no small subcontracting plants that I know about.

Mr. ROE. They have decentralized their contracts in that area?

Mr. JANDREAU. In Schenectady proper they say there are only two plants, American Locomotive and General Electric. There is a small mica works there. That is about all.

Mr. ROE. In your remarks a few minutes ago about the ages of 18 to 26 you were referring to IV–F's, weren't you? You were not refering to able-bodied men?

Mr. JANDREAU. No.

Mr. ROE. I just wanted to clarify that. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. I want to ask you about this 8,000 who were laid off. How many were there on the rolls of the company at Schenectady on January 2, 1944?

Mr. JANDREAU. Approximately 28,000.

Mr. JOHNSON. How many were there on the rolls on December 31, 1944?

Mr. JANDREAU. Approximately 20,000.

Mr. JOHNSON. That includes influxes during the year?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. So there was a net loss of 8,000 during the year?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. So there was a net loss of 8,000?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, only in the production units.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, about the draft board, your duties as chairman of the draft board. Did you keep track of the peaple that they deferred? In other words, if they left, were they instructed to notify you right away?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, the employer does that. And the registrant is also supposed to do it.

Mr. JOHNSON. Was it your policy to keep in touch with them, to see that they went back to some deferred occupation?

Mr. JANDREAU. Heretofore it was the job of the U. S. E. S. mainly, but we would be notified that the registrant had left a critical job, and if we had no record of where he was, we would send a letter and ask him what he was doing.

Mr. JOHNSON. When you originally deferred that man, he had to be in some war industry?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right.

Mr. JOHNSON. And that was the ground of the deferment?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Isn't it your conception of the job that he has got to stay there, otherwise his deferment lapses?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right. He must stay there or the deferment is no good.

Mr. JOHNSON. If you don't keep track of him, how do you know that the policy of deferment is carried out?

Mr. JANDREAU. The only way we can keep track of him, the employer notifies the draft board is that the 42–B—that is the request for deferment—has run out because the employee has left or has been laid off.

Mr. JOHNSON. If you find out that he isn't working in a deferred occupation, you reclassify him to I–A, if he is physically fit?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, just exactly how does your procedure there differ from that in this bill? As I understand this bill, the Director, Judge Byrnes, lists all these people who could go into some war occupation that are not now engaged in one, and then the draft board brings them in and gives them a certain length of time to go into a useful occupation, and it is only after they refuse that they are inducted. That is exactly what you have been doing, isn't it?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right, within a certain age limit.

Mr. JOHNSON. What is the particular objection to the bill, then, if it carries out the very policy that your board has been carrying out?

Mr. JANDREAU. It appears to me that there is no need for a bill, when you have means, as I pointed out, through the draft board—you already have means of keeping people employed in critical industry. It seems to me to be something hanging over people's heads when the majority of the people are doing the right job now.

Mr. JOHNSON. I realize that.

Mr. JANDREAU. And it certainly is not good for morale, to say the least.

Mr. JOHNSON. This is not aimed at the ones that are doing the right job. It is aimed at the ones that are not doing it. I think there is a lot of stress put on the fact that there area lot of people not doing the right job, but, as I said before, and I will say it again, 1943 was a good example of what people will do. We met our production schedules then, when we had the work. We can meet them again, and I don't think we are going to win this war just because we have got a piece of legislation that will force everyone to go into a critical industry. I will tell you this, if you limit it too much, the companies won't be able to handle it. They won't be able to keep the men when they haven't got the work.

In other words, you don't believe, then, the statement that the President makes, that there is a very critical shortage in certain lines, and the very purpose of this bill is to fill those gaps?

Mr. JANDREAU. We haven't found it that way as the result of our survey.

Mr. JOHNSON. In other words, he may be misinformed?

Mr. JANDREAU. He apparently is.

Mr. JOHNSON. But then do you think there is—as an experienced chairman of a draft board—do you think there is machinery now available for handling this very thing?

Mr. JANDREAU. Yes, I do.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, what is the objection to the Director of Mobilization, who is supposed to have and does have, a bird's-eye view of the whole national picture, designating the one you are to take and put into essential industry?

Mr. JANDREAU. It is more or less on a voluntary basis now as it is handled by the draft boards, because the draft board has the right to weigh up the situation, depending upon the circumstances, and still defer. Now, we have a considerable number of, we will say, less essential occupations that are necessary to critical jobs, such as milk dealers, farmers, automobile repair shops, and all that sort of thing that are not listed as critical.

Mr. JOHNSON. I realize there are different priorities, but as I understand the bill, the duty of the Director is to weigh all that and see

just exactly what is required for the one priority for critical jobs. I can't see how that is very much different than what your board has been doing, and what they can do.

Mr. JANDREAU. I think the biggest job today is to review the whole situation and let everyone be informed as to what the problems are, and I am pretty sure that after that is done you will live up more or less to the responsibility, and you will meet your requirements of war production.

Mr. JOHNSON. That has been the case in the past, but do you object to the clause in the bill there that says where a man will not submit, he shall be put in a kind of labor battalion with sort of a stigma on him?

Mr. JANDREAU. No; I don't believe that that is the right thing to do.

Mr. JOHNSON. That part of the bill is obnoxious to you?

Mr. JANDREAU. That's right. I don't think it is necessary.

Mr. JOHNSON. This morning I asked your chief, Mr. Murray, concerning the fact as I said at least one part of the bill on page 2, these men are to be taken by voluntary recruiting by management, labor, and Government, and he said that later provisions in the bill nullified that provision. Can you point those out to the committee, please?

Mr. JANDREAU. I am not familiar with that part of it.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the clause that is used in section 1, on page 2, line 14, and you do not know of any clause in the bill later that nullifies that provision? Is that correct?

Mr. JANDREAU. I do not; no.

Mr. JOHNSON. If you want to think it over, I would be glad to have you put it in the record later.

Mr. JANDREAU. All right.

Mr. JOHNSON. Look at the middle paragraph on page 2, the last clause. If you want to read it over and think it over and put something in later on, you may do so.

Mr. JANDREAU. Suppose I do that.

Mr. JOHNSON. Lines 14 and 15. Just find out what clauses, if any, later in the bill, nullify that provision.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Jandreau, with reference to the functions that you have under the Selective Service Act, of course, that can only operate on the identical group which is liable for military service. In other words, if a man is not between the ages of 18 and 26, you could not induct him above 26—or above 38, I believe is the law. You could not induct him in that case, so he would not have to get any compulsion of the draft board; and, if he is physically handicapped, you would have to obey the direction of the draft board, so that in the final analysis you are forcing into essential industry the identical people that you are calling on now, and they are under no obligation for the war effort.

Mr. JANDREAU. On the contrary, we do have—draft boards do have authority to induct under 26.

Mr. KILDAY. Not under existing directives.

Mr. JANDREAU. Under existing directives, up to 37, for work where they will not comply with the request of the draft board to go into essential industry, which we consider a violation—up to 38.

Mr. KILDAY. From 38 to 45 there is no compulsion?

Mr. JANDREAU. No, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. So, when you get all finished with it, it is the group you are calling on to render military service that you force to do industrial work?

Mr. JANDREAU. Of course, my point is that we do not need it, because the people have proved that when it is on a voluntary basis you get the desired results.

Mr. KILDAY. Of course, what you and Mr. Murray advocate here today is the collaboration of management, labor, and Government on the entire thing, and this bill as drawn proposes exactly that, and permits its mandatory forces to come into play only after the people have failed to conform to what your collaboration has agreed upon. Page 2, line 7 [reading]:

> The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion shall certify to the Director of Selective Service from time to time the manpower requirements of war or war-supporting plants and activities within each industrial area, which (after consultation with the appropriate officials of management, labor, and Government) he determines will not be met by stabilizing manpower in the manner hereinabove provided and by voluntary recruiting by management, labor, and Government.

So there is, as a condition precedent to any action, this very consultation that you advocate, and the voluntary recruitment which you advocate, and it is only after that fails that the compulsory features of the law come into effect. So what would be the objection to having in reserve the power of compulsion after your consultation and voluntary recruiting fails?

Mr. JANDREAU. And, as Mr. Murray pointed out this morning, the problem we face in legislation is in interpretation. We think that where there are compulsory features in a bill they vitiate the principles of work voluntarily, and at the same time there are too many people that deliberately take advantage of compulsory features. For example, in the field of collective bargaining we have found time and time again where people were forced to live up to the principles that that law was supposed to establish.

Mr. KILDAY. In your draft-board work you told us you found this reserve power—which you have—greatly accelerates the voluntary transfer of power, which you advocate.

Mr. JANDREAU. For your information, 99 percent of the cases that I have had a chance to handle—and I have handled all of them on our board—it is just a case of sitting down and discussing the matter with the individual and he responds very well.

Mr. KILDAY. You have got the stick behind your back, though.

Mr. JANDREAU. I am sorry, but I don't have a stick.

Mr. KILDAY. I mean by that, you have the power as a member of the draft board, the local board. If your persuasion is not quite eloquent enough, you know you have something else, and he still has that in mind, and that would be the situation under this bill.

Mr. JANDREAU. I could say the same thing about what has taken place heretofore. So far as war production is concerned, it has worked out satisfactorily on a voluntary basis, and it can be done again.

Mr. KILDAY. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one or two questions I want to ask you. I happen to be chairman of a deferment board myself in the Capitol, and at least three or four new Members of Congress have called me in the last week to inquire about their secretaries, whether they will be

deferred or not. I deferred a meeting with the Senators this afternoon on account of these hearings, to accommodate you gentlemen. One of them had a letter from the Pittsburgh draft board reading like this:

DEAR MR. SO AND SO: No doubt you have learned of the late regulations of the Selective Service System, and this is to advise you that this board is considering your reclassification, and we thought you would like to know it, so that if, within the next 10 days, you can find a job in war industry, it will not be necessary to reclassify you as I–A.

Is that similar to the kind of notice you send out to your fellows up there?

Mr. JANDREAU. No, we don't have it worded just that way.

The CHAIRMAN. How are they worded?

Mr. JANDREAU. We tell them about the need for a person to make a contribution to the war effort, and the type of jobs that are available in the community, and if he has any trouble trying to get such a job, to come in and see us. But we run smack into this problem, that the companies are not so willing and anxious to hire them. They say they have got to let people go rather than employ them.

The CHAIRMAN. Without regard to wether people are willing to hire them or not, your intent in issuing that order is to get the worker to work or go into the service?

Mr. JANDREAU. They are intended to carry out instructions from Washington. I would say that it seems to me there is a lack of need for getting manpower before you get the jobs available. You are putting the cart before the horse.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question: Are you in favor of the idle men in this country either working in a war plant producing war munitions or things used in the armed services, or going into the Army, if they are fit for the Army?

Mr. JANDREAU. I think everyone should do their part and carry out their responsibilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Isn't that the responsibility of everyone of us?

Mr. JANDREAU. I am pretty sure that in our country we can still depend on the response of the people in order to preserve democracy. They will volunteer and do their job. I think we should exhaust that first, before we say "We will club you into it."

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, I have a telegram here from the Lieutenant Governor of the State of Michigan, dated January 16, 1945, saying:

The Commission reports 13,456 drawing unemployment compensation.

That is signed Vernon J. Brown, Lieutenant Governor. That is addressed to a Member of Congress. Now, don't you think we might find some good workers in that bunch in one State, with this act?

Mr. JANDREAU. I will say this: That that just proves to me that there are not jobs, because before you are eligible for unemployment insurance you have to be available for work, and you have to be at the beck and call of the U. S. E. S. in order to get that insurance. Now, the U. S. E. S. is the only agency today that can place people in critical employment. So my contention is that there are not the jobs, and the industries are not providing jobs, and you have just proven here a point that here are 56,000 people who are willing and able to work and they can't find work for them.

Mr. HARNESS. If they refuse a job, they are cut off?

Mr. JANDREAU. They stop their unemployment insurance.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a minute. I have got this witness. What about the fellows that quit a job because the State has a compensation law, quitting a job in industry and saying that he is out of employment, and then going to compensation?

Mr. JANDREAU. He is not eligible for compensation if he quits his job.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if he quits his job and gets compensation, whether he is eligible for it or not, what about putting him back to work?

Mr. JANDREAU. In my State you can't get them. He could not get compensation in New York State if he quit his job.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, but suppose he does get on compensation at $30 a month and sits down and doesn't work. What are you going to do with him?

Mr. JANDREAU. Where is that State that pays $30 a month? I don't think there is any State that pays more than the lowest rate in industry.

The CHAIRMAN. Unemployment compensation?

Mr. JANDREAU. I don't know a State.

The CHAIRMAN. I had a conference around that table not long ago with about 20 men from the unemployment bureaus of the States of this country, and there were several of them reported more than $30 a month.

Mr. JANDREAU. Thirty dollars a month?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean a week; $30 a week.

Mr. JANDREAU. I would say it should be that way, but I don't know of any.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose that situation should exist, would it be remedied by this act or not?

Mr. JANDREAU. I think anybody that deliberately abuses a law ought to be dealt with accordingly, and that is the way we do business in this country. I don't think you should make a law that is going to injure the innocent.

The CHAIRMAN. If a man was on compensation when he was able to work, on compensation instead of being in war production, where he could render some service to this country, would you say that he ought to be in the production of war materials or still on compensation?

Mr. JANDREAU. I think he should be in the production of war materials. That is the natural answer. Certainly if I answered it in the negative you would be charging me with sabotaging the war effort, at least, with such an attitude. When you cite exceptions to the rule, I don't think that means very much. I say the vast majority of American citizens today will operate on a voluntary basis much more quickly than they will on a compulsory basis. That is the basis, so far as I am concerned, of real Americanism.

The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, you may be excused. We have two more witnesses here who want to explain their position.

We will now hear Mr. Abramson. Irving Abramson, I believe, is the name. Will you please state your business, whom you represent, and make your statement as fully as you wish, and I hope the com-

mittee will defer any questions until Mr. Abramson finishes. He wants to catch a plane at 5 o'clock, I believe.

STATEMENT OF IRVING ABRAMSON, PRESIDENT, NEW JERSEY STATE INDUSTRIAL UNION COUNCIL, CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS

Mr. ABRAMSON. Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that the survey and analysis which is the basis of our conclusions——

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Whom do you represent, Mr. Abramson?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I am president of the New Jersey State C. I. O. Council. The analysis which I have here, and which has been the basis of the report which I am submitting to this honorable committee, was not gotten up originally for the purpose of giving evidence to this committee. As a matter of fact, it was orginally gone into for the purpose of getting a constructive idea and a constructive analysis as to whether or not the existing facilities of the various plants are being used. Information was brought to the attention of our national organization that they thought was of sufficient importance that it might be a contribution to the thoughts of this committee, and for that reason we submit it.

For the record I should like to say that the schedules that I will submit bear two corrections. They were gotten up this morning in haste and, on schedule B, Jersey City should read 39 plants and the total should be 285, and the number of plants closed should be 15 instead of 16, and the total number should read 163 instead of 164, and wherever the figure 286 appears it should be 285, number of plants.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you like to correct that for the purpose of the record, the printed record?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I have already corrected it in the statement that the reporter has now, and I just thought I would get it in the record at the same time.

In making this analysis and survey we were guided by the perspective of determining whether critical A–1 plants were fully utilizing all of their productive facilities. We also thought it important to determine whether the demands for manpower submitted by employers were justified by conditions in their plants.

In order to get a correct picture we took without qualification all of the plants listed as A–1 in the largest industrial area in New Jersey. This includes the counties of Essex, Union, and Hudson. In these counties there are 285 plants listed by the War Manpower Commission as A–1. The total manpower requirements for these plants have been certified as totaling 15,086.

We sought to determine the following information:

1. How many of these plants were open on New Year's Day?
2. How many shifts do they work?
3. How many hours per week do they work?

When I say "do they work" I am referring to their present operation.

4. Could their manpower needs be satisfied by utilizing facilities and plants not now being used?
5. Could their needs be satisfied by voluntary negotiations?

6. What nonessential industries are in that area?

Set forth in exhibit A are the number of A–1 plants in each city and the manpower needs in the area in question.

In exhibit B are set forth the plants in each city that were closed, open or partly open, on New Years' Day.

This survey indicates that out 285 plants in the A–1 class, 164 shut down for one or more days during the New Year holiday, 95 were operating, and 17 were partly open. This means that only 35 percent of the plants were fully open on New Years' Day. It is difficult to understand why, in an area defined as critical by the War Manpower Commission, with an alleged manpower shortage, only one-third of the plants found it important enough to ask their employees to come in for work.

Exhibit C demonstrates beyond contradiction, in my opinion, that the manpower requirements can be more than met by voluntary arrangements between labor and management in extending present facilities. Only 26 percent of the plants are working a 56-hour week, while as many as 35 percent cling to the 48-hour minimum week required by law. As many as 42 percent are operating only one shift, and only 24 percent operating on a three-shift basis.

The total number of workers employed in all of these plants is more than 200,000. The manpower need is approximately 7 percent of the total employment in the area involved. The schedules indicate there is substantially more than a 7 percent increase in manpower to be secured by extending hours or shifts, as the case may be, in plants working less than three shifts and less than 56 hours per week.

Plants working less than 56 hours per week account for 10,432 of the 15,086 manpower needs in the area involved, or 68 percent of the tatal manpower requirements. Thus 68 percent of the manpower needs can be eliminated if the employers decide to extend the hours of work through volunteer negotiations. We have found no case where the employees have refused to extend their hours where the need has been demonstrated.

The demands submitted by employers for manpower should not be taken for granted, and in many cases may be found unjustified. For example, in one of the plants in question the employer requested 100 foundry workers needed in a plant making critical equipment for the Navy. On investigation we found that this firm had another foundry plant about 3 miles away in the same city, producing material for civilian use. This smaller subsidiary had a complet foundry employing 1,500 to 2,000 foundry workers working on civilian production, while the company was requesting 100 foundry workers for his war plant. This was called to the attention of and verified by an Army officer associated with the War Manpower Commission.

In another plant an employer certified a need for 25 wire drawers. Wire drawing is a skilled operation. The plant was working 2 shifts of 48 hours each. Among those working in the plant were 200 wire drawers. The union proposed two shifts of 9 hours each, and after negotiating this change, the employer withdrew his demand for extra manpower. If the extra 25 men were secured, they represented at 48 hours per week, 1,200 man-hours. An extra hour each day for 6 days for each of the 200 wire drawers then employed also represented 1,200 man-hours. Thus a demand for extra manpower equal to 12½ per-

cent of his existing force in that department was eliminated by the addition of 1 hour a day. Even if the extra demand equaled 25 percent of the existing force, it could be absorbed by 2 hours extra per day. To meet an emergency, workers would not object to working these extra hours at proper compensation if the need required them to do so.

Those are but a few examples of how the manpower needs certified by employers are not always justified and must first be investigated before being accepted.

The application of this approach, in view of the major portion of the plants working less than full capacity would seem to furnish the answer to most of our manpower conditions.

We cannot escape the conclusion that many employers have not worked on holidays, as this survey amply demonstrates, and are not extending hours of production because of the fact that overtime payments may cut into their profits.

Another avenue of manpower that may be explored if existing facilities are exhausted is the nonessential and luxury industry. The area in which a need for manpower has been certified for 15,000 men and women has nonessential industries employing 38,469. I might say parenthetically, here, the fact that even on a national basis the various obvious channel for war manpower is being completely overlooked by the War Manpower Commission, and to prove this fact, if we walk into any area office of the War Manpower Commission, they will not be able to furnish any list of nonessential industries, and you begin to wonder why. When we talk at the present time of making the maximum use of facilities, and transferring workers from nonessential industries to war industries, it is absolutely unbelievable to find that the area directors in each area know nothing about the employment conditions in critical war plants in this area—and I have an analysis of 24—but I just want to make this remark to indicate that as a general policy the War Manpower Commission does not have an analysis of what the nonessential industries are, and I say it is impossible to have an intelligent application, either on the legislative process or any other process, if they don't know what the nonessential employees are.

The CHAIRMAN. With that kind of record do you favor turning over the administration of the thing to them?

Mr. ABRAMSON. To the War Manpower Commission?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ABRAMSON. Certainly I think as a whole, corroborating what President Murray has said, the War Manpower Commission has worked very well. These are administrative jobs and not a legislative job, because the person on top can say to them, "We want you to have all the facts pertaining to A–1 plants, and nonessential plants." It is direction, not legislation.

The CHAIRMAN. Selective service is direction and regulation rather than legislation, isn't it?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Selective service?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ABRAMSON. You have in selective service, as well as in any other place, a combination of both the virtues and defects of both administrative and legislative.

Mr. JOHNSON. You mean to tell us that there is no list of essential and nonessential occupations?

Mr. ABRAMSON. No, I don't say that. The figures I am quoting now are about nonessential industries, and those which I will quote later on are about essential industries.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am directing my question to your statement that there is no list, in the area offices of the War Manpower Commission, of essential and nonessential occupations.

Mr. ABRAMSON. No, I didn't say that, if you please, Mr. Congressman. I said that the area War Manpower Commissions do not have a list or figures on the nonessential industries. That is what I say. I know that because I have made a demand for that, and in discussion with the various representatives of the war manpower commission I was simply aghast when I found that they just didn't have it.

Taking the largest industrial county as an example, we found the manpower requirements certified for Essex County to be 7,320. The plants in that county, alone, making jewelry, brassierres, girdles, cigars, and cosmetics, employ 7,118.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that was all necessary production?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Well, at least one of those would have a minimum wear and tear, which might be lengthened and used in wartime. But the point is that I took here what appeared to be certainly industries which border on the luxury line, and they are only 34 of many industries, and they total exactly the amount of manpower requirements required for that county. It occurs to me that an intelligent application of allocating materials by the War Production Board, if necessary, would make a greater contribution to manpower requirements than legislative compulsion. We in New Jersey are forced to this conclusion by reason of our experience:

1. That there is no shortage of manpower that cannot be supplied by industry itself in extending and making use of existing facilities.

2. Employers in many cases have not been fully aware of their responsibilities to utilize their full workweek.

3. The War Production Board owes a responsibility to which it can make a greater contribution in solving manpower problems by a more forceful and discriminating application of allocating materials to luxury industries.

Now, I might conclude with this, if you please, Mr. Chairman, that while the analysis I have here—and I might say that in each case the A–1 plan here has been checked with the War Manpower Commission with respect to authenticity; the number of plants closed, as demonstrated by this survey, have been checked with the War Manpower Commission with respect to correctness. In this exhibit I indicate plants closed, which means closed upon New Year's Day, but I happen to know that very large and important plants have been closed for the whole week end—1, 2, and 3 days—and again I respectfully submit to this committee that it is inconceivable, in a critical time, during a war, when it is supposed to be an all-out war effort, when we are talking about compulsory legislation, that we find important war plants shut down, not only on New Year's Day, but for several days, and I am sure that the members of this committee will make a very careful analysis of this schedule, and this schedule, it seems to me, will indicate that compulsory legislation will be only scratching the surface as against taking care of the real and basic

need, which is seeing that these plants which are not using their existing plant facilities do the job and use them. As a matter of fact, we got so excited back in my State of New Jersey, where these plants have been shut down, that petitions were beginning to be passed around by employees calling the attention of the employers that they are not fulfilling their patriotic duty when they close down their plants. And I might respectfully submit, as a matter of conclusion, that I have the names of every one of these plants that I talk about, their areas, and their total manpower needs, if you gentlemen of this committee desire to see them.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Are those plants organized, by the way?

Mr. ABRAMSON. The major portion of them are. I didn't discriminate with respect to organized or unorganized, because I took every one of the A–1 plants. As yet we haven't got them all organized.

The CHAIRMAN. You may put that list into the record, if you will leave it for us or send it back to me.

Mr. ABRAMSON. I will be glad to do that. I have one copy of them with respect to the examples I have set down, but I would rather not read into the record the companies involved.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, send it to us.

Mr. ABRAMSON. I prefer not to. I will be glad to make it available to the members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Simply list the companies as No. 1 or 2 or 3 or 4, and check them in by number or alphabetically.

Mr. ABRAMSON. They are in this exhibit, of which I have a copy for each member. You will find a pretty careful analysis of each one in each city.

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to leave them for the committee that will be all right. Thank you very much for your statement.

Mr. SHERIDAN. You referred to the foundry where they needed 150 additional employees, while they had 300 or so working in a private foundry 3 miles away on civilian work. Did you call that to the attention of the Army officer in the district, and if so, what was done to correct it?

Mr. ABRAMSON. You are referring to the plant which had a need for 100 wire drawers and the subsidiary plant where they were employing 150 to 200 on civilian work?

Mr. Sheridan, I will say in addition, to answer that question very specifically, that in our State we have found enough of these conditions where the facilities of the plant are not being utilized, to propose to the Army and to the Navy that a grievance committee be set up where we can present these situations and have them corrected. We brought this to the attention of the lieutenant in charge of the War Manpower Commission, and he commented that the condition would be remedied.

Mr. SHERIDAN. How long ago was that?

Mr. ABRAMSON. This discussion was had, I believe, on Wednesday or Thursday of last week.

Mr. SHERIDAN. There has not been adequate time for any constructive action yet.

Mr. ABRAMSON. No; I don't think so, but he agreed with me.

Mr. SHERIDAN. You also stated that 22 percent of these plants are operating on one shift and 24 percent on three shifts, in an area that has been designated as critical by the War Manpower Commission.

Mr. ABRAMSON. That's right.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Why don't they put on another shift where they only have one, if labor is available? That is a point I would like to have.

Mr. ABRAMSON. I thought that information would be important, and the reason why it is is that if there is one shift operating, and that shift is operating only 40 hours, the addition of 1 hour per man would be equal to 12½ percent of the existing force in the department.

Mr. SHERIDAN. You indicated that in your statement. I am asking you now, Could you put on another shift? You have the equipment there. You say it is not utilized to its full capacity. How could you put on another shift, two shifts operating around the clock, if the labor is not available in that area?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I didn't indicate that there ought to be another shift put on. The only reason I submit that information to you is to show the preponderance of firms which are working on one or two shifts, so that where they could not put on another shift because the manpower was not available, they could increase their present hours. For that reason I went into a very careful analysis of the hours worked in connection with the shifts worked.

Mr. DURHAM. Have there been any soldiers furloughed in this area who are working in these plants?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I don't know of any. I have heard of that.

Mr. PRICE. You mentioned the fact that some of these plants did not work over the week end, and not any over New Year's. What power do you think is now available that can make them work?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I am glad you asked that question, because I think that goes to the heart of many of the so-called "beefs" against those who are violators. Both with respect to luxury industries, it seems to me, and to war industries, where the employers are not doing what is requested to be done in the war effort, there seems to be ample power in the present structure of the law to remedy the situation. For example, if a person in a war industry does not sufficiently comply with War Manpower needs, two things can be done:

1. A refusal to certify any more manpower from the United States Employment Service.

2. The War Production Board can refuse to give any more priority materials to them.

So that we have a sufficient control, administrative and otherwise, and even legislatively, for the full control, if intelligently applied, with respect to the luxury industries, where the War Production Board can make intelligent application of priorities, and with respect to war industries, where the War Manpower Commission can say, "From now on no more referals," and to the War Production Board, "Please don't give any more priorities with respect to materials."

The CHAIRMAN. Answering the question as to just what authority there is dealing with the plant that is not performing its functions as a war plant, under section 9 of the original Selective Service and Training Act, the Government can take them over and operate them. That is in the law, thte original act.

Mr. ABRAMSON. I recognize that.

Mr. PRICE. If the chairman will bear with me, I think he missed the point. My point was this particular plant may be complying with the contract, but it may be doing it in a manner that is less efficient than it might be doing it, such as laying off men over the week end.

That could be done by management if in their judgment they thought it was not necessary to work over the week-end, or didn't feel that enough men would show up to work. In that case I wonder where the power would come from to force these people to work those days.

The CHAIRMAN. There isn't any power to deal with individuals by the Government as this bill proposes, but the President has the right, when he finds that it is not performing its contract and is behind schedule, or for any other reason in his judgment is not satisfactorily operating, he has the right to take them over and operate them by the Government.

Mr. ABRAMSON. May I respectfully submit, Mr. Chairman, that under our present structure and laws, from a very realistic point of view we need not resort to any such drastic measures. In many cases where there are violations by employers we may resort to the War Manpower Commission or to the War Production Board with respect to priorities, and that will work just as effectively.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the less drastic measure provided in the bill here.

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is a matter of opinion.

Mr. SLASON. Do you know whether or not any of these plants are behind in their production schedules and deliveries on their contracts?

Mr. ABRAMSON. No. We have not gone into that point.

Mr. CLASON. Have you ever heard of any complaint, so far as you know, to the effect that they were not delivering in accordance with their Government contracts?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I am not prepared to answer that question.

Mr. CLASON. You pointed out that they only need 15,000 persons there. They can get them out of nonessential industries without in any way hampering the war effort, only bringing a little more trouble upon civilians.

Mr. ABRAMSON. I only pointed that out because it seemed to me that here you have a typical pattern which pertains not only to this large industrial section, but I think it is applicable to every other section of the country:

1. If the plants are not using all of their existing facilities.

2. Before you resort to compulsory legislation, you have the luxury industries that could be used.

Mr. JOHNSON. When you speak of compulsory legislation in this law, what you are referring to finally is the taking in of IV–F's into the Army after they have had a chance to voluntarily go into industry? Is that correct?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I didn't think that the bill that you have under consideration now restricts your field of thought to IV–F's. I thought it was much broader than that.

Mr. JOHNSON. This has to do with IV–F's. The man has a chance first to go into war industry, and if he doesn't comply within a reasonable time, then he can be placed in a labor battalion. Is that the compulsion you are talking about?

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is one of them.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is the one in the bill?

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is one of them.

Mr. JOHNSON. I am talking about this bill.

Mr. ABRAMSON. That's right. That is one of them.

Mr. JOHNSON. You object to that?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. You think that is compulsion, that it is obnoxious?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. You think it will retard production amongst those who are volunteering to go into industry, when it is called to their attention?

Mr. ABRAMSON. May I say what I think is a constructive contribution to what might be done in that connection?

There are many workers, hundreds, if not thousands, now employed in nonessential industries that would be in the war plants if only somebody in the United States Government in some branch of it would say to these people, "We will see to it that your seniority is protected, so that when this war is over, if you work 15 years in this nonessential plant, you may go back there and there hold your job." But we can't get an administrative agency to say that, and if we can get it, that solves the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the problem of seniority with you people?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes, sir; a very important one, if a man works for 20 years in a nonessential plant.

Mr. JOHNSON. Then if Judge Byrnes protected seniority and pointed out that they should go into some war industry, you think it would be all right?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I think it would be one very important contribution to solving the problem.

Mr. JOHNSON. That would leave only a small group of objectors who migth say, "I am not going into any war plant," then they could be taken into the Army. Is there anything wrong about that?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Will you state that again, please?

Mr. JOHNSON. That would leave only the very small group who refuse to go into war plants, and under this law they would be taken into a labor battalion Is there anything wrong with that?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. What is wrong with it?

Mr. ABRAMSON. That is if we are going to take this very small group, as you have defined it, and incorporate a fundamental philosophy which is obnoxious to most of our people, I think that is a mistake. We ought to be intelligent enough to take care of our small problems, instead of creating a larger one which may be a boomerang.

Mr. JOHNSON. You are familiar with the Brewster plant, aren't you?

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Didn't your union use economic pressure there to compel the running of that plant after the Navy determined to close it?

Mr. ABRAMSON. That's right.

Mr. JOHNSON. In other words, you used your economic power to compel them to manufacture things the Navy didn't want? Isn't that the fact?

Mr. ABRAMSON. That's right.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is a form of compulsion, isn't it?

Mr. ABRAMSON. It is a form of influence [laughter].

Mr. JOHNSON. It is a pressure method, anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Abramson, do you make any distinction between the obligation of the citizen in wartime and in peacetime?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. You think he ought to be required to do whatever is necessary to defend the country in wartime, don't you?

Mr. ABRAMSON. I think we all do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Are there any further questions?

Mr. SHERIDAN. Do you think that your recommendation might remedy the political situation?

Mr. ABRAMSON. You have a sort of a high point to decide there.

Mr. SHERIDAN. Do you have any information as to any of those plants that were closed during the holidays? Are they possessed of the Army and Navy E?

Mr. ABRAMSON. It does occur to me that that might be the basis of an investigation.

Mr. SHERIDAN. It is a very interesting point.

Mr. ABRAMSON. Yes.

(Mr. Abramson presented the following exhibits:)

EXHIBIT A

Summary

Office	Number of plants	Manpower requirements
Newark	145	5,934
Jersey City	29	2,305
Hoboken	8	1,536
East Orange	12	439
Elizabeth	45	1,720
Irvington	19	199
Bloomfield	14	748
Bayonne	13	2,205
Total	285	15,086

EXHIBIT B

City	Number of plants	Closed	Unknown	Open	Partly open
Newark	145	90	5	42	8
Jersey City	39	15	2	10	2
Hoboken	8	3	1	4	
Irvington	19	13		5	1
Elizabeth	45	26		14	5
East Orange	12	2	1	9	
Bloomfield	14	8	1	4	1
Bayonne	13	6		7	
Total	285	163	10	95	17

EXHIBIT C

	Number of plants	First shift	Second shift	Third shift	48 hours	56 hours
Newark	145	63	53	26	50	37
Jersey City	39	11	8	10	12	5
Hoboken	8	6	2		3	5
Irvington	19	11	7	1	6	1
Elizabeth	45	20	12	12	16	16
East Orange	12	3	6	13	2	5
Bloomfield	14	5	4	5	9	1
Bayonne	13	2	7	4	5	6
Total	285	121	99	71	102	76

	Percent
Operating 1 shift	42
Operating 2 shifts	34
Operating 3 shifts	24
Operating 48 hours	35
Operating 56 hours	26

Plants working less than 56 hours per week account for 10,432 of the 15,086 manpower needs in the area involved or 68 percent of the total requirements.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Abramson. We will now hear Mr. Llewellyn. Will you state your full name and representation, Mr. Llewellyn?

STATEMENT OF PERCY LLEWELLYN, REPRESENTING THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS OF AMERICA

Mr. LLEWELLYN. My name is Percy Llewellyn, and I am an international executive board member of the United Automobile Workers of America, and director of the West Side region of the city of Detroit. I want to cite some figures here, concurring in the position of the C. I. O., of which we are an affiliate, that at this time we feel there is no need for the enactment of legislation in the matter now before the committee.

The Detroit Steel Casting Co., of the city of Detroit, employing approximately 700 employees, manufacturers of castings for invasion barges and railroad cars, with very high manpower priority. The plant lacks 120 men in labor classification. The reasons:

Low wages: There is a dispute before the War Labor Board at the present time.

Bad working conditions: The plant was built about 50 years ago. Very little improvements have been made since that time, and no attempt has been made to utilize women for light jobs in storerooms.

Federal Motor Truck Co., employing approximately 1,000 employees, manufacturers of trucks for Army and civilian use.

This company has a schedule of 16 Army trucks per day and 20 to 30 civilian trucks per day.

Production on Army trucks has dropped to 14 per day. The plant works 5 days a week, 10 hours a day, and 4 hours on Saturday. The workers have asked to work all day on Saturday, to help the situation. Many women could be used on jobs that men are now working on.

Lyons, Inc.: Employs approximately 1,000 employees. Manufacturers of 40-millimeter shell cases. Negroes are hired only on nonproduction jobs. Women could be better utilized on punch presses, draw presses, screw machines, and other small machines where manpower ceiling has been reached.

Firestone Motor Products, Wyandotte, Mich.: Manufacturers of tank and gun parts, employing about 1,000 workers.

No Negroes are hired. Union expects collusion between War Manpower Commission and company to prevent filling quota of workers with Negroes.

Kelsey-Hayes: There has been a recent lay-off of over 1,000 at the Plymouth, Mich., plant of the Kelsey-Hayes Co. That is a machine-gun plant. One hundred involved cannot transfer to the Detroit plant because of transportation difficulties.

Wolverine Tube Co.: Employing approximately 1,000 employees, manufacturers of copper, brass, and aluminum condenser tubes, is laying off women out of line of seniority, while men are working at jobs women can do. The company is still hiring men while laying off women workers.

Chandler-Hill Corporation: Produces aircraft, tanks, and landing barges. Total employment between 400 and 500. The plant is set up fairly efficiently. No Negroes are hired. Men and women working together on drill presses, drilling machines, grinders, screw machines, and so forth. One hundred and fifty employees laid off, and are being gradually recalled. Wages fair.

Women could be used on above jobs that men are now doing.

Detroit Lubricator: Produces engineering specialties, valve controls, and so forth. The plant is set up quite efficiently.

Very few Negroes are hired. Men and women are working together on machine assemblies. More women could be utilized. Wages fairly O. K.

I want to go now into the large plants in the city of Detroit, Ford Motor Co. I want to read into the record a communication which one of my representatives in the Michigan survey has sent me:

JANUARY 10, 1945.

To: Mr. Percy Llewellyn, Director.

From: Harold Johnson, International Representative, Foundries at Ford Motor Co.

DEAR SIR AND BROTHER: Please be advised that a survey of the four foundries now being operated by the Ford Motor Co. at the Rouge plant disclose that a large amount of facilities that could be used for the production of vital and much needed war materials are standing idle, and in some sections of one of the foundries, some production lines stand idle and in complete black-out. This period of machine idleness does not take well with the workers employed in these foundries, when each day they work near or pass by these idle facilities and look on in amazement knowing that thousands of their fellow foundry workers have either been layed off or transferred to other work while employment statistics claim shortage of foundry workers and while the War Department pleads for more and more production.

A remedy improving this situation will meet with the approval and the cooperation of every loyal American foundry worker now employed at the Rouge plant or elsewhere. It is more evident now since the appeal of President Roosevelt to the Nation on January 6, 1945, that no hands nor machines that can produce should stand idle, lest we deny our fighting men the equipment much needed, and prolong the war.

In our opinion, the foundries now operated at the Ford Rouge plant can be utilized to a much greater advantage to the War Department when so arranged and given the go-ahead signal, for instance:

The steel foundry, newly built, Government-constructed, and considered the most modernly equipped in America, stands partly idle. Standing idle is such valuable facilities as melting furnaces, shot blast, moulding machines, core-making machines, heat-treat furnaces, cupalos, etc. This foundry, if producing at full capacity would employ about 3,000 workers, whereas, at present, it affords employment to a little more than 50 percent of normal capacity.

Neither of the three shifts are working full-shift capacity. The day shift is operating approximately 75 percent, the afternoon shift, 30 percent, and the midnight shift, 15 percent.

This foundry is engaged in the manufacture of malleable iron and steel products and should it be operated at full capacity, there would be a credible increase in the production of material, and it is believed possible that most of the workers who have been layed off or transferred to other work in the Rouge plant, can be obtained and returned to their previously held jobs in the steel foundry.

THE PRODUCTION FOUNDRY

This foundry like the steel foundry has many facilities standing idle, though going through a period of remodeling and repairing, there are still many facilities idle that could be used to great advantage and employ a great many of the workers who are layed off or who have been transferred to other jobs in other departments in the Rouge plant.

This foundry, long known as a production genius, normally employs about 9,000 workers, while at present the employees number a little more than 50 percent. In some sections of this foundry, production lines are standing idle and in complete black-out. Neither of the three shifts are working full capacity, the day shift is working approximately 75 percent, the afternoon, 35 percent, and the midnight 10 percent.

In our opinion, many of the idle facilities could be returned to operation in this foundry and many of the layed-off and transferred workers could be obtained and production credibly increased.

THE MAGNESIUM FOUNDRY

This is a small foundry also newly constructed by the Government and is engaged in the manufacture of magnesium castings, parts for the Pratt-Whitney airplane engine. This foundry which normally employed approximately 1,700 workers, is at present employing a little over 50 percent of that number due to the fact that some jobs have been discontinued and the shift capacity reduced. Some production lines have been completely eliminated with nothing replacing such jobs as have been moved. This has reduced the amount of production and the number of employees to near 50-percent of that number, due to the fact that some jobs have been discontinued and the shift capacity reduced. Some production lines have been completely eliminated, with nothing replacing such jobs as have been moved. This has reduced the amount of production and the number of employees to near 50 percent.

Many core-making benches are standing idle and the midnight shift is almost completely idle and in total black-out. The afternoon shift operates about 50 percent and the day shift is operating about 75 percent of shift capacity. Thus, the magnesium foundry could be utilized to a great advantage if the idle facilities were operated and more facilities installed where the production of certain castings was discontinued.

THE JOBBING FOUNDRY

This is another small foundry engaged mostly in jobbing floor molding though there are some jobbing molding machines in operation.

This foundry is engaged in the production of steel, brass, aluminum, and gray-iron castings and normally employs about 700 workers. Present employment is down to about 325 employees. Standing idle in this foundry is jobbing floor space, melting furnaces, and jobbing molding machines, all of which could be put into operation and used to a great advantage toward producing vital war materials.

It is believed that the foundry employees of both the jobbing and magnesium foundries could be called back from lay-offs and obtained from the other departments to where they have been transferred in the Rouge plant and placed back on their jobs thus relieving the critical foundry situation that exists in most foundries throughout the Nation. We believe that enough laid-off and transferred Rouge foundry workers can be obtained to necessitate the operation of many facilities now standing idle and by so doing, production could be increased throughout the Rouge foundries, in general, at least 35 percent.

We are also of the opinion, that should the Government place contracts with the Rouge foundries and divert others to the Rouge that are being held up in foundries elsewhere, that such orders would be delivered on schedule and in quantities satisfactory to the War Department.

I refer this report to you ont of all sincerity and fairness to all concerned and I trust it may bring immediate results in that our Government's plea for more production meets the earnest approval of every Rouge foundry worker wherever they may be. May I beg of you, on behalf of the Rouge foundry workers to enlist the aid of every Government, civil, or labor agency that may assist in the elimination of this idle machine age existing in the Rouge foundries and improve our war effort.

Fraternally yours,

HAROLD JOHNSON,
International Representative Region 1-A,
United Automobile Workers, Congress of Industrial Organizations.

That is the end of the communication.

I want to take the production foundry and give you a few employment figures. In August of 1941, working on civilian production, there were employed in the production foundry of the River Rouge plant of the Ford Motor Co., approximately 10,760 workers. In July 1942, there were employed approximately 7,994. In July 1943, there were employed 7,934; in July 1944, 5,896; and in December 1944, 5,228.

We have no knowledge of the company renewing contracts. They are today making trucks, and tractor parts. There are approximately 200 workers employed on landing-gear work. There were in 1943 600 workers transferred to the new steel foundry. At the same time there were transferred to the Pratt & Whitney building 250 workers on nonfoundry work. Six hundred were transferred to the jobbing foundry. Many of these have since been retransferred to the motor building on nonfoundry work. Approximately 75 workers have been transferred to the rolling mill, on nonfoundry work.

I cite that to show the committee that there are approximately 6,000 foundry workers employed, formerly employed in the River Rouge plant who have been transferred to other work within the boundaries of the Ford Motor Co., and many of them have been laid off. Among those people laid off, the majority of them are women, women who could be called back today and take the place of the foundry workers who are working on nonfoundry work, which will allow them to be placed back on their previous jobs of producing foundry material.

I want to cite now the figures of the entire Rouge plant, so far as employment is concerned. In August 1941, there were employed 79,325 workers. In July 1942, there were employed 70,603 workers. In July 1943, they reached a peak of 84 648 workers. In July 1944, 1 year later, it dropped from 85,648 down to 69,362, and in December 1944, employment since July of 1944, dropped 2,308 from 69,362.

The Manpower Commission in Detroit has asserted that there is a manpower shortage in the foundry classification. The Ford Motor Co. has not hired any since 1943; however, they are now calling back a few laid-off workers. The reason for that in our opinion, is this: The foundry workers of the Ford Motor Co. have received a higher rate of pay than foundry workers generally throughout the Detroit area, or other areas. The minimum pay is about $1.10 an hour, and runs up to approximately $1.45 to $1.50 an hour. We find that the Ford Motor Co. is still getting foundry work done because of the high rate of pay the Ford Motor Co. is able to subcontract out to other concerns throughout the country, paying a lower rate of pay, and are able to get their foundry work taken care of. They then can use their foundry workers employed in the Rouge plant in other classifications, such as machine work and assembly work.

We are of the opinion that, if the Ford Motor Co. was forced by the Government to take back the foundry workers and put these modern foundries in operation under the wage scales agreed to between the union and the company, that the foundry situation would be helped tremendously.

Another problem we find is that the Ford Motor Co. and the rest of the automobile companies—that is, the large automobile companies, General Motors, Chrysler—a few months ago started out on a great race to find out which one was going to be able to convert most quickly, reconvert to civilian production, and I presume it was because of the high rate of competition that they have always had in the past that each company wants to get their product on the market before the other. We find that this is also true in the foundries. In fact, I have a grievance that the workers have made out to the committeeman regarding the health item, and it was taken up through the various steps of the grievance procedure, and we find that the company has answered this grievance in the following way:

The foundry is at present under a reconversion program, and this matter will be satisfactorily looked after when this is completed.

He doesn't say what the reconversion program is, but from our knowledge of it, it is a reconversion of the foundry getting ready for civilian production.

That is about all I have to offer. I will be glad to answer any questions that any of the Congressmen may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one question. Do you know of any instance where a foundry has had contracts for war supplies that has not been performed or any contract at all?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. I known of none. I know that some of the contracts they have canceled; in many cases where the company had sublet the contract out, they will do that before they will try to manufacture it themselves.

Mr. DURHAM. Are they subcontracting such things as axles for the heavy trucks and castings for the heavy trucks?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. The Ford Motor Co.?

Mr. DURHAM. The Ford Motor Co.

Mr. LLEWELLYN. The Ford Motor Co., to my knowledge, some time ago we were down here trying to bet more work, when certain contracts were listed to be discontinued. We discussed the problem with Mr. Nelson, and he suggested that the company take an Army truck contract. The company refused to do that, however, because they will not change their specifications. They build Army trucks for the Army under their present specifications, which calls for civilian trucks. They will not change their equipment or their planning to build a truck under the specifications called for by the Army.

Mr. ROE. If the military authorities said they needed trucks built on different specifications, don't you think that that company, in order to comply with full cooperation in the war effort, should be forced to make trucks of that kind?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. I certainly agree.

Mr. DURHAM. That is just one of the problems that we have here. Changes in design of everything come so fast that they can't keep up with them—some of them.

The CHAIRMAN. One thing that the witness emphasized here is the fact that Mr. Ford sublets a lot of his business in order to enable the smaller plants to make a profit, apparently on things that he does not want to make in his own plant. Now, the gentleman knows, of course, that there has been a regular campaign on in Congress to require all these large concerns to sublet as much of their work as possible, in order to give the small businessman something to do, and in order to spread the work. That has been the desire of Congress, and we even set up a committee to investigate that matter and then passed a small war plants act and appropriated $150,000 or $200,000 for it. So that is not a criticism of Mr. Ford if he is doing that.

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Only in this way, Mr. Congressman—that we have a foundry situation that seems to be one of our critical situations, and I can't see how we are helping the war effort by taking the work out of an immense foundry at the River Rouge plant and subletting it out to critical areas, while foundry employees who can do this work are being transferred into another plant on other work.

The CHAIRMAN. And some of the truck difficulties, of course, might be due to the fact that they haven't been able to get foundry work?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Correct.

Mr. FENTON. What kind of foundries does Mr. Ford sublet those to?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. To the same type of foundry, to one that can do the work. The Ford Motor Co. is equipped to do any kind of foundry work or steel work. They have a steel mill.

Mr. FENTON. Are those other companies unionized? They don't pay as much wages, do they?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. That is correct. Some of them are unionized; some of them may not be. I have not made a survey into that. It so happens that the Ford Motor Co.'s rate of pay has always been higher than most of the other companies, and that is the reason now that they are taking this position.

Mr. FENTON. Would you be in a position to say that some of these foundries that they sublet to are members of the C. I. O.?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. That is correct.

Mr. FENTON. And they haven't got the same rate of pay as the Ford Motor Co.?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. That is right.

Mr. DURHAM. I gather from your statement that you don't believe there is any shortage of manpower in your area?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. They certainly have not proved it to us in the Detroit area—that there is a shortage—because people have been laid off from employment. In July 1943 there were 69,362 employed, and that has gone down to 60,308 in December, 1944—rather, from July 1944 to December, a 6 months' period, a drop of 9,000 workers.

Mr. DURHAM. They are not employing as many people as they were on civilian production in 1940. Is that correct?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Correct. Civilian production in 1941 was employing 79,000, and in July 1943 they were employing 64,648 people.

Mr. DURHAM. A lot of those have gone into the armed services, of course.

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Some of them have. There is a majority of them who went into the armed services in the years 1941 and 1942; but still, with all of those people going into the armed services in the years 1941 and 1942, in July 1943 they had 84,000 people employed in the River Rouge plant, and today they only have 60,000 people employed, which is 24,000 less than they had in 1943. The majority of the people who were laid off are among those 13,000 that the Lieutenant Governor has cited as drawing compensation. A lot more of them, I presume, have gone into essential industries. A lot of them possibly have obtained jobs in essential industries.

Mr. DURHAM. Were any of these men deferred because of essential work there?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. There have been some deferments, of course.

Mr. DURHAM. There are still some of them?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. That is correct. Of course, we have criticized, too, some of the deferment problems. We have found cases where the Ford Motor Co. would ask deferment for a particular worker who was an apprentice and refused to ask a deferment for a journeyman.

Mr. DURHAM. What percentage, at the present time, if you know, of civilian production is done by Ford & Co.?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. The only military vehicles he is making, to my knowledge, are jeeps. He is not making any trucks for the Army. All of his truck manufacturing is civilian trucks.

Mr. DURHAM. You do not know what the percentage is of his manufacture of jeeps and what the percentage of his manufacture of civilian trucks is?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. No; I do not. Of course, he is building airplane parts.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin, do you have any questions?

Mr. MARTIN. Your analysis is based on actual conditions prevailing right now on the matter of availability of labor in the Detroit area?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. That is right.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, have you given any study to the possible impact of heavy draft of manpower into the armed forces?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. I have.

Mr. MARTIN. Will that change that picture so that the labor situation will be one of a different type than it is now?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Not to a great extent.

The CHAIRMAN. What are the figures on that?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Our figures are approximately thus: That in the Detroit area, from July 1943 to December 1944, there has been a drop, in the Ford plant alone, of some 24,000 workers.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, how many of those went into the armed forces? Do you have that?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. I do not have that figure. However, I would say that, basing it upon August of 1941, when we had 79,000, and then dropping to 70,000 in July, and then coming up from 70,000 to 84,000 in July of 1943, based upon those figures, there certainly is manpower available in the Detroit area.

Mr. MARTIN. You do not, then, from your previous answer, expect any difficulty from this further draft of men into the armed forces?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. No; I do not.

Mr. MARTIN. Of manpower available in the Detroit area?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Based upon the manpower available—that is, if they will use the women and Negroes that are available—I think it can more than take up the slack.

Mr. MARTIN. In other words, if they do come in and take a number of able-bodied men out of the industrial plants, your study in the

Detroit area leads you to believe that they can be replaced by Negroes and women who have had some experience in industry?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Mostly laid off employees of the company. The Ford Motor Co. has not hired since 1943.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, is your study such that you could generalize to the entire Detroit area on the basis of your study of the Ford Motor plant and say that that condition prevails rather generally throughout the Detroit area?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. It does. It does as far as women and Negroes are concerned.

Mr. MARTIN. And by that you mean most able-bodied men taken into the armed forces, from the Detroit industrial area, you would expect to be replaceable by Negroes and women?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. That is right.

Mr. MARTIN. Who are experienced workers?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. Yes; that is correct.

Mr. MARTIN. Who have been laid off?

Mr. LLEWELLYN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you very much, sir.

(Witness excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let me announce to the committee that we will meet at 10 o'clock in the morning, and we have a witness from the National Association of Manufacturers; and after that is over with, we will go on and consider this bill for amendment; that is, for reporting.

On Friday we will have a brief hearing in order to let General Kirk, who has to make a 30-day trip overseas, testify on the nurses' bill.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman, I have requested permission to be heard.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; we will try to hear you tomorrow, right after the Manufacturers Association man, or just before him, whichever one of you gets here first.

All right; the committee is in recess.

(Whereupon, at 5:45 p. m., the committee recessed until 10 a. m., the following day.)

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee on Military Affairs met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

Present: Representatives Thomason, Sparkman, Kilday, Durham, Philbin, Stewart, Price, Winstead, Roe, Holifield, Arends, Clason, Martin, Elston, Harness, Fenton, and Johnson of California.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the committee be in order, please.

Now, gentlemen, the member from South Dakota, Mr. Francis Case, has requested to be heard this morning before he leaves for the funeral of Mr. O'Connor. Representative Case is in the witness chair, and we will be glad to hear you make whatever statement you wish, Mr. Case.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANCIS CASE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

Mr. CASE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the courtesy in letting me speak at this time on this subject which is before the committee, and I want to be brief, for your consideration as well as my own.

I recognize that the Committee on Military Affairs is going into the whole question of need and into the several detailed problems, and I am not going to go into that phase of it. I want to speak particularly with regard to H. R. 377, a bill which I first introduced in the Seventy-eighth Congress and reintroduced on the first session of this Congress, a bill to establish a National Service Corps.

This bill does not seek to cover certain questions that are involved in the May bill, but it does seek to apply the principles of universal service in a flexible way to manpower problems. The best explanation of the bill, I think, is to read it, Mr. Chairman, and it is very brief. [Reading:]

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That during any war in which the United States may be engaged, the Secretary of War is hereby authorized and directed to establish a National Service Corps as a component of the Army of the United States, with special steps, as hereinafter provided, consisting of not to exceed one hundred thousand men, members of which shall be assigned to work on the production of urgently needed war materials, as the Secretary may deem necessary, after consultation with the Director of the War Manpower Commission and the War Production Board.

SEC. 2. (a) The National Director of Selective Service is authorized and directed to supply personnel for the National Service Corps, by establishing quotas for the several States, on a basis of population, to be called from time to time according to the requirements submitted to him by the Secretary of War, and

under regulations formulated by him in conformity with principles established by the Selective Service Act.

At that point I will interrupt the reading of the bill just to make a brief comment on that section. The intent there is to utilize the principle of universal service and to utilize existing machinery of the Selective Service System, including the local boards.

Flexibility is provided by the quota principle, already in use in connection with calling men for service in the armed forces.

Section 3 reads:

(a) Personnel of the National Service Corps shall be paid by the Army, the wage that each would have received had he been a civil-service employee of the Government classified for the particular position to which he is assigned. He shall also be entitled to such benefits for injury, unemployment, and retirement as he would be entitled to if employed in the regular civil service of the United States and the reemployment rights he would have if serving in the armed forces.

(b) In cases where personnel of the National Service Corps is assigned to work on war production in private indostry, the Secretary shall obtain from the private contractor appropriate agreements for reimbursements to the United States of any compensation paid or benefits extended under this section.

Now, briefly on that section, that seeks to suggest a possible solution for the problem of pay, compensation, and post-war rights. In discussions I have heard of this whole problem, one question that has arisen has been whether a man drawn into industrial work would be paid Army pay working alongside of a man receiving wages set by the industry. My suggestion in that regard would be to pay him the wages that he would have if he were a civil servant of the Government, classified for that particular type of work, with the same benefits for injury, unemployment, and retirement that he would have if he were a civil servant of the Government. But a man in industry, it does not seem to me, should be entitled to the same compensation, or to post-war benefits, as a man who is serving on the battle front. Consequently, I suggest the use of the civil-service rules and the application of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act for injury. But my thought is that if a man is drawn from another occupation to be employed in this fashion, he should have the rights to reemployment that a man drawn for the armed forces would have.

Mr. SPARKMAN. What about the problem of the man working under civil-service rates of compensation beside the man who is working under prevailing wage rates in some particular section, or rates that have been agreed to under a union agreement. You would have some friction there, would you not, or difference?

Mr. CASE. There might be some dispartity there; but, generally speaking, one would have to assume that the civil-service rates established for a certain classification in an area bear some relationship to the prevailing wage in that area. It did not seem to me that it would be possible to set up any formula that would assure absolute identity of rates in every instance; so that, accepting the thoughts that the civil-service rates in an area must bear some fair relationship to the prevailing rates, I suggested that as the best solution to that problem.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you not think it would be a better fit if you had said that they should draw the wages being paid for comparable work in that same plant to which they may be assigned, so that they would fit right in with the schedule for that particular plant?

Mr. CASE. I think the committee should pass judgment on a question like that. I realize that many details of this have come before you that have not occurred to me, but some uniformity should apply to all men who are commandeered by the Government for work, and it seems to me that the civil-service rates must have some justification or they would not exist.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. CASE. Section 4 provides that there are to be appropriated to the War Department such sums as necessary to carry out this act and section 5, the title.

I think I have covered the principal points in the bill, Mr. Chairman, with the possible exception of referring to the post-war benefits. It seems to me that while the man who might be drafted for industrial service should not have the same entitlements for compensation as a man who has served at the battle fronts, yet he should have the reemployment rights that apply to the men in the armed forces.

Paragraph (b) of section 3 provides for reimbursement to the United States for any compensation paid or benefits when they are used in private industry.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. DURHAM. They would need far more than your bill carries here, would they not, a hundred thousand men?

Mr. CASE. Obviously in any bill the matter of figures is a matter for the committee to determine when it sizes up the problem. The figure of 100,000 was suggested as a starting point, when I introduced the bill last year. If the need is 400,000, or whatever it may be, of course, that can be established by the committee and subsequently amended as needs dictate.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you have to catch a train, I will ask that the committee forego questioning at this time. We appreciate your statement and will be glad to give it consideration when we come to the consideration in the committee.

Mr. CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, our next witness is a representative of the National Association of Manufacturers, Mr. Frederick C. Crawford.

Mr. Crawford, will you come around, please, sir, and identify yourself, tell us who you represent, and give us your statement?

STATEMENT OF FREDERICK C. CRAWFORD, PRESIDENT, THOMPSON PRODUCTS, INC., CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Chairman, my name is Fred Crawford. My job is president of the Thompson Products Co., in Cleveland, Ohio. I have been asked to come here representing 12,000 members of the National Association of Manufacturers and some 40,000 industries through the country, affiliated through State and city manufacturing organizations, in what is known as the N. I. C., or National Industrial Council.

These gentlemen have given a good deal of thought to this question of production. I want to speak for them and draw somewhat from my own experience.

I am here rather as a representative business manager who has the job of getting out this production that is needed for the war. I want to speak from that angle, that of the fellow who has to deal with the American worker, with the material, the machinery, and the orders, and deliver the shells, guns, airplanes, and what not.

I would like to say on behalf of American industry that our objective, like that of all good Americans, is to win the war as quickly as possible, and any device that will aid in winning the war we are for. I realize that in the proposed act our military people believe that it will help win the war. With the same honest opinion, many of us in business do not think that a national-service act will aid but possibly will not do as good a job as the voluntary system that we have followed in the past.

I would like very briefly to review the first 2 or 3 years of the war job. Two and a half years ago industry faced a much tougher problem than it does today. We were faced with a productive problem beyond anything any American dreamed of. The plants were not built; there was no organization to aid in the work; we did not know at that time that you could make an expert grinder hand out of a hair dresser, and that she would do as good a job as an expert mechanic. We faced an astounding program.

We did certain things. First of all, we impressed upon the people of this country that there was a war, and a serious war, and a vast job ahead.

Second, orders were placed in large quantity, and the American worker understood that these would run for some time and that it meant steady work without lay-offs.

We started a training program; we started getting material together, and all the machinery of mass production, by the voluntary system, was turned loose. Some people were impatient at the beginning, but you must understand that mass production is a curious thing. Mr. Knudsen said that you cannot hatch a dozen eggs short of 21 days, but when the hen has set that long, they begin coming pretty fast.

Mass production requires the presence of machinery, of materials, the preparation of the tools, a program that is known, the training of the people, and then away you go. In spite of many handicaps, lack of organization, lack of nonschedule, the wage-and-hour legislation, putting a penalty on work over 40 hours, in spite of turn-over, absenteeism from new workers who had never been in war work, and slow down, and all the traditional restrictions on production, in a short time when mass production got going, we went at an enormous rate.

I cite those handicaps to show that we have never fully exhausted our capacity.

In a short time we flooded the country with production. So that by this summer Congress was debating surpluses, and they were whispering there would be a scandal from the enormous surpluses of this mass production.

Our experiences all show that from the voluntary system and when mass production is put together, you get a great output of production.

I want to mention here that the greatest source of that production was not in the number of people working but in the efficient use of the tools of mass production. Henry Ford said the virtue on the farm is not the number of farm hands but rather the size of the crop at the end of the year. And to those of us in the factory, who have the job

of getting this out, I stress that the virtue in the factory not the number of hours, or time, or the mere number of workers, but the output at the end of the day that can be shipped abroad with which to fight the war.

Now, just a thing about who the American workers are. They are not the pawns in this game, they are human. They are the best patriotic hard working, honest Americans we have today, the great force of American workers. You cannot fool them; they are smart. That is why they are the best workers in the world; that is why they outproduce everybody else.

Let me describe one of my plants. Thirty-seven nationalities, 28 religions, 13 percent colored, 35 percent women; surely a melting pot of American life. Every one with aspirations and desires and hopes and patriotism just like everybody else, all working together.

Now, the key to production in America is the efficient use of the tools of production. The efficient use depends upon what is in the head of the American worker. The mass psychology, the country-wide psychology, is the most important thing. What the worker thinks, and free, willing workers that know the job, and know why it is important, those who believe that they have some work ahead without a lay-off, cannot be beat.

General Marshall said one day:

> The American soldier is the best soldier in the world, if you tell him what the objective is and why you want to carry it, and when you want to take it.

The American worker is exactly the same bird in a factory as you find in the Army. If he knows the objective, why you want to take it, and when it must be taken, he is a great worker.

I cite this as an example of the success of the voluntary system in past years: That work psychology, what the worker thinks, is the important thing.

Now, what has happened to put us in the position that we are in? Let me briefly tell you.

A year ago we started a honeymoon of optimism in this country. We told the war worker that the war was going to be over this year. We told it all over the country. The Army, and the press, and you, and I, and everybody else were quite convinced the war would be over this year. We not only told the Americans it was over, but we proved it. We started quite ruthlessly to cancel orders without much thought about what it did to the working force.

I would like to give you two or three examples of how the cancelations completely reversed the worker psychology that meant a football team of efficient mass production. Take the city of St. Louis, which was filled with small arms manufacture. Within 1 week, we suddenly discovered we had a surplus of small arms that might become a scandal, and we shut all those plants down, putting 26,000 people out in the street in 1 week.

Remember, what the worker thinks is the key to mass production cooperation. It was pretty hard to whip that town up after that performance.

Another one, which is in my town, a certain airplane plant was told to build a certain long-distance bomber; for week after week, Army and industry whipped up the workers to turn out 20,000 strong for this bomber. They began to turn out. Then one day, all of a

sudden, the radio said, "The whole project is canceled. Stay home for a week. We do not know what to do with you."

Not only did those workers slip away, but the effect upon all industry in that community was profound. I cite these examples of where we not only told the workers the war was over but we absolutely proved it by the method of cancelation.

I would like to point out third, gentlemen, that last summer Congress debated surpluses for a long time. The country debated the coming unemployment that might be here after the turn of the year.

We did another rather foolish thing that affected the worker, and I speak from my own experience. Where orders were to be renewed, in which there was some question as to how many pieces were needed, we were very slow to issue the new orders. I am thinking particularly of a production line of 2,000 skilled workers that have whipped up a wonderful teamwork in one of my plants. They were producing 70 percent spares, because the sands of Africa indicated that that was the spare requirements for this part. When we got out of Africa, we found 20 percent was quite enough. The 50 percent extra spares piled up in warehouses until there was a 3 month's supply. Quite properly, the Army said to use the spares on new motors and not make any for 90 days.

An order came out to shut down this line of 2,000 people for 90 days, and at the end of the 90 days, to start again with the 2,000, full speed, which is an impossible thing to do in mass production. We caught that one. We did not announce it to our workers. We looked around for new products. We got in on the new jet propulsion motors and had a mass meeting to tell our workers we had gotten some new orders and in the cancelation of the old, there would be a short period of moving and machinery replacing. We told them to take a vacation and stand by for bigger production. That is an example of how we might have handled the cut-backs and renewals.

What actually happened this fall was, orders were not renewed in time. It takes 30 days to assemble a motor, 30 days to make the parts, and 30 days to make the steel. Unless the order is placed 90 days before the motor is required, somebody is going to be laid off. This year, deliveries of January 1, in some cases, were not ordered until December 15, so lay-offs were caused by this improper renewal of orders.

I cite these examples simply to show you that not only did we tell the American people that the war was over, but we proved it by the way we handled the orders.

Now, I repeat, the American worker is smart. Who is this American worker? What are our reserves of labor? I want to again describe those workers. Six ministers, who preach on Sunday, and they are darn fine welders during the week. They did not want to work; they are marginal workers, no National Service Act would catch them. They are patriotic; they come to me and say, "When can we go back to our church? We are here because we are patriotic."

A large number of women who were war mothers, no national act would catch them, because their husbands are away. They put the children in the nursery and come to work in the war plants. Hundreds of them say, "When can I go home; when is this game up?"

I have in my plant 15 barbers, all older men, who stored their barber chairs to come to work patriotically. No national service act will

catch them. They say to me every day, "When can I leave and open up my shop again?"

Mr. THOMASON. We are not after that type of people, that I know of. They are not the kind of people we are trying to reach. We join you in commending them. What are you going to do about these 4,000,000 who are doing absolutely nothing in any contribution to the war effort? Those are the ones we want.

Mr. ELSTON. What 4,000,000, might I ask?

Mr. THOMASON. IV–F's.

Mr. ELSTON. Have you had any testimony in this committee of how many IV–F's are not working? There has not been any testimony thus far about that.

Mr. KILDAY. You were not here.

Mr. THOMASON. Yes; I just want to supplement that, because I join Mr. Crawford in the high commendation of the rank and file of workers in all of the plants, especially those you have mentioned. There are no more patriotic men or women than they are. They are doing their part.

As I understand it, the War Department is saying that we have to have 900,000 men in the Army in the next 6 months, five, six, or seven hundred thousand in the industry, and in order to get these 900,000 in the Army, to meet terrific demands on both fronts, especially after the German counteroffensive, if 330,000 of those must come out of industry, speaking for myself, I am going to join in the highest praise of these people that you are talking about.

I want to know about these 4,000,000 who are not doing anything in this terrible crisis. What are you going to say about that? Do you want them to do anything? If so, how are you going to reach them? I would like some ideas.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would like to come to the IV–F's later in my talk, if I may.

Now, the problem that confronts us today is a serious one. Nobody is to blame but the German. The German people are tougher than we thought. They will not quit; according to the rules, they have been licked four times already, I am told.

About 30 days ago our top command learned we had a war on our hands. In the last 2 weeks American management and industry has begun to learn that there is a new schedule. The American worker has not yet learned that we are starting a new war with big orders and a big program.

Now, nobody is to blame for that. It is the turn in the fortunes of war.

I would like to speak of the manpower problem as we see it in our plants today. After a year and a half, in which we told the worker the war was over, that he had better go find something else to do, and proved that by the handling of orders, we find the following astounding results.

In the past year a million and a half people have left war plants. Today the shortage is 146,000 people, scattered over the country in war plants. Between fifty and sixty million people are working in America, which makes one-quarter of 1 percent the size of the problem today. Tomorrow, we are told, it will be 300,000. All right, it is a half percent. Next summer, we are told, it will be 900,000, to take your own figure. That is about a percent and a half.

I want to compare this shortage today with some other difficulties, such as absenteeism, which is 6 percent. It is 24 times more important today than the immediate manpower shortage, because 6 percent of our people stay home every day.

Take the workweek, for instance. We are supposed to work 48 hours. Still management is fined and under terrific pressure to shorten hours because of the laws of the land. We are working 45.6 hours; we are losing 5 percent of our total hours, because we do not get a 48-hour week. That is exactly 16 times more important today than the manpower shortage that we are facing today.

Mr. KILDAY. Mr. Crawford, in your own plants, what proportion of your contracts are on a fixed bid and what proportion are on cost-plus?

Mr. CRAWFORD. One hundred percent. All contracts in my plants have been competitive bidding; no cost-plus.

Mr. KILDAY. Does your contract permit you to increase cost because of overtime, or anything like that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No; absolutely no provision for changing price except downward. All of it is competitive, which is true of a great, large number of the thousands of manufacturers that make the parts to go into these assemblies.

Mr KILDAY. If the Wage Board would increase the wage rate in your plants, you could not have——

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would simply have to petition and ask, but there is no provision for that.

Mr. KILDAY. But there is a petition by which governmental reimbursement is made for unexpected wage increases, is there not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I have never seen it work.

Mr. KILDAY. But there is such a provision, is there not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I do not know that it affects my business, which is purely straight competitive bidding.

Mr. SPARKMAN. What is the length of the workweek in your district?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We are working a 13-day week in my plants. That is, we give everybody 2 Sundays off a month. That gives 15 days' pay for 13 days of work, 2 of time and a half, and 1 double time, in this so-called 13-day week.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, how many hours would that be?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, each worker works 7½ hours a day; three shifts, dividing the 24 hours in three shifts of 8 hours, with a half hour for lunch.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That would be 52½ hours a week?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; you get 13 days time 7½ hours.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Forty-nine hours approximately?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Divided over a 2-week period?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, I am very much interested in what you say regarding the workweek. You seem to think that 48 hours in a workweek should be adhered to by us; is that your thought?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; I think the greatest place to get added production is to fill out the full week.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, are production facilities set up in such a way that you can work a full 48-hour week in every particular line? Is it not true that you simply cannot work that much, because there

may be a bottleneck ahead, where your workweek may be much greater than 48 hours?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; mass production, of course, presumes that you get the thing running smoothly. A bottleneck in one place delays others.

Mr. SPARKMAN. To have a 48-hour workweek uniform, you would have to assume that you had the whole production line set up in just the right proportions all along.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And, of course, that does not actually exist.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No; it never actually exists. In some cases you have more machinery in one department than the other, and it can do the job in a little less time, to keep up with less machinery in another department, where it takes longer.

Mr. SPARKMAN. General Knudsen told us the other day that 54 hours, was what he regarded as the absolute maximum. Beyond that amount, the efficiency of the worker decreased. Do you agree with that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I have never seen any convincing evidence that tied together the number of hours and the efficiency. We suppose, and it is probably true, that for the average worker, too long hours reduce the efficiency, and yet there are experiments in plants in America working 84 hours a week, with splendid efficiency and no apparent bad effects from it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Sustained over a long period of time?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Over a long period.

Mr. KILDAY. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead with your statement, Mr. Crawford.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Now, I would like to repeat that, if, in the past year, we had held one-tenth of the men who left our plants, through lack of orders, lack of releases, which are the reasons they left, not because they drifted away, we would have had no manpower problem today. I want to repeat, for Mr. Thomason, that the great reserve of American manpower lies in these professions, services and classes of which I speak. The extra reserve that America calls out are these people who normally do not work and who come out to fill our plants.

The nature of the problem, I believe, today, is entirely local. In different spots, there are different reasons why there is temporarily a shortage.

There is a shortage within my own plant. Over-all, we have a waiting list, but I have a shortage among my several plants. I have another plant where I have no work. It will take me 2 weeks to shift work and machinery between plants, which occurs very often. The balancing of manpower, machinery, and requirements is our big problem. The requirements are constantly changing.

In one plant, I am being canceled on Monday, while in another plant, I am having new orders Tuesday and we are always shifting. It takes time and that is entirely a local problem.

Now, I would like to point out one thing very strongly, gentlemen. That is, if we had had 2½ years ago, a service act, we would be exactly where we are today. There would have been the same mass production; there would have been the same surpluses that were debated last summer; the same fear of unemployment; the same cancelations of small arms in St. Louis; the same cancelations in the Cleveland

bomber plant, where on one day the radio told them to stay home. We would have lost the same million and a half people that we did lose. We would be exactly where we are today. There would have been the same German drive, the same awakening as to the strength of Germany; the same call for new production; the same enormous increases in orders that has just come in, in the last few days, as an urgent program.

How can we get it going again? I repeat, gentlemen, whether we have a law, or do not have a law, American industry and mass production, men and management, must go through the same procedure to get production going, and it makes no difference, in some ways whether you do or do not have a law.

The first thing we have to do is to let the American people in on a secret. We have a damn tough war on our hands, ahead of us. They do not yet know that. That means ending opposition and predictions and telling them more about the war.

The second most important thing to me is to recognize the psychology of a good American worker. Let us admit we were all wrong; let us quit saying industry is behind. It is not behind. It is so far ahead that surpluses were a scandal. Let us admit there are new, large schedules. Let us put up notices, aircraft production is up, shells and ships are up, and let us get over to the American worker that there is a big job ahead with a lot of good money in it, steady work and no lay-offs. Tell them to come back to work.

I would like to point out this matter about being behind on tent cloth, which today is said to be terribly behind. We were up to 60,000,000 units of cloth last spring. We canceled it down, I believe, to 20,000,000 units of cloth, and laid off those people, telling them we did not want them any more. All of a sudden, within 30 days, we issue orders scheduling 80,000,000 units of cloth and tell them they are behind. You cannot tell a worker he is behind when he has been laid off last week.

I believe, already, industry has pulled production up to 50,000,000 units.

The fourth thing I propose is that we get these schedules out, boast about them, publish them, and show them that it means steady work.

Fifth, let us use more wisdom in canceling an order and establishing a new one. Before we cancel the old one, let us announce to the plant that there is a new one coming; stand by.

Let us take off the silly hush-hush that makes it impossible for a manager to tell his men that he has an order. Today there is a magic word. I used it the other day, jet propulsion, which means steady jobs for a year and a half. I have a long waiting list; everybody wants to work in this new department, which means steady war orders with good pay.

Let us publicize the truth about this thing, widely. I will predict that without any law or any action, you will get just what you did before, which was a flood of reserve, marginal workers, who will come back to work. The worker psychology is the key in this thing. The barber will put his chair back into storage and the minister will come down, the hairdresser and the school teacher and the people who are America's great reserve of workers, without whom we cannot meet this enormous program, will all come forth.

I will point out that most of that great reserve would not be touched by any service act whatsoever. Grandpa is at home on his pension; he is a darn good worker and he will come back if it is steady work, but not if it is intermittent.

I would like to shift just a minute and give you a little of industry's fears and worries about what would happen under this service act. I have stressed that time is in the factor. We want to start yesterday, not tomorrow. I believe it would take a long time, not only to enact this act, but to set up machinery to make it work. It will not touch the marginal worker, where I will get all of my extra help.

I would like to stress that the virtue in the factory today is not the number of men working, but the voluntary cooperative use of tools for production that gives us the efficiency, because the virtue is in the number of shells we produce. We fail utterly to see how you could administer this proposed law. What would you pay them? Where would you house them? What would you do in a plant that has 20,000 workers and needs 50? Where would you take care of these people? Would they wear uniforms? Would the others work with them? What would be the effect upon this voluntary cooperating mass production efficiency that makes a mere output?

The Army has a great tradition, which is, when a man enters the Army, he belongs to his Government, body and soul. He is regimented, taken care of, housed, clothed, and fed. We fail utterly to see how that could be done with an American worker. What would you do about absenteeism? Your labor battalion man on Sunday morning reports he is sick—what are you going to do about it? In the Army, if a man is not on the line at 6 o'clock in the morning, he is either in the hospital or the brig. What are you going to do about the labor battalion who stays home? It will not affect absenteeism a bit.

What are you going to do about the dissatisfied, unhappy worker? If I am running a football team, I have got to have the team running with me. If you give me a left end who persists in running in the opposite direction, I have to get rid of him. I would rather have 10 men running with me than 11 running the other way.

Mr. THOMASON. That is the only way you can win a war, too, is it not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right; but a worker who is dissatisfied and thinks he is pushed around, who does not understand this thing, would not contribute production to my plant. I will do better without him.

We have had no experience in America, with the most free people in the world, in trying to push them around. In England, the experience is not convincing. The day I landed in England, I picked up the newspaper to read that bombing was on. The weather was bad and absenteeism was 26 percent. I do not see that the compulsion law had any effect on that. People were tired and they did not come to work.

Lastly, I think it is so contrary to the whole scheme of our American free democracy, that I think the resistance and the talk about it would be most destructive in all of American life.

Now, what does industry propose to do as an alternative? First of all, gentlemen, industry began this job 30 days ago, when Germany attacked, and it became evident that the war is not over. I would like to give you the story in my own community, because it is typical of every community in America.

A year ago, we had 251,000 people working in my community. During the period in which we told them the war was over, and when we were canceling orders, it dropped below 230,000. We lost over 21,000.

Every month, for 8 months, we lost workers. They were being lost because there were no orders to keep them busy. In December, when the attack came, the loss stopped, and it leveled off. The first of January, there was a publicity drive that there would be big orders and steady work again. The curve turned up.

The total shortage in Cleveland, a week ago, was 5,000 people. At the end of a publicity drive, 2,300 people reported to U. S. E. S. in 1 week, all marginal workers who said that they thought the show was over. They told us if we had a year's steady work, they would be back on the job.

There is an example of how businessmen, and good American labor, knowing the problem, with orders to back them up and steady work, solved the problem in a short time.

Mr. KILDAY. When did that happen, Mr. Crawford?

Mr. CRAWFORD. In the last 2 weeks.

Mr. KILDAY. After this bill was introduced?

Mr. THOMASON. Sure.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Since the first of the year.

American industry today is well organized. Fifty thousand companies are knit together by this organization. Already, they have started work, which is possible because, for the first time in a long time, definite programs and schedules are given us by the services.

Now, industry proposes that you can do something that would perhaps strengthen local groups. I am not advocating that we supplement and add to the authority of the W. M. C., because it is the best vehicle in the world, but I am advocating that we strengthen its hand, because it is a vehicle which now exists, one which is already organized in every city in America.

I would like to point out to the War Manpower Commission that in the communities, thousands of men already constitute war manpower committees. They are held in repute in their communities, even more than the national committee is in Washington.

We propose that you give some statutory authority to local committees to do three things:

We propose, first, that you give to the local committee authority when it sets ceilings on a nonessential industry and does not get compliance, that you give them the right through the courts to enforce that ceiling. In other words, the local committee can call up the local judge and ask him to call this certain person down and tell him to do what the committee wants him to do.

Mr. THOMASON. Are you talking about war manpower now?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, local war manpower committees.

Mr. THOMASON. You are going to turn it all over to manpower?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. I repeat that I would like to use the vehicle that exists, the War Manpower Committee, because it is organized in every community in America with good men, and it is respected by American industry and labor.

Mr. THOMASON. You just want to take the bridle off and turn it all over to them?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We propose to give them added authority, to do three things——

Mr. THOMASON. You want legislation to give them full and complete authority——

Mr. CRAWFORD. I did not say that. I said statutory authority to do three things, which are, where a local industry, nonessential, will not adhere to the ceiling which is set by the Manpower Commission, they have the right to go to the courts to get that order carried out. That enables local committees, where there are local problems, to reduce the number of unessential workers, by setting ceilings on unessential inustry.

Second, we propose to give them the authority, through the courts, for compulsory release of workers. That is, to order a nonessential industry to release a hundred workers, so that they will report to U. S. E. S. and be sent to an essential industry.

Mr. KILDAY. You want that to be done by the local courts?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. You are not a lawyer?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No.

Mr. KILDAY. Then you do not realize how long it takes to get a case through the Federal district court.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, we believe that there is the authority to turn to the court to get this order carried out. In local communities, you will get a rather prompt and good compliance because local people understand their local problems.

The third thing we want to do is to give statutory authority to the local group through the courts, to make the transfer of workers from one industry to the other, and have a little more power behind it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I think that is a very interesting point. What would that power be?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, let me give a particular case. We have, in the town, a nonessential industry, employing 700 people. The local problem indicates that two hundred of those should go into essential industry. The first thing that would be done would be to establish a ceiling of 500 for that industry. The second thing would be to have 200 people discharged from that industry by the management of that industry. The third thing would be that when they report to the U. S. E. S., the controlled referrals would be continued and those people would be turned over to essential industry, to find no work in nonessential industry.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well now, does that mean that those two hundred who are released from this plant, where the ceiling is imposed, would have to go to another plant to work?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Or get no work.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Or get no work?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. What would they do if they did not go to the plant where you directed them to go?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I never saw a worker who did not want a good job.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We are confronted here with real problems and practical problems, and here is a point which I want to get. Most of the opposition to this measure or to legislation of this type, has been directed to the compulsory features of it. Now, it seems to me

that you are putting compulsion in here, first, on the plant itself, to having ceilings imposed on it.

It is an interesting point, to my way of thinking, as to how these ceilings are to be enforced.

Mr. THOMASON. Well, he wants legislation to take them to the Federal courts.

Mr. KILDAY. But I want to understand how the Federal courts are going to enforce it. A man is enjoined from employing more than a certain number? Is that it? Who is going to say just whom he shall discharge from that plant?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is up to him to reduce his employment.

Mr. KILDAY. It is up to him. Then he is going to keep the cream of the crop and discharge his IV–F's, is he not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is all right.

Mr. KILDAY. Are you going to help the labor market by turning those fellows out who perhaps have had a hard time getting on there in the beginning?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. And shift them over to an unwilling employer, somewhere else?

Mr. CRAWFORD. If, in the community, there is need, in essential industry, for 200 workers, and they are now in nonessential industry, this proposes that the compulsion is upon the manufacturer, not upon the laborer. The manufacturer who——

Mr. KILDAY. Yes, but compulsion is compulsion. What difference does it make where it is directed? In principle what difference does it make?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think it makes a great deal of difference whether it is on the management or industry or on the laborer.

Mr. KILDAY. It seems to me that when you assert compulsion on the 200 workers, who are released, you are going to force them to go to another plant where they may not want to work.

Mr. CRAWFORD. They are in exactly the same position as they would be if the nonessential industry did not need them.

Mr. THOMASON. If they do not do it, you are going to drag them into Federal court and prosecute them?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Just a moment, I have another point. You are referring to these people who are released from nonessential, but you would put ceilings in essential, too?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No; nonessential.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am looking at your note and you say establishment of employment ceilings for all industries, essential and nonessential. As I recall it, your testimony was just that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is, I suppose, because there are degrees of essentiality, and if all industries in a town are essential, you might have a less essential one—one with too many workers who could get along with less, perhaps hoarding or what not.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Let me ask this. Would you impose a ceiling on essential industries? That is, would you give the War Manpower Commission authority, through legislation, to impose ceilings without the use of sanctions?

Mr. CRAWFORD. There might be quite a need for that, if some essential industry were hoarding labor or obviously hanging on to more men than it really needed to do the job.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Will the gentleman yield? As I understand him, the Director is willing to use compulsion on those employed on nonessential industries, but not willing to use compulsion on those who are not doing anything for the war effort.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Let me say we propose no compulsion on the American worker, because we do not believe it will work. The compulsion in this case is upon the employer of labor.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want compulsion either on the busy worker or the idle worker?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No; I do not think we need it. I think we can handle him better without it. I think he will respond voluntarily much better.

Mr. THOMASON. What are you going to do with the man who is not doing any kind of work in this war effort?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think the number is so tiny that it is negligible.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead with your statement.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would like to make this point: We believe American labor, voluntarily, will do a far better job, because willing workers are the only kind we want in a plant. If a manufacturer hoards labor, or if a nonessential industry, such as a hotel, perhaps, has twice as many people to give good service as it should have in time of war, this gives the local committee, respected in their community, the right to tell the hotel keeper he has too many people, that he must reduce them to half. If he does not play ball, they can call up the judge and tell him to put some pressure on the hotel keeper.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would like to make the point that we do not advocate compulsion on any worker but, rather, upon the employer of the worker.

I would like to point out that this is totally a local operation, and I repeat that the W. M. C. committees, locally, are local businessmen and local labor leaders who are held in much more repute in the local centers than the national committee is in the Nation, and they can be effective in the settling of a local problem.

Touching on the IV–F's, industry believes the IV–F's, in some cases, have been unjustly criticized. I believe it is all in the hands of the Army today to handle the IV–F's. If they are within the draft age, they can be drafted, and I do not think the Army would have to put many of them in the Army if they were to say "work or fight."

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you be kind enough to read what you have there into the record exactly as it is? Page 5, point 2. I would like to have you read that into the record.

Mr. CRAWFORD. We emphatically endorse the immediate application of the work-or-fight principle, but believe that no additional legislation is required to accomplish this objective and that it should be made effective immediately within the present framework of the selective service authority and machinery.

Mr. JOHNSON. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Crawford, have you read the specific bill that we are considering, H. R. 1119?

Mr. CAWFORD. I must say that I have not studied it.

68175—45——24

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, in my opinion, that puts in the very thing that you have right there, with this one exception, which is what is worrying some of us. Judge Byrnes makes the list of nonessential workers, nonessential occupations, then he asks the Selective Service organization to tell those men to go into war work, and he designates a group of industries and occupations that they can enter. He gives them a reasonable time to go into that work voluntarily, then those who refuse it is proposed to take into the Army as a labor battalion. That is exactly what you have here.

Mr. CRAWFORD. The Army has that authority today, I believe. It can take all of the IV—F's. The IV—F is a creation of the Army, is it not?

Mr. ELSTON. They are taking some of them right now. They are doing that very thing under Selective Service right now.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Mr. CRAWFORD. We believe that very few men would be taken by the Army. The great bulk of them would go to work.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, are we going to listen to this testimony, or are we going to be interrupted all the time by questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Mr. ARENDS. If we do not want to hear both sides of this question, then let us quit.

The CHAIRMAN. We will do that at this point and then we will let him continue with his statement.

Mr. KILDAY. I was very much interested in the statement that you had not read the bill, Mr. Crawford.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It has been described to me, sir. I am here, just as a businessman who has to get the production out, to give you the viewpoint of the problem.

Mr. KILDAY. I want to call your attention to this: Some of us formulated the Draft Act; we formulated it and know all of its background. It is known as the Selective Training and Service Act, and at the time we drew it we decidedly used the word "selective" on the theory that a man should be selected for the service which he could best render.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. Now, with that in mind, let us take the first provision of the bill, which is that if a man is in an essential industry and is deferred because of his occupation in that essential industry, that is based upon the fact that it has been determined that he can best serve in industry. We then provide that, if he leaves that essential industry to go into another without the permission of his draft board, he would be subject to induction.

My proposal is to change that to make him subject to the penalties of the Selective Training and Service Act. Can you disagree with a provision of law which says that the man who is selected as being an able soldier shall go into the Army to fight and live under the conditions such as he would have to live to fight? Should it not also say that if a man can do his best in industry, but has been deferred because of his position in industry, he must stay there to turn out the work? Unless it is determined that he can go somewhere else to do something better. You would have no objection to that, would you?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I believe that if he leaves his work, for which he is deferred, he should be reclassified to be taken into the Army. There will be very few such cases.

Mr. KILDAY. That is exactly what is provided here.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is what exists today, is it not?

Mr. KILDAY. The second provision which we have here is that the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion shall certify to the Director of Selective Service from time to time the war manpower requirements of war supporting plants and activities in each industrial area, which after consultation with the appropriate officials of management, labor, and Government, he determines cannot be met by stabilizing the manpower in the manner hereinbefore provided. That is, make him stay on the job, by voluntary recruiting of management, labor, and Government, so that we provide, first of all, it must be after consultation with management, labor, and Government.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. Then. have an all-out voluntary recruiting campaign by management, labor, and Government, so that as a condition precedent to any compulsion, you must have what labor unions advocate—the meeting or consultation.

After we have done that and tried in every way in the world to get them voluntarily, if that fails, then we will revert to compulsion. How could you disagree with a provision which says that where every effort for voluntary service is made, with a deliberate refusal to conform, we are going to use compulsion, realizing the ability to use compulsion renders its use unnecessary? I do not thing you disagree much with this act, Mr. Crawford.

Mr. CRAWFORD. We do not see why any added legislation is needed. The IV–F is within the draft age. The Army can take him now, and do anything they want to do with him.

Mr. KILDAY. There is your point. Under the draft act, the age bracket and the physical status, put compulsion only on the age group which is liable for military service.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. KILDAY. The man beyond the military age is subject to no compulsion under the Selective Service Act, but the man who is physically disqualified is subject to no compulsion, either. I do not think that you and I basically disagree.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead, Mr. Crawford. Let him finish his statement and then we will take up whatever time is necessary to develop the statement further. Make notes on his testimony.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I just finished, sir, saying that the feeling we have is, the largest production we can get in America is from free labor and free American industry, just as we got it before. We feel that no added legislation is needed for the men who are in the IV–F class. The Army, I think, should use them under the Selective Service Act, and even if they did take some of them, very few would go in. Most of them would go into industry.

Already the U. S. E. S. offices talk of a new prolonged war, and these people are flocking back to work. We think we will get more production without that legislation.

I would just like to end by touching on some of the surveys which were made that are interesting. I refer to these surveys because I am

trying to present the idea of a small manufacturer who has the job at the local level of doing work.

Birmingham reports that they have no manpower shortage in that area at the present time, and do not anticipate any.

San Francisco reports that no critical war plants are behind schedule because of manpower shortage.

Nineteen thousand needed to meet estimates. None available locally, unemployed, or in nonessential industries. Employer-labor-public program operating satisfactorily and compulsory legislation considered unnecessary.

In other words, they believe that to go along as we are doing, we will do a better job.

Connecticut reports:

The War Manpower Commission machinery for the Bridgeport area, under Director Downs and his labor management committee, has won the confidence and cooperation of all war-production plants by its handling of manpower and related problems within the limitation of available workers; therefore, any drastic change in present operations seems inadvisable.

Joilet, Ill.:

Three critical war plants in area are behind schedule. Do not anticipate relief through local supply, but believe problem can be worked out locally.

Evansville reports that at present all plants are up to date:

We at present are classified in labor area No. 3. Industry is making an effort to employ female help to fill out marginal help.

I want to point out there is a vast reserve of marginal, cooperative, goods Americans who will fill all this shortage.

Des Moines, Iowa:

There is really no critical manpower shortage in Iowa.

Louisville, Ky.:

Generally speaking, no critical war plants in this area that are behind schedule because of manpower shortage. There is considerable discussion of contemplated production lags because of potential demands. Type of labor to be needed is generally available locally. It is believed the present program will solve the problem, but this is conjecture because the program is in the future and exact conditions months hence cannot be accurately determined. We do not know what our orders are going to be.

New Orleans:

Large critical war plants are not behind because of manpower shortage. Aircraft, boats and drydock ship repairers in need of additional skilled labor. Recent publicity has helped situation.

Detroit, Mich., which is one of our greatest arsenals, reports:

No plants in this area behind their schedule because of manpower shortage.

There is no production being held up in all of Michigan because of manpower shortages.

Washington indicates that at a time when industry needs extreme flexibility because of changing wartime requirements, the strait jacket will not help:

We do not want any compulsory labor.

Muskegon:

We know all plants in this area are on schedule except our foundries. We have no nonessential plants in this area. All are on war work.

Our plants employ about 32,000 workers and the requests at United States Employment Service indicate that we need about 700 more.

That is a very small percentage.

The present program, in my opinion, is sufficient if we can get people to stay on the job. It is not more employer cooperation that we need, but greater employee cooperation. Rate of absenteeism is our problem.

I pick a few of these out as I go along.

Jamestown, N. Y.:

Some plants are behind schedule. Believe with cooperation of nonessential plant we can handle the situation.

Columbus, Ohio:

Problem not so much in numbers but in specialized critical occupations.

That is, the training and cooperation of specialists.

Dayton, Ohio:

Minor labor shortage here in few critical war plants. Employer cooperation will solve problem. Our opinion compulsory legislation not needed here.

Oklahoma:

One of our war plants even or ahead schedule.

Erie:

This area has been getting along pretty well under such voluntary plans.

There are a great many of these, gentlemen.

Pittsburgh, Pa.:

Pittsburgh has been operating under manpower budget and priority, which is working fairly well. Consequently, it is my considered judgment that there is no need of a national service act.

I read these, gentlemen, because, and I repeat, it is not the Army, nor the generals, but the American industrial manager in his local area, who has the war production, and the local manager in his area does not care where he gets his labor, provided it is cooperating, helpful, efficient, mass production labor. If we can train a hairdresser to make shells, if she does a better job than somebody else, that is the way we will do it. Then it will be done, I believe, voluntarily.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the end of your statement, Mr. Crawford?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. I would like permission to put the statement and these quotations in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Surely.

(The document referred to will appear in the revised hearing.)

The CHAIRMAN. You have made a very brilliant statement, which is very interesting. I hesitate to ask you anything at all on the old rule that I used to observe when I was practicing law over a number of years, of not antagonizing or trying to cross-examine a smart witness. But, I want to ask you just a couple of questions that are not difficult to answer, and perhaps not very difficult to ask.

If, as you have stated, industry, labor, Government agencies, the people generally, the Congress included, have all made a lot of mistakes over the past year in getting optomistic over the war situation, and have thus retarded production that is now badly needed, would you say that we ought to correct our mistakes?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Certainly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Then, if we ought to correct them, and the Congress is trying to correct them, do you not think that industry

and labor ought to go along with the Congress to try to enable them to do what they should do about it?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think perhaps we differ in this, sir. What is the mistake?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you told us about it. The mistake was getting the people to believe the war was over and it was not necessary to go ahead with any more production.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Then I outlined how I would correct the mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you did. But you agree that if the Congress determines that it ought to be corrected in a different way, that it is the final authority on it that should be observed, do you not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Congress is the final authority, sir, but I am here just as the poor fellow who has to get the production. Giving my honest opinion, I do not think the way you are going at it would be the best way to correct the mistake.

The CHAIRMAN. Sure, you are entitled to give your opinion, but I am asking you about the situation which confronts us. If we have a lot of idle people in the country who ought to be at work, and a lot of people in the country who are not in the armed forces, who should be in the armed forces, and if there is no means at the present time of getting them in, you favor putting them there, do you not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. May I answer that this way, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You may answer it any way you want to.

Mr. CRAWFORD. What we want are the products of war.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. And I do not think it is so important how we get them, if we get them quickly. I believe that American industry will find the people to make them quickest, whether it is a IV–F, or a hairdresser, we want the one that will produce the shells fastest. I believe that can best be solved locally as it always has been, and whether you punish people or not is beside the point. We are not out to do that. We are out to get shells and war production.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think in trying to punish a small percentage who do not play ball we may lose the objective which is to get the shells.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I will put it this way: Do you believe that we ought to use compulsion to put a man on the battle front to fight and die, and then refuse to use the other man who will not work?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I believe, sir, those are totally different things.

The CHAIRMAN. How different?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think that armies, by tradition, are places where men are taken, entirely regimented, fed, housed, clothed, told what to do, in which all voluntary choice is gone. Every waking hour he is under control and command and he is proud of it. I think you cannot have the same position outside the Army. A man who is living at home, who is feeding himself, finding his own recreation, coming and going, is independent, cannot be under the same set-up.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words——

Mr. CRAWFORD. You are either in the Army or you are out of the Army. There cannot be a halfway.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; well, you believe too, according to your statement, that if I am an able-bodied man playing pool in a pool hall every day while my neighbor at the next house is over at the battle front fighting, I should not be bothered about playing pool; is that it? What is your reaction to that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, I repeat, sir——

The CHAIRMAN. You do not want to bother the pool player; is that it?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think that the percentage who will not play ball is so small in this country that it is negligible.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know any more than that?

Mr. CLASON. Well, you know about it then, what are the figures?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Thomason, do you have any questions?

Mr. THOMASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. Crawford, I will go back to the question which I tried to raise a little while ago. I believe you made a very interesting statement with which I am in accord. My colleague may have been right, though, that if you read the bill, you may find yourself in support of the proper amendment. But you, at the very conclusion of your testimony, cited a number of cities, industrial cities, where they had ample manpower to meet the needs. I believe it is true, is it not, that there are about 40 percent of the plants in the country under schedule right now. Something like 60 percent are up to or above schedule.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That raises the point, sir——

Mr. THOMASON. And 40 percent under schedule?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That raises the point, sir, what is a schedule? If a plant was up to date and ahead 2 weeks ago and the schedule has been doubled, as is true in most cases in this country, you cannot say he is behind today.

Mr. THOMASON. Well, for the purpose of my question, we will assume, then, that all of the plants you have mentioned are up to schedule and have ample manpower to meet their requirements at the present moment.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. THOMASON. But if the high command of the Army and Navy say, as they have to this committee, that we are facing a very serious crisis and that we have raked the bottom of the barrel, insofar as manpower is concerned, for the Army, outside of the 18-year-old boys who are coming in, and that within the next 6 months, 330,000 able, physically fit men, must be pulled out of these plants you have mentioned, how do you propose to replace them if we are going to win this war and keep up the schedules?

Mr. CRAWFORD. From the reserves of American labor that I have described.

Mr. THOMASON. What reserves?

Mr. CRAWFORD. The marginal people that I have described. The people from services——

Mr. THOMASON. Well, let us be frank.

Mr. CRAWFORD. People from the professions who have left, a million and a half of them, because there wasn't work for them. They will come back.

Mr. THOMASON. Does that include the IV–F's?

Mr. CRAWFORD. In many cases.

Mr. THOMASON. Does that include the 4,000,000 IV–F's that Secretary Patterson testified about?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I do not know that figure, sir, I cannot answer. I would like to stress——

Mr. THOMASON. Would that include the several million in the country who are, even though they be employed at something, are not employed in essential war work?

Mr. CRAWFORD. May I answer that, sir, in this way: Getting back to the poolroom, that if they are in the poolroom, close the poolroom, as you did the race track. Close any nonessential industry. That power exists today. We wondered why it was not done before.

Mr. THOMASON. Well, since this is an all-out effort now, why not get all of these people engaged in nonessential war work into some kind of essential war work? Why not do that? If this is not the right approach, I am asking for your position just like that of any other patriotic man in the country. We have to trust somebody, and when men like Under Secretary of War Patterson and General Marshall and others come and say we are fixing to equip eight divisions of French——

Mr. ELSTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMASON. Not for a second. And that we have over 400,000 in the hospitals, and that we have had this expected counteroffensive and that we are in a very dangerous war, now, then, what is the argument, if any, against taking this great mass of men who are doing absolutely nothing in the way of a contribution to the war effort? What is wrong in principle with having those men do something? And I do not want you to misunderstand me, either.

I join you in the highest praise of the people you have talked about who are now in the plants. Nobody is after that class of people. We commend them; we praise them. They are just as patriotic as anyone. We are not disturbing those people. The law does not touch them except to try to fix them and keep them where they are and to try to stop absenteeism and things of that sort. What is wrong in principle about that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Thomason, I am back to the objectives. Industry's job is to deliver the required amount of war materials. We think the way to do it is not to spend the time punishing a IV–F but to get the people in the industry that will produce the quickest and best.

We believe they will come voluntarily.

Mr. THOMASON. Nobody wants to punish the IV–F's, but I think we are all agreed that if they are physically qualified to do some essential war work, they ought to be had in some line of war endeavor.

How do you propose to reach them?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Sir, I repeat, we propose to deliver the shells that are require and we believe the way to do it is with the free American worker that will cooperate.

Let me point out, sir, that far more important than the number of people working in any plant is the efficiency. I would like to take the time to compare a plant in America and a plant in England, showing what cooperative American labor does and I will just take a minute: To make a thousand pieces in America of the identical part, we use 250 workers in a day. In the counterpart plant in England, where there is compulsion, they use 755 people in a day to make a thousand pieces, using over 500 more people than we do in America.

Far more important than your IV–F is the cooperative efficiency of mass production.

Mr. THOMASON. I still commend you and your workers for that fine job, but I say in this frightful crisis, that certainly these 4,000,000 other people ought to be doing something, whether it is in your plant or some other plant, to contribute something to the war effort in view of the sacrifices that our boys at the front are doing.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arends, do you have a question?

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Crawford, I might say in my little town the pool hall has been closed a long time ago and the boss has gone out to work and nobody is playing pool around there.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Good.

Mr. ARENDS. I am very glad to hear the testimony you presented as also the testimony of Mr. Phil Murray, both were interesting and you have both brought out facts and figures which I have been glad to have.

From the statement you have made a few moments ago as to reports from industrial centers, would you repeat where you got these opinions and conclusions as to the demands?

Mr. CRAWFORD. This was a recent survey made by organized business which, within the last few days or weeks, rather, has asked these industries to study their situation and report it. That will be submitted.

Mr. ARENDS. Might I then ask you if you know where the other figures came from that we need 900,000 more men in industry immediately? Where those figures came from?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Let me repeat, a survey, a very careful one made showed that today's need is about 150,000 or a quarter of 1 percent.

Mr. ARENDS. That is after the stepped-up program or schedule?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; the stepped-up program, somebody has said, requires in the near future 300,000, and I believe Secretary Patterson used the figure seven hundred or nine hundred thousand by next summer. I am using the other fellow's figure.

Mr. ARENDS. You mentioned in your testimony that industry had been pressured for shorter hours. Yesterday Mr. Murray testified here that the C. I. O. unions' total membership of over 6,000,000—that they were hoping and desired to put into effect at least a 48-hour week.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would say that in the fall months of this year the shortening of the hours was first due to the fact that we thought the war was over and there were not orders enough to keep the full hours going. Whenever that happens, every manufacturer, under the cost of overtime, has a tendency to shorten his hours, if he can.

Mr. ARENDS. Now you, as a representative of industry, say that you could do the job voluntarily. Mr. Murray, yesterday, as a representative of 6,000,000 C. I. O. members, states it can be done voluntarily. Have you ever in your plant, of which many of us have heard a lot about, ever been short of production schedules to any sizable amount?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We have never held up a single order any day, and we have been for a long period in a No. 1 critical area, with shortages, but those shortages are such a small percentage of total labor that all this Sunday work or some emergency straightens it out.

Mr. ARENDS. We constantly discuss the position of 4,000,000 IV–F's in this country. I would like to get some figures, and I do not believe they have ever been revealed before this committee as to how many of them were in essential industry. I believe it was testified that a

survey was going to be made, but so far I do not believe we know how many IV–F's are in essential industry today.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sparkman, do you have anything further?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Crawford, you suggest that, without the need of legislation, selective service can handle the IV–F cases now. Of course, that would be only the IV–F's in the age bracket from which they are drafting men for the service, and you would not touch perhaps the greatest source of labor, the ages from in the early thirties up to 60 or 56 years?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You would only get a relatively small number that way, would you not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We will draw the labor when needed to make this program from that class. I would propose the Army take what it wants. We will produce from what is left. But let's pick the efficient worker——

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, the Army does not want any of them. It has taken a great many in for limited service already, and it says it cannot absorb a great many more. What would you do with those that the Army has not taken?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I believe the Army could put more pressure on them, and say we are going to take more, and a great many would turn to essential industry.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you not think a great many of these IV–F's would like very much to get into the Army?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I question that, sir. It may be so, but my experience is that the IV–F would like to be a fighting man; if he cannot be a fighting man, he would rather have a job.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Would you let him share all of the benefits that would go to any other man in the service?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think everybody that the Army takes as a soldier must share the benefits. In this country all citizens should be treated alike. You are in or are not in it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Would you have the Armies use them as workers in any kind of work units or anything of that kind?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I am told that five-sixths of all the men in the Army never fight but are in the supply services that supply those at the front.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes; but you do not mean by that, that you understand that these IV–F's could all fit into the supply forces of the Army, do you?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think all the Army would get could be. I do not think they would get nearly as many as they think they would get. I think the men would go to work and I think it is more essential to know that there is war work and steady pay for a lasting period is more important than anything else to get them in the industry. We are just learning that from the new schedules.

Mr. SPARKMAN. A few minutes ago, in answer to Mr. Thomason, you indicated that these plants that are behind schedule have, for the most part, become that way very recently as a result of stepped-up schedules.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I am looking at a chart before me now of production of duck which shows that we were far behind in production of that for every single month during 1944. And another chart for the production

of heavy trucks, trucks of 8 tons or more, which shows that we were far behind schedule every month during 1944 with the exception of a few.

I do not know to what extent that would be true and to what extent of other lines of production, but I believe it would be erroneous to try to create the impression that we are behind just within the past few weeks, because there are certain lines of production, I think you would agree, in which we have been continuously running behind; is not that true?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is true, sir. May I speak of heavy trucks?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CRAWFORD. More heavy trucks were ordered this year than ever the world contemplated using in 10 years.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You mean this year or 1944?

Mr. CRAWFORD. 1944. One truck producer said to me we are never expected to make over 200 of one type of truck; and he had an order for 12,000. Now, those require large forgings and units and parts for which this country was not equipped. Most of them are made in Detroit. There has not been a manpower shortage that is serious in Detroit. It has been a question of building up the productive facilities.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, do you mean then that we had a shortage of facilities for making certain parts and that, in turn, created the bottleneck?

Mr. CRAWFORD. And it takes time, sir; heavy presses for forgings, more than we have ever used. They are being built gradually. That is the problem of mass production.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Do you question the figures of 700,000 that were given to us by Mr. Krug and Under Secretary Patterson and Mr. Knudsen?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, sir; but I get this comfort from those figures: If America's manpower problem, which is so critical today, is going to run from a quarter of a percent to less than a percent and a half, that that is the most encouraging thing I know; we will find four times that right in our own communities when they know there is steady work there.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I know when you reduce it to that kind of an argument, I know that the first impression is to lessen its importance, and yet, I remember that that same argument has been advanced from time to time with reference to the effect of strikes on production. Yet, I think undoubtedly one of the sorest spots with the American people has been, and particularly with the soldiers on the fighting front, has been the strikes. Therefore, I am not sure that the reduction to such a simple formula is proper. If we have a shortage of 146,000 people in production, regardless of what that percentage may be, our production problems are not going to be solved until those 146,000 people are found to take their proper places on the production line.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And I am just wondering if we are going to be able to solve this so long as we have labor shortages, regardless of how widely scattered it may be or how small it may seem to be in proportion to our labor market as a whole.

I wonder what your reaction would be to some kind of legislation, if it could be worked out, whereby, instead of having an over-all national service act, certain powers would be vested in the President to apply

those powers just in those particular pockets where the labor shortage may occur?

Mr. CRAWFORD. May I take those up in order?

It is interesting that the Labor Department has persisted that a quarter of 1 percent manpower loss in strikes did not amount to anything. That is, our manpower loss today. Of course, industry has never agreed with that. We had the tragic case——

Mr. SPARKMAN. But you are advancing the same argument now.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; but let me explain. We had a tragic thing in Cleveland the other day. Four hundred maintenance workers struck. They amounted to nothing in the total figure, but—of the electric power plant—within a very short time hundreds of thousands of labor were lost because the plant known as a maintenance worker's organizing drive, I believe, and they had 400 members out of 1,700 and shut Cleveland industry down.

Now, that was a very terrible loss of production from a tiny few people. That does not count in the case of this shortage; and I will say, in the case of this shortage, many of them could not be used today. I need men in my plant, but I cannot use them until the tools and materials come.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, now, before you get too far away, suppose those 400 men you talked about who struck, instead, using an example of strikers—suppose we were short 400 men, in making these forgings that you say are necessary for the production of these heavy-duty trucks; are you not going to feel that effect up the line just as badly perhaps?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes: but there has not been a shortage this summer, and it has not been the cause of the shortage of trucks. It has been the tools and the enormous demand of materials that are not ordinarily made in this country.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Then it has been materials rather than labor?

Mr. CRAWFORD. In that case. Now, I would like to repeat—I would like to answer your last question: "Would you favor giving the President power to act locally?" Speed is required. I believe the businessmen of my community and the labor leaders of my community and the good people of my community, acting today, can solve that problem before the machinery can even be organized for the President to act under this new suggestion of yours. I do not see how it could be administered.

I do not see how anybody but local people will know what the problem is or how to issue an order.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, I assume, of course, that the administration of it would be vested in somebody that is on the ground. It would simply be an invocation of the powers by the President.

Take a case like this: someone was mentioning it before our committees a few days ago, that 2,000 workers, in a B–29 plant at Cincinnati, had been laid off recently.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And that at the same time, probably that same number were needed in similar work at Paterson, N. J.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, there is no power today to shift those 2,000 workers from Cincinnati to Paterson, is there?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Except through voluntary action.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. SPARKMAN. We are told that we may not expect voluntary action because we do not provide for transportation expenses for them there and back. Do you believe that if we did provide such transportation expenses that the incentive would be such to move them voluntarily?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Sparkman, you would not move them if you had six laws and double transportation. What happened in Cincinnati was that a large engine plant had finished making small engines. "We do not want any more small engines," they said; "we now want large engines"; and for a period of 50 days, while machinery is shifted and dies are made, those men are off. They go back then into making B–29 engines.

Mr. SPARKMAN. They are just off temporarily?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Certainly. That is a perfect example of the shifting of materials. Those men will be wanted and more to making larger engines, but you cannot go from small to large without the repercussion of changing.

Mr. SPARKMAN. By the way, I noticed with interest in your statement reference to the notice of cut-backs.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. How long a notice would you think should be given?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Of a cut-back of orders?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is how it is done, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And is it practical to give any notice?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is how it is done. Let me give you an example—may I?—in my own plant, which I touched on, but not fully. My plant had overproduced a certain item. The Army wanted to shut down for 90 days and start again. You cannot do that in mass production. You cannot do that to the mass psychology of the worker without telling him to go home and get another job; indirectly, we caught that one. We said to the Army, "Say nothing; we will handle it." We sought new orders in these new engines. We called our people together and announced that we were in on new engines with new jobs for a year ahead. "Stand by. Take your vacations. Do what you want to do. Get your crop in, and come back, and stay away while we move this machinery around, and in 2 weeks come back. We built it into a morale builder. We gained employment by it. That is the proper way to handle it, and that is what I said. Last year we were very careless in announcing cut-backs and reductions and cancelations, which were just a notice to the American worker: "The jig is up; go get another job or you will be on W. P. A."

Mr. SPARKMAN. Well, of course, you were fortunate, but not in every instance is the manufacturer going to be able to get those additional workers. Assuming you did not have additional orders available, sometime in the future that condition is going to exist for all manufacturers; how much notice of cut-back would you need?

Mr. CRAWFORD. But being in emergency territory where others need them, a little bit of work would have steered these people into some other necessary plants.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Voluntarily?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We are quite as concerned about keeping our people working as they are. And let me stress again, Mr. Sparkman, that you entirely miss the thought and psychology of the American worker. For 6 months he is not worried about the war; he is worried about how long he can keep a good job. He is worried about the feeling that has developed in his mind that Uncle Sam wants him until he has got surpluses and then chops him off and does not care what happens to him.

Mr. SPARKMAN. And you think a great many of them went back to civilian production?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I never saw a good American that did not want a good job that was going to last.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CLASON. Mr. Crawford, I was kind of sorry if the chairman gave you the impression that he did not like to ask you questions because you were a good witness or a keen witness, because I do not think there is any special pleading going on in this committee. We all want to get all the facts.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. And while some of us may be directing our questions in a manner which indicates that we are either in support or opposed to a bill, we are really trying to find out all of the facts, and we welcome having a smart witness and a man who has the facts rather than one who comes in and just gives glittering generalities and cannot back them up either with facts or with a background of experience on which this committee can rely; and in your particular case, we have such a witness, a man with both facts and the background.

Now, one of the things I think which as distributed us is the fact that both of the groups which are going to be called upon to bring forth the production, whatever it may be, that the Army and the Navy are going to need for the remainder of this war—that is, management and labor—both are opposed to this bill and, in fact, are opposed to any form of legislation other than what you may have suggested here this morning.

On the other side are the ones who have, in effect, suggested shortages, both of manpower and materials and delays in production, which delays, as I see it, from your testimony, are not real delays but rather are the case of where a plant is suddenly handed a huge order or a big order and until that order is actually being delivered there will always be that backlog of unsupplied trucks, or whatever the item may be.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Perforce, I suppose there are cases where contracts with delivery dates are not being lived up to. I wonder if you could tell this committee to what extent you think that that is true, where the manufacturer has taken contracts, has had delivery dates for a certain number of items, and is not able to meet his contract delivery dates?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I might mention a few: Heavy trucks, I repeat—the war demands many, many times as many heavy trucks as a peacetime economy could possibly use. Therefore, there were not the tools and the dies and the forges and the size presses to produce them. And it takes a year sometimes to build a big press of that type.

The point of mass production is that you have got to wait 21 days before your eggs begin to hatch and then go to beat the band.

Another is heavy tires. We consume heavy tires beyond anything we dreamed of, in France. Now, tires require molds in which they are made and tools and devices of which there were not enough in this country, and those had to be built. There weren't big tire factories enough because the consumption was many times that of peacetime. That is coming along. I predict we will be flooded with tires this spring.

There are two examples: One—in my own case, I am behind delivery on a new kind of a part, a new kind of a motor. I am behind 2 months on delivery. That part was ordered recently, and the delivery date was set immediately, because it is a "hot" motor, as we say; it was necessary to get something like a half million dollars of machine tools and dies and fixtures. The Government worked with labor and management to get them. The machines are only being delivered today in my plant for a delivery specified last November.

You cannot tell my workers that I am behind on that product. That is listed as being behind schedule. It is a new kind of a motor. No one has ever run one or seen one. We do not know today what material it will be made out of. We are working almost blindly.

I have another contract in my plant that is very "hot" and is behind schedule; and, I repeat, I have not seen the blueprints yet. I said, "I will build it, but I do not know what it looks like." Scheduled delivery was January 1.

There is a great deal of that in this new war program. You must remember, gentlemen, that except in isolated cases the country was flooded with surpluses, and from July on the American worker was convinced he had lost his war job and he had better get himself under cover; and if you will put yourself in the mind of the worker, he saw this optimism, he drifted away because there weren't orders to keep him busy. If he gets it through his head there is a year's work ahead, he will come back again.

Much of this being behind is enormous increases in schedule, I am told—I do not know; I have never seen the schedule—that the demands for 1945 exceed those for 1944, and yet 3 months ago it was to be 70 percent of 1944.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Clason.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to have the witness answer the question fully.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he has answered.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to have him answer——

The CHAIRMAN. If he would like to say anything else, let him say it.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Those are just samples of why in some places we are behind.

Mr. CLASON. Now, during the course of this questioning, there is a lot of red herrings drawn across the trail, and that is the question of the 4,000,000 IV–F's. Now, who are and what are the 4,000,000 IV–F's?

Nobody has ever explained it in the presence of this committee, and there is no testimony in the record, so far as I know, which breaks down those 4,000,000 IV–F's.

Some of them may be mental cases that could not be used either in the Army or industry. I hope they are very few in number. Others undoubtedly are in a class where they could not be used in the Army anyhow; that is, they are over the 36 age limit and the Army would

not want them even if they were not IV–F. But so far as how many of the 4,000,000 IV–F's are actually employed in industry, those who present the figures, or the grand total, have furnished no break-down and do not tell us how many are already in industry and how many of them are evading any kind of proper task for the war effort.

I understand from your testimony you do not believe that there are any great number of these IV–F's who are attempting to avoid getting a good job in a war plant if they could possibly get one. Is that right?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir; may I say that at the local level, my observations of the IV–F, are these: They are just as loyal Americans as any other class; human nature does not change; we have many of them in the plant doing a magnificent job. We have many that are deeply disappointed that they cannot fight for their country. I do not find IV–F's a special class who are unpatriotic in neglecting their duty. Human nature does not change.

Mr. CLASON. And so you would say that any reference to a IV–F class on the theory they are slackers in the war effort is wholly uncalled for?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Is very unfair to that class, sir. I have seen young men leave college and come into the plant because they would not be around in civilian clothes. They were ashamed of not being able to fight for their country.

Mr. CLASON. Then, we are told that some total of additional men would be needed in industry, men or women; so far as the women would take up the additional slack or additional need for manpower this next 6 months, this legislation does not cover them at all.

Mr. CRAWFORD. No.

Mr. CLASON. Suppose there are in fact 900,000 persons needed during the next 6 months to fill necessary war jobs, would some of these places be taken by women?

Mr. CRAWFORD. And in many cases industry would prefer a woman to a less efficient IV–F or somebody else; if that is the case, let industry pick its most efficient worker to get the shells.

In Detroit today, I am told that 60,000 women are ready and available for business, and the tools are not ready and the orders to put them to work. There is no shortage there.

Mr. CLASON. Would you say that regardless of whether or not IV–F figure is 300,000 or 700,000 or 900,000 which may be needed by June 30, 1945, that out of the reservoir of labor now existing, men who have left the plant, men and women who have left the plants and whom you have described, and from other sources, that these men and women can be obtained without hurting the Army or agriculture or any other necessary work?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I believe industry and labor will have new surpluses by next summer or fall, if the orders are placed and we are left to work this thing out just as we did 2½ years ago.

Mr. CLASON. Now, do I understand, then, from your testimony, that you believe that the present difficult position in which apparently our Government is placed, due to the fact that they have had to dump an unprecedented number of orders, both in amount and number, upon industry—do you believe that this present difficult position can be straightened out and all the necessary manpower secured without any legislation whatsoever?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I do, sir; yes.

Mr. CLASON. Do you agree that without legislation this production can be—well, I will put it in a different manner: In which way would you say this production which is desired by the Government can be obtained the quicker and the better? With the use of legislation or by allowing industry and labor to straighten the matter out as they are now doing?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I believe, sir, that industrial management and labor at the local level where the problem exists can straighten it out so much quicker than any other way that they should be allowed to do that.

Mr. CLASON. Can you see any reason whatsoever for this legislation at this time?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, sir; and particularly when you consider that—take any figure suggested from 150,000 to 900,000, the problem is under one and a half percent of those employed in America, and there are reserves of labor, in the marginal classes of workers, that far exceed that. We can use more women. Efficiency alone will do it, as we swing into mass production. The pressure today, sir, is because we are in the age of tooling and preparing for mass production in these new things, and the deliveries do not come as fast as we would like them because the tools have to be made and the material secured and the plant rearranged. We are in that period as we were two and a half years ago. But when it began to roll, we inundated you with surpluses. We will again.

Mr. CLASON. Now the Army, as I understand it, will probably want to take some 336,000 or some fairly large number of men into the armed services in the age groups up to 38 years.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is all right.

Mr. CLASON. During the next 6 months.

Mr. ELSTON. Thirty years.

Mr. CLASON. Well, say up to 38. I am willing to go the limit. Whatever the age limit is.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is all right.

Mr. CLASON. Would you say industry and labor; that is, the unions and management, working together would be able to meet any loss in manpower due to the removal of those persons for the military services without this legislation?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I believe we will at the local level, given a little bit of time, and quicker than in any other way, we will fill up those ranks, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Of course, you realize that those men will have to go. There will be no question about that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I will qualify that in a single way, there are today many young technical men in sciences and arts that were unknown 10 years ago who have come from our technical schools—I speak of radar, for instance, jet propulsion and some of these new devices—where young men, in military age, are the experts of the day and Uncle Sam, in taking the young men, must leave the few who are experts in these new arts and sciences, and are so important to their development.

Mr. CLASON. I think we can agree on that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That will be done by reasonable deferment.

Mr. CLASON. I think we can count upon the Selective Service and military authorities to take care of that question.

68175—45——25

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes. For example, I am told that the extraordinary gun mechanism of the B–29 which is a world development was done by men averaging 27 years old, because they were right out of these studies which qualified them to tackle that job. Certainly they are more available there than they would be anywhere else.

Mr. CLASON. Now, assume the worst picture: Assuming that the figures that the Army has given us as to their need for manpower during the next 6 months, say they have to double their needs, that they need more and more men, that our fronts develop so far and we have some serious battles also that we have got to put more and more men overseas or in the training camps.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Do you feel that if this present critical condition does develop into an even more serious one, that any good would be gained by having this legislation or meeting the developing more critical situation with present tools for industry and manpower?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think industry, come what may, will get more products for war, using the voluntary system, than we will under any other.

Mr. CLASON. No matter what the demands may be for manpower?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Durham, do you have any questions?

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Crawford, you, at the present time, hold the top priority position as far as manpower is concerned in manufacturing for the Army and Navy.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. DURHAM. How long would it take you or how long does it take you to train your individual, from the time you take him in the raw until his productive capacity is working in the production line?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Mr. Durham, one of the extraordinary discoveries made 2½ and 3 years ago, was this: That you can take a person from the services or professions, a gardner, a butler, a hair dresser, a barber, and with 90 days of specialized intensive training, make him a better specialist than many old-time mechanics. That is what is extraordinary about American mass production, and that is why we draw so heavily from the services as our reserve. You must remember that half of the people, who work, work in the services not in the factory; and we draw from the vast number of people in the services for this additional labor.

Mr. DURHAM. But it would take you 90 days to train this individual that we try to give you at the present time?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. DURHAM. Before his production capacity would be worth very much?

Mr. CRAWFORD. In many cases, yes. I say that at the end of 90 days, many people in the professions will excel in one operation in the factory—they just learn one—but they will excel in it, but they are productive from the start.

Mr. DURHAM. Of course, that varies in different industries, does it not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. DURHAM. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin, do you have a question?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Crawford, in your discussion and your regular statement you emphasized somewhat the matter of surpluses and I was not quite sure whether you were talking about surpluses in your particular industry or industry generally.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, surpluses of war materials.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you consider farm machinery a war material?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. Your comments had no reference to that?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I am talking about war material that has no other use.

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

Mr. CRAWFORD. And I am referring, sir, to the newspaper articles of last summer that said that fifty to sixty billion dollars of war materials would be on our hands to be disposed of.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, now, from your testimony, I had the impression that your position is if the orders were through you would take care of the rest.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Orders and the time to tool properly and get mass production going.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, now, that leads me to this question, applying it to the matter of farm machinery; I have been told for more than a year by practically every agency having any jurisdiction in the matter that the shortage of farm machinery was due to a matter of manpower and not to a matter of material shortage, and I believe I can judge, from my own section of the country, that it was not a shortage of orders. They are stacked up on orders, begging for delivery of tractors or corn pickers and I cannot be convinced that there is a shortage of materials in that field.

It is a shortage of manpower.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Well, I can only give you my own experience. We build many parts that go into farm material.

Mr. MARTIN. I know that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. And we have been able to secure only the material for the limited amounts released. For instance, a certain number of tractors will be released and then we got the material and produce it and ship it and a certain number go out. I believe that is all scheduled by W. P. B. I am talking from memory now.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, looking ahead, as we are coming toward the present stage of the war and from this point on out, it is speculating quite a bit, is it not, to expect an absolute balance of the placing of orders?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Certainly, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. In other words, that demand we are shooting at now is a matter of placing orders evenly so labor and management do have a balanced program in front of it, I don't have much hope that we can so place those orders in the latter part of the war as to bring it out in absolute balance.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It will never be, sir.

Mr. MARTIN. We will have unbalanced spots all over the country and it may come to pass that we will need a huge supply of workers down here in the cotton-duck industry, for instance, and perhaps nowhere near there is there any other spot that is in an emergency position as to labor.

Now, will your local administration that you have been talking about here answer that problem, or would it be necessary to have coordination of the program over all in the matter of management and labor to meet spots that arise in more unequal distribution as the war comes to the latter stages. I cannot see that your local situation can face that with absolute assurance that you will have the matter well in hand when the orders themselves are bound to be spotted more and more as the war comes to an end.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is true.

Mr. MARTIN. That is where I think your local approach to this thing is going to even come less of the mark than it has heretofore.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I beg to differ, sir. Take in the cotton duck, there are a certain number of looms. They have all run in peacetime. There are only so many. There is no increase in looms, and if they run busy again, it will be just as they have run in the past. The difficulty will come where a large order is placed in a community—and that is true today of my town—large orders for assemblies, that have a manpower demand that exceeds the available manpower. But mass production immediately breaks that into bits and pieces, and then we start out and look for the communities that need orders and industry is trained and skilled and has been doing that. That is the automobile industry's strength, that it breaks the car immediately into bits and pieces where the labor content is, and those are subcontracted in hundreds of places and hundreds of towns.

My company has hundreds of subcontractors. We hear of a community that is not a class 1 area—we subcontract a piece of something we are making.

Mr. MARTIN. So that with proper placing of the orders for any stepping up of production within a reasonable time you could manage all these challenges to production being answered without any real crisis arising?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I might say the orders might be so great that it is beyond the total capacity of the country ever to produce them, but I will say this, that industry, left to do the job itself under the conditions will do a better job than if the program is attempted to be regulated from Washington under some law.

Let me speak of this subcontracting again. The purchasing agents and procurement officers of industry know more about where you can get a thing made than anybody in the United States. It is their life work.

Mr. MARTIN. Instead of allowing local emergencies of manpower shortages to interrupt here in your production schedule, you would rather leave it to industry to sublet or subcontract or distribute these production needs where the labor is located, and therefore the company could come within the field of local administration.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Exactly. I will give you a specific example.

Mr. MARTIN. You gave some opinion here regarding the matter of absorption of IV–F's. Of course, they are not the only class covered by this proposed legislation, but I was interested in comparing your statement with that of General Knudsen, when he was before the committee the other day, wherein he testified that industry has not yet absorbed all the IV–F's it could absorb without reducing its efficiency materially. Our effort of our approach to this is to get more of them available for you and help you get them into your plants. We are not trying to tell you how good they will be, but I have great confidence in General Knudsen's statements that you could absorb a great many more now if you leave this matter to the War Manpower Commission, the operations locally, under them, how are we to assume or assure the Congress and the people that we would not run into the situation again similar to that that has developed since last April, and I refer to last April principally because Mr. McNutt came here before a special committee that I was not on recently and assured them that he had the situation well in hand, last April, and everything was going along wonderfully and we coasted right into something that happened in December.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, from my brief experience in the Army, I have come to the conclusion that you have got to prepare for the battle before the battle starts and not in the middle of December for the push.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, why was the break-down between April, when Mr. McNutt appeared before this committee, and the push in December? That has got the country somewhat upset.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That, I think——

Mr. MARTIN. There is where you have got to put in your licks, and they were not put in, apparently, I am judging from the background for this legislation here.

Now, have we any assurance that your local administration, in this problem, under the jurisdiction of the War Manpower Commission, will steer shy of a repetition of that schedule?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think, sir, I said earlier in my story, that that is not the responsibility of the local committee. The American people decided the war was over. They entirely misjudged the strength of the Germans. We were up to schedule. Mr. McNutt was right. Mr. Knudsen is right. We were going along all right. We were going along all fall and orders were being canceled. We told the American people the war was over. That has nothing to do with industry, labor, and management.

Mr. MARTIN. But your whole system as it operated between April and December was diverted from accomplishment to some degree, that we were expecting of our Nation, in those very months following April.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Sir, industry can only produce the orders that are placed and all through that periods orders were cut, and reconversion was talked about, and surpluses, and unemployment.

Mr. MARTIN. Was not your whole trouble in the period from April to December attributable to the cutting of orders?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It might be.

Mr. MARTIN. Was that the only trouble?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Principally, due to the fact the American people decided the war would end in November or December. I do not see that the local manpower committee and industry and labor did anything than manufacture what they were ordered to manufacture.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, I believe you spoke in response to Mr. Clason's questioning to the effect that the taking away of the further manpower for the armed forces would not, in your opinion, increase your problem of production material.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It will increase it, sir, but we will adjust ours much quicker voluntarily than we would any other way to meet the problem.

Mr. MARTIN. I was interested in your report here from the State of Iowa, in the last sentence that is given here, and I do not know who made this statement to you and how big a field he is attempting to cover—"insofar as Iowa is concerned, we do not believe in compulsory legislation."

I want to know what is the antecedent of that word "we."

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is from organized business groups; organized business groups were asked their opinion of local conditions.

Mr. MARTIN. That is a sweeping statement. I think about three more pushes on the western front and I will take issue with that. It may take another push or two to make my point, but I just wondered how sweeping that statement is.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harness, have you a question?

Mr. HARNESS. Yes. Mr. Crawford, do you know how many IV–F's are employed in your organization? Do you have any idea?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I canot give you the idea today. They have all been classified. We have those figures. I do not have them with me, however.

Mr. HARNESS. How many employees do you have, all told?

Mr. CRAWFORD. About 20,000.

Mr. HARNESS. Would you be willing to make an estimate as to the number of IV–F's you have got out of 20,000 employees?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No; I have not anything in mind, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, do you have quite a few of them?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Oh, a great many.

Mr. HARNESS. We have heard bandied about here the figure of 4,000,000 IV–F's who are not in industry. Well, there are a total of only about 4,000,000 men classified as IV–F's and the assumption is that all of them were not in essential industry.

Mr. CRAWFORD. My judgment would be that that is quite a fictitious figure, sir; I do not know.

Mr. HARNESS. That is my judgment, too. There has not been a single authority come before this committee and tell us how many men are not in war industry, who are classified IV–F, and until we get the figure, why, we are just talking into thin air about some mythical number which may be so-called slackers, as they have been referred to.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Will my colleague yield on that point? Would it not be possible to obtain that figure from General Hershey's department?

Mr. HARNESS. You try and get it. We have tried to get it, but they have not been able to give it to us thus far.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think we should have it.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, we have not been able to get it, anyway.

Now, how many veterans, returned veterans, do you employ, Mr. Crawford?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Quite a few. I have been surprised how few of our own people have come back to work with us from the war.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, the Army or military authorities tell us that there are approximately 50,000 a month being discharged.

Mr. CRAWFORD. A larger figure, I believe, than that.

Mr. HARNESS. Of course, a number of those men are not able to go back to work.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Exactly.

Mr. HARNESS. A great number of them are seeking jobs, they want jobs.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Is not that a potential market, labor market to augment—take care of this shortage of labor?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We have been surprised that more have not applied for work and industry has adapted itself, sir, we have blind, we have people without hands, we have totally blind people, we have a man that cannot stand up, and they are all fitted into our employment, and are useful.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, now, in recruiting labor in your area—you say it is a critical labor area——

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Have you run across a lot of these poolroom players and these fellows that are not doing anything toward this war effort?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Very few that are worth a damn around the factory, sir, pardon my expression. You see, our object is to produce the shells and the guns and the airplanes, and we want a football team that will team in and do it and we will do it better with people that want to do it. I would say the thing to do is to close the poolrooms, as we did the race tracks, close any nonessential industry and those people will draft into essential industry.

Mr. HARNESS. Now notwithstanding some observations that have been made that it does not cover the employees that you are talking about, that are working, it does cover every person, male person, in this country, between 18 and 45, whether they are working or not working?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. HARNESS. And it places in the hands of one man, here in Washington, the control over all of those people, the absolute control over all of those male persons between the ages of 18 and 45.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. It provides nothing about paying the transportation of anybody that the Director of War Mobilization wants to move from Kansas City to San Francisco. It makes no provision whatsoever for housing those employees if they sought to do that.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. HARNESS. And do not let anybody tell you that it does not cover all of them, because it does. Now, you just came back from the European front; did you not?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, I was over there, too, about the same time that you were. Did you get any impression about the fact that the people of this country were not getting all the facts in the news about how terrible this war is?

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think that is pertinent to this issue.

Mr. HARNESS. I think it is quite pertinent.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, you have been over there and you know about it. Why clutter up the record with that?

Mr. HARNESS. I am not cluttering it up when he has testified at length here that the reason there is a hysteria here about the shortage of manpower was because of the news about the optimism of the people.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; and I have put in the record a statement, I do not know whether you were here or not at the time, that it would be admitted there was general confusion and optimism all over the country that wrecked the program.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, let us find out what his answer is to that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, if you want to find out about his visits to Europe, we will have to listen.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Very briefly, sir, I came back with the opinion that the war is much more serious than the American people generally understood. I made a rather eloquent plea that in the censorship and control of that news, the psychology of the American worker be taken into account. He is extremely responsive and he has his own relatives over there and if he got the picture as realistically as some of us did, he would go back to work without any urging.

I was urged by a large number of reporters, newspapermen, and writers in Paris, to go back and say to the Army, "Please let us send our stories through of the bad as well as the good so America has a truer picture" and I tie that in with what I call the worker psychology.

Mr. HARNESS. Now, I thoroughly agree with the opinion you have expressed. In other words, you believe that if the American people were told about the reverses as well as the successes, that we would not have this trouble of recruiting manpower to produce the things necessary to oppose our enemies.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. And you want to repeat that you are not in favor of this legislation?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you got any other representation you want to make? I am trying to save time here to accommodate a lot of witnesses.

Mr. CLASON. Well, why make a statement like that?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like to say this, that it is customary to go far afield from an issue. We are considering a very brief piece of legislation here on the question of manpower at home. Whether the war leaders need criticism or do not need criticism is immaterial to this. I hope we will show our patriotism by trying to pull together.

Now, Mr. Price, any questions?

Mr. PRICE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead? Do you have any questions?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Yes; I have.

Mr. Crawford, in your testimony this morning, you referred to the small percentage of man-days lost due to strikes. I am wondering if you can also give an example of how one strike will affect other work. I am wondering if this has affected conversion in your plant from one contract to another, or what effect strikes have had upon your plants. How many man-days have been lost as a result of strikes? Do you have those figures?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I could not say. I do not want to repeat that the closing of the power plant in Cleveland shut us down.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Would you consider that strikes absolutely have not affected the war effort?

Mr. CRAWFORD. They have played their part, sir.

Mr. WINSTEAD. I would like to ask a question with reference to the transfer of men from nonessential industries to essential war industries. If I understood you correctly, you would be willing to force those in nonessential industry into essential industry or else not permit them to work. You gave a hotel, as an example, for instance.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. WINSTEAD. That would be using force or pressure?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Now, I am wondering whether you would oppose legislation, either this bill or some other, that will also advocate the use of pressure or force to get everybody into some kind of essential work. In other words, we have a great number of industries in this country which may not be classified as essential war industries, but which are nevertheless very essential.

The main thing I am interested in is, if we cannot pass legislation that will be helpful, I think we should not pass any; but if we can pass any type of legislation that will help to get many people in this country who are not contributing directly or indirectly to the war effort, into some type of work that is, whether it is in an essential war industry or not, I think it should be done. Certainly I do not want to do anything that would reflect upon the IV–F's as being an unpatriotic group because there are many of them who are physically unable to do any type of work and many others who have endeavored to get proper employment. I cannot, however, see where there can be any harm in legislation which gives one the right to do the things he prefers to do, to permit labor management and the Government to endeavor to do the job and then if such procedures fail and we find ourselves facing an emergency some time in the future, to resort to the provisions of this bill. I cannot see what objection there can be on the part of anyone to passing such type of legislation, and if I understand the bill, which covers the very requirement which have been discussed here, and if I have understood correctly the testimony before this committee, the greatest objection that labor has and the one which they have emphasized most is that this proposed legislation is a slap at labor. I think you have made an excellent statement here and I concur with most of it. Certainly if labor is at fault, they are not alone. We might list many reasons why it would be desirable to avoid any legislation of this character but there is no necessity to discuss it at this time because we have got to face the issue.

I am inclined to believe that this critical situation can be met without additional legislation; however, I happen to be one of those who made the trip to Europe, and I am fearful that the problem might not be met; and we all know or should realize from what we have seen and been told that we are facing a critical situation insofar as production of certain equipment and supplies is concerned. I, therefore, ask why should there be so much objection to a bill that convevs no intention to slap labor, or anyone else, but which will give additional and much-needed assistance to management, labor, and Government, if and when needed, thus providing the machinery with which to operate. I cannot see where objection lies.

The CHAIRMAN. Let him answer the question.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I must repeat again, sir, with your permission, that our objective in industry is to produce the things needed for the war,

and we believe they will be produced quicker and in larger volume without the labor battalion, without any law, rather than with it.

Mr. WINSTEAD. But this would not be effective if you do not need this surplus supply of manpower. If not effective, it would not affect the worker. It would not affect industry; it would not affect manpower efforts; it would be made available only if that manpower were needed with some force and pressure to encourage it.

Mr. CRAWFORD. It is an entire reversal, sir, of our whole American system and scheme. You cannot push the American worker around in any way; 99¾ percent are on the job. We will fill out the other quarter of 1 percent and I believe do a better job as we are. That is the opinion of a production man.

Mr. WINSTEAD. You believe that without further legislation you can meet the issue? Now, I say further, that on a small percentage of man-days lost due to strikes, if we are making a type of heavy equipment or tanks or ammunition, and get right up to the point of victory, if we should give out of supplies, or if the men should stop, or if just one one-thousands of 1 percent of all the man-days involved were to bring about that end, it would certainly affect it in a material way. Many of us have heard it said that strikes do not affect the war effort, but I understand that industry has done its part to convince the American people that strikes have very severely affected the war effort.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sparkman has a question.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Some reference was made here a little while ago to the effect that there had been no break-down of IV–F's. I knew that earlier in the testimony that that had been broken down, so I stepped outside and got those figures, and I think it might be helpful to know that there are 1,000,000 in classifications II–A–F, II–B–F, and II–C–F, and there are 3,500,000 IV–F's that have not yet been classified as being in essential industry.

Mr. HARKNESS. But you do not know whether they are or are not in essential industry.

Mr. SPARKMAN. They are not in essential industry. I will put it that way. There was the testimony before the committee several days ago.

Mr. HARKNESS. Who testified to it?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Colonel Keesling.

Mr. HARKNESS. I still maintain they do not know whether they are in or out.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Fenton, any questions?

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Chairman, my question was to be along the line of these IV–F's.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, make your questions as direct as possible and the witness will be as direct as possible in his answers.

Mr. FENTON. I would like to do that but I would like it, if my colleague from Alabama would give us an idea of what these breakdowns of IV–F's are—II–A–F and II–B–F and all that sort of stuff.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is already in the record with Colonel Keesling's testimony and Colonel Keesling is going to testify further, I understand, but that indicates that they are engaged in essential industry. It might be essential industry directly in war work, supporting war work, or essential to the war work; they are essential classifications, whereas IV–F is not an essential classification.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. FENTON. You say Colonel Keesling——

Mr. SPARKMAN. The "F" indicates if they were not in essential industry they would be in IV–F.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the record.

Mr. FENTON. I have tried to find out the line of demarcation between a limited serviceman taken into the Army and an IV–F. That has not been given to me to this moment. Now, it seems to me with the Army and the Navy testifying here, that they do not want this service unit, that they have plenty of limited servicemen to do the battalion work or whatever they are going to do.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct.

Mr. FENTON. What are they going to do with these men? Why this penalty?

The CHAIRMAN. Want to get them to work.

Mr. FENTON. It seems to me there should be some intelligent approach to that, as to the line of demarcation between those disabilities, and, if Colonel Keesling is going to testify again, I will withhold my questions until he is on the stand.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. Thank you very much. Mr. Holifield, do you have any questions?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Crawford, the subject of strikes has been brought into this matter and there is no doubt that strikes have affected, to a certain extent, the IV–F's, but is it not true that mistakes in procurement and also refusals of industry, in many instances, to take contracts, have also had an effect upon the production?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Many things have affected it, sir. I do not know of any serious case of industry refusing to take a contract if it was equipped or could produce the goods.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Then there are many factors. The fact that strikes have received all the publicity does not mean necessarily that they would be the only deterring factor in production?

Mr. CRAWFORD. No; the deterring factors are absenteeism, strikes, overtime, and all of that sort of thing, and in spite of this present freeze industry has produced.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Now, have military procurement agencies taken into consideration the practical problems of production? In many instances, in making their cancelation of contracts, have they taken into consideration that fact? You testified that they made abrupt cancelations without giving you time to change over. Isn't that true?

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is true, sir. The *Brewster case* being an example.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. That is right. Now, in the allocation of contracts, have they always allocated them to small businesses in noncritical areas or have they, in many instances, continued to pile up the back log in big companies?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. In critical areas; is that true?

Mr. CRAWFORD. It has been very well done.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. In my own Los Angeles area I know of many cases where subcontractors were asking for contracts from the bigger companies that they had not received. I know of instances at the present time, and I have cases on my desk of people in the Los Angeles critical

No. 1 labor area, small manufacturers, who are being denied contracts at this time, that they are capable both from the standpoint of facilities and manpower to produce, because the contracts are being concentrated in bigger hands.

Mr. CRAWFORD. I think that is a very small part, I mean relatively small.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. But there is the field of increased production in the small contract area, or the small producer area, that has yet to be completely utilized?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Possibly, sir, but the large assembler will scrap over those companies for subcontracts more than any procurement agency. The big companies have people all over the country looking for small people to do things for them.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. You spoke also of longer hours being worked. Has there been any pressure on the part of labor unions toward working shorter hours or have they asked to work longer hours in most instances?

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would say in most cases they like the longer hours.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. And management, the same way?

Mr. CRAWFORD. The same way.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Is there any law on the books at the present time that prevents either labor or management from utilizing longer hours as you are doing in your plant?

Mr. CRAWFORD. None, sir.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, do you have any questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. Just one or two questions which I think are new relative to a new approach which you have made to the problem.

Frankly, I do not think you understand the laws we are considering. I wish you would read it after we get through with the hearing. But, anyway, if we passed this or any similar law, it would take some time before it is finally through Congress and the President signs it and it is finally in operation at your plant. Will that have any kind of a damaging effect on the outlook of the workers there?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. I mean the uncertainty as to what the law is going to be, and news will lag in trying to learn just what it is, and as to its provisions.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. In what way, just briefly, would it affect your situation?

Mr. CRAWFORD. You touch upon one of the greatest fundamentals of mass production. Any changes in condition make it difficult and interfere.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, does the change manifest itself and the uncertainty, in decrease in production and shifting of workers and the like?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; uncertainty, fear, and worry about what is going to happen.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, right along that line, I want to ask you another question. You have developed here rather well the matter of the psychology of these workers, how temperamental and sensitive they are.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. We have been talking here about IV–F's and unfortunately we are only talking about 1 percent of them. The obstreperous ones are the only ones we are thinking about, but the impression has gotten out that the IV–F's are stigmatized people.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Exactly.

Mr. JOHNSON. You know they are not, though; they are blind people and, as the gentleman said, there is a million of them in direct war work now.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, do you think the general psychology that seems to have been created over this legislation regarding this IV–F is one that it would be hard to change and wipe out? I mean, what effect would all this agitation about IV–F's—and we are only talking about 1 percent—would that break down the morale of the 98 or 99 percent who are willing and anxious to work in war work?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Very much so. It is so contrary to the entire American tradition.

Mr. JOHNSON. You realize, of course, that in this law, on the face of it, the law wants to recruit people for the Army, but the Assistant Secretary of War came in here and said to us that if we get more than 20,000 in the labor battalions, the law will be a failure.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That is right.

Mr. JOHNSON. So you think that if we were just to leave these things up to the groups that are now handling the things, that is, the employers and the employees, that they could take care of it?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, this million and a half workers that have left, do you know anything about where they are? Are they in other industries or where are they?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; I can tell you very quickly. When there were no orders to keep them busy—they are smart Americans—they put two and two together; they are self-reliant; the barber went back to his business, the hairdresser to his business.

Mr. JOHNSON. What I mean is, Do you have any over-all figures? Are half a million of them back to work or are they still——

Mr. CRAWFORD. I would think half of them went in to other industries and the other half do not work normally.

Mr. JOHNSON. And that is part of the reservoir you expect to tap?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes; it is a vast reservoir.

Mr. JOHNSON. One other question. Out in my area there, in northern California, we have a great deal of trouble over absenteeism.

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, what, if anything, do you think, as an industrialist, would lower absenteeism? Ours runs as high as 6 to 9 percent in some plants.

Mr. CRAWFORD. That, again, depends upon what the worker thinks about the need and seriousness of the war and all those things.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, it comes back to your idea of psychology?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Exactly.

Mr. JOHNSON. And what about the turn-over? The turn-over out there is very great. Up to 10 percent sometimes. Do you think that is affected by the news, for instance?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Very much; and, of course, there has been a lot of shopping around between industries——

Mr. JOHNSON. In your plant, was there a reduction in absenteeism and turn-over when the bad news came out about the war?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir; absenteeism particularly fell to a half.

Mr. JOHNSON. Dropped right——

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. In other words, it was cut in two?

Mr. CRAWFORD. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. What about the turn-over?

Mr. CRAWFORD. We have very little turn-over.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Mr. Price?

Mr. PRICE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Crawford.

We are glad to have had your testimony.

(The papers referred to in Mr. Crawford's testimony are as follows:)

MEMORANDUM OUTLINING HIGHLIGHTS OF NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS INTENSIFIED VOLUNTARY MANPOWER PROGRAM AS THE ALTERNATIVE TO A NATIONAL SERVICE LAW

(Statement presented, by Frederick C. Crawford, president, Thompson Products, Inc., and chairman, National Association of Manufacturers executive committee, to House Military Affairs Committee, January 17, 1944)

Before discussing ways and means of solving present manpower shortages, it is pertinent to review briefly the miracle of war production accomplished by industry since Pearl Harbor as it relates to the recruitment, hiring, training, and successful utilization of millions of workers—many of them never before employed in a factory.

Millions of women were added to the industrial work force since the war began; hundreds of thousands of supervisors were made overnight; green workers, both men and women, from every walk of life—the home, school, professions, the farm, retail trades—all were brought into industry and given intensive training.

Almost immediately America's gigantic war machine got into full stride and unbelievable volumes of tanks, ships, airplanes, and all manner of war goods began their march to the various fighting fronts.

All this was accomplished through voluntary action on the part of management and labor—18,000,000 people in war activities—through the cooperation of management and labor on the local level—within the machinery of the voluntary war manpower program.

In looking at this record it is also necessary to realize that since Pearl Harbor a variety of factors have operated to curtail the full potential of man-hours of work in war-producing companies, such as turn-over, absenteeism, slow-downs, strikes, and certain traditional union practices and regulations which restrict the output of the individual worker, set manpower requirements which immobilize badly needed workers and reduce the reservoir of manpower needed for critically urgent production.

I mention these in passing, not because it is our intention to minimize the magnificent contribution of labor to the war effort, but to indicate that we have not exhausted the full capacities of the manpower now at work in our factories.

PRESENT MANPOWER SITUATION

Let us now look at the acute manpower problem facing the Nation. There is variously estimated to be a shortage of 150,000 to 700,000 workers, who will be needed in the next 6 months. The great disparity in estimates is in itself an indication of the peculiar character of the manpower problem we must now solve. The best reports available clearly show that the critical shortages involve a small number of companies in widely scattered areas throughout the community which need relatively small numbers of workers. In other words, the problem is entirely local.

Further, the kind of workers needed varies from company to company. In some instances the need is for unskilled labor, whereas the skilled or technical employee is required for others.

Another exceedingly important fact is that the shortages existing today are different from those that existed last week, 2 weeks ago, or a month ago; and it is even more important to realize that the shortages we will have to face next week and a month from now will again be different. In fact, they will of necessity be different and changing all the time, because they will reflect the changing needs and strategy of our military forces.

Let's look at the size of the manpower shortage again.

The most frequently quoted figure is 150,000. This represents approximately one-fourth of 1 percent of the Nation's labor force. We are fully conscious of the fact that these shortages, although small in number, are critically needed and must be solved immediately. But our attempts to solve these problems must be made in the full recognition that action must be taken on the local level in the very areas where the shortages exist, geared to the particular circumstances and conditions that exist in those areas. In other words, more intensive cooperation and coordination by management and labor on the local level, in collaboration with the local War Manpower Commission.

In the past year almost a million and a half workers have left war producing companies. If we got back only one-half of these people, we would have no manpower shortages. The problem would be over. Now, why did they slip away? Why have war companies lost these people? In most cases because they were laid off or discharged for want of war orders at a time when the Nation was debating what to do with the enormous surpluses that industry and labor had produced.

There are many other answers, but foremost among them are two which lend themselves to immediate correction. These are—

1. When Government and Army officials, and the press, began to talk of an early defeat of Germany; and, as this kind of news gathered momentum, it was immediately reflected in the wholesale departure of war workers from their jobs, seeking, as is natural, to provide for their best welfare by getting post-war jobs. This began as long ago as last March, April, and May.

2. The second major cause that drove war workers into other channels was the overnight cut-backs and contract cancelations that inevitably created a feeling of panic and insecurity in the minds of all as they realized that they might become an army of unemployed unless they sought shelter in jobs that would continue in peacetime.

3. During the fall and winter months announcements were made that the war would end last year and cut-backs would be from 25 to 30 percent. During this period industry had great difficulty in getting orders released by the Government in time to buy raw material and keep the plant going. Many employees had periods of lay-off during these delays, which further emphasized the nearness of the end of the war in their minds.

There is very little question in my mind, and I am sure in the minds of thousands of employers like myself, that once the people in this country understand the full significance of our military situation as it is reflected in war production, and once they realize that there will be some continuity in war work and that cut-backs will not descend upon them without notice, they will immediately flock back and gladly take up their war jobs again.

The most patriotic individual in the world is the American, and I am firmly convinced that if the facts are made available to the people our manpower problems will be at an end. In fact, there is already overwhelming proof that this is so. Last week and the week before—in city after city—we saw hundreds, yes, thousands, of workers flocking to the United States Employment Service offices asking for war jobs. The way to let the people know is, first of all, to admit that all groups in America made a mistake. We underestimated the German. His strength is now apparent. Tell the American worker that we guessed wrong—the war isn't over. Announce to the public that there are enormous production schedules for 1945—larger than '44. We are going ahead on a program that means steady labor for a long period. There are huge schedules; publish them.

PROPOSED NATIONAL SERVICE LAW NO SOLUTION

A national service act is being proposed as the answer to our manpower crisis, which is clearly local, spotty, varied, and changing, involving altogether approxi-

mately one-fourth of 1 percent of our labor force * * * approximately the same proportion of war workers as involved in strikes this past year, which proportion, according to the War Production Board and other Government agencies, was so minute as to have had no effect whatsoever on our war production.

If national manpower legislation could provide the answer, industry itself would be the first to call for the enactment of a national service law. But the very nature of the manpower problems today is proof-positive that national legislation, a blanket law, would not and could not solve the crisis.

Let's face the issue squarely:

1. The manpower shortages need immediate, effective action on the local level where they exist.

Would a service law provide this immediate action? No; it could not—

(a) If we had had a manpower law, it would not have changed anything; we would be right where we are now. The rate at which they are flocking back could not be exceeded even with a service act.

(b) It would take time—weeks or months—to enact legislation. By the time enabling legislation was passed, the manpower problem may have wholly changed in character many times and perhaps eased off to an appreciable extent.

(c) When the law would finally have passed, it would be necessary for all the women in the country to register. We all know how time-consuming this would be.

2. How would a service law be administered?

(*a*) Difficulties of administering such legislation fairly and without hardship are obvious.

(*b*) The machinery to enforce the law would be both cumbersome and slow.

(*c*) Individuals required to staff the personnel of the agency to administer the law would constitute a further critical burden upon our already small reservoir of manpower.

3. Workers dissatisfied because of the operation of the law would be inefficient employees. Whereas the immediate psychologic effect of such a law might stimulate employees to take up war jobs—the effect would be short-lived. The regimentation and compulsion that are inherent in a national service law would quickly irk and disturb workers with the consequent serious loss of morale and efficiency. It is very doubtful whether forced labor will be as productive as voluntary labor.

4. The possible effectiveness of a national service law can, to some extent, be measured by the experience of England with such legislation.

FIVE-POINT PROGRAM TO SOLVE MANPOWER SHORTAGES

Specifically, industry's action program is based on these five points:

1. *Legislative authority for the War Manpower Commission.*—More effective enforcement of existing War Manpower Commission machinery and regulations must be secured. This should be accomplished by giving the War Manpower Commission statutory authority—with enforcement through the courts rather than by sanctions—with respect to:

(*a*) Establishment of employment ceilings for all industries—essential and nonessential.

(*b*) Use of controlled referrals.

(*c*) Compulsory releases.

The operation of this authority should be determined through, and administered by, the War Manpower Commission in full cooperation and consultation with industry and labor, on the local level, in those areas designated as critical.

2. *Immediate operation of the work-or-fight principle.*—We emphatically endorse the immediate application of the work-or-fight principle, but believe that no additional legislation is required to accomplish this objective and that it should be made effective immediately within the present framework of the selective service authority and machinery.

3. *Reemphasis by management on in-plant practices to increase production.*—(*a*) The fullest utilization of existing manpower can be accomplished by the reanalysis of work methods, manpower scheduling, and the elimination of any labor hoarding.

(*b*) More accurate estimates by industrial management in reporting immediate needed manpower to local United States Employment Service or War Manpower Commission offices will help eliminate some of the confusion now surrounding the manpower situation and aid materially in the immediate solution of existing shortages.

4. *Reemphasis by labor on increased production.*—Reduction of absenteeism, the elimination of all union restrictions upon production, and strict adherence to the no-strike pledge will aid materially in increasing production.

5. *Realistic policy of public opinion.*—The public should be fully advised and kept informed of the problems now confronting our fighting men, because that, with the facts clearly before them, is the way to stimulate the maximum concerted action of all our people in the fullest prosecution of the war on the domestic front. The psychological effect of accurate information to the public, without endangering military strategy, will be immediate and substantial in the way of increased war production.

This program, in detail, is attached hereto as appendix A.

UP-TO-THE-MINUTE SPOT SURVEYS OF THE MANPOWER SITUATION BY COMPANY AND AREA

Attached hereto as appendix B are several telegraphic, telephonic, and mail surveys undertaken within the past 10 days for the purpose of obtaining up-to-the-minute information from (1) companies reported as having critical manpower shortages; (2) a cross section of employers of war-producing companies; and (3) key industrial localities.

MEMORANDUM RELATING TO MANPOWER RECOMMENDATIONS OF N. A. M.

In seeking to solve the present critical manpower shortage, the National Association of Manufacturers offers its fullest possible cooperation to Government in an action program to deal with existing manpower problems.

We believe that the manpower problem can be met through voluntary procedures although we would call for general national-service legislation ourselves if we believed that it could provide solution to today's acute manpower shortages. Believing that the solution can come through full use of voluntary methods, emergency meetings of National Association of Manufacturers committees with representatives from State and local industrial associations have been called and a comprehensive action program with clearly defined objectives has been formulated. Fundamental to this program is a recognition that the problem is essentially local in character and that any program designed to provide a solution to existing manpower problems must be worked out at the local level.

The attached statement present the broad outlines of this program. It calls for concerted, cooperative, and immediate action by Government, by industry, and by labor. It is offered herewith in the hope that it can serve as a basis for the national manpower policy. It is now suggested that the Government give full consideration to the suggestions contained therein with the view of unifying the policy-making of all the various Government and procurement agencies concerned with manpower problems.

In connection with those recommendations in which final action rests with the Government, we shall be pleased to consult on any phases particularly those which have industrial implications.

In connection with those recommendations which relate directly to labor, we assume that appropriate Government officials will consult with labor officials to discuss means for securing necessary action.

Those objectives which are industry's obligation, at least as far as ultimate action is concerned, we should like to discuss thoroughly with appropriate Government representatives.

This discussion should follow these lines:

1. Agreement on the objectives which industry and Government believe are desirable.

2. Using these agreed-upon objectives as the framework, industrial associations, and the Government should determine the manner in which these objectives can be achieved, keeping in mind the facilities at the disposal of each which can be brought to bear to bring about the desired results.

It should be our aim, also, in the interests of efficiency and most immediate action, to use existing machinery—rather than to set up new machinery—to motivate this program.

68175—45——26

The National Association of Manufacturers will actively put to work all the means at its disposal in making effective a unified program that has been agreed upon by the Government agencies.

To make any such program effective, industry must have an increased consciousness of the importance of lending it their unqualified support. The National Association of Manufacturers at the national level can and will stimulate this consciousness through all its publications, speeches of its officers, statements to the press, etc.

In addition to this national stimulus, it will be necessary also to secure community leadership in rallying industry to the support of the program at the local level where the ultimate solution must be worked out.

Through the more than 150 State and local industrial associations affiliated with the National Association of Manufacturers through the National Industrial Council, steps will be taken to enlist local support.

This might take the form of calling some of their principal officers to a Washington or a regional meeting to discuss with Government officials responsible for the program the ways to get cooperative action, and the form such action might take as outlined in the general over-all program.

Probably the first step in the way of organization would be to stimulate a closer liaison between the War Production Board and industry at all levels. This could take the form of appointing to those War Production Board advisory committees which do not now have it industrial representation which is representative of and can maintain close liaison with the industrial associations in that War Production Board area.

This closer liaison should work toward securing the enlistment of industrial associations in such specific projects as:

1. Dramatizing to the community and its workers the importance of the war job being done in that community. If there can be available from the War Production Board specific production information, that information can be used by industrial associations as the basis for a publicity campaign of local advertisements, statements to the press, and speeches by local industrialists. Through these methods and others, workers can be encouraged to take or remain at their war jobs, to keep absenteeism at a minimum and generally raise the working morale to result in increased production.
2. Work out cooperative arrangements among manufacturers so that each will be encouraged to lend its know-how, or raw materials, or component parts to assist other manufacturers suffering from or threatened with a war-production slippage.
3. With sufficient advance information from the War Production Board on cut-backs in their areas to help expedite the necessary local labor adjustments in such a manner that maximum-production efficiency in the locality can be maintained.
4. Developing procedures for determining as rapidly as possible those plants which have or expect to have productive facilities available.

Industrial manpower shortages, although they involve only a small number of companies, in widely scattered communities, which need relatively small numbers of employees, today threaten to curtail the striking force of our armed forces on the various fighting fronts.

Industry stands ready to "do what it takes" to win the war and would itself call for general national-service legislation if that promised to solve existing manpower problems. The National Association of Manufacturers committee on manpower, at an emergency meeting called to deal with the manpower crisis, concluded after exhaustive analysis, that national legislation would not and could not do the manpower job that needs to be done.

Specifically, the National Association of Manufacturers submits the following action program on manpower:

I. Immediate operation of the work-or-fight principle.

We emphatically endorse the immediate operation of the work-or-fight principle, but feel that this principle can be put into effective operation without recourse to legislation. To that end we urge Nation-wide application of the following procedures, some of which are already in force in some localities:

(*a*) The establishment of a physical standard lower than the existing standard for the reexamination and reclassification of the approximately 3,600,000 men now rejected by the armed services as IV–F's.

1. These men who fail to meet these lowered standards would continue to be classified as IV–F's, unfit for military service.
2. Those who pass the standard constitute the group to which the work-or-fight ultimatum applies. These men will be given a definite period of time—30 days—within which they have the opportunity of taking a job in a war-producing company; or, failing to do so, would be immediately subject to Army call.
3. This proposal requires the fullest cooperation of the armed services so that when the 30-day period expires, induction into the Army is immediate and automatic.

(*b*) Gather all possible information about:

1. Those men rejected as IV–F's to determine which are now in war jobs and which should be immediately available for war work.
2. Men in the older-age bracket, from 38 to 45, not now employed in war work who could be channeled to war production.
3. The whereabouts of II–B's who have abandoned war jobs . . . for the purpose of reclassifying them into I–A or channeling them into war activities.
4. The number of II–A's whose jobs could be filled by women or others, thus making them available for war work.

Data of this kind may quickly result in rounding up a substantial supply of workers available for critcially urgent war jobs.

(*c*) The immediate reexamination and check-up of both the II–A and II–B classifications to—

1. Channel out of the II–A—essential civilian—group those men who can be replaced by women, older men, or others less qualified to do war work, thereby facilitating the transfer of many II–A's to war plants.
2. Check on the II–B's—those industrial employees deferred by local draft boards because of essential war occupations—but who have since abandoned their jobs.
3. Farm workers who have been deferred for agricultural activities.

II. More effective administration and enforcement by the War Manpower Commission.

(*a*) More effective enforcement of the War Manpower Commission orders can be secured by judicial processes defined by statute rather than by "sanctions." It is recommended therefore that the War Manpower Commission be given statutory authority, with enforcement through existing courts, with respect to:

1. The establishment of employment ceilings on all employers.
2. Use of controlled referrals.
3. Compulsory releases.

The operation of this authority should be determined through and administered by the War Manpower Commission in full cooperation and consultation with industry and labor on the local level.

(*b*) Intensified cooperation and coordination by all essential and nonessential employers, labor and the War Manpower Commission, as well as all affected Government agencies, to:

1. Maintain a day-by-day factual analysis of the manpower situation.
2. Channel needed workers to the right place at the right time.

(c) War Manpower Commission survey of the manpower situation, in both essential and nonessential employment, in all areas * * * to supplement the suggestion above.

(d) A sound procurement policy giving consideration to the status of labor areas in placing contracts.

(e) Improved functioning of existing manpower and War Production Board committees to facilitate the more effective allocation of needed labor.

(f) Carefully review the use of medical certificates as a device to obtain certificates of availability from the United States Employment Service offices.

(g) Recruiting of part-time workers from among students, professionals, and other groups in the community.

(h) Keeping each community advised as to the kind of activities defined as essential and those defined as nonessential.

III. Improve in-plant practices by reemphasizing to management.

(a) Reanalysis of work methods and schedules for more efficient production.

(b) Fullest utilization of existing manpower at maximum skill.

(c) Reexamination of work methods with a view to accomplishing maximum mechanization of work processes, where desirable and practicable.

(d) Careful consideration to the possibility of extending or reducing the hours of work per week to accomplish greater efficiency and maximum production.

(e) More careful inventory of existing labor supply in relation to war production schedules in determining additional labor requirements.

(g) More careful estimates in reporting needed manpower to local United States Employment Services or War Manpower Commission offices so as to avoid the possibility of exaggerating manpower shortages.

(h) Establishing and maintaining a very close working relationship with local United States Employment Services offices in connection with granting releases to employees.

(i) Reduction of absenteeism through careful attention to working conditions and sound labor relations policies.

(j) Continued recruitment of women workers and continued attention to the maintenance of sound and satisfactory working conditions and personnel policies.

(k) Job training, up-grading, and better supervision.

(l) Employment and selective placement of the greatest possible number of veterans. Demobilization of approximately 100,000 veterans each month affords a new reservoir of available manpower for war jobs.

(m) Employers in nonessential activities—manufacturing, distribution, service, retail and other activities—should exert every effort to keep their personnel down to the irreducible minimum and thereby help the community in making the greatest possible number of workers available for war jobs.

IV. Reemphasis by labor on increased production.

(a) Reduction of absenteeism and tardiness to the greatest possible extent.

(b) Elimination of any and all union restrictions or limitations upon production.

(c) Renewed attention to the necessity for staying on the job for the duration, giving a full day's work; and strict adherence to the nonstrike pledge.

V. A realistic up-to-the-minute policy of public information, both nationally and locally.

(a) The public should be kept fully advised of the problems now confronting our fighting men so that the wholehearted and concerted action of all the people can be applied to the manpower problem. Similarly, they should be kept informed of developments on the home front.

1. The psychological effect of keeping the public accurately informed on a day-to-day basis—without endangering military strategy—will be immediate and substantial in the way of increased production.

2. Similarly, the true up-to-the-minute manpower facts in a community * * * as they change from day to day and from plant to plant * * * will go a long way toward stimulating maximum cooperation between management and labor on the local level. Informed community opinion will serve as an effective method of stimulating greater efficiency and increasing production.

3. As soon as employees realize and understand the relationship of the product they are making in their company to the total war effort, they will give their maximum efforts toward greater efficiency and production in the plant.

JANUARY 17, 1945.

On January 6, 1945, affiliates of the National Industrial Council were asked to furnish certain information relating to manpower shortages and to the need for national service legislation. The following are pertinent quotations taken from some of the replies received:

Alabama.

Birmingham: "We have no manpower shortage in this area at the present time and do not anticipate any in the near future. In regard to any legislation that Congress might enact, the only type that might be beneficial would be to place several of these IV–F men back in defense work. I refer especially to those men who were working in defense plants and quit these jobs to take on other types of work. It is my understanding that there are several thousand of these men who could be back actively at work in defense plants."

California.

San Francisco: "(1) No critical war plants bay area behind schedule because of manpower shortage; 19,000 needed to meet estimates; none available locally unemployed nor in nonessential plants; employer-labor-public program operating satisfactorily; compulsory legislation considered unnecessary.

"(2) We believe that arbitrary induction of men into service between 18 and 26 without due regard to mechanical skill is responsible for certain shortage of manpower. We also feel that manpower administration should cooperate more fully with employer who in last analysis is responsible for result. Recently called attention Manpower Commission to clearances secured for trivial reasons such as management refusals to apply for extra gasoline so man could visit girl living 40 miles away."

Connecticut.

Bridgeport: "The War Manpower Commission machinery for the Bridgeport area under Director Downs and his labor management committee has won the confidence and cooperation of all war production plants by its handling of manpower and related problems within the limitations of available workers; therefore, any drastic change in present operations seems inadvisable."

Illinois.

Joliet: "Three critical war plants in area are behind schedule because of manpower shortage. Do not anticipate relief through local supply in the immediate future but believe problem can be worked out locally without help of legislation."

Indiana.

Evansville: "At present in Evansville all war plants are up on their schedules. We, at the present, are classified in labor area No. 3 which indicates that we have a surplus of male labor. At least for the next 6 months we will have a balanced labor market in this area.

"Industry is making an effort to employ female help on jobs in plants wherever possible. A resurvey of jobs has been made and supervisory forces have been instructed to use female help where theretofore it was thought that these jobs could only be handled by male labor.

"Our effort to cope with the manpower conditions was first to impress our supervisory forces the need of action and the employment of additional female help. We feel that we have solved our problem here and that there is no need for compulsory legislation at this time as far as we are concerned."

Iowa.

Des Moines: "There is really no critical manpower situation in Iowa. There are two or three plants that are behind schedule, due entirely to the fact that their production program has been suddenly increased. The State war manpower director informs me there is an immediate need for 10,000 persons and that, while it is going to be rather difficult to meet requirements, he is not at all alarmed over his ability to fill the needs of essential industries.

"Insofar as Iowa is concerned, we do not believe in compulsory legislation."

Kentucky.

Louisville: "1. Generally speaking, there are no critical war plants in this area that are behind schedule because of manpower shortage. There is considerable discussion of contemplated production lags because of potential demands.

"2. Type of labor to be needed is generally available locally. When the 'work or fight' order was recently issued, manpower offices were deluged with applications of IV–F's, men in nonessential work who wanted war work.

"3. This area has one big war plant under construction (powder plant at Charlestown, Ind.). War Department and Manpower Commission have been arguing as to whether to stop construction of plant because of potential manpower shortage. Plant construction is going ahead.

"It is believed that the present program will solve the problem, but this is conjecture because the program is in the future and exact conditions months hence cannot be accurately determined.

"4. Employer cooperation has been 'revitalized' and it is not believed compulsory legislation is necessary.

"It is believed by those very close to the problem here in Louisville that the alternate program to compulsory legislation, etc., should be a more vigorous follow-up by War Manpower Commission on those men who leave war plants and get other jobs in nonwar organizations should be followed up more closely, and moral persuasions be used by War Manpower Commission with companies hiring such men."

Louisiana.

New Orleans: "(1) While large critical war plants in this area are not behind schedule, they are faced with a shortage of skilled labor to meet schedules after next 60 days. War Manpower Commission hard at work on training program to meet this condition when it arises. However, our greatest need, tool and die makers, not available locally. Effort is under way to recruit from other sections. Comparatively few of these will meet our needs in this area. Our own ship repair firms on schedule and do not anticipate difficulty in meeting schedules. Present program in effect believed sufficient meet local conditions.

"(2) Aircraft boats and drydock ship repairers in need of additional skilled labor. Recent publicity has helped situation. The need for 5 or 6 months will be greater along certain lines of production.

"(3) As whole, Louisiana manpower in fair shape with major shortages in New Orleans lumber industry and farms. Lumber production lag due partially to need for about 1,000 men plus shortage of equipment. Lumber needs partly met by war prisoners use. Agriculture shortage not too serious for planting season, but may be at harvest. Minor problem in oil drilling not problem in refining. Shipbuilding, aircraft, drydock ship repairing spotty with shortage skilled labor. Believe able supply needs of munitions plants with peak requirements coming June or July. New Orleans ship repairing in good shape can handle additional work. United States Employment Service crowded with applicants, but too early to decide skilled labor. Absenteeism major New Orleans problem."

Michigan.

Detroit: "(1) There are no plants in this area behind their schedule because of manpower shortage. At meeting with heads of armed services, War Production Board and War Manpower Commission statement was made by General Quinton, Commander Peters, and Army Air Corps colonel that there is no manpower shortage in the Detroit area. There is no need for legislation on this subject and all of our managements here believe that free labor will produce and slave labor will not. Our position on National Service Act and compulsory control of workers is rigidly opposed and believe it a serious blunder. We do not anticipate shortage. We do not need any more labor. We have 60,000 women available but without jobs. Suggest as a future program that Washington find out the facts about manpower and quit being carried away by political bunk.

"(2) There is no production being held up in Michigan because of manpower; furthermore, the Washington efforts indicate that at a time when industry needs flexibility because of changing wartime requirements, a strait jacket is being placed upon the manpower situation. We do not want any kind of compulsory labor in Michigan. Our managements cannot understand why such action needed and would oppose vigorously this whole compulsory program. I will predict that if the compulsory program goes through, production will drop tremendously, I think the unions will agree with us on that."

Muskegon: "Insofar as we know, all plants in this area are on schedule except our foundries. (We have no 'nonessential' plants, all plants being on war work.) Our plants employ about 32,000 workers, and the requests at United States Employment Service indicate that we need about 700 more, mainly in the foundries on unskillful work.

* * * * * * *

"Twenty-two percent of our entire industrial work force is in foundries. This type of work is, of course, not so desirable as work in other types of plants, so even though other plants were ordered to reduce their pay rolls, the workers in those plants who were released would not go to work in the foundries. They would leave town first.

"The present program, in my opinion, is sufficient if we can get people to stay on the job. It is not more employer cooperation that we need, but greater employee cooperation. The turn-over in the foundries in 1943 and 1944 was 120 percent. The increase in employment in our foundries in 1944 amounted to 53 persons and to obtain this increase the foundries had to hire 7,400 persons.

"Their rate of absenteeism is much greater than other industries, and they have been plagued with more than their share of work stoppages. If someone can devise a program which will cut down absenteeism, reduce turn-over, and stop the 'quickie' strikes, our manpower problem would be more than solved.

"Our wage rates are tops in the State, and weekly earnings are about $16 higher than the average for the Nation, as reported by Bureau of Labor Statistics. Our foundry rates are extremely high, but they still have to undergo strike after strike (two in the last 2 days) for more money. They violated wage stabilization time after time so as to get the men back on the job over the past couple of years. Within the last 60 days the War Labor Board penalized the above two mentioned plants $67,000 and $30,000, respectively, for having given raises under pressure from the unions so as to get the men back to work producing these critical materials.

"So, what we need is employee cooperation. Legislation merely designed to keep a worker to stay on a particular job will only result in his slowing down his production and otherwise disrupting the plant until he succeeds in getting himself fired.

"If we need any legislation, it is something which will prohibit any further concessions in wages (direct or indirect) on the part of the War Labor Board. If the workers find they can no longer get concessions, they will probably give us a decent day's production to earn their money. Likewise, they will be more likely to stay on the job the full week in order to get the size pay check they desire. As long as they keep going back to War Labor Board for more adjustments, and get it as they are now doing, they will continue to restrict production. Remove these restrictions on production, and the manpower problem is solved."

Pontiac: "I wish to advise we have three 'must' plants in Pontiac and we seem to be holding about even as far as manpower is concerned in two of these plants and in the third plant we need an additional 500 male employees.

"However, our labor turn-over in these plants had been very high up until the new regulation of selective service was issued. I think this step on the part of selective service has eased to some extent our labor turn-over.

"Our absenteeism in the plants has been the serious problem. We have about 1,400 men who are off every day during the week and I am at a loss to know what corrective measures could be taken to reduce this lost time. I have suggested to Major Holmes of the State selective service headquarters that a bulletin could be sent to employers stating that a man who is absent excessively would be subject to a I–A classification. In my opinion this would be of some help to those that fall into selective-service age limits.

"Serving on the War Manpower Commission in the Pontiac areas, I have consistently fought against giving employees certificates of availability where a high skill has been very much in question. We have lost a lot of men through this procedure and most of them have come out of our 'must' plants. I am sure anything that could be done to correct this situation would be of material help to us."

New York.

Jamestown: "Some plants are behind schedule. Believe with cooperation of nonessential plant we can handle the situation."

Ohio.

Columbus: "Problem not so much in numbers but in specialized critical occupations and in increasing and chronic absenteeism. Suggest idea that Selective

Service might work out with War Manpower Commission procedure to hold critical workers in war employment without general compulsory universal draft legislation."

Dayton: "Minor labor shortage here in few critical war plants. Employer cooperation will solve problem. Our opinion compulsory legislation not needed here."

Elyria: "Number plants behind schedule due to manpower shortage. Labor supply is available by transfers from less essential and self-employed. Present program should be continued; beneficial results already apparent. Member companies agree compulsory legislation not answer to problem."

Oklahoma.

Oklahoma City: "Replying question 1, our war plants even or ahead schedule. Question 2, military discharges, more intelligent handling, employment service; available labor adequate. Question 3, considerable number dischargees going into nonessential plants incident Manpower Commission's order waiving employment office application. Question 4, with more intelligent administration employment service present program entirely sufficient. Concluding, labor situation on Oklahoma farms the critical problem. Adequate applicants both essential and nonessential industries. Congress could well consider removal feather-bed rules, time lags, and payments for time not worked and longer day is answer."

Pennsylvania.

Erie: "This area has been getting along pretty well under such voluntary plans as have been adopted that conform to general War Manpower Commission rules. We think we can continue to get along on that basis much better than we can by compulsory regulation.

"The only important vital manpower shortage in the Erie area is that of common labor which would be solved by less than 500 individuals willing to do that kind of work. On the basis of present business and estimated demands, we do not anticipate any great shortage of labor in the near future, although by spring, if there are no cut-backs, there will be substantial demand for more metal workers.

"We do not see how any legislation by Congress of any more directives would help the situation. As a rule, such things muddle up the situation and create no additional manpower. We are not experiencing any material shortage of womenpower and the women are sticking to the job remarkably well. This is not to say that we have more labor than we need or all that we want or all that we can use, but it is to say that the feeling here is that we can get along better with such directives as we have, and with the continuance of voluntary cooperation we believe the whole situation will be worked out better than would be brought about by more legislation or directives."

Philadelphia: "The cumbersome mechanism of a National Service Act should hardly be necessary to handle a Nation-wide shortage placed at 141,000 workers by War Manpower Commission, which will probably not exceed 300,000 in the next 6 months. Some action, possibly legislative, to prevent IV–F's and those over 38 from taking advantage of their apparent immunity from induction by leaving or remaining out of essential employment, accompanied by a check-up on compliance with the requirement that registrants inform local boards of job changes and coupled with a program of temporary negotiated transfers might fill the gap in really critical programs.

Pittsburgh: "As you may know, the Pittsburgh area has for some time been operating under a manpower budget and priority referral plan, which has worked out fairly satisfactorily. Consequently, it is my considered judgment that there is no need of a National Service Act as far as this area is concerned. It is rather late in the game for a labor draft which would necessitate setting up additional machinery and personnel with the resultant red tape. In fact, we need less bureaucracy instead of more, and some of our manpower problems would be relieved if large numbers of unnecessary Government employees were released for actual service.

"At the present time, without considering future replacements to be necessitated by labor turn-over, there is an approximate shortage of 20,000 workers over all. However, the important manpower shortages are concentrated in 20 plants which need a total of 700 workers. These plants are in the heavy truck, axle, airplane propeller, rocket, heavy shell, and cannon industries. A number of these plants are behind schedule because of manpower shortages.

"While the War Manpower Commission has no accurate data, it is an established fact that the type of labor needed is not unemployed and is available, if at all, only in nonessential or less essential plants.

"It is anticipated that these shortages as above outlined will continue in the near future at least in part primarily because of labor turn-over.

"It is felt that the present program in vogue here will come closer to solving the problem than would compulsory labor legislation in the form of a draft.

"The following suggestions are submitted to reinforce the existing program here:

"(1) More accurate reporting on present and future needs employers some of whom are inclined to exaggerate their requirements in order to secure an A–1 priority rating.

"(2) Tightening of stabilization controls to secure all-out compliance with the manpower stabilization plan, particularly by employers in nonessential and less essential industries.

"(3) Greater restrictions in the issuance of statements of availability and referral notices. While the statement of availability must theoretically be reinforced by the United States Employment Service referral notice, a number of employers employ workers on the strength of another employer's statement of availability only. It might be well to take away from employers the option of issuing statements of availability thus compelling every worker who wishes to change his job to go to the United States Employment Service for a referral to some other employer. A worker should not be able to secure a release or referral notice because of under-utilization of skill unless he is sent to a top priority employer.

"(4) Legislation to force IV–F's into essential industries and extension of the recent ruling that workers between 18 and 38 on occupational deferment cannot change jobs without O. K. of their local draft boards so as to include those up to 45 years of age.

"(5) Following the precedent established in releasing from the Army workers with foundry and forge experience, similar releases might be arranged for other skills to be sent to other critical industries. Experience here shows that such soldiers are fine producers and improve the morale of other workers.

"(6) Placing of limited restrictions on newly employed veterans who at present are free of all restrictions. A number of veterans here, because of their freedom from restrictions, have jumped from job to job thus setting a bad example to others and contribution to labor turn-over. Because of this situation, some employers hesitate to employ veterans other than their former employees."

Tennessee.

Nashville: "No important manpower shortage in Nashville area anticipated. United States Employment Service recruiting labor here for other areas. Cut-backs in local plants and rumors of cut-backs have caused a few lay-offs and uneasiness among workers. We are scraping bottom of barrel for efficient help, with absenteeism and turn-over most vexing problems. Do not believe additional legislation necessary, but workers need know more about true course of war and need for material."

Texas.

San Antonio: "Our manpower situation in San Antonio, though tight, is easier than it was 90 days ago and the immediate outlook is favorable.

* * * * * * *

"This area is naturally deeply concerned about the drafting of agricultural labor, particularly as it pertains to ranch hands. These cattle ranchers have long since been stripped to the bone of manpower. To apply the draft further to this class of labor would mean disaster.

"From information which I have been able to secure, it appears that our IV–F's in this locality have pretty well been utilized in the war effort. The pressure applied by the recent Byrnes statement has been effective and it is our personal opinion that legislation would create more difficulties than it would cure."

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness we have is Mr. Martin H. Miller, national legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.

Mr. Miller, will you come around, please, and present your statement.

Service might work out with War Manpower Commission procedure to hold critical workers in war employment without general compulsory universal draft legislation."

Dayton: "Minor labor shortage here in few critical war plants. Employer cooperation will solve problem. Our opinion compulsory legislation not needed here."

Elyria: "Number plants behind schedule due to manpower shortage. Labor supply is available by transfers from less essential and self-employed. Present program should be continued; beneficial results already apparent. Member companies agree compulsory legislation not answer to problem."

Oklahoma.

Oklahoma City: "Replying question 1, our war plants even or ahead schedule. Question 2, military discharges, more intelligent handling, employment service; available labor adequate. Question 3, considerable number dischargees going into nonessential plants incident Manpower Commission's order waiving employment office application. Question 4, with more intelligent administration employment service present program entirely sufficient. Concluding, labor situation on Oklahoma farms the critical problem. Adequate applicants both essential and nonessential industries. Congress could well consider removal feather-bed rules, time lags, and payments for time not worked and longer day is answer."

Pennsylvania.

Erie: "This area has been getting along pretty well under such voluntary plans as have been adopted that conform to general War Manpower Commission rules. We think we can continue to get along on that basis much better than we can by compulsory regulation.

"The only important vital manpower shortage in the Erie area is that of common labor which would be solved by less than 500 individuals willing to do that kind of work. On the basis of present business and estimated demands, we do not anticipate any great shortage of labor in the near future, although by spring, if there are no cut-backs, there will be substantial demand for more metal workers.

"We do not see how any legislation by Congress of any more directives would help the situation. As a rule, such things muddle up the situation and create no additional manpower. We are not experiencing any material shortage of womenpower and the women are sticking to the job remarkably well. This is not to say that we have more labor than we need or all that we want or all that we can use, but it is to say that the feeling here is that we can get along better with such directives as we have, and with the continuance of voluntary cooperation we believe the whole situation will be worked out better than would be brought about by more legislation or directives."

Philadelphia: "The cumbersome mechanism of a National Service Act should hardly be necessary to handle a Nation-wide shortage placed at 141,000 workers by War Manpower Commission, which will probably not exceed 300,000 in the next 6 months. Some action, possibly legislative, to prevent IV–F's and those over 38 from taking advantage of their apparent immunity from induction by leaving or remaining out of essential employment, accompanied by a check-up on compliance with the requirement that registrants inform local boards of job changes and coupled with a program of temporary negotiated transfers might fill the gap in really critical programs.

Pittsburgh: "As you may know, the Pittsburgh area has for some time been operating under a manpower budget and priority referral plan, which has worked out fairly satisfactorily. Consequently, it is my considered judgment that there is no need of a National Service Act as far as this area is concerned. It is rather late in the game for a labor draft which would necessitate setting up additional machinery and personnel with the resultant red tape. In fact, we need less bureaucracy instead of more, and some of our manpower problems would be relieved if large numbers of unnecessary Government employees were released for actual service.

"At the present time, without considering future replacements to be necessitated by labor turn-over, there is an approximate shortage of 20,000 workers over all. However, the important manpower shortages are concentrated in 20 plants which need a total of 700 workers. These plants are in the heavy truck, axle, airplane propeller, rocket, heavy shell, and cannon industries. A number of these plants are behind schedule because of manpower shortages.

"While the War Manpower Commission has no accurate data, it is an established fact that the type of labor needed is not unemployed and is available, if at all, only in nonessential or less essential plants.

"It is anticipated that these shortages as above outlined will continue in the near future at least in part primarily because of labor turn-over.

"It is felt that the present program in vogue here will come closer to solving the problem than would compulsory labor legislation in the form of a draft.

"The following suggestions are submitted to reinforce the existing program here:

"(1) More accurate reporting on present and future needs employers some of whom are inclined to exaggerate their requirements in order to secure an A–1 priority rating.

"(2) Tightening of stabilization controls to secure all-out compliance with the manpower stabilization plan, particularly by employers in nonessential and less essential industries.

"(3) Greater restrictions in the issuance of statements of availability and referral notices. While the statement of availability must theoretically be reinforced by the United States Employment Service referral notice, a number of employers employ workers on the strength of another employer's statement of availability only. It might be well to take away from employers the option of issuing statements of availability thus compelling every worker who wishes to change his job to go to the United States Employment Service for a referral to some other employer. A worker should not be able to secure a release or referral notice because of under-utilization of skill unless he is sent to a top priority employer.

"(4) Legislation to force IV–F's into essential industries and extension of the recent ruling that workers between 18 and 38 on occupational deferment cannot change jobs without O. K. of their local draft boards so as to include those up to 45 years of age.

"(5) Following the precedent established in releasing from the Army workers with foundry and forge experience, similar releases might be arranged for other skills to be sent to other critical industries. Experience here shows that such soldiers are fine producers and improve the morale of other workers.

"(6) Placing of limited restrictions on newly employed veterans who at present are free of all restrictions. A number of veterans here, because of their freedom from restrictions, have jumped from job to job thus setting a bad example to others and contribution to labor turn-over. Because of this situation, some employers hesitate to employ veterans other than their former employees."

Tennessee.

Nashville: "No important manpower shortage in Nashville area anticipated. United States Employment Service recruiting labor here for other areas. Cut-backs in local plants and rumors of cut-backs have caused a few lay-offs and uneasiness among workers. We are scraping bottom of barrel for efficient help, with absenteeism and turn-over most vexing problems. Do not believe additional legislation necessary, but workers need know more about true course of war and need for material."

Texas.

San Antonio: "Our manpower situation in San Antonio, though tight, is easier than it was 90 days ago and the immediate outlook is favorable.

* * * * * * *

"This area is naturally deeply concerned about the drafting of agricultural labor, particularly as it pertains to ranch hands. These cattle ranchers have long since been stripped to the bone of manpower. To apply the draft further to this class of labor would mean disaster.

"From information which I have been able to secure, it appears that our IV–F's in this locality have pretty well been utilized in the war effort. The pressure applied by the recent Byrnes statement has been effective and it is our personal opinion that legislation would create more difficulties than it would cure."

The CHAIRMAN. The next witness we have is Mr. Martin H. Miller, national legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.

Mr. Miller, will you come around, please, and present your statement.

STATEMENT OF MARTIN H. MILLER, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BROTHERHOOD OF RAILROAD TRAINMEN

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am Martin H. Miller, national legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, with offices at 10 Independence Avenue SW., Washington, D. C. The grand lodge headquarters of the brotherhood are located in Cleveland, Ohio. Mr. A. F. Whitney is president. The brotherhood consists of over 210,000 members in the United States, Canada, and Newfoundland, employed by railroads and bus companies as conductors and brakemen in road, yard, passenger, and freight service, yardmasters, switchtenders, car retarder operators, and operators on intercity busses.

The May bill is often referred to as the "work or fight" bill. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen is opposed to provisions of the May bill. We oppose any semblance of conscription of civilians for civil work, even though such work is a necessary part of the war activities. We see a distinct difference between conscription for military service and conscription for civil work. We are of the opinion that trends toward conscription of civilians in the United States will lead dangerously close to the evils which we war against.

We believe there is a sufficiency of patriotism, of loyalty, and of the desire to serve the general welfare of the Nation, to meet any obstacles and overcome any opposition, if that patriotism and that loyalty and that desire to serve are sufficiently awakened, properly guided, and adequately used.

The "work or fight" bill, now under consideration, does not provide for all-out civilian conscription, as was proposed in the Wadsworth-Austin bills in the previous Congress, but it does single out a group of male persons, registrants under the selective service, ages 18 to 45. While the provisions of the bill do not force such registrants to work for certain employers, they have their choice of being channeled into certain industries, occupations, or in the employment of certain corporations, or be reclassified and made available for immediate induction into the land or naval forces, notwithstanding that many of such registrants have been excused from active military duty due to physical disabilities.

If such registrant should be so unfortunate as to be placed into one of the regular military units, he could be assigned for service in a special service unit. While serving in the special service unit, such registrant would be under military supervision, discipline, obligations, and punishment, but will not be entitled to the benefits of the laws enacted for the benefit of the military personnel. Even his family, although entirely blameless for the causes that brought about the assignment in the special-service unit, would suffer as a result thereof. If I understand the bill correctly, the registrant assigned to the special-service unit could be forced to work in the service of a private employer upon certification by the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

As previously mentioned, it would be possible to find in the special-service units many registrants previously rejected for military services, who, after such rejection, found employment, business, or professional

connections which would enable them to support themselves and their dependents. Now, because these particular registrants were physically disabled and were unable—or the wages and working conditions were such, or the acceptance of specified work in certain localities would, in their better judgment, be disadvantageous to them and their dependents—they will be forced to work in special-service units under a semblance of military effort, after which they and their dependents will be denied equal consideration with those who were physically fit and were originally accepted into military service. That does not sound like America—it is not, in my opinion, American.

The officers and members of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen appreciate the seriousness of manpower shortages in our war efforts. Such shortages have been impressively called to our attention many thousands of times. We also recognize the essentiality of keeping up and progressing war production and transportation. Our members have felt the effects of wage freezes, while the living costs continued to rise, either directly or through inferior qualities. They have worked excessively long work days and watched the hazards of their work increase, all of which tend to make their type of work less attractive to those not accustomed to such work. I imagine a check into other employments will find somewhat similar conditions.

We find there is still plenty of room for improvement in employment conditions on railroads, where some of the present manpower shortages allegedly exist. Road train crews are in many instances being held unreasonable lengths of time at the away-from-home terminals—trains are being operated with so many cars that they cannot be operated speedily over the road and through the terminals. We know, from our practical experience on railroads, that increased efficiency in operation of the freight trains will do a great deal to alleviate the manpower shortage, if not entirely eliminate it. We are of the opinion that similar conditions exist in other industrial efforts.

We have read in the papers where large plants have been built—never used—and later torn down; all a waste of manpower. We also read in the papers a few months ago of the overproduction of ammunition, especially small-arm ammunition, which necessitated the closing down of some of the plants.

Now, there's publicity about a shortage of ammunition, and it seems the first effort being made to solve the difficulty is publicity for a restricted civilian conscription. At the same time we find the officials of the War and Navy Departments progressing the idea of compulsory military training in peacetime for male youths between ages 17 and 20. We also find that many of the supporters of civilian conscription are also the supporters of compulsory military training, which they carefully term "universal military training."

It appears that those favoring civilian conscription and compulsory military training are using the present situation in the war and the alleged manpower shortages to progress these ideas. We question the need of compulsory military training. We sincerely question the present alleged manpower shortages.

We have heard the demands for civilian conscription under the plea that such is essential to provide needed manpower in our war efforts. We believe that there is no need for civilian conscription. The Nation has ample manpower and it can be had in sufficient numbers where

needed, if proper steps are made toward the full utilization of our manpower in the war effort.

We do not believe there is any urgency for the drastic steps proposed in the May bill. Our brotherhood has come a long way through its ability to sit across the table and bargain with our employers. True, we have faced a few who still possessed the "master and slave" idea of employment relationships; they were and are extremely few today.

Now, what would be wrong and out of place if our Nation, at war or in peace, would apply the idea of the conference table in attempting to solve the problems which so vitally affect all. Here it is claimed, and I believe correctly so, that we face serious manpower shortages in certain areas and in certain industries, which are vital to our war effort. What is proposed? First, we have a big publicity campaign magnifying the critical situation regarding the manpower shortages; then, as if planned, bills providing for civilian conscription are introduced, and more publicity. People—yes, the great majority—when they understand, oppose and resent conscription of civilians, who would be driven, like cattle, to the private profit-making industries of the Nation. True, such industries would be engaged in the war effort but their private profits go to the individual owners, the same as if they were not in war effort and the same as if their employees were free and working under a genuine collective-bargaining agreement. No attempts, at least no real and straightforward attempts, are made to have the representatives of the most interested groups sit around the conference table, where there is great possibility that that problem, along with the many others interwoven with it, could be worked out to the mutual satisfaction of all and to the jubilant success of each and every one of our war efforts. What appears to me to have been a mistake before the hue and cry for civilian conscription seems to have been carried along and continued with the introduction of the May "work-or-fight" bill.

True, the May bill does not affect all—only the males between the ages of 18 and 45, and only those who, in the opinion of the Director of Selective Service, are not in an activity essential to the war effort. What could be so wrong and unreasonable in attempting to reach the solution of the present manpower problem by submitting the questions to a conference of the representatives of the interested groups? We need some real consideration of the problems confronting the workers, both as workers and as consumers. If the manufacturers are to be permitted to garner the highest profits, then the worker deserves more consideration in wages, working and living conditions. It is my firm belief that if immediate steps are taken to correct the inequities of wages for comparable work, working and living conditions, you will have almost immediately corrected the situation this bill seeks to overcome—that of adequate manpower, when and where needed.

We do not believe such a law is needed; a conference of the representatives of the interested parties will, in my opinion, solve the problems, however great they may be, for, after all, we are all Americans and the great majority of us will exert every effort to uphold the principles for which America stands and will do all necessary to support our war effort if given the direction and guidance. The conference table is a powerful weapon if it is used properly in our war effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to ask the witness a question, if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, Mr. Clason.

Mr. CLASON. He is the legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.

A moment ago, we were told, or a few minutes ago, that the problem of IV–F has diminished in from 4,000,000 to three and a half. There were a million who are now classified II–A–F and other categories. Of course, they are no longer IV–F's.

Mr. MILLER. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Would you say that by taking out the cream of these persons who have been physically handicapped or otherwise unable to go into the Army, that the reservoir of IV–F's, that is, the three and a half million IV–F's that are now and who are not broken down in any way, would you say that was a reservoir where you could get many persons who could work in your type of work in the railroad?

Mr. MILLER. No, sir. The qualifications of train service employees is such that if he cannot pass an Army examination he certainly cannot work as a railroad brakeman, switchman, or conductor.

Mr. CLASON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. SPARKMAN. You are speaking only from the standpoint of railroad workers, but not of the industry as a whole?

Mr. MILLER. The question was directed entirely to the class of employees represented by my organization.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is true.

Mr. MILLER. To that point, I directed my answer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; Mr. Fenton, go right ahead.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Miller, are you in favor of this legislation?

Mr. MILLER. My statement is that we are emphatically opposed to it. Opposed to this or any other kind of compulsory national service legislation. We believe the conference table can solve this problem. Our brotherhood, for 16 years, has been quite successful in sitting across the conference table with our employers and working out our problems. We believe that the Government can do the same thing in this emergency. It was tried out in the railroad industry early last year when we had the Railroad Manpower Mobilization Committee, and we ended the difficulties of railroad employment shortages. That Committee functioned very well until the death of Mr. Eastman, and it was then broken up and nothing more has been done about it.

Mr. FENTON. Well, then, you believe with all the labor leaders, Mr. Murray and Mr. Hines and the industry representatives as far as we have gotten and Mr. Crawford that this legislation is not needed?

Mr. MILLER. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you be mistaken about it?

Mr. MILLER. We could.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Do you know whether at present you have any IVF's employed in railroad work?

Mr. MILLER. I believe we have, to my knowledge, three who are in passenger service.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Come around, Colonel Sanders, please.

Colonel Sanders, will you state your position, where you are employed, and what you are doing at the War Department or in the service, wherever you are?

STATEMENT OF COL. LEWIS SANDERS, FIELD ARTILLERY, LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF

Colonel SANDERS. Col. Lewis Sanders, Field Artillery, assigned to the Legislative and Liaison Division of the Office of Chief of Staff, and consultant to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, particularly on manpower problems.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any experience in dealing with the question of manpower supply and the utilization of it in industry and in government?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us about it. Go ahead with your statement in such a way as you wish.

Colonel SANDERS. I am an industrial engineer in civil life, a graduate engineer. I operated in mining, railroading, industry.

I was chief of the Reemployment Division of the Selective Service System from the time that was organized until January 1944. I set up the replacement schedules for industry, for the replacement of men taken out for the armed services, and I have been continuously studying the manpower situation since the spring of 1942.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, now you can go ahead with your statement, Colonel.

Colonel SANDERS. I would like to present some facts here which I think will bring this picture into better relative proportions. I have listened to all the testimony presented here. The witnesses against the bill have emphasized the tremendous production schedule. All the witnesses for the bill acknowledged that, but it is not the question on which the Congress has to decide, nor is it the critical situation. The critical situation is the fact that we have not reached certain necessary objectives which were possible objectives.

I will read one paragraph of a memorandum I prepared a year ago:

> The production figures are so large as to be without any standard for comparison, and the accomplishment so remarkable as to virtually stop that critical analysis so essential for insuring future accomplishment of vital objectives. But such analysis must be made if we are to foresee in time to enable us to take the necessary preventative measures, to meet those obstacles likely to arise during the coming year.

Now, it was stated by a number of the witnesses that we accomplished our objective in 1943 when we did not have this wave of optimism or some of the other factors that were pleaded as the reason for the present situation.

In 1943, we had not accomplished our objectives. In the airplane production program, we were 9,000 planes short of our objective, and that objective was one which had been scaled down by 30,000 planes from the original objective in order to get an objective which it was felt could be met on the basis of materials and labor available.

Naval construction was met on combat ships, but was short in 1943 28 percent on auxiliary ships of which only 176 were completed out of 244 planned, and patrol and mine craft were 20 percent behind, a shortage of 270 out of 1,336 planned vessels.

In Ordnance, we were then short in 90-millimeter ammunition, 23.6 percent; 105-millimeter ammunition, 11.6 percent; antipersonnel mines, 36.3 percent; multiple gun carriages for 50-millimeter guns, 37.3 percent.

I won't read all of these but just the more significant.

Armored cars, utility, 53.7 percent; in trucks and tractors, we ran shortages from 9.7 percent up to 16 percent; in Signal Corps equipment and radio sets, we had shortages ranging from 16 percent to 45 percent, 54 percent, 64 percent, and 74 percent; in engineer generating sets, we were short 48 percent; in transportation equipment for the Army, we were short, in small freight or passenger vessels, 30.9 percent; in medium tugboats, 32 percent; in medium cargo barges, 29 percent; and in Diesel electrical locomotives, 24.1 percent.

The CHAIRMAN. On what are those figures based, Colonel?

Colonel SANDERS. This is the Ordnance, Maritime Commission, Navy Department reports, all of which they prepared especially for me.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. Now go ahead.

Colonel SANDERS. For the year 1944, we were short on medium and heavy artillery ammunition, 6.2 percent; on mortar ammunition, 11.5 percent; on 105 millimeter howitzer ammunition, 7.8 percent; on bombs, grenades, 9.2 percent; on heavy trucks, 6 percent; air-borne radar, 22.4 percent; dry cells for batteries, 23.8 percent; cotton duck, 13.7 percent; tires, heavy truck, 9.7 percent; and that is not a complete list of the shortages. It is all I have got the survey on up to this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead with your statement, Colonel.

Colonel SANDERS. It is true that we have surpluses of manpower, but they are where we cannot use them. The relationship of shortages cannot be appraised directly at the local level. They are cumulative, as, for example, shortage of foundry workers, in 1943, completely shut down two large engine plants and because of the lack of engines, the tanks, trucks, and other units in which the engines were to have been installed could not be completed and we had a shortage of these machines, except that these missing units were made good through a greater number getting overseas because of the decrease in sinking by submarines and the reduced need for replacements because of unexpectedly low battle losses. This shortage would have been reflected by a shortage of equipment at the battle front.

Even so, there was one period when it was necessary to deprive troops in training in the United States of some items of equipment in order to supply troops in the theater of operations overseas.

So, in appraising shortages of labor, it is not a correct estimate of their seriousness to appraise them in terms of percentage of the total labor force.

To begin with, their relationship is not toward a labor force of 53,000,000, but to the munitions production force which is 10,000,000 or less, so that their impact in percentage is five times as great as represented, and the absence of one piece may tie up a big unit.

I have seen airplanes tied up on a field for lack of propellers or lack of navigating instruments.

One of our serious shortages is in radar. While you can operate without radar, your effectiveness of fire is very seriously decreased by its absence.

We are short, I believe now, some 30,000 workers in radio and radar. On January 1 last year we were short 130,000 workers in that same field. That means greater safety for the enemy, greater losses for us, more wasteful expenditure of ammunition, just for a small group of workers producing a small piece of equipment.

Now, as to the quantity of work that is needed, it is here broken down by requirements after a conference of the various agencies concerned.

This whole thing can go in the record if desired, but I will give you only the summaries.

In the "must" program, the immediate requirements are for 150,000 workers and at June 30, including those, 300,000; for the armed forces 130,000, and 900,000 at June 30.

War and war supporting industries and activities, other than the "must" programs, 100,000 immediately, 200,000 for the 6 months.

Scheduled program readjustments, 200,000 for the 6 months' period. Total immediate requirements 380,000 and the 6 months' requirements 1,600,000.

The estimated labor supply to meet that for the 6-month period are: discharges from the armed forces, 400,000; declining munitions and Government personnel, 280,000; and normal growth of the labor force, 500,000; making 1,180,000, source of supply; excess of the demand over supply, 420,000.

Now, that does not tell the whole story of the impact on industry.

Mr. DURHAM. Who made that survey, Colonel?

Colonel SANDERS. This was made by the Army, Navy, and War Production Board, I believe, Selective Service and War Manpower Commission.

Mr. DURHAM. War Manpower was in on this, too?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes. It is an interagency report.

In order to get the full labor problem you have to face you have to take turn-over into account. Our rate of turn-over is such that that alone calls for 14,000,000 placements annually to take care of the turn-over, which means workers being oriented into new jobs and decrease in efficiency.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, is your problem there not more of turn-over than of new men? You cannot produce men as fast as you can the turn-over. The thing is to reduce the turn-over somehow.

Colonel SANDERS. It is very important to reduce the turn-over to increase the efficiency. I am pointing out the impact, on many a comparatively small shortage is superimposed on a very serious job or problem. In other words, you do not get a correct picture when you say your problem is only 400,000 men against a 50,000,000 labor force. It is 500,000 people added to a problem of 14,000,000 placements, and a labor force that has been practically squeezed dry.

Mr. DURHAM. Do you think this present bill will cure that turn-over situation that exists, or alleviate it, at least?

Colonel SANDERS. It, I believe, can reduce it to workable proportions, because a great deal of the turn-over comes from restlessness. Some of it has sound reasons. Where it has sound reason it should not be checked.

That has been broken down as to the requirements for specific items as ammunition, rockets, trucks, and so forth, which I will not read.

It has also been broken down by labor areas in the study, so that the number of people required in each major labor area, and the industries which affect them, are in the analysis.

The CHAIRMAN. You would like to put that in the record?

Colonel SANDERS. If you wish. The record is quite voluminous.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel SANDERS. All of the witnesses against the bill asked to have continued the voluntary system under which they have been working. That is not an accurate statement of the system, because it is not a voluntary system. It is at present a coercive system, but of irregular coercions that do not bear on everybody alike.

It is not voluntary when you tell a man to move into a job for fear of reclassification and induction into the armed forces. It is not voluntary when you tell a man he cannot leave the job without certificate of availability, under penalty of 60 days idleness, enforced by indirect sanctions employed against employers.

All I see that this bill does is to give the sanction of law to procedures that now stem primarily from Executive decrees and the use of laws for purposes for which they were not originally enacted. In other words, that legalizes what is now being done and makes it more uniform and, therefore, more democratic.

As an industrialist, I do not see that this conveys any reflection on labor or any psychological handicap to labor. It is not based on the idea that labor has fallen down. As I read the bill, it is simply an additional tool to enable the Government to do a well-done job better, and the better performance is needed by the exigencies of the war situation.

We are not quite reaching what we need, and the situation is getting more critical.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel. Have you any further statement that you wish to make?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes; it was cited here that turn-over and absenteeism were primarily related to low wages and housing conditions. Here is the record of about the highest-paid industry in the United States, the private shipyard:

Two hundred and forty-five shipyards, employing 1,001,000 people, having an average hourly rate of pay of $1.41 and an average weekly wage of $67.26, showed, for the month of November, 8.5 percent absenteeism, or a loss of 3,966,000 man-hours, which, in the equivalent of Liberty ships, would build between 9 and 10 Liberty ships in the month.

In turn-over, that same highly paid industry showed 6¼ percent quit-rate average for the first 10 months of 1944. Six and a half for 1943, showing that the quit rate has remained practically level for those 2 years, and it was 4.9 for 1942.

Mr. MARTIN. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Colonel, were there orders on hand in that shipbuilding industry at the time that absenteeism occurred?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

68175—45——27

Mr. MARTIN. Adequate orders to keep them occupied at full production schedules?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Colonel?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes; the British system was mentioned here with the statement that, although they had a law over there, their operation was practically entirely voluntary. That is not quite the full picture. I had this from Mr. Myrddin Evans, G. Myrddin Evans, who occupies the equivalent position of the Chairman of the Manpower Commission in this country; he enforces the law. He told me that while they had only had to have some 700 prosecutions under the law, and most of their compliances were entirely voluntary, they had had to ship some workers by order, but not use any enforcement means to get compliance. He also said that they absolutely could not have operated on the voluntary system without the law behind them, to give them a background, and to impress on everybody that they held equal obligations under the law.

It was also mentioned that a law of this sort was without precedent in the United States. That is not quite correct. In the Constitutions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont, dating back into 1700, and in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, occurs this clause:

> That every member of society has the right to be protected in the employment of life, liberty, and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion toward the expense of that protection, and yield his personal services when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.

That does not limit it to military service.

The State of Virginia, in 1777, passed a law for supplying the troops raised by Virginia, in which this is one paragraph:

> And the commissioners or any two of them may employ, or, if they impress some workmen as they shall judge sufficient to make up into wearing apparel such clothing and leather. The wages of any workman impressed in case of disagreement between the parties shall be settled in the same manner.

In 1917, Maryland passed a compulsory work law, containing this clause:

> The Governor shall thereupon assign or cause to be assigned, and if necessary, reassign or cause to be reassigned, such persons to occupations as aforesaid, carried on by the State, the counties, or the city of Baltimore, or to private employers engaged in occupation of the character above mentioned and to accept the services of such persons.

New Jersey, in 1918, passed a similar law, not quite so broad as this, but still providing for assignment to private employment.

Mr. CLASON. May I ask a question there?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Did they have a penalty clause to put them in jail if they did not obey?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. How much was the penalty in Maryland?

Colonel SANDERS "Failure of such persons to register shall be a misdemeanor and shall be punishable by a fine not exceeding fifty dollars."

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I have a question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CLASON. He has not answered my question yet.

Colonel SANDERS. "Any such person failing or refusing to do or to continue to do the work assigned to him, and who in the meanwhile has not become regularly or continuously employed in some business, occupation, trade or profession, shall, upon conviction before any justice of the peace, having criminal jurisdiction, be fined not more than five hundred or be imprisoned not more than six months or be both fined and imprisoned in the discretion of a court."

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I have a question, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. What is the validity of that State law? Was it ever protested in the Supreme Court?

Colonel SANDERS. I do not know, sir, but it is still on the statute books, in the last code of Maryland.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Colonel?

Colonel SANDERS. Only that the statement that this bill would upset the present machinery does not seem to me——

Mr. HARNESS. Upset what?

Colonel SANDERS. Present machinery, under which labor is being handled, and these local councils in which labor, management, and Government participated sound, because I see nothing in the operation of the bill which interferes with the continuance of those at all.

It merely places an added tool at the disposal of the Government for those who do not willingly volunteer their services under the urging of such committees.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, the bill expressly employed the means of the existing agencies, on page 2, line 7.

Colonel SANDERS. It seems to me the same thing as a motor-traffic law, and your motor police. You do not come under the law unless vou go out and violate. You are a free driver so long as you behave yourself.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, what you mean to say, if I understood your statement, is that it is not the existence of the law that hurts, but it is infliction of the penalties provided by the law.

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARNESS. In that connection, Mr. Chairman, you refer to line 7, page 2 of the bill. This is a rather extreme example, but suppose a man was working in a factory, and his job was just intolerable. If he quit the job, then he could be punished for it?

The CHAIRMAN. But there is another provision in this bill which will provide that if he is absent from his employment without reasonable excuses——

Mr. HARNESS. But who is going to pass on the reasons?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, somebody has to pass on it. Maybe the Supreme Court; I do not know.

Mr. HARNESS. You have got another provision in here, referring to the Director of War Mobilization; line 10, page 2, you say, "After consultation with the proper officials of management, labor, and government"—well, he already has a board that he is supposed to consult with, an advisory board, and we are told the advisory board recommends against this, but he does not pay any attention to them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the intent and purpose of the bill are to reach those who are not working or not in the Army, those who are able-bodied, who refuse to render service.

Mr. HARNESS. Mr. Chairman, I think I could support legislation that would try to get at those people that are not doing anything, but

this covers everybody. It does not only cover them, but it covers everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Between the ages of 18 and 45.

Mr. HARNESS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Mr. Clason, any questions?

Mr. CLASON. You are the legislative consultant for the Senate Committee on Military Affairs?

Colonel SANDERS. Not their legislative consultant; I am their consultant and was brought there primarily on manpower questions.

Mr. CLASON. I see. And you are, however, in the War Department?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes; I am in the War Department.

Mr. CLASON. And how long have you been with the War Department?

Colonel SANDERS. Well, I have been a Reserve officer since the 1st of November 1916.

Mr. CLASON. But how long have you been on duty?

Colonel SANDERS. I have been on active duty here since January 7, 1941.

Mr. CLASON. And prior to that you were an industrialist?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Running a plant of your own?

Colonel SANDERS. At times, and partly in consulting work.

Mr. CLASON. Well, consulting with regard to labor problems or other problems?

Colonel SANDERS. Not consulting on labor problems. I have handled labor problems directly, in foundries, mining, and various parts of the United States, Mexico, and Central America.

Mr. CLASON. I see. Well now, has the number of IV–F's been brought to your attention?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. How many do you understand that there are today in the IV–F class?

Colonel SANDERS. Of men who were originally classified as IV–F, about four and a half million. Of those, a number have been reclassified by their local boards, into II–A, II–B, and II–C, or II–L, or II–AL.

Mr. CLASON. The question is, How many are in IV–F today? The others are already working, as I understand it.

Colonel SANDERS. Well, in IV–F today—IV–F's are working.

Mr. CLASON. IV–F's are working also?

Colonel SANDERS. Oh, yes.

Mr. CLASON. Well, what——

Colonel SANDERS. IV–F classification only shows a man's physical condition.

Mr. CLASON. How many are now IV–F's, if you can tell us that?

Colonel SANDERS. I think there are about 3,800,000 in that classification; Colonel Keesling has the latest data on that, I think.

Mr. CLASON. How many did you say, three million and eight, or did you say two?

Colonel SANDERS. I have it here; 3,572,000.

Mr. CLASON. That is as of what date?

Colonel SANDERS. I think that was probably for the beginning of December.

Mr. CLASON. Of those three-millon-odd, how many are now in employment of some kind?

Colonel SANDERS. Nobody knows exactly, because a continuous record is not kept of all of those men, which would be a tremendous task. The estimates of those who are sufficiently incapacitated so as to be unemployable range from 300,000 to something over 500,000, all of which is an estimate.

A matter of 937,000 have been reclassified from IV–F into the various II–A, B, and C, classifications.

Mr. CLASON. Those are essential jobs.

Colonel SANDERS. Those are war jobs, war-supporting jobs, or agriculture.

Mr. FENTON. How many?

Colonel SANDERS. 973,000.

Mr. CLASON. On that basis, then——

Colonel SANDERS. Which brings you up to an original total of 4,475,000 IV–F's.

Mr. CLASON. But how many does it leave in the pool of IV–F's? That brings us down to 3,000,000-something-or-other. Then you take out half a million who could not possibly work because of their physical or mental disqualifications, which leaves you around 3,000,000 still in IV–F.

Colonel SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. Now, of those 3,000,000, has any study been made or have you any figures to show us how many of those might be available and capable of performing work in war industry?

Colonel SANDERS. Probably the bulk of those 3,000,000 would be capable of performing work in war industry, and you would normally expect the IV–F's to have about the same distribution as men who were not IV–F's. In our total employment force, you see, only 10,000,000 out of 52,000,000 are engaged in direct war work.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, what did you mean, Colonel, when you stated that there was only a manpower pool of 1,100,000 available from which to get war workers when you state there are now 3,000,000 in this group, or a large share of them who are able to go into war work?

Colonel SANDERS. I said physically able to go into war work.

Mr. CLASON. Well, mentally, too?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. If they are physically and mentally able, they form a manpower pool from which any necessary manpower for war industry can be obtained?

Colonel SANDERS. If you can succeed in getting them out of their existing occupations.

Mr. CLASON. What are their occupations today? Does anyone know?

Colonel SANDERS. Scattered all over in trade and services. Some of them in war industries.

Mr. CLASON. In the same proportion as men who are not in the IV–F class?

Colonel SANDERS. They may be in war industry in a higher proportion than the others, because they have been subjected to greater direct contact, to sway them into war industries, through the process of interviewing many of them by the U. S. Employment Service, when they

were rejected at the induction stations. Also, by the fact that selective service tried to swing them toward war industries, so they may run a higher percentage——

Mr. CLASON. Well then——

Colonel SANDERS. In war industry than the rest of the population.

Mr. CLASON. Well, so long as that pool exists outside of essential war industry, everything is all right. What is the age of these men that you are talking about?

Colonel SANDERS. These would be the men from 18 to 38.

Mr. CLASON. Yes.

Colonel SANDERS. The rest of your labor pool is made up of people that range from 16 years of age up to 74.

Mr. CLASON. So there is no reason to assume that these IV–F's are not just as patriotic and loyal as any other American, is there?

Colonel SANDERS. No.

Mr. CLASON. And you would expect to have just as many of them take jobs in war industry as are capable of doing so, when they are needed, and that is impressed upon them?

Colonel SANDERS. I would expect so. I can see only one psychological difference from the other men in the same age bracket, and that is when a man is classified as IV–F, he feels that that frees him from all further control by the Government; whereas the man not classified as IV–F and in a war job, who got a deferment because he was in a war job, still feels a hand on his shoulder. But the man who was classified as IV–F felt the hand had been taken off his shoulder.

Mr. HARNESS. I wonder if we could get the number of the 3,000,000 IV–F's that are in industry?

Mr. CLASON. Well, you said 973,000.

Colonel SANDERS. That is the number that have been reclassified. But that is not a complete count of them.

Mr. CLASON. Perhaps I got that wrong; 973,000 were what?

Colonel SANDERS. Classified from the IV–F classification into the classifications of II–B and C, with either an F or AL following.

Mr. CLASON. What is the number?

Colonel SANDERS. 973,000 total. But that, I understand, is not a complete classification; that the boards have not reclassified everybody.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, it is quite possible that a number of other IV–F's, perhaps totaling a large figure, are also in war industry.

Colonel SANDERS. They probably are.

Mr. CLASON. They probably are?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir. Nobody has accurate data on that, so far as I can find out.

Mr. HARNESS. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLASON. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. That is the thing I have been talking about. They have been talking about 4 million to 4½ million IV–F's, that are not in war industry and that we would reach them through this legislation. Now, your break-down shows four and a half million originally classified at IV–F; 500,000 of those are because of mental or physical disabilities and cannot be used, and approximately a million, or 973,000 of the balance have been reclassified as farmers and war workers, leaving approximately 3,000,000. Of those 3,000,000, you have no

break-down; you do not know whether they are in war industry or not, do you?

Colonel SANDERS. I have not been able to find any break-down on them.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, have you checked with Selective Service to find out?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes. Colonel Keesling may have something; I have not got it.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, then, it is just a mythical figure as to how many of these men are actually unemployed, is it not? Or that are not in war industry?

Colonel SANDERS. As to who are not in war industry, you can only go by approximations from some old sampling tests, as far as I know.

Mr. HARNESS. And you could not even estimate the number of the 3,000,000 men who are classified IV–F who are or are not in war industry, can you?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes; I can give you an estimate of that, but it is a sheer estimate; the probabilities are that there are at least 2,000,000 of them.

Mr. HARNESS. In war industry?

Colonel SANDERS. Not in war industry.

Mr. HARNESS. Not in war industry?

Colonel SANDERS. But in that there are occupations that are the pattern of all the rest of employment. You see, we only have less than 10,000,000 out of $52,000,000 labor force in war industry today. They are in transportation, they are in trade, in services, and so on; that is, the rest of the 52,000,000.

Mr. HARNESS. If a number of those IV–F's were driving streetcars or busses in the District of Columbia, that is a war supporting industry, is it not?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. That is all.

Mr. CLASON. As I understand your picture, then, you disagree with both labor and industry as to the number of men that are going to be required by industry between now and June 30?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. You place the figure at how many?

Colonel SANDERS. Four hundred and seventy thousand additional workers are needed.

Mr. CLASON. As against their 300,000?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes; and they were talking about a pool of a million and a half from which to draw that.

Mr. CLASON. Well, how large a pool do you say there is?

Colonel SANDERS. It is a deficit of 470,000, not a pool; in other words, that is the deficiency.

Mr. CLASON. Well, that is what I thought. Now, when you talk about this deficit of 476,000, you have to add that on to the pool that the labor and industrial persons were talking about. How many men do you say, then that we do have to put into industry by June 30; not the 476,000, but that and the entire pool?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. How many is that?

Colonel SANDERS. There are a million six hundred thousand that have to go into the armed forces and into industry by June 30, of which you have in sight all but 470,000. That 470,000 has to be obtained by moving people out of other occupations that are not essential to the war. For instance, the significant thing is that we have brought up this tremendous war production without having decreased employment to any appreciable extent in trade, services, finance, and so forth, which should have yielded up men to it. That has remained constant for the last 2 years, at about 11,300,000 people employed in those occupations.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, you would say that Mr. Miller and Mr. Crawford and Mr. Murray and Mr. Hines are being supported in their arguments by erroneous figures?

Colonel SANDERS. I think they have not got the complete figures. I do not think they have all of the War and Navy Departments' procurement programs. I think that is where the discrepancy comes in.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, you would say that, upon information which has been given out by the Government to labor and industry up to the present time, their figures are correct?

Colonel SANDERS. That I have not checked on.

Mr. CLASON. Well, have you any reason to believe that their figures are not correct, based upon what information has been given out?

Colonel SANDERS. I am not sure on that.

Mr. CLASON. Well, the only difference between what you state and what they stated is 176,000 persons, is it not?

Colonel SANDERS. No; because they state figures ranging from 150,000. I think their top is about three hundred or three hundred and fifty thousand, against which they claimed a pool of about a million and a half people to draw on. I do not know where that pool of a million and a half people exists.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, tell us how many new jobs you think the Government is going to create by its orders between now and June 30. We are apparently going around the corners here without getting anywhere on the manpower question.

Colonel SANDERS. Seven hundred thousand.

Mr. DURHAM. Is that based entirely on the procurement program of the Army and Navy?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That represents the net increase?

Colonel SANDERS. That is the net increase.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, we had the 700,000 when we started here with the Government witnesses. Now you say, however, that labor and industry are wrong as to the size of the manpower pool from which they can draw.

Colonel SANDERS. Yes. One thing they overlooked, they talked about a million and a half people having disappeared from production. The place they disappeared to was in the armed forces because we withdrew from industry in the year 1944 of one million and a half or more for the armed forces, the net being after allowing for the return of men discharged from the services. We actually drew over 2,300,000 out, but we returned some 600,000 in discharges.

Mr. DURHAM. All those were withdrawn from industry, were they, Colonel?

Colonel SANDERS. Not from munitions. They were drawn from the whole economy. So some of these people who left jobs where there was a cut-back in munitions, took the places of men who had been drawn out of trade, transportation, services, and so forth.

Mr. CLASON. Do you understand that the military services are returning 50,000 a month or more to war industries or to industry each month, do you not?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir, and this takes account of that.

Mr. CLASON. In other words, taking account of everything, you are still 476,000 short?

Colonel SANDERS. That is right.

Mr. HARNESS. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLASON. All right.

Mr. HARNESS. Does that take into account the figures of the Labor Department and the War Manpower Commission's report of December, where my recollection is that it is in the record there, that it was 1,600,000 employees that left war industry during that period in 1944?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir, because that corresponds with the withdrawals for the armed services.

Mr. HARNESS. And the testimony of Mr. Hines, who broke that down by saying that 500,000 of that number went into the armed forces and the rest of them were still out of employment is not correct?

Colonel SANDERS. Well, I do not know where he got that figure, because a million and a half went into the armed forces. As a matter of fact, 2,300,000 went into the armed forces, but about a million and a half net, after allowing for the men returning from the armed forces.

Mr. CLASON. How many of those men had come out of war industry?

Colonel SANDERS. That I do not know.

Mr. CLASON. Well, there would be very few because ordinarily a man capable of holding down an essential war job would not be taken, would he?

Colonel SANDERS. Well, in 1944, we started stripping war industries of the men from 18 to 22, first, and then extended that up to 18 to 26.

Mr. CLASON. But you cannot tell us how many those people are?

Colonel SANDERS. No, I have not the figures on that.

Mr. CLASON. Is it possible to get them?

Colonel SANDERS. I think so.

Mr. DURHAM. Is the Army taking back into the service any of that 50,000 discharged; any of them at all?

Colonel SANDERS. I do not think any appreciable number. There may have been a few sporadic cases.

Mr. DURHAM. Why I ask that question is that I have a letter from a man who has served 4 years and wants to get back in and who is having difficulty getting back into the service. It sounds ridiculous.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. CLASON. You told us the Army found there has been a shortage each month amounting to a certain percent for 2 years in the production of heavy ammunition.

Colonel SANDERS. Correct.

Mr. CLASON. Why did not the Army do something about it during those 2 years if they thought it was necessary?

Colonel SANDERS. The Army did do something about it.

Mr. CLASON. Well, did they increase the production during that period?

Colonel SANDERS. They did.

Mr. CLASON. And then, would you say that the production of heavy ammunition in October of 1944 was greater than it was in any preceding month?

Colonel SANDERS. I have not the figures, month by month, on that.

Mr. CLASON. Well, do you know whether or not there were any cut-backs during this period of 2 years?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, I think there have been cut-backs when the change in the military situation caused the reserve supplies to catch up with the requirements.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, an argument based upon the proposition that industry was not producing as many as the Army would like to have had is more or less fallacious because industry was told not to produce as much; is not that true?

Colonel SANDERS. No, sir; I think we are picking up two different questions there. Industry, in approaching this, has apparently thought somebody was trying to criticize it, which was not the case. Objectives were set which could have been reached, but it was beyond the power of industry to reach them if it could not get the manpower to do it.

Mr. CLASON. Well, there was not any shortage of manpower all last year, according to the testimony by everybody, Government officials and everybody else, so you cannot tell us manpower in October prevented them from producing them, can you, lack of manpower?

Colonel SANDERS. There were local shortages of manpower all during last year.

Mr. CLASON. In the heavy ammunitions industry?

Colonel SANDERS. We have found an average of 68 to 70 critical areas where the manpower supply was below the requirements and about 80, I think it is——

Mr. CLASON. Well, at any rate, Colonel, in October you were short of manpower. You doubled your requests in October for more stuff. You trimmed it in November, and it is now fivefold. You are certainly in an awful mess over the manpower situation, are you not?

Colonel SANDERS. The stepped-up requirements, sir, are only for portions of equipment. The entire program is not stepped up in any such proportion as that and there have been cut-backs on other portions of the program. As, for example——

Mr. CLASON. I will yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you.

I wanted to ask you if the list of shortages which you read to us, if you applied the proposition of manpower strictly as a cause of those shortages or were there other contributing factors?

Colonel SANDERS. There are other contributing factors.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. All right.

Mr. MARTIN. Colonel, what kind of reclassification of IV–F has Selective Service conducted? Has that been a continuous operation?

Colonel SANDERS. I am not in a position to speak for Selective Service on that.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, you testified here that they had reclassified some 973,000 people. Do you know when that was done?

Colonel SANDERS. No. I believe it was started sometime last year, and the process went along continuously.

Mr. MARTIN. Do you know whether any check-up has been made of those 973,000 to see whether they are still working at the jobs for which they were so reclassified?

Colonel SANDERS. That I cannot answer as of first-hand information, but my understanding is that the local boards are under directions to keep track of these men and to reclassify them if they do not stay on the jobs for which they were reclassified.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, I have one other question along different lines. The purpose of this bill, as I see it, is to get men to work. Would you say the method of administration would call for the administrators to have the power and exercise it, placing an individual worker at work under a specific private employer?

Colonel SANDERS. Do I think they should have such power?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

Colonel SANDERS. Yes; I do.

Mr. MARTIN. And exercise it?

Colonel SANDERS. I do; and exercise it.

That is, if voluntary methods do not succeed.

Mr. MARTIN. To place an individual worker, a specific individual worker, at work for a specific private employer in private employment?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes, sir. I would like to answer that question a little more fully, because it bears on a type of argument that has been brought up very frequently in the last 2 years, and that is the idea that the work for a private employer, who is operating for a profit, has some bearing on the subject. The facts are that the private employers in this matter are, to all intents and purposes, agents of the Government, carrying out a war operation, and the man is not assigned to him for any purpose of furthering the employer's profit but solely to further the objectives of the Government.

If the profit bore on it, then all the objections would disappear, it seems to me, if the employer was operating at a loss.

The CHAIRMAN. It applies only to people who are manufacturing war materials for the Government?

Colonel SANDERS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Not to private industry engaged in private production?

Colonel SANDERS. That is right.

Mr. MARTIN. The fact that they have a Government order, then, entitles them to the support of the Government in furnishing them with men who are required by force to work for them individually?

Colonel SANDERS. I would not put it in quite those terms, sir.

I say it is the right of the Government, under the Constitution, which empowers Congress to raise and maintain Army and Navy, to procure its necessary equipment, if necessary, by assigning men to produce it.

Mr. MARTIN. Are you a lawyer?

Colonel SANDERS. No, sir.

(The reports of Colonel Sanders are as follows:)

MANPOWER REPORT

Interagency agreement has been reached on the following tabulation of labor demand and supply for the period to June 30, 1945:

TABLE I.—*Estimated labor*

(DEMAND JAN. 1-JUNE 30, 1945)

	Immediate requirements	Requirements to June 30, 1945 (including immediate requirements)
Must programs	[1] 150,000	300,000
Armed forces	130,000	900,000
War and war-supporting industries and activities other than must programs [2]	100,000	200,000
Scheduled program readjustments [3]		200,000
Total requirements	380,000	1,600,000

(SUPPLY JAN. 1-JUNE 30, 1945)

Armed forces dischargees		400,000
Declining munitions and government		280,000
Normal growth of labor force		500,000
		1,180,000
Excess of demand over supply		420,000
Total		1,600,000

[1] This figure, based on incomplete coverage, probably underestimates immediate requirements.
[2] Includes requirements for transportation, public utilities, construction, Federal agencies (to the extent not included in other items), and other essential activities.
[3] This includes supply requirements for French Government.

The indicated national labor deficit of 420,000 will not be met during the next 6 months unless (1) 100,000 agricultural workers now deferred are inducted into the armed forces and not replaced from the civilian population; (2) unemployment is reduced by another 100,000 from the current low level; (3) less essential industries release 220,000 workers.

There is no reason to believe that all or any of these necessary adjustments will occur under current manpower regulations and practices. It is therefore expected that the demands of war activities for labor will exceed the supply available during the next 6 months.

Even if 1.6 million workers do become available by June 30 to meet the requirements of war activities, great difficulties will be encountered in transferring such workers to the areas, industries, and occupations where their services are required.

Because so many of its critical programs are scheduled for expansion during the next 6 months, the Army Service Forces will be more seriously affected by labor shortages than any other procurement agency. The seriousness of the immediate and future manpower problems which confront Army Service Forces is indicated in table II, which summarizes the labor requirements of its major critical programs.

TABLE II.—*Estimated additional labor requirements for major critical Army Service Forces programs*

	Immediate requirements (January 1945)	Total requirements to July 1, 1945
Ordnance	42,000	131,500
Ammunition, mortar, and medium	1,500	9,500
Ammunition, small arms	13,000	42,000
Ammunition, heavy artillery	3,000	4,500
Artillery, heavy	1,500	1,500
Explosives and loading plants	9,000	50,000
Bombs (including Chemical Warfare Service)	3,000	6,000
Rockets (exclusive of propellent but including Navy)	2,000	7,000
Tanks	2,000	4,000
Trucks	7,000	7,000
Signal Corps	8,800	12,300
Radar (Army Service Forces only)	6,000	6,000
Assault and field wire	1,300	2,800
Batteries, dry cell	1,500	[1] 3,500
Quartermaster Corps: Cotton duck	5,500	[2] 10,000
Corps of Engineers: Construction, including new ammunition facilities and off-continent work	6,000	35,000
Tires	2,200	8,300
Foundries	9,000	9,000
Army Service Forces installations	56,500	([3])

[1] Includes 2,000 prisoners of war to be employed in Milwaukee.
[2] Estimate based on number of cotton duck mills which may be converted to 3-shift operations.
[3] INA.

To meet the immediate and 6-month labor demands of war activities, including the armed forces, various programs are under discussion at the present time. The most comprehensive program involves legislation authorizing national service which will impose a legal obligation to serve the war interest upon a majority of the United States population of working age. In the meantime, consideration is being given by congressional committees to so-called work-or-fight legislation which will permit control of most males registered with selective service to insure their participation in war activities.

More limited types of action designed to overcome manpower shortages in war industries include expanded use of prisoners of war and of foreign workers brought into the United States. The War Department is taking emergency action to furlough soldiers, who are eligible for discharge and qualified for industrial employment, to particularly critical industries. In a few cases, soldiers not scheduled for discharge are being furloughed to jobs in war industries. The recent prohibition against resumption of most types of civilian production has been extended to all group II labor-shortage areas in order to reduce the competition for available workers which war industries must overcome. Another significant program involves the aggressive use of publicity and special recruitment techniques to counteract the widespread feeling that the war is over and to improve the effectiveness of existing procedures for staffing war plants. These and other types of action taken to relieve the specific manpower difficulties impeding procurement of critical Army Service Forces items are mentioned below.

Military tires.

Production of military tires increased 5 percent for the week ending December 23, the production for the last week of that month declined as a result of Christmas shut-downs and absenteeism caused, in part, by unprecedented snowstorms. The labor shortages at tire plants in Akron, Ohio, and Chicopee Falls, Mass., have been reduced to a nominal point. Shortages at the 4 tire plants in Los Angeles were substantially relieved by use of 500 soldiers. These soldiers are a part of the 2,279 who had been released on a E. R. C. or furlough basis to the tire plants through the first week in January. Consideration is being given to the furlough of an additional 1,000 soldiers to tire-fabric plants in order to overcome a current bottleneck, and 75 soldiers from an Army Air Forces establishment are being used under a rotation furlough plan to move carbon

black from a plant in the Texas Panhandle. Special wage action is being taken to assist recruitment for construction of three carbon black plants in Texas and New Mexico. It is hoped that the 4-month program of continuous 7-day operation which has been set up in all tire-producing areas will increase output materially.

Foundries and forge shops.

The immediate labor needs of foundries and forge shops engaged in Army Service Forces programs have been largely satisfied through release of 1,085 soldiers on a E. R. C. or furlough basis, intensive recruitment in the civilian labor market, and the use of about 1,100 foreign workers. Relatively high rates of separation from foundry jobs requires continued effort to provide replacements as needed. Workers being imported from Jamaica to fill orders already placed by foundries and other war plants will provide some of the needed replacement labor.

Ordnance Department.

Employment in 19 GOCO explosives and loading establishments (selected for study because of difficulties involved in staffing them) was more than 2,000 workers (4.5 percent behind scheduled employment at the end of December. The plants most seriously behind their hiring schedules were New River, Ravenna, Lone Star, and Sangamon. Excessive turn-over continued to impede attainment of required employment level in many plants, notably at Kankakeee, Redstone Arsenal, Badger, Lone Star, Plum Brook, Kingsbury, and Iowa. In the last few weeks, selective service work-or-fight regulations have resulted in sufficient hires to meet he current needs of Sunflower ordnance works which had been previously affected by labor shortages. Interregional recruitment was obtained during the first week of January for Kankakee (300 workers) and Ravenna (300 workers); this privilege was later withdrawn from Kankakee because housing is reportedly unavailable in that Illinoins area. No difficulties are reported by the Ordnance Department concerning the remaining 36 explosives and loading establishments.

Employment in the major small-arms ammunition plants (exclusive of explosives) was close to schedule at the end of December, but staffing difficulties are expected during January when hiring schedules rise sharply. The most serious manpower problems are anticipated in the St. Louis area where United States Cartridge, Weestern Cartridge, and McQuay-Norris must all expand in the next few weeks. Brass mills involved in the small-arms ammunition program have been getting workers but still need some 800 to meet recently accelerated schedules.

Manpower problems affecting the heavy-artillery program became apparent during December because the possibilities of in-plant transfers of labor to this heavy work had been exhausted, and accelerated schedules for other "must" items had been placed in some of the heavy artillery facilities. Although no serious manpower shortages have as yet been reported and production lags resulting from lack of labor have been insignificant, it is expected that labor shortages will impede heavy artillery production objectives during 1945 to an increasing extent. Practically all producers of heavy artillery are situated in tight labor-market areas and compete for available labor with many other must plants. The Ordnance Department reports that no significant production lags due to labor shortages are affecting the heavy-artillery ammunition program (exclusively of explosives and loading plants); facilities, equipment, and component shortages continue to be the major problem. At the end of December, however, plants engaged in this program were reported by War Manpower Commission to need 5,000 workers within the next few weeks.

The sizable labor needs of medium and mortar artillery ammunition producers (excluding explosives and loading plants) are not a current problem because the majority of the plants engaged in the expended program will not come into full production until after the middle of 1945.

Signal Corps.

Despite continuing and intensive recruitment efforts, the current needs of the dry-cell battery plants on the "must" list remain at about 1,000 workers because separations from these plants tend to balance new hires. The largest needs are for the P. R. Mallory Co., Indianapolis (180 workers); R. M. R. Corporation, Madison, Wis. (200); and Signal Battery Co., Milwaukee, Wis. (200). Approximately 1,500 prisoners of war will man two lines assembling dry cells into batteries at Billy Mitchell Field near Milwaukee. These prisoners will begin work at staggered intervals during the next 2 months. Some 500 additional civilian workers will be added to the Signal Battery Co.'s main plant to make the cells for assembly by the prisoners.

In the field and assault wire program, Signal Corps reports that the most difficult manpower situation exists at the United States Rubber Co., Bristol, R. I., where 350 to 400 additional workers are needed to operate new machines which are being installed to balance production within this plant. Progress in staffing the new United States Rubber Co.'s wire plant, Lowell, Mass., is not fast enough to meet production requirements; some 550 additional workers must still be obtained. The General Cable Co.'s plants, located in various parts of the country, still need a few workers each, but the manpower situation in these plants appears to be well in hand.

Most radar plants producing for the Signal Corps are currently reported to be having no significant manpower difficulties. Receiving-tube plants are facing difficulties, partly traceable to high separation rates, particularly in the Newark, N. J., area.

Corps of Engineers.

General shortages of common male labor and the acute scarcity of certain types of skilled construction workers, such as those in the plumbing trades, are creating serious problems for the Corps of Engineers in connection with the expansion of GOCO explosives and loading facilities. As a result, all construction of ammunition facilities has been added to the national "must" list. Accelerated construction schedules necessitate interregional recruitment of 1,300 workers of various types for Badger ordnance works and 200 pipefitters for Gopher ordnance works during the months of January and February. Interregional recruitment privileges are also being obtained for some of the 7,000 to 8,000 construction workers to be employed at Indiana ordnance works, (Louisville area) and for a few hundred needed at Pantex ordnance plant (Amarillo, Tex.). Some of these orders, as well as some orders placed locally by construction contractors engaged on GOCO expansion projects, are in competition with the demand for construction workers needed to complete the Navy rocket plant in Camden, Ark., which, for manpower purposes, is rated just behind Manhattan district projects.

Quartermaster Corps.

Employment in duck plants has been substantially increased through intensive recruitment of workers from the civilian labor market and through furloughing of more than 1,100 soldiers, many of whom had critically needed skills. Programs for converting additional looms to duck production in order to utilize existing work forces on war production are proceeding satisfactorily. Many plants are now operating partial third shifts, but further extension of third-shift operation is hampered by a current shortage of yarn as well as by lack of some materials and equipment on which delivery is being expedited.

Large expansion in procurement of boneless beef has resulted in additional manpower requirements. The Quartermaster Corps is preparing an analysis to indicate those plants in civilian production to which sanctions may be applied to force workers into war production. Some success has already been attained in the use of foreign workers; 100 have been placed in the Chicago area and arrangements for the use of an additional 400 are in the process of completion. In addition, use of prisoners of war is being pressed. Consideration is also being given to a plan to furlough soldiers to meet the urgent needs of this program.

Freezing by the War Production Board of certain types of machinery used in manufacturing socks and worsteds for military use and the resultant transfer of labor from civilian work has improved production of these items, but additional workers are still needed.

The selective service work-or-fight regulations, which have assisted some war contractors in obtaining labor, are having an adverse effect on those quartermaster contractors who are also engaged in production for the civilian economy. Employees of such contractors fear that their work is not essential and are leaving for jobs more definitely associated with the war effort.

Chemical Warfare Service.

The Chemical Warfare Service has indicated that labor shortages among subcontractors in the M5 ointment, M2 smoke generator, and 4.2 inch chemical mortal shell programs have been impeding production of the finished items; labor shortages are also reported among prime contractors in the latter program. Action on these cases is being taken in the areas in which the plants are located.

Transportation Corps.

The major manpower problem confronting the Transportation Corps is the long-continued and growing shortage of operating personnel needed by railroads in the 11 Western States. During September, a virtual rail blockade developed in the San Francisco Bay area as a result of a shortage of switchmen and firemen. A similar 10-day traffic stoppage occurred on the Western Pacific at Stockton, Calif., in December when idle engines prevented that road from picking up some 1,000 cars from the Southern Pacific during a 5-days period. These serious tie-ups developed despite the fact that some 70 percent of all operating personnel on western terminal railroads are doubling up almost to the limit of the 16-hour law. Current efforts to maintain the flow of traffic by transfer of employees, overtime work, and intensive recruitment are seriously threatened by probable selective service induction of 300 to 500 brakemen, switchmen, firemen, shopmen, telegraphers, dispatchers, and engine foremen.

Medical Department.

The only Medical Department item reported as being affected by labor difficulties is dental burs. A strike of several weeks' duration at Ransom & Randolph (Toledo, Ohio) caused this procurement lag.

Labor Relations.

Strikes affecting War Department procurement interests declined steadily from the first 2 weeks in November to the end of December 1944. Strike activities continued at a very low level during the first 10 days of 1945. The following chart presents in graphic form the fluctuation in men-days lost through strikes affecting War Department procurement during the 3 years 1942–44.

IMPACT OF EXPANDED ARMY SERVICE FORCES PROGRAMS ON LOCAL AREAS

Labor is relatively immoble and industrial facilities are concentrated in certain sections of the country. As a result, every sizable program expansion encounters labor supply problems which are localized in labor market areas and have little relationship to the relative abundance or scarcity of manpower within the entire country. At present, for example, the supply of actual and potential workers within the United States is unquestionably large enough to meet any foreseeable demand, but very serious labor shortage situations exist in particular areas. For that reason, existing manpower controls and effective programs for recruiting labor are local in nature. If the current and projected manpower problems which face Army Service Forces are to be shown clearly, it is necessary to look closely at local labor situations. These are unavoidably obscured by national manpower summaries. Therefore, the brief statements which follow outline the chief manpower difficulties which are now affecting or are expected to impede Army Service Forces procurement of critical items during the next 6 months.

AKRON, OHIO

Major Army Service Forces interest: Military tires, other rubber goods, shell loading.

This area, which includes the rubber capital of the world, also has a large Navy aircraft plant (Goodyear), one of the large heavy shell loading plants (Ravenna), and several foundries and machine shops. The tire plants have undertaken some expansions which will increase employment demands through the middle of 1945, but these manpower needs are not expected to be excessively large. The priority position given to tires in Akron has made increasingly difficult the manpower problems of other war plants engaged in the manufacture of other rubber goods, castings, tools, and the loading of shells. The Ravenna plant is faced with the additional difficulty of the commuting distance from the heavily populated center of Akron. Employment at the Goodyear aircraft plant, until recently scheduled to decline by more than 8,000 before July 1945, will be maintained at 22,000. This change in plan will greatly handicap recruitment for critical tire and shell-loading plants.

BUFFALO, N. Y.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Tires, iron and steel, electrical and ordnance plants, radar and wire.

Approximately 13,000 additional workers will be required by important plants in the Buffalo area during the next 6 months. This over-all demand will be substantially balanced by the release of workers from the Curtiss and Bell aircraft plants. However, there has been a consistent migration out of the area which, if continued, will result in a shortage of several thousand workers by July 1945. In order to obtain a balance of labor demand and supply, reduction of the present rate of out-migration appears to be essential.

At present the labor shortage in Buffalo plants engaged in must programs is estimated at 2,300; other important war-supporting industries, including transportation, are short an additional 6,000. Major new labor requirements involve the Chevrolet engine plant which will need an additional 4,500 workers in order to meet a new contract, and the Dunlop Tire & Rubber Co., which will require another 300 workers in order to increase its production by 30 percent.

CHICAGO, ILL.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Radio, radar and components, trucks, foundries, tanks, machine tools, heavy artillery, brass, meat packing and food processing.

Local labor supply continues to be inadequate to meet demands for skilled or common labor. Despite intensive recruitment efforts, employment is declining. Between 40,000 and 50,000 workers are currently needed to staff plants with expanding schedules and as replacements. Unfilled priority openings total nearly 17,000, a major part of which are for "must" production. Army Service Forces' plants are in a slightly better position than others, although foundries and other heavy industries are short of manpower. The indicated immediate prospects for the area are continued shortages in most plants now in need and increased work load.

The small-arms ammunition program will call for approximately 1,200 additional workers by June 1945. The numerous concerns producing for the Signal Corps in this major radar center lack more than 1,000 workers to meet production schedules. Competing with these and other Army Service Forces contractors are the manufacturers of aircraft and air engines who need thousands of workers for expansion and replacements. All of these labor demands increase the problem of providing workers for seasonal livestock runs through the meat-processing establishments in which the Quartermaster Corps has a predominant interest. The job of providing workers for expanding plants in the Chicago area is complicated by transportation difficulties encountered in moving workers from the population centers to the newer plants on the West Side.

CLEVELAND, OHIO

Major Army Service Forces interest: Trucks and truck components, machine tools, shells, small-arms ammunition, and dry-cell batteries.

In addition to the prime contracts which have been placed in the Cleveland area by the technical services and the Army Air Forces, the War Department is indirectly but vitally concerned with the huge volume of subcontracts for war goods in Cleveland plants. Most of the important manufacturers have suffered from the critical shortage of male labor which has existed in the area for many months. Particularly affected by the scarcity of male labor are machine-tool plants, foundries, and other metal-working establishments whose production is basic to the truck and combat-vehicle, aircraft, and shell programs. Although original plans for the expansion of aircraft production at the Fisher plants in Cleveland have been drastically curtailed in recent months, labor continues to be needed for subassembly activities in those plants and the production of air instruments and components by numerous concerns, including Jack & Heinz and Thompson Products. Two large dry-cell-battery plants—General Dry Batteries and National Carbon—continue with minor unfilled labor needs and a considerable replacement problem. White Motor Co. and various other firms engaged in the production of trucks or their components also have a serious continuing need for manpower, largely to provide replacements for separations. Expansion of the small arms and artillery ammunition programs will require increased employment in the Chase Brass & Copper plants.

The most difficult labor problems in Cleveland are associated with control of the volume of subcontracts placed in that area. Basically, it is necessary to make certain that subcontracts are related to the supply of labor available for war work. While labor is scarce, contracts which can be placed elsewhere must be kept out and prime contractors in Cleveland must subcontract within the area as widely as possible.

68175—45——28

DES MOINES, IOWA

Major Army Service Forces interest: Small-arms ammunition, military tires.

The expanding small-arms ammunition program will have a rather severe impact on the limited manpower resources of this area. The Des Moines ordnance plant is by far the dominant employer and the net increase in its labor requirements over the next 6 months will alone be larger than the combined current employment of the next three important employers. In addition, important increases will be required by several employers participating in the tire program. No compensatory decreases in employment are expected for other plants in the area.

DETROIT, MICH.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Trucks, tanks, brass, shells, foundries.

Despite a gradual improvement in the over-all labor supply situation in the Detroit area, production lags due to manpower shortages continue in a number of "must" plants, due primarily to the lack of certain types of skills. In mid-December, the Detroit office of the United States Employment Service had about 4,300 unfilled priority openings on file, of which some 2,500 were orders placed by facilities engaged in Army Service Forces programs. A total of 45 companies producing must items were reported to be behind schedule. Some of these plants, and the approximate number of workers needed immediately to bring them up to schedule, are listed below:

Name of facility	Item produced	Number of workers needed
Chrysler Corporation, project X100	Manhattan district	50
Dodge Corporation	Heavy trucks	146
Budd Wheel Co.	Heavy shells	575
Cadillac Division, General Motors Corporation	Tanks	153
Edward G. Budd Co.	Heavy trucks	500

Loosening of the over-all manpower situation has created a certain amount of local pressure for resumption of civilian production. Such pressure should be counteracted by utilizing Detroit's production potential to the full on expanding programs.

GARY, HAMMOND, SOUTH CHICAGO, IND. AND ILL.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Cast armor, basic steel, tanks, foundries, petroleum and coal products.

The Gary area has a reported current shortage of approximately 2,000 workers for "must" production. Recently announced ordnance expansions will place a further heavy demand upon the area. This demand is not expected to be offset by any reduction in production required for other war programs. Major firms include: Carnegie Illinois Steel Corporation, American Bridge Co., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., American Steel Foundry, Pullman Standard, Republic Steel Co., and Continental Foundry & Machine Co. The concentration of heavy industry in this area results in excessive demands for male labor and minimizes the extent to which females can be used to fill job vacancies.

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Radar, trucks and components, brass, dry cell batteries, penicillin, tires, foundries.

The Indianapolis area is rapidly becoming a major manpower bottleneck. Its present classification in group II does not adequately reflect the current serious shortage of both male and female workers and the fact that the more than 100 major establishments report increased labor demands totaling approximately 10,000 by June 1945. The largest requirements exist at Allison Engine Co., 1,300; R. C. A.-Victor, 500; International Harvester, 350; American Bearing, 350; Firestone, 300; and P. R. Mallory, 200. The impact of the expanding medium artillery ammunition program on several facilities in the area, principally Tokheim Oil Tank & Pump Co., will further aggravate the situation. An added problem is created by the high rate of turn-over characteristic of the entire area, which normally attracts a large number of workers from other States, especially from the South. Improvement of the housing situation and other measures designed to reduce turn-over and aid new recruitment are necessary to meet the labor requirements of the diversified industries of Indianapolis.

LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Port of embarkation and related activities, military tires, shell steel.

The Los Angeles labor shortage continues to be a serious one and affects such diverse programs of war interest as aircraft, aircraft parts, shipbuilding, tires, and Army and Navy installations. The current net shortage is approximately 25,000. The projected estimates of employment in the aircraft plants indicate a fairly constant level through June 1945 while in shipbuilding and ship repair there will be an estimated decline of approximately 7,000. The tire companies will be required to expand existing employment throughout this period.

In view of the steadily increasing rate of out-migration from the area and the high replacement needs for most of the war plants, the problem of staffing plants engaged in critical war industry in the area will remain acute throughout the first 6 months of 1945. The relatively lower wages of these facilities particularly difficult.

LOUISVILLE, KY.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Shells, shell loading, explosives, synthetic rubber.

This area, which consists of Louisville and adjacent portions of Kentucky and Indiana, is likely to become one of the major manpower trouble spots in the country. To meet increased Army and Navy rocket-powder requirements, a $30,000,000 facilities expansion was authorized for Indiana ordnance works, involving a need for 7,000 construction workers by April 1945 and 5,700 production workers by October 1945. Simultaneously, Hoosier ordnance plant was called upon to expand bag-loading operations in connection with the new medium artillery ammunition program. Only a small fraction of the labor requirements of these two ordnance facilities can be met locally in view of a decision on the part of the Army Air Forces to convert the Curtiss plant to B–29 modification, contrary to a previous announcement that this plant would be placed in stand-by condition and would release approximately 4,000 workers. Several other "must" plants also have additional labor needs, among them American Air Filter Co. and Tube Turns Co. Extensive interregional recruitment and use of foreign workers will be required to solve the problem, together with a greatly expanded program of housing and community facilities construction. Moreover, tighter controls than heretofore applied should be placed on nonessential and less-essential activities.

MADISON, WIS.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Dry-cell batteries, machine tools, and explosives.

This area, including Baraboo with the Badger ordnance works, continues short in manpower supply with strong competition for manpower distributed between Gisholt Machine Co., Oscar Mayer & Co., Wisconsin Foundry & Machine Co., Ray-O-Vac, and RMR Corporation. The latter company producing the RM cell battery has been forced to make a large but effective use of part-time workers. Recent developments have greatly increased ordnance requirements for double base powder which necessitated acceleration of facilities construction at Badger ordnance works and resultant additional construction-labor requirements. In December the contractor reported a shortage of some 1,800 construction workers of all categories. In the activated portions of Badger ordnance works, approximately 225 foreign workers are being used, with 400 more on order. Local satisfaction of Badger requirements with respect to both production and construction labor is not believed possible, and the very tight labor supply in this area will no doubt continue with lagging production of varying degrees of severity in the above plants.

MILWAUKEE, WIS.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Shell steel, bombs, truck components, machinery, Manhattan district foundries, and dry-cell batteries.

The larger part (60 to 70 percent) of current and anticipated labor demand in Milwaukee is for male workers able to perform arduous jobs. The available

supply, on the other hand, consists primarily of women. This situation has in the past and will continue to create serious difficulties in meeting expanding requirements of Army Service Forces. Due to previous rapid expansions, turnover has been and is high in most Milwaukee plants. There is a current general shortage of 3,000 to 4,000 workers (mostly male) in the area. Increased inmigration is not expected to solve the shortage problem because of the very tight housing situation. The use of prisoners of war is being considered in an effort to alleviate the manpower shortage at Signal Battery Co. Several hundred foreign workers, principally Jamaicans, have been assigned to local foundries and forges. Nevertheless, a number of critical plants are failing to meet production schedules because of labor shortage. Among these are Ladish Drop Forge Co., Heil Co., Chain Belt Co., and Bucyrus Erie Co.

NEWARK, N. J.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Radar, artillery shells, Chemical Warfare Service bombs, rockets, Office of Dependency Benefits, chemicals.

Numerous critical war-procurement programs have been seriously impeded by the continued shortages of both male and female labor in the Newark area. In recent months the available supply of labor in Newark has not even been sufficient to provide plants on "must" production with the workers needed for necessary expansion and replacements. Although the Navy Department has a predominant interest (shipbuilding) in the Newark area, so many important Army Service Forces contractors are located there that Army officers have initiated a community program designed to mobilize local leaders for action which must be taken if essential war work is to be completed on schedule.

Radar and other electrical equipment, the most important Army Service Forces interest in the area, involves 13 large plants and many smaller concerns, most of which have unmet labor needs. Ordnance producers with unfilled manpower requirements include the American Type Founders plant in Elizabeth (heavy shells and artillery components) and Unique Art Co. (Chemical Warfare Service bombs). The continuing sizable needs of the Office of Dependency Benefits for clerical workers comprise another important labor problem for Army Service Forces. No announcements have been made of cut-backs which will ease the manpower situation in Newark during the next 6 months; shipbuilding is expected to remain about at the present level.

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Small arms, small-arms ammunition, tires, wire, castings.

Although the supply of labor is roughly adequate to meet most urgent requirements, the situation is likely to deteriorate as expansion needs of the small-arms ammunition and tire programs become increasingly felt. The main pinch will affect the tire plants, which have always had difficulty in attracting an adequate supply of labor due to the unpleasant nature of the work. The present trend of accelerated out-migration further aggravates the problem. On the other hand, the problem of staffing the small-arms ammunition plant to the required level is not expected to be a serious one.

PHILADELPHIA, PA., AND CAMDEN, N. J.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Tires, radar, heavy artillery, trucks, shipbuilding, Army Service Forces installations, including Frankford Arsenal, Signal Corps and Quartermaster depots, rockets, textiles, rayon, fabric, bearings.

Production lags due to severe shortages of technical, skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled male workers continue in a number of plants, principally in the shipbuilding, machinery, ordnance, and iron and steel products industries. Replacements necessary for military-service withdrawals and for women leaving the labor market will intensify the present shortage. Employment expansion requirements and selective-service replacements will total approximately 32,000 by March 1945. Industries anticipating the largest needs are: Shipbuilding, 9,000; aircraft, 4,600; electric machinery, 2,400; Government establishments, 2,300; ordnance, 1,400; iron and steel products, 1,500; nonelectrical machinery, 1,900. There exists also an unapproved, unmet demand for 8,000 workers at the Philadelphia Navy Yard.

As of December 15, 1944, a total of 44 companies producing "must" items were reported behind schedule because of a shortage of manpower. Some of these plants as well as an estimate of the number of workers required immediately to bring them up to schedule, are listed below:

Name of facility	Item	Number of workers needed
E. G. Budd	Heavy shells	168
Heintz Manufacturing Co	Rockets, cannon	169
New York Shipbuilding Corporation	Ships	1,067
RCA-Victor	Radar	114
General Steel Castings Corporation	Foundries and forge shop	197
Sun Shipbuilding Co	Ships	1,160
Frankford Arsenal	Small-arms ammunition, shells, fire-control apparatus.	2,451
Autocar Co	Trucks	188

The needs of critical plants will have to be filled by an intensified program of transfers from less essential industries and by workers laid off as a result of contract cancelations. Success will depend to a large degree on effectiveness of new manpower controls.

PITTSBURGH, PA.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Heavy shell machining and forging, coal, iron, and steel machinery.

Demand for male workers exceeds local supply. Employment expansion needs and selective service replacements for the area will total approximately 16,100. The largest employment expansions are scheduled for the following industries: Iron and steel, 6,200; ordnance, 2,000; electrical and nonelectrical machinery, 1,100; interstate railroad transportation, 900; propellers, 600. Declining requirements in the shipbuilding industry will alleviate the situation only to a minor extent. It will be necessary to bring additional labor into the area and put more stress on reduction of labor turn-over. Bulk of demand is for unskilled male workers for steel mills and foundries, but all types of skilled and semiskilled machine shop and foundry workers and bituminous coal miners are also needed.

QUAD CITIES, ILL.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Rock Island Arsenal, storage batteries, ammunition containers, tank parts, and cast armor.

Rock Island Arsenal, one of the principal producers of recoil and breech mechanisms for the 105-millimeter howitzer, 155-millimeter gun and howitzer, and 8-inch gun, is not operating at capacity because of a current shortage of approximately 500 workers. By June 1945, the arsenal must recruit approximately 2,000 workers. Serious competition for available local labor is presented by the increasing demands of four large farm machinery producers located in the area. If the labor needs of Rock Island Arsenal are to be met, a substantial reduction of the employment ceilings of the farm machinery plants must be effected at an early date. Considerable labor requirements also exist at the Bettendorf plant of International Harvester and the Ordnance Foundry Co.; both of these establishments are involved in various aspects of the tank program.

RADFORD, VA.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Radford ordnance works, New River ordnance plant.

Radford ordnance works, producing smokeless powder, TNT, pentolite, has consistently posed one of the most difficult recruitment problems among the explosives plants. Located near a small community, this facility depends on inmigrants from adjacent areas for a large part of its labor force. Housing and transportation factors as well as the marginal quality of many of the new recruits has created an excessive turn-over rate. More intensive tapping of surplus labor available in nearby Roanoke is expected to result from a recent decision to recruit 950 Negroes in that area for employment in the Radford and New River plants. Nevertheless, the recent decision to expand bag-loading operations at New River ordnance plant will create a new problem of recruitment despite current efforts to subcontract part of the production of bags to less tight areas. Improved in-plant facilities are required to reduce turn-over and absenteeism rates, which are excessive, especially at Radford.

ST. LOUIS, MO.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Small-arms ammunition, bullet cores, explosives, Manhattan district project, foundries and forges, truck components.

No over-all labor shortage exists in St. Louis at present, but that portion of the area situated in western Illinois is short of workers because of transportation and racial factors. Increased production schedules, primarily for small-arms ammunition, will result in tightening the entire labor market considerably. Analysis of the three major Army Service Forces establishments (St. Louis Ordnance Plant, Western Cartridge Co., McQuay-Norris Core Plant) employing 26,000 workers on December 1, 1944, indicates an immediate demand for over 4,000 workers. By June 1945 approximately 9,500 additional workers will be needed by these plants. If this demand is to be met, a marked reduction of turn-over in war plants, transfer of workers from less essential establishments, and intensified recruitment of women will be required.

SPRINGFIELD AND DECATUR, ILL.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Manhattan district project, shell and bomb loading, Diesel engines for Corps of Engineers procured tractors, foundries.

Continued heavy requirements for all types of labor by several large Army Service Forces establishments, notably Garfield Division, Houdaille-Hershey (Manhattan district project), Sangamon ordnance plant, and Caterpillar Military Engine Co., as well as for a number of critical foundries and forges render the Springfield-Decatur area one of the tightest in the country. Sangamon ordnance plant alone will require approximately 3,000 additional workers by the middle of 1945. Virtually all Army Service Forces contractors in the area are behind production schedules. Drastic reduction of turn-over at some of the plants, especially at Sangamon, intensified recruitment of workers normally engaged in agriculture, provision of additional housing facilities to attract immigrants and improved transportation are required to solve the manpower problem in Springfield and Decatur.

TOLEDO, OHIO

Major Army Service Forces interest: Heavy shells, bullet cores, jeeps, machine tools, tank and truck components.

The expanding small-arms ammunition and heavy-shell programs will have an impact in this area. Of particular interest in this area are the sizable labor requirements of the Willys-Overland plants which are engaged in shell machining and forging and in the production of bullet cores, aircraft components, and jeeps. Factors which may ease the labor supply situation are the fact that the bullet core plant's large requirements will be mainly for women and the fact that an aircraft propeller plant has released a sizable number of workers. However, the general outlook in this diversified area, which is also a large center for various tank and truck components and machine tools, is still critical.

WATERBURY, CONN.

Major Army Service Forces interest: Several brass mills involved in the ammunition programs, mechanical time fuzes, rubber goods.

The impact of the expanded small arms and medium artillery ammunition program will further aggravate the tight labor supply situation in Waterbury. Major facilities in the area, among them Scovill Manufacturing Co. (fuzes, boosters, primers, case cups); Waterbury Rolling Mills (brass cups and strip); Lux Clock Co. (M103 fuze); Chase Brass & Copper Co. (brass cups and strip); American Brass Co. (brass strip), report a total immediate need for more than 2,600 workers. Intensified recruitment of commuters from adjacent rural areas and tight controls on turn-over are required to meet labor needs. The Army Service Forces area representative reports active cooperation of the local offices of all Government agencies in dealing with the problem.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the committee will be in session at 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 1:45 p. m., the committee adjourned until 10 a. m. the following day.)

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

The Committee on Military Affairs met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman), presiding.

Present: Representatives Thomason, Brooks, Sparkman, Kilday, Durham, Sheridan, Philbin, Stewart, Roe, Holifield, Winstead, Andrews, Arends, Clason, Martin, Harness, Fenton, J. Leroy Johnson of California, and Luce.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. This committee has been studying carefully and almost continuously the manpower subject for 2½ years. We had hearings that involved 1,068 pages, I believe it is, of testimony on what was known as the Austin-Wadsworth bill, which was really a bill for national service.

Then we had a subcommittee working here for months and months and months, with some of the ablest members of the committee on it. They made recommendations of what they thought ought to be done, to the Selective Service System.

Now, we have had hearings on this particular bill, at which we have heard representatives of the War and Navy Departments, Manpower Commission, Selective Service System, and the labor groups, and anybody else who wanted to be heard.

I think we have gone far enough with the hearings, and that the committee is well enough informed that they know what they want to do, can do, or should do.

I want to read into the record a communication from the President of the United States, received this morning.

I also wnat to read into the record a table taken from the records of the Labor Department, which shows the number of strikes that were conducted in the various months of the year, 1944, from January through October and shows the percentage of available working time and the workers involved by number, and other information, which can go into the record.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

Summary—strikes in February 1944

	Strikes beginning in month		Man-days idle during month (all strikes)	
	Number	Workers involved	Number	Percent of available working time
January 1944	330	110,000	625,000	0.08
February 1944	330	115,000	470,000	.06
March 1944	360	115,000	415,000	.06
April 1944	435	155,000	580,000	.08
May 1944	610	290,000	1,400,000	.19
June 1944	500	155,000	680,000	.09
July 1944	470	145,000	680,000	.09
August 1944	485	190,000	935,000	.12
September 1944	390	185,000	660,000	.09
October 1944	440	220,000	690,000	.09
Total	4,350	1,680,000	7,135,000	

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I want to read into the record the letter from the President of the United States. I imagine you have all read the letter, and it is published, and also letters from General Marshall, and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King. It can go into the record without reading.

(The letters referred to are as follows:)

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 17, 1945.

Hon. ANDREW J. MAY,
Chairman, House Military Affairs Committee.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN MAY: In my recent message on the state of the Union, I pointed out the urgent need of a national service law, and recommended that, pending action by the Congress on the broader aspects of national service, the Congress immediately enact legislation which will be effective in using the 4,000,000 men now classified in IV–F in whatever capacity is best for the war effort.

The urgent need of this legislation has not lessened but has increased since the sending of my message.

It is true that there has been a trend toward increased placement of manpower in the last 2 weeks, but there is danger that this trend, which was unquestionably due to the belief that Congress contemplated prompt action, will be reversed by reports now current in the press that congressional action is likel yto be delayed.

I am familiar with the provisions of H. R. 1119, on which hearings are now being held before your committee. While this bill is not a complete national service law, it will go far to secure the effective employment in the war effort of all registrants under the selective service law between the ages of 18 and 45.

While there may be some differences of opinion on the details of the bill, prompt action now is much more important in the war effort than the perfecting of detail.

As the United Nations enter upon a truly total offense against their enemies, it is vital that that total offense should not slacken because of any less than total utilization of our manpower on the home front.

I hope that you will impress upon the members of your committee, and that your committee will impress upon the Congress how important it is that action be taken without delay on H. R. 1119, so that news may go to our fighting men that they can go all out with confidence that they cannot exhaust the supplies we are sending them and that information may come to our enemies that there will be no slackening of our total offense until they lay down their arms.

I enclose copy of a letter signed by General Marshall and Admiral King which I have just received.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

JANUARY 16, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: As the agents directly responsible to you for the conduct of military operations, we feel that it is our duty to report to you the urgent necessity for immediate action to improve the siuation relative to the acute need for young and vigorous replacements for the Army and Navy and to provide the necessary manpower to increase the production of critical items of munitions, accelerate ship construction, and effect the rapid repair of damaged vessels.

Personnel losses sustained by the Army in the past 2 months have, by reason of the severity of the weather and the fighting on the European front, taxed the replacement system to the breaking point. The Army must provide 600,000 replacements for overseas theaters before June 30, and, together with the Navy, will require a total of 900,000 inductions by June 30. Losses or wastage in equipment due to the German offensive and winter fighting conditions must be made good, and there must also be provided the equipment for eight French divisions and for the accumulation of reserves in equipment which do not exist at the present time. It is estimated that 700,000 industrial workers must be added to the force producing Army and Navy munitions and to supporting industries in the next 6 months if our urgent needs are to be met.

The increased intensity of the operations in the Pacific, particularly the operations of the fleet in support of the Philippine operations, has resulted in extensive damage to naval vessels, many of which will require major repairs. Due to the over-all shortage of shipworkers, this increased repair load is already being reflected in a slow-down in the construction of new ships which have been counted on for future operations. New devices and weapons in production and ready for production require additional facilities and civilian labor. The fast tempo and increased damage has introduced demands for additional naval personnel in the way of replacements. Items of particular moment are replacements for casualties and war-fatigued men particularly pilots and crews for aircraft. The Navy also requires a considerable number of additional Medical Corps personnel.

Due to ever-increasing demands for the support of the large forces, Army and Navy, deployed overseas and for the minimum relief of liberated areas, the availability of shipping also presents problems calling for early solution. The building, repair, and manning of ships of the merchant marine require to be taken fully into account in the over-all military situation.

You are intimately familiar, Mr. President, with the great importance of regaining the offensive on the western front and pressing it, together with operations against the Japanese, with constantly increasing intensity in the months to come. To this end, therefore, we feel that the United States should make every conceivable effort to enable the armed forces to carry out your instructions.

G. C. MARSHALL, *Chief of Staff.*
E. J. KING, *Chief of Naval Operations.*

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Sanders just handed me a document that he promised to furnish yesterday. That will go into the record.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

MEMORANDUM—MANPOWER SHORTAGES

1. Cut-backs frequently do not release manpower at the point where it is needed for other war production. Sometimes the cut-back releases workers in a plant who cannot be used on other war production in that same plant. For example, one plant making tanks and packaging ammunition laid off 544 workers when the ammunition contract was completed because they were mostly women who could not be used on tank construction. Another plant laid off 159 workers who had been on aircraft-engine parts when this contract was cut back, all having been first offered work on tank construction which they did not take.

Frequently there is urgent need for manpower in other localities than where the cut-back has been made, but the workers do not move to the new jobs. In one case they refused critical jobs at a town 40 miles from the town where the cut-back had been made.

2. There are additional causes besides manpower shortage involved in failure to reach production objectives, but the situation requires the remedying of all of these, and the manpower situation cannot be left as it is simply because there are other defects to be remedied. All of the other defects have been under remedial measures that started long before the manpower question was critical,

and much progress has been made. Much of future progress in these matters is dependent upon remedying manpower troubles, since they are a limiting factor in improving the other items.

Shortages of materials has been reduced to a minimum. Efficiency in the use of labor has, on the average, been brought to a point that is close to the attainable until turn-over and absenteesim are brought down to reasonable amounts. For example, at the start it required 1,100,000 man-hours to build a Liberty ship. In yard after yard this was reduced to 350,000 to 400,000 hours. On medium bombers the time was, step by step, reduced from an original estimate of 45,000 man-hours on assembly line production to 13,000 hours.

3. Other inefficiencies in operations, that critical surveys reveal, are normal to manufacturing operations at all times, peace or war. No one has yet discovered a means of operating a business at 100 percent efficiency and remaining solvent; overhead for supervision becomes excessive and more than eats up all savings.

4. A major factor in the inability to get manpower where needed when needed is the high resistance shown by workers to moving from permanent jobs in non-essential work into war jobs. Trades, services, etc., which should have shown a substantial decrease in employment during the war have maintained almost their full peacetime number of employees, and there are now some 11,300,000 people employed in these fields.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us turn to another matter. Colonel Keesling is here to make a further brief statement to the committee; all right, Colonel.

FURTHER STATEMENT OF COL. FRANCIS V. KEESLING, JR., SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM

Colonel KEESLING. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the testimony of Mr. Hines, representing the A. F. L., Mr. Murray, representing the C. I. O.; and the four C. I. O. officials at the hearings before this committee on Monday and Tuesday of this week, appeared to be in no way inconsistent with the provisions of this bill, H. R. 1119. As a matter of fact, the bill expressly provides for the remedy they suggested, namely, a joint conference attended by representatives of management, labor, agriculture, and Government before the use of any compulsion. "Agriculture" could be written in there, in that provision of the bill, on page 2.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel KEESLING. As requested by the C. I. O. and the A. F. L., such meetings would be held by the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, whose office has been established by Congress. Only after such conferences definitely disclose that manpower shortages exist which cannot be promptly filled by voluntary recruitment, on the part of labor, management, agriculture, and the manpower agencies of Government, would the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion take the steps necessary to have selective service local boards prevail upon the specific number of the right kind of deferred registrants to respond voluntarily.

There are, therefore, not one but two opportunities given for volunteering: (1) By the usual processes of labor; management, agriculture, and the manpower agencies of the Government; and (2) by the selective service local boards.

All those who voluntarily respond to either the first or the second voluntary programs will not be affected by this bill. Their patriotism will, however, be protected by providing a penalty for those unpatriotic persons who do not respond voluntarily.

According to Mr. Murray and Mr. Hines, apparently no such joint meetings have as yet been held which met with their satisfaction. This bill, as I said before, insures the holding of the type of meetings they have specifically pleaded for. It also insures the maximum use of existing voluntary methods, plus an extension of such procedures before any compulsion is utilized.

Contrary to certain misconceptions I have heard expressed recently by persons who apparently are not entirely familiar with the provisions of the bill, which not only include the labor representatives but also Mr. Crawford, of the N. A. M., who testified that he had not read the bill, although his testimony favoring work or fight principles was substantially in accordance with the provisions of the bill——

Mr. HARNESS. That is a matter of conclusion, Mr. Chairman.

Colonel KEESLING. On that point, Mr. Harness, let me refer to the transcript covering Mr. Crawford's testimony. The portion of it in point reads as follows:

Mr. CRAWFORD. We emphatically endorse the immediate application of the work or fight principle but believe that no additional legislation is required to accomplish this objective and that it should be made effective immediately within the present framework of the selective-service authority and machinery.

A committee member told Mr. Crawford that those views were in complete accord with the purpose of H. R. 1119, and asked:

Mr. Crawford, have you read the specific bill that we are considering, H. R. 1119?

To which Mr. Crawford replied:

No; I must say that I have not studied it.

Contrary to certain misconceptions, I have heard expressed recently by persons who apparently are not sufficiently familiar with the provisions of this bill, H. R. 1119, including Mr. Crawford, there is nothing in the bill which would abolish the existing labor, management, agriculture, and Government committees. I am particularly familiar with the San Francisco area committees. Many of the labor, management, agriculture, and Government members of those committees are close friends of mine. They have been doing the best they could with the means provided them thus far. With the additional means recently provided them administratively by Selective Service at the request of Justice Byrnes, and with the additional assistance which this bill will provide them, but only when, where, and if necessary, most of the detrimental effects of uncontrolled turn-over and many of the situations described at length yesterday and the day before yesterday by representatives of labor organizations, will be corrected.

I have here a summary of the detrimental effects of uncontrolled turn-over, which I will not read but which you may desire to have inserted in the record at this point. It includes hoarding, inefficiency from use of green personnel in large numbers, aggravation of the situation in congested areas, and many other things.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you can let that go right into the record.

(The material referred to is as follows:)

The curtailment of turn-over will, in my opinion, remove one of the greatest, if not the greatest, obstacles and handicaps which have been permitted to remain in the paths of labor and management for over 3 years. The degree to which war production has been successful is a great tribute to labor and management, there is no question about that, but in performing their work they have been faced with

all of the detrimental results of uncontrolled turn-over, as Selective Service has been. Some of these detrimental results which are not commonly attributed to turn-over have been as follows:

1. Farms were stripped of farm labor in 1942, which was corrected only by enactment of the second portion of the Tydings amendment and the knowledge that farms had been so stripped that by returning to the farms under, not a blanket test for deferment, but an actual irreplaceable test, men knew they would have more chance for deferment by going back to the farms than remaining in industry.

2. Retention by management of recruiting personnel and training personnel in order to obtain and train replacements in an endeavor to fill vacancies caused by those shifting from job to job. If turn-over had been curtailed, this trained personnel could have been used in the plant, not for instructing purposes, but for actual purposes, or could have been released for war work elsewhere, to say nothing of the increased cost that retention of such personnel has added to the over-all cost of war production and the national debt.

3. With the high rate of turn-over it has been necessary to use more persons to do the same job that could have been done by less personnel if stabilized and trained. Use of inexperienced personnel caused great inefficiency and more chance for accidents and errors, resulting in loss of life and defective equipment. It has been a waste of manpower and has increased the cost of war production in addition to preventing maximum utilization of manpower and machinery. How can any expert or anybody else talk about utilizing manpower when labor and management have been faced with the terrific rate of turn-over each month and over 6 months or a year period? You can't have maximum utilization under such circumstances.

4. Hoarding, for which management has been criticized, was under the circumstance, a "must" so far as they were concerned. Recognizing that they would lose persons every day because turn-over had not been curtailed, management necessarily had to have a reserve pool of hoarded labor either already trained or in process of training so that they would be available to fill the vacancies caused by personnel shifting to more attractive war jobs or permanent peacetime jobs.

5. The extent to which shortages of manpower have prevented the armed forces and the War Production Board from increasing the amounts and time schedules of certain war production items is, of course, attributable in a large part to uncontrolled turn-over. This is true because, according to Mr. Krug's testimony last week, the schedules are fixed not on a needs basis but on the amount of production which can be obtained in a certain time after making due allowance for all of the existing shortcomings.

These shortcomings include manpower shortages caused by turn-over. It is obvious, of course, that the Army and Navy cannot fix grand strategy and war plans on the basis of the amount of war production they feel should be produced by certain times, but which under the existing circumstances will not be produced. This is true even though they feel such production could be obtained under a proper program properly administered. They must, of course, take the practical slant and fix their grand strategy on the basis of what they will actually get under existing circumstances. By stopping turn-over, the manpower situation will be tremendously improved, and schedules fixed at below the actual volume of production needed by the armed forces can be stepped up. This will permit the program of the war to be speeded up to the maximum.

6. With turn-over uncontrolled, persons have been free to shift at will from place to place, from State to State, and from region to region throughout the Nation. Of course, this has resulted in unnecessary congestion of transportation, of housing, and of all other facilities such as laundries, restaurants, and others. With turn-over controlled, transportation congestion, housing congestion, and other congestions will be tremendously improved.

In addition to these other detrimental effects of uncontrolled turn-over, turn-over has disrupted selective-service operations and inductions continually during the 4 years we have been in operation, particularly during the 3 years since we have been in war. As industry and agriculture lost so many men from uncontrolled turn-over, pressure was put upon Selective Service to liberalize its occupational deferment policies and to leave men in industry and agriculture beyond a reasonable period of time within which replacements should and would have been obtained had turn-over from other causes been curtailed. This required our deferring and passing over young, physically qualified men, and inducting married men and fathers in their stead, ahead of time. The confusion that has been caused to registrants, employers, and the public by reason of the periodical and continual changes in Selective Service policies can be traced almost entirely to failure to control turn-over, for it has obviously caused us to "back and fill" in our endeavors to go back and pick up the young single men and other physically qualified men whom we have passed over. This is necessary, not only from the standpoint of the morale of men already in the armed forces, for they are willing to wait a reasonable period of time for persons of the same status to take their proper places, but it also affects the morale of the men themselves, the men who have been deferred. Selective Service has told these deferred men who are physically qualified that they have no choice in the matter, that they can't leave the plant to go into the armed forces, that it is their patriotic duty to stay in the plant until Selective Service determines that there is a replacement not only capable of replacing but also ready and willing, as well as capable, to serve as a replacement. The mere fact that you have thousands of IV–F's in nonessential work, thousands of older men in nonessential work, women who are capable and have the ability to be replacements, so long as nothing is done either to stop turn-over or to get these people on a selective program in as replacements. Selective Service has been forced, necessarily, in order to protect war production, to defer the type of fellow who is needed by the armed forces, and induct a fellow that the Army can't use as well, and who should remain in the civilian economy and in the war plant, to the disruption of the civilian economy, the men themselves, and the armed forces.

Colonel KEESLING. One of the labor representatives of the C. I. O., Mr. Leo Jandreau, general vice president, United Electrical and Radio Machine Workers of America, with a membership of 700,000, who appeared here, was testifying on the lack of utilization within plants and other war-production matters. When he was asked questions concerning the bill, he indicated that he believed there was no need for legislation because they already had authority under the Selective Service Act to put a man in the Army in case he did not do what he should, that is, either stay where he was unless he obtained local board approval, or shift from nonessential to war work if asked to do so by his local board. As it turned out, he was, in my opinion, one of the best advocates for the bill. It developed that he is local board chairman who believes in work or fight principles and has already been applying them, administratively. There is, therefore, no difference in principle between his program and the one contained in H. R. 1119. H. R. 1119 merely gives legislative authority to the work-or-fight program, thereby removing all doubt as to its being able to be put into effect administratively.

Questions have been raised concerning whether or not there is more turn-over among IV–F's than among men classified in class 2, deferred by reason of their occupation.

Last July I proceeded to the San Francisco area where I discussed that and other manpower matters with representatives of labor, management, agriculture, and Government. I have here the records and reports from that investigation, which I shall keep available for use of this committee.

Mr. THOMASON. So we will be sure it is in this record, how many IV–F's are there?

Colonel KEESLING. Between the ages of 18 and 38, there are approximately 3,500,000.

Mr. THOMASON. All right. How many in the next group, that is, 38 to 45?

Colonel KEESLING. We do not have them between 38 and 45, they are all in one classification.

Mr. THOMASON. How many of them are engaged in essential war work?

Colonel KEESLING. In addition to the 3,500,000, there are 1,000,000 who have been physically examined and rejected, who are in the II–A (F), II–B (F), or II–C (F) classifications.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, I do not understand that. Let us get this straightened out.

Mr. THOMASON. Just give me a little time.

Mr. HARNESS. Have him repeat the figures.

Mr. THOMASON. How many IV–F's are there between 18 and 45?

Colonel KEESLING. This chart, the top part of it, shows a breakdown by ages of the approximately 3,500,000 IV–F's. It discloses that of those 18 to 26, there are 1,363,000; 26 to 30, 710,000; and 30 to 38, 1,508,000.

Mr. THOMASON. How many between 38 and 45?

Colonel KEESLING. The 38 to 45's are all lumped together in one classification now, IV–A, and there are 7,000,000 in that group, total.

Mr. THOMASON. All right. Let us go right back and be specific to get through with this. How many IV–F's between 18 and 26 are engaged in essential war work?

Colonel KEESLING. Following the recommendation of the committee, early this spring, rather than last year as stated by Colonel Sanders, the Selective Service established classes II–A, B, C, with an "F" after each.

Mr. THOMASON. What are they?

Colonel KEESLING. In those classifications——

Mr. THOMASON. No; tell us what is II–A (F), II–B (F), II–C (F)?

Colonel KEESLING. The classifications II–A (F), II–B (F), and II–C (F) are those who have already been examined and rejected, and who also meet the requirements for occupational deferment for men of their rejected status.

Mr. THOMASON. What I want to be sure to have in this record very clearly is how many IV–F's there are, and how many of those are now, approximately, engaged in essential war work. This is necessary in order that we may determine how many of them are not in essential war work, so we may know how to legislate about it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMASON. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I think the misunderstanding comes from this: We, in our minds, classify everybody who has been physically rejected, as IV–F's; when, as a matter of fact, Selective Service does not have them all classified in IV–F. They have them classified as II–A (F), II–B (F), II–C (F), and IV–F.

Now, Colonel, what I think we ought to have, without going into anything else, is to take, first, II–A (F). Tell what II–A (F) includes, and the number in that classification. Then take II–B (F), then II–C (F), then IV–F.

Mr. THOMASON. That is exactly what I was trying to get him to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. THOMASON. Can you supply that for the record?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes.

Mr. THOMASON. All right, let us have the full facts.

Mr. BROOKS. Before he goes ahead, I would like to ask if there is any duplication of the II–A (F)'s and the IV–F's on both classifications.

Colonel KEESLING. No; here are your totals.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us not get away from our other question.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, he has that all down there if you will give him a chance.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I am trying to do. You have heard Mr. Sparkman's question, now give us a direct answer.

Colonel KEESLING. We have lumped classes II–A and II–B together because they are all the men who are occupationally deferred, other than farmers. There are, in class II–A (F) and class II–B (F) 850,000. They are the men who are entitled to deferment for two reasons. One, by reason of their physical status, and two, by reason of their occupation.

Mr. HARNESS. You do not know how many of each?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, wait a minute. Give the other groups.

Colonel KEESLING. In class II–C(F), there are 125,000. Those are the men who are deferred by reason of their physical status and also by reason of being farm workers.

They got into those Class II–F classifications in one of several ways. Either they were originally in class IV–F, and got into essential work, in which case their employer could ask for reclassification, or the individual could ask for reclassification, so that he could put his chest out a little bit further and say, "I am not merely a IV–F, I am also occupationally deferred. I am doing my part in the war effort." That was what the committee asked us to do and we did it.

There are 4,250,000 men in class II–A and class II–B, and there are 1,500,000 men in II–C, most of whom have never been given a physical examination.

Mrs. LUCE. You said 125,000?

Colonel KEESLING. That was in II–C(F). But in the II–C, these men have not been given a physical examination, for the most part. That means that in getting these 750,000 men for the armed forces, when we send up men on a selective basis for preinduction physical examination, some 40 to 50 percent of the total, of the 4,250,000 and the 1,500,000 are going to be physically rejected.

When they are physically rejected, they then can have a choice of, one, either going into IV–F, or going back into II–A, B, or CF designation, depending upon whether they fail to return to the farm or war plant where they had been working and go to some other work, or whether they go back to the farm or the war plant.

The test for a II–A(F), II–B(F), II–C(F) designation is much more liberal that the occupational test for a straight class II–A, II–B, or II–C classification.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel.

Colonel KEESLING. There are seven to eight million persons between the ages of 18 and 38 who either have already been examined or rejected for military service or not having as yet been examined would be rejected for military service upon being given an examination. Adding the 7,000,000 38–45's to that gives us 14,000,000 to 15,000,000 men 18–45 who are not qualified for military service and are free to do as they please unless "work or fight" or other controls are placed over them.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, it seems to me that the only thing we need to have added, which has already been stated by you, is that of the IV–F classification, of which there are approximately three and a half million.

The thing that is bothering a good many members of this committee is whether or not a substantial part of that three and a half million is engaged in war work, which would entitled them to a II–A, II–B, or II–C classification if they applied for it.

Colonel KEESLING. As of today, there is no one but the individual selective service board who could give you the exact information on that. But, now that this legislation is being talked about, and now that we have had recent administrative action by Selective Service and the armed forces at Justice Byrnes' request, any of the 3,500,000 who are in that group and who are actually engaged in war effort work, but whose employers, or who themselves have not requested a classification into this occupationally deferred class, are going to be doing it awfully fast. Our regulations provide for such reclassifications upon request and employers and registrants have a duty to keep the local boards informed of changes in status, address, and so forth. Our records should reflect the effect of any requests for reclassification the next time we make a monthly report to you.

Mr. HARNESS. Of the 3,500,000 IV–F's, it is merely an assumption that they are not in war industry, is it not?

Colonel KEESLING. The answer is categorically "Yes," but explaining the answer, the only reason that a person would be in class IV–F and not in II–A (F), II–B (F), II–C (F), if he were in essential work, would be that he has not requested reclassification.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, how do you know that they have asked for it? You do not know whether they are in industry or whether they are not?

Colonel KEESLING. Some may have believed that there was no need for them to have a II–A (F), II–B (F), II–C (F) designation rather than a IV–F designation, because there was no control being exercised over the IV–F's. Presumably all of the 3,500,000 are in nonessential work because under the regulations they should have requested reclassification from IV–F into II–A (F), II–B (F), or II–C (F) if they were in essential work. However, Mr. Chairman, there are no doubt some o fthe 3,500,000 men who are in war work, and whose employers will, in the near future request a class II–A (F), II–B (F), or II–C (F) designation in order to keep them out of the operations of this bill.

Mr. HARNESS. All right, will you further state that, so far as you know, there are none of these 3,500,000 not in war industry? Do you understand what I mean?

Colonel KEESLING. I get your question, but it is common knowledge, and I know of my own knowledge, that many 18 to 38's who are IV–F's are not in war work.

Mr. HARNESS. Can you give the number to us?

Colonel KEESLING. I cannot give you the exact number now, sir. I believe that in our next report, we will see a change in the statistics as a result of employers requesting the II–A (F), B (F), and C (F) designations. Any local board in any area within a very short time can give us this information because they now have, or will very soon have, the basis for that information in their files. Every registrant is dutybound, under penalty of a $10,000 fine and a 5-year jail sentence, to keep his local board notified of change in address, change in occupation, or any other change in status. Maybe some have not been doing it because they felt there was no need to do it because as IV–F's they have been out of the picture so far. But, with the talk of this legislation, I have seen in the newspapers, and elsewhere, where they are saying, "It is assumed that the employers and the individual are without delay going to request reclassifications for essential IV–F's into II–A (F), B (F), and C (F)."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Brooks, do you have a question?

Mr. BROOKS. I want to renew my question there, Mr. Chairman. In your category of IV–F's, do you include any of these who are characterized as II–A, II–B, II–C. II–A (F), II–B (F), II–C (F) or any of those categories? Do you duplicate them?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir, the grand total of the II–A (F), II–B (F) and II–C (F)'s and the IV–F's is about 4,500,000, and splitting them, there are about 1,000,000 in the II–A, B, C (F's) and 3,500,000 in the IV–F's.

Mrs. LUCE. In reference to Mr. Harness' question of you, namely:

> Colonel, is it not true that all this bill does is to find out how many there are under the IV–F classification who are not in industry, and exercise some control over them?

This bill does a great deal more than that, does it not?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; it applies to 18,000,000 deferred registrants between the ages of 18 and 45; and in further answer to that question, this bill provides and requires that such an inventory as we are speaking about here be made forthwith. Commencing on line 16 of the bill, it says, "The Director of Selective Service shall maintain an inventory of all deferred registrants——"

Mrs. LUCE. Let me interrupt you there. Refer back to the question of whether that is all this bill does. It does a great deal more. It keeps all categories.

Mr. HARNESS. Pardon me for interrupting, but I did not ask that. I did not assume that.

Mrs. LUCE. That was your question to him, Mr. Harness; if you would read it back, you would find that to be true.

Mr. HARNESS. I made the statement that this bill revolved around this 4,000,000 IV–F group.

Mrs. LUCE. What you said was, "Is it not true that all this bill does——"

Mr. HARNESS. If that is what I said, it was not what I meant. It covers much more than the IV–F's.

Mrs. LUCE. Yes; excuse me.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, Mrs. Luce?

Mrs. LUCE. No, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. The other day, Colonel, you mentioned the fact that this group, which you were trying to get, who are in nonessential occupations, only consisted of 425,000, did you not? So all we are talking about is that little group; is that not correct?

Colonel KEESLING. Whatever the number is that they are going to need, that will be the ultimate number that you are going to have to apply the bill to, but only to the extent they can't be recruited by labor, management, agriculture, and Government agencies.

68175—45——29

Mr. JOHNSON. I thought you said there were 425,000 known IV–F's who were not engaged in war work.

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; I never made that statement.

Mr. HARNESS. That is just the point. He does not know how many are in or how many are out.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Andrews, do you have any questions?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to ask a few questions.

Colonel Keesling, as I understand it, what we want to know is: We want you to go out of here this morning and get hold of one of your chart makers and come in here with a picture of all men who are included in this bill up to 45. Bring that on a chart, the whole business, with figures, one class of IV–F's; break that down into all the classifications up to 38.

Now, I am not asking you to show me what you have there, because you do not have it.

First, the 3,500,000 broken down into these classifications, and a brief memorandum under each one saying exactly why they were put in there.

Then what I am particularly interested in are these men over 38, because the bill runs from 38 to 45, which is your biggest pool, 7,000,000 men. If you do not know the answers to these, make a guess, and say it is a guess. Lord knows, Selective Service ought to be able to guess better than anybody else on any of these classifications. But make it definite, and say that these are the figures, that it is a guess, and do the same thing on 38 to 45. Is that clear? That is what I want.

Now, there is one other thing I would like to ask. This bill, H. R. 1119, is, in effect, a National Service Act, for all men between 18 and 45, and excluding women, is that not correct?

Colonel KEESLING. It is a certain variety of National Service Act, but with a prescribed procedure for operating under it and also with definite restrictions and safeguards.

Mr. ANDREWS. Now, assuming that we are going to pass out of the committee a bill of this description and assuming that the majority of the committee are against military compulsion, that, in other words, we would take the alternative, which is civilian penalties; take H. R. 1119, just as it is and assume we are going to have civilian penalties; then it is virtually the same as the so-called Wadsworth-Austin bill for national service between 18 and 45. You must admit, and any intelligent person will, that H. R. 1119 is completely half-baked, does not go anywhere near the picture, provides none of the material that, after thoughtful and mature consideration, was incorporated in the Austin-Wadsworth bill, such as the question of maximum hours, labor unions, right to join labor unions, open shop, closed shop, exclusions from the provisions of national service, registration of qualifications of the workers, survey of needs, call for volunteers, obligations under the act, travel, if moved from one town to another, housing provisions, regulation of selective service workers and assignment of workers, assignment to selective service boards of industrial labor experts on loads, and so on.

You cannot tell me, if my assumption is right, that H. R. 1119 is not a half-baked potato and it leaves everything in such a situation that it will be a completely wild scramble. What do you say to my statement?

Colonel KEESLING. I do not think it would be a completely wild scramble. It does not contemplate setting up any organization that is not already in existence, and I believe it can be put into operation forthwith.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, if I say we are going to pass another bill, like this one, but that has the stuff in it that any sound man would put in it, what would your objection be?

The CHAIRMAN. Well now, I am ruling that your question is improper, because this committee has passed on national service at one time, and it was then in its outright malignant form.

Mr. ANDREWS. The President is asking for it again.

The CHAIRMAN. He is not now.

Mr. ANDREWS. He said, in his office, he would take all he could get and be glad to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is getting the answer for you. You can answer it Colonel, and then we will be through with that.

Colonel KEESLING. It is my opinion that the President said he desired this legislation without major amendment because he believed that it would pass promptly and would help to do the job, and it is my personal opinion that if the broader form had a chance of getting through without controversy, promptly, then we should have that type of legislation, provided you put in the safeguards of operation that you have in this bill.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arends, do you have any questions?

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Andrews asked the first question that I had in mind. The second one is, would it not be possible for all these IV–F's to be reexamined and then the local draft boards could find out if they are in essential occupations or not, and then instruct them to get into essential occupations?

Colonel KEESLING. That is exactly the purpose of this bill, sir.

Mr. ARENDS. That is right.

Colonel KEESLING. And the local boards already have most of that information in their files. It is merely a question of our going to the boards to ask them for it when and where necessary.

Mr. ARENDS. All right. Let me ask you one other question.

Mr. FENTON. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. ARENDS. Yes.

Mr. FENTON. This reexamination of those men that you refer to pertains to not only whether they are in occupations, but whether they are really physically disabled?

Mr. ARENDS. Yes; that is right. And the other thing, of course, is, the board cannot force them to go into essential occupations now even if they find out they are not.

Colonel KEESLING. There is a doubt. Judge Patterson raised the question on account of the Elston amendment, which says you cannot induct groups of persons because of their occupation.

Mr. ARENDS. Have you sent out instructions to the draft boards, as to the possible drafting of able-bodied farmers, to change the procedure that has been followed up until recently?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir. It is my understanding that the first part of the Tydings amendment is still in complete effect. What the

general did was to send out an expression of opinion of the President. Justice Byrnes sent to General Hershey a letter, in which he stated that the President had determined that it was more essential to the war effort for able-bodied farmers under 26 to be in the armed forces than on the farms. General Hershey sent along to the local boards that expression of opinion, and said that this was an opinion which they would have with them when they were considering whether the individual farm worker met the four tests of the Tydings amendment namely, whether he was necessary to and regularly engaged in an agricultural occupation or endeavor essential to the war effort and was irreplaceable. .

Mr. ARENDS. In other words, the suggestion from the President, then, has made the local boards change their attitudes on some young farmers under 26 because they are all beginning to take them now, as we all know.

Colonel KEESLING. It would be a question of the local boards taking into consideration an expression of the President.

Mr. ARENDS. But not directed by Selective Service to do so?

Colonel KEESLING. No; we have merely sent it along as in times past when we have sent information along from, first, the O. P. M., or War Food, or any of the agencies of the Government, exactly the same as these essential lists from the War Manpower Commission are sent along. They are merely evidence for the local boards to consider in making their determinations.

Mr. ARENDS. That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ARENDS. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. On this point, according to the provisions of H. R. 1119, assuming that what you say is true, that that was a Presidential expression that you passed on, not in the form of a regulation under this bill, the way I read this bill the selective-service board would be obliged to send along a replacement to that farmer. Would he, under H. R. 1119?

Colonel KEESLING. That is exactly the point I would like to bring out here in answer to some of the questions. There are two things: One, if you do not pass this bill there is no way of getting replacements that I know of, for the men who are going to be taken off by the local boards even under the Tydings amendment.

Mr. ANDREWS. There is a provision in the National Service Act to the effect that he could not be taken until replacement was made.

Mr. THOMASON. Does this bill repeal or in any way amend the Tydings amendment?

Colonel KEESLING. In its present form, this does not in any way amend the first portion of the Tydings amendment.

Mr. THOMASON. That answers my question.

Colonel KEESLING. Actually, it is my recommendation that the introduction to the bill be amended so as to repeal the "work or fight" proviso of the Tydings amendment and substitute a broader "work or fight" provision. But that would not effect the part of the Tydings amendment you have been talking about.

Mr. THOMASON. Let us get right down to the point. Then is it still left to the discretion of the local boards, as to whether or not a man who is essential on a farm shall be inducted?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. This bill in no way, in my opinion, affects that.

Mr. THOMASON. What is that?

Colonel KEESLING. This bill, in my opinion, in no way detracts from that, but actually will aid the farm situation by furnishing replacements for those men who are taken off, which replacements will be from among the IV–F's and older men who left the farms because the "work or fight" proviso of the Tydings amendment wasn't applied to them. The Army wouldn't induct the IV–E's or 38–45 farm jumper without legislative authority curtailing his benefits.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. ARENDS. Just a minute. I suggest, Marvin Jones should come up here and clarify this. Let us get him up here and see how we are going to do this thing, because in the draft board's uncertain position today, these young men are actually being drafted under 26 years who are doing twice the work that replacements might do, because replacements are not physically fit to do the job.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I want to ask you this, Colonel, was it the policy of Selective Service to appeal all form deferments and drafts?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. Was that not a matter of practice, to appeal every deferment in the farm areas?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir.

Mr. BROOKS. I submitted a list to you of everyone that I could find, and I understood Selective Service to tell me that you were appealing all of them.

Colonel KEESLING. That may be true in some instances, but I do not believe that you will find that is true throughout the country.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I think there were 47 in the list that I submitted to you, and directions had gone out from the Selective Service to appeal every farm deferment. But that is not correct, is it?

Colonel KEESLING. Not throughout the country; no, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. How about in certain areas of the country?

Colonel KEESLING. It may be, sir, I am not familiar with that.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Can you say the same for industry? Do you take the same appeals?

Colonel KEESLING. There are appeals being taken for industry. As a matter of fact, we have been so stringent on the men under 26 in the class II–A and class II–B classifications, that there are only 100,000 men now under 26 in the II–A and II–B classifications. That includes 60,000 who are in the merchant marine, which leaves 40,000 distributed among the Government agencies, the doctors, the medical students, all the technical people, and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harness, do you have any questions?

Mr. HARNESS. I would like to ask the colonel a question. Mr. Thomason asked you a while ago whether or not, in your opinion, this H. R. 1119, in any way repealed or affected the Tydings amendment of the Selective Service Act, and you said it did not. Well, now, this gives the power to the Director of Selective Service and not to the draft board, does it not?

Colonel KEESLING. In what respect, sir?

Mr. HARNESS. On page 2, line 16—

the Director of Selective Service shall maintain an inventory—

and so forth, and then over on page 3, line 5—

the Director of Selective Service shall call upon such local boards in such area and outside the area if he deems it in the national interest to request their registrants within the categories so designated to become employed in such plants or activity, and any such registrant who fails shall be punished according to the Act.

Now, do you mean to say that leaves it entirely within the discretion of the local boards?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; because you have down in lines 14 to 17 on page 3:

Unless such registrant is found by a selective service local board subject to appeal in accordance with 10–A (2) to have had a just reason for not being so employed.

In addition to that, sir, the only time that this part of the bill would come into effect would be after Justice Byrnes had had a meeting with labor, management, agriculture, and Government, and determined that there was no way that they could handle the job with existing machinery.

Mr. HARNESS. And you know that the selective-service boards in 50 percent, and perhaps in a greater percentage, of cases follow the advice and suggestion of the Director of Selective Service and the State director?

Colonel KEESLING. Well, if that be true now, this is not going to change the situation, sir. But I do not think that that is entirely true. Our experience does not show that the local boards have not decided the cases themselves.

Mr. HARNESS. This completely repeals and supersedes, then, the Tydings amendment.

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; it is not intended to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sparkman, do you have a question?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I just want to ask you two questions, Colonel. Now, as I understand it, under this bill, farming is considered an essential occupation just like any other war industry; is that true?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; provided the tests of the Tydings amendment are met and probably on even a more liberal basis.

Mr. SPARKMAN. All right. A great many complaints that I have had with reference to farm labor have been directed toward a failure of IV–F's, after being classified IV–F, to return to the farms. Now, it is your contention, as I understand, that this legislation will be helpful to the farm situation because it will tend to turn a great many of those IV–F's, who came originally off the farm, back to the farm?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clason, do you have a question?

Mr. CLASON. Yes. But those IV–F's who are already in essential industry, you would not take them away from essential industry at this point and create a difficulty there in order to put them on the farms, would you?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; it would be a matter of comparable necessity.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, unless the person is placed in a IV–F category, hereafter it is not going to have any effect on that situation at all, is it?

Colonel KEESLING. It will have the effect of causing some of these IV–F farm workers and over-age farm workers, who left the farms and went into nonessential industry, to get back on the farms. And there are many of them, because nonessential industry has been holding out rather large inducements to some of these people because of their situation and their shortages of manpower. Nonessential industry has been a tremendous competitor in this field, particularly on getting the IV–F's and the over-age men to leave the farms because the work on the farms and in the dairies is unattractive work as compared with much of the work that they now can get in nonessential work, where there is right now a lack of competition because 11,900,000 persons are away in the armed forces and many additional millions are in war jobs. They can get much better nonwar permanent jobs now in relation to their ability than they could get later when the soldiers and war workers begin to return.

Mr. CLASON. Now, have you got any figures to show how many of them are in these nonessential industries that would be turned back to the farms?

Colonel KEESLING. I have no figures, sir, but when we appeared before the Senate Committee on Agriculture about the time that this committee was holding hearings last spring, the Senators there were very much aware of what was happening when a man who had been in class II–C would go up to his induction station for an examination and find that he was disqualified into class IV–F. He would say to himself, in many cases, "I have been a patriot long enough. Now I am going to join all these other IV–F's who left the farm because the work was unattractive and the pay low as compared with other jobs. I am going to leave the farm. I am free. I can do whatever I want to." Some of the Senators felt that it would be advisable to extend the Tydings amendment proviso beyond merely the class II–C men who had not had a physical, to include the class II–C–F men.

Mr. CLASON. Now, did I understand that in some conversations you had with the Under Secretary of War, Judge Patterson, he indicated that if the Elston amendment were stricken or was not in the selective-service law, it would result in no need for this legislation?

Colonel KEESLING. Judge Patterson, testifying before the special subcommittee last spring, indicated that there was a doubt as to whether or not they could induct IV–F's who were in nonessential jobs because they would not shift from nonessential to essential jobs. It was merely an expression of doubt at which time he said that he believed it would be advisable even if the majority of people felt you could do it, to have legislation to make absolutely certain on that point, and also, so that the people in the country would know that this whole procedure would have the sanction of Congress, and if necessary, would be carried out by the executive department.

Mr. CLASON. As I gather from your testimony here, this bill, in your opinion, is more in the nature of propaganda and you do not expect many cases to ever reach the induction or court stage in case the penalty is changed?

Colonel KEESLING. I will say "yes" to the second part of your question, sir. I believe, however, that we have been propagandizing for too long a period of time. We have been crying "wolf" time after time after time, and my own personal opinion is that the people have been terrifically confused as a result of it, and unless we now carry through with some legislation, we are going to have the IV–F's feel

that nothing is ever going to be done, and also the older-aged men, and hence they will be free to go about their business as they see fit.

Mr. CLASON. Well, as far as the Army is concerned, this bill is not going to help you in any way in filling up your manpower, is it, to put the men right in the Army, the men that you want for fighting purposes? This bill does not help you in any way, shape, or manner; does it?

Colonel KEESLING. It does help, sir, because it will provide the means for getting replacements for the 330,000 men that I told the committee were going to have to be taken out of either the farm group or the industrial group, or both.

Mr. CLASON. But you are going to take them out regardless of this bill, are you not? You are going to have the men in the Army? We can rely on that, can we not?

Colonel KEESLING. We are going to take them out regardless, but this will permit us to take the man of the type, age, and other status that the armed forces say they want, because it will enable us to get replacements for them—who would not serve as replacements without such a program as provided in H. R. 1119.

Mr. CLASON. It gets down to this: This is not doing anything to get men into the Army really. This proposition is just to put men now in other employment into specific categories in essential industry, is it not?

Colonel KEESLING. It is for both purposes.

Mr. CLASON. Well, if you take the 330,000 out of the industrial group who are needed in the Army, the Army is out of the picture; they have got all the men they want. The only thing you are missing is the 330,000 workers in industry, is it not?

Colonel KEESLING. Or on the farms.

Mr. CLASON. Or on the farms.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. So, what we are really down to is the question of need for men for industry and for the farms?

Colonel KEFSLING. That is right, except that unless you have a means of furnishing replacements, we may have to defer a young, single man under 26 as being more needed in industry at war production or on a farm than in the Army unless we get the replacement. In such a situation we'd have to take an older, less-qualified man instead.

Mr. CLASON. How many of these young men under 26 are there in industry? I understood there were 100,000 altogether, 60,000 in the merchant marine and 40,000 in industry; is that right?

Colonel KEESLING. Forty thousand in Federal agencies, including arsenals and shipyards, industry, doctors, technical and professional men, medical students, and all of the other deferred classes except farmers.

Mr. CLASON. Only 40,000?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, after hearing the testimony of the representatives of labor, Mr. Hines and Mr. Murray, is there any doubt in your mind they would be able to replace the 40,000?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; because we've already been quite hard on that group. But it is not the 40,000 they are concerned about, sir, it is the large number that are between 26 and 30.

Mr. CLASON. How many of those are there?

Colonel KEESLING. That is the only pool that we really have to draw upon except the 360,000 young farmers——

Mr. CLASON. Well, how many are there in that pool from 26 to 30? You say there were 40,000 in the group from 16 to 26. How many in the 26 to 30?

Colonel KEESLING. I do not remember them offhand. I have them in my case, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You can furnish them later, Colonel, and let it be printed in the hearing unless the gentleman insists on the answer now.

Mr. CLASON. It would be helpful to my examination to have them now, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Colonel KEESLING. There are 800,000 in classes II–A and II–B between 26 and 29.

Mr. CLASON. Eight hundred thousand?

Colonel KEESLING. And only 265,000 in II–C, farmers, between 26 and 29.

Mr. CLASON. Well, what you are really trying to tell us—if I could only understand what is behind the bill, I think it would help me a lot. Now, if the Army really mean what they said, we are only getting the beginning of what they need at the present time, then there is not any need for this bill. But if you are going so far with your needs for active men in the armed forces that you need all of the men from 18 to 26, who are physically fit and who are today in industry and on the farms, in agriculture, why then, I feel that the picture is entirely a different picture.

Colonel KEESLING. That is exactly the picture, Mr. Clason. The other day I testified that there were 330,000 men that we would have to find in the next 6 months from among the 360,000 farmers under 26 years of age, from among the 100,000 men under 26 who are either in the merchant marine or in all of these other occupations, or from among the 800,000 men in II–A and II–B or the 265,000 men in class II–C, 26 to 29, or in the age groups occupationally deferred of 30 and above.

Mr. CLASON. And you expect that—on account of this war, in the near future—so that if the purposes of this bill are to be made effective, that all of that group may be called into the Army?

Colonel KEESLING. There is no telling how much these demands of the armed forces may increase, sir. I cannot tell you, but that is one thing that this bill would do, provid the replacements for the men you have to get into the military—and nobody can say how large that is going to be—and, on the other hand, to provide the men to fill the existing shortages that they say now exist in war production and that will exist in the future as they step up their production program. So you have got a twofold purpose for this bill.

Mr. CLASON. But, of course, on the evidence of orders given to industry, both organized labor and industry have shown that they have, in their opinion, enough men on whom to draw to carry on their work successfully?

Colonel KEESLING. They have got enough men numerically on paper, but not actually. Past experience shows that merely because sufficient numbers of people are around who are capable of serving as re-

placements, that doesn't mean they will do so or that they will not leave if they happen to be in war work or shift into it. When I used to go fishing there were always plenty of fish around, and theoretically I should have been able to catch them. But it didn't seem to work out that way.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, in other words, you feel that the Army officials and the Government officials are in a better position to judge of that than organized labor—Mr. Murray, Mr. Hines, and the head of the N. A. M., or former head, Mr. Crawford?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; I do, sir; and I might add that last spring we had large, very large, numbers of physically qualified men in the class II–A and II–B groups under 26. The reason that they were there was because the IV–F's and the over-age persons, although capable—being there numerically—did not make themselves available as replacements. Therefore we had not been able to take out these young men before then, and that is why selective service had to defer these men beyond a reasonable period of time. Consequently, we had to back and fill in our policies in repeated attempts to go back and get them. That is what caused all the confusion.

Mr. CLASON. In other words, labor and management have not cooperated with you in furnishing replacements for the men of draft age physically fit to go into the Army?

Colonel KEESLING. They have cooperated 100 percent with the means that were at their disposal. They could not force these IV–F's and over-age men and women to come in as replacements. That is the purpose of this bill.

Mr. CLASON. Have they been teaching persons, trying to fit them as replacements for persons who have these deferred classifications?

Colonel KEESLING. They have to the limited extent they could get them voluntarily. Also the turn-over rate has been so large that management and labor, although they have done a marvelous job, have done it in the face of the most tremendous handicaps. They have had a turn-over which has required them to hoard, because they have to have replacements in training or already available to take the places of the men they anticipate are going to leave. They also have had a tremendous amount of green personnel in there continually. Testimony by the heads of the west coast aircraft plants before your special subcommittee revealed that if they could only have had some slight curtailment of turn-over, plant efficiency would have been tremendously increased, hoarding eliminated, error and accident rates decreased, and many other congested and detrimental factors relieved.

Mr. CLASON. Well, then, tell me, how are you going to take a man out, a keyman in essential industry today, and put in another man if he is not fit and apparently there is not anyone able to take his place?

Colonel KEESLING. There are plenty of qualified men, technicians who are working in nonessential jobs, who could be brought in. Also, Mr. Crawford, of the N. A. M., yesterday testified that under the production system, it only took 90 days to train a man to do some of the most expert jobs under the current way of producing.

Mr. CLASON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions on this side?

Mr. ANDREWS. I would like to say that Colonel Keesling cannot guess as to what the demands of the Army are going to be. He does not know himself. We may have quite a lot worse fighting over a longer period than we have had in the bulge.

Another thing he has not brought out is the fact of the United States completely equipping 10 or 20 new French divisions, and I do not think anybody on earth is dumb enough not to know what the equipping of 10 or 15 French divisions would mean to our own side of the picture.

Mr. CLASON. Have you taken that into consideration in your requirements?

Colonel KEESLING. "My requirements" are those that were furnished to us by the Army and Navy, sir.

Mr. CLASON. Well, did not they cover equipment for——

Colonel KEESLING. They presumably are taking all of that into consideration.

Mr. CLASON. They are taking that all into consideration?

Colonel KEESLING. They must be, sir.

Mr. CLASON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions on this side?

Mr. Stewart, do you have a question?

Mr. STEWART. Colonel Keesling, the selective service boards have been taking farmers generally, notwithstanding the Tydings amendment, all through the draft, have they not?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEWART. The proportion of farmers that has been accepted for selective service is greater than those in the industrial plants, is it not?

Colonel KEESLING. I will have to furnish that for the record, sir. I believe we have information on that.

Mr. STEWART. Well, just what you remember about it, have there been more farmers taken from the standpoint of percentage than there have been out of industry?

Colonel KEESLING. From my recollection of the last time I checked on it, my answer would be "no," but rather than have that answer go in definitely, I would rather furnish the information for the record.

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Chairman, I have a question.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. Colonel Keesling, rumor has come to me that Mr. McNutt has made some ruling heretofore about whether or not agriculture is going to be considered as essential war industry. Do you know what his ruling is?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; I heard the same rumor, but I have not had a chance to go into it.

Mr. MARTIN. What was the rumor you heard?

Colonel KEESLING. Off the record?

Mr. MARTIN. No; I want this on the record.

Colonel KEESLING. I would rather not state a rumor, sir; I would rather get the exact W. M. C. listing.

Mr. THOMASON. Did the law in the Tydings amendment make agriculture an essential industry?

Mr. MARTIN. That is my hope.

Mr. THOMASON. That is the way the draft boards have construed it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is my hope, Mr. Martin. Go ahead.

Mr. MARTIN. You do not wish to state the rumor you heard?

Colonel KEESLING. I will say this in answer to your question—that any designation by W. M. C. or anybody else in the Government will merely be considered as evidence by the local board under the Tydings amendment.

Mr. MARTIN. Does the Selective Service System consider at this time that agriculture is an essential war industry?

Colonel KEESLING. On a selective basis, on a comparative basis, the same as in industry. Some are, and some are not.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, all these figures you have given today are quite clear to me between the ages of 18 to 38, but I would like to have, along with Mr. May's request for a break-down of those figures, in concrete form, a designation of the age groups from 18 to 26, 26 to 30, and 30 to 38, of those numbers classified in II–A–F, II–B–F, and II–C–F, and II–A, II–B, and II–C. I am particularly interested in those classified in II–C and in II–C–F, because the age of a farm worker has a very real bearing on his productive capacity, and in our type of farming in Iowa, that is a very far-reaching principle. I know that the Army is very desirous of getting the same young, vigorous manpower into uniform that we must have on the farms if we are going to lift the big crops out of the field to the extent that the War Food Administration has requested of us. Looking immediately ahead, and I think you are going to come into more direct clash with the standing of agriculture—looking ahead—than you are with industry generally, because from General Knudsen's testimony and several other witnesses on behalf of industry here, I have gained the impression that the younger years are not as much more essential in industry than the older years as is the case in agriculture. You cannot answer the agricultural production problems of increased food production with men from 38 to 45 nor with IV–F's. That is why I want to have those figures, those ages indicated, and then I would like to ask you whether you can give us an estimate of the number of farmers, by age groups, on the present requisitions from the armed forces so that we can have some guide as to how deeply you will cut into that pool of young, vigorous manpower.

That is quite an order, but it goes to the very root of this question as far as agriculture is concerned.

Now, I understand you are going to break down the figures quite completely on the ages 38 to 45?

Colonel KEESLING. I am going to do that to the extent we have the information, Mr. Martin.

Mr. MARTIN. How long will it take you to get the information?

Colonel KEESLING. We have those broken down into classes, but I must state this—that we only processed those men for less than a 1-year period for induction into the armed forces. That was from about February 1942 until December 1942. At that time the Army said they would take no one over 38, so our figures are not complete because the processing ceased then.

Mr. MARTIN. How long do you anticipate it would take you to get the figures that Mr. May has asked you to get?

Colonel KEESLING. I can probably have those today, sir, on an estimate basis.

Mr. MARTIN. On the ages 38 to 45?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir; on the best information we have.

Mr. STEWART. Will you yield to me right there?

Mr. MARTIN. I will yield, sir.

Mr. STEWART. Just one question. You promised me that you would secure me the data on the relations that the farmer had to the industrial worker.

Colonel KEESLING. By inductions—percentage of inductions?

Mr. STEWART. Yes; percentages of inductions.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes; to the extent they are available.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Fenton, do you have any questions?

Mr. FENTON. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

I am wondering whether or not you could tell us how many men the Army and Navy have in these specialized schools.

Colonel KEESLING. I cannot tell you the number, sir; I would have to get that from the armed forces. You see, after we send these men up for induction and they are inducted, Selective Service does not have any jurisdiction over what they do with the men. They are members of the armed forces.

Mr. STEWART. You do not know whether they are considerable in number or not?

Colonel KEESLING. I do not know what the numbers are at the present time, sir.

Mr. STEWART. How many men are being discharged from the Army now?

Colonel KEESLING. They are running about, I think, 60,000 a month, Army and Navy total, and that includes all causes for discharge to civilian life. There have been about 1,500,000 total that have been discharged to civilian life from the Army and Navy.

Mr. STEWART. You do not know how many of them have gone back into industry?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; and I have not included in the IV–F, or II–A, B, C (F) figures any of those 1,500,000 who have been discharged from the Army to civilian life because they are kept in I–C, and it is my understanding that this committee had directed General Hershey to go over and have all limitations and restrictions upon them as far as manpower restrictions were concerned removed, and that has been done, so they are completely out of this picture at the present time. They are not now being subjected to manpower controls.

Mr. STEWART. Now, of those 973,000 people that were reclassified to II–A and II–B and II–C (F), is there another classification? I thought I understood you the other day to say there was II–L, or something like that.

Colonel KEESLING. I included for the purpose of my reports the L's as well as the F's as being physically disqualified. They are included in the figures I gave as the F designations.

Mr. STEWART. But, outside of those 450,000 who are not fit for work of any kind, you do not know how many of the remaining 3,500,000 would go in that category, too? You do not know the percentage?

Colonel KEESLING. I can merely give you a sample. Colonel Berry, who is here, furnished me yesterday with a sample that is very old, was taken in 1942, and I believe covered 93 local boards in Michigan. That showed that of the IV–F's or men physically rejected, there were 87 percent of them actually working. Hence there were at least 87 percent of those who were physically rejected who were qualified to work.

Mr. STEWART. Well, then, we do know that 87 percent were working at that time?

Colonel KEESLING. At all sorts of work, both essential and nonessential. That was a sample of 93 local boards in Michigan in 1942. We will have much better information than that if we, under this bill, are directed to inventory the IV–F groups.

Mr. FENTON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I would like to ask the colonel a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Holifield has a question.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Do the procurement agencies plan to increase orders for military material so much that the present small shortage of manpower will become much larger in industry? Over all purposes? Now, our testimony from labor and from management was that they had substantially met the present requirements, and I think you understand the reason of my question, Colonel Keesling.

Colonel KEESLING. Yes, sir. That does not come within my jurisdiction, but I was present and heard the testimony where the Army and Navy and War Production Board stated that they were stepping up their procurement requirements which would require additional men, in addition to the existing shortages of manpower.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Then the arguments of industry and labor that they had met the requirements would not apply to future increased orders?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; and in that connection I think it is of vital importance that the committee should understand the basis upon which these production schedules are made. I listened to the testimony of Mr. Krug before the Mead committee, at which time he said that the production schedules were not on a needs basis but that they were based on the amount of production they estimated could be attained after allowing for all shortcomings, including manpower shortages and the detrimental effects of uncontrolled turn-over.

Of course, General Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot base their strategic plans upon what they feel should be accomplished in the way of production. They have to go on a practical basis of what can be expected to be produced even with all these shortcomings. I cannot say, because I do not know what their plans have been, but I cannot say that their plans would not have been speeded up if some of these things had been corrected, such as the detrimental effects of turn-over, and so forth.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Thank you.

Colonel KEESLING. And when they say that they are up to schedule, that merely means that they are up to what they estimated they could make after all of these shortcomings. That does not mean they are getting all they could use and really need to get this war over at the earliest moment.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to ask you one question: Have you been apprised of the requests of Albert S. Goss, master of the National Grange, who yesterday telegraphed President Roosevelt asking him to stop the drafting of farm workers pending an investigation with regard to the effect on food production?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I have not seen it.

I want to ask the colonel one question. Is it or is it not a fact that this bill furnishes a basis for replacements in industry, agriculture, and all necessary workers, alike, that you do not now have available under the law?

Colonel KEESLING. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; thank you, sir.

Mr. FENTON. Mr. Chairman, not being a lawyer, summing this thing all up, I want to ask a question along that line.

Does subsection (c) of section 5 or does it not give all the authority necessary, I mean of the Selective Service Act, without any legislation?

Colonel KEESLING. Subsection (c)?

Mr. FENTON. Yes.

Colonel KEESLING. Well, section 5 (c)——

Mr. FENTON. (E) rather.

Colonel KEESLING. Oh, section 5 (e) gives the President the authority to defer. The existing Selective Service Act contemplates that all are liable between 18——

Mr. FENTON. Yes.

Colonel KEESLING. Contemplates that all men between the ages of 18 and 45 are liable with but very few exceptions that Congress wrote in as blanket exemptions: Ministers, divinity students, public officials, and a few others.

This section 5 (e) gives the President the right to defer, under certain circumstances, and it has always been our concept that he can select for the armed forces any of those he wants to and can defer any that he wants to. By means of deferment he is in effect selecting men for industry, provided the armed forces will take in a few of these IV–F's and over-age men, so men in that status will realize they must meet the conditions fixed for continued deferment or be drafted.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, sir.

Mr. FENTON. Well, then, the answer is, he has not got the authority unless we give it to him; is that it?

Colonel KEESLING. There is the authority there to induct the IV–F's and over-age men up to 45, but there is a question that was raised by Judge Patterson as to whether or not the Elston amendment precludes it, and therefore Judge Patterson last spring recommended that there be some legislation on the subject to remove that. He also recommended, as did the Navy at that time, that the Army and Navy be given the authority to place these IV–F's and men 38 to 45, men who were inducted because they were violators, in a special-pay and other status, if they were inducted. This bill, H. R. 1119, merely covers those two points.

Mr. FENTON. Well, is it not a fact that the Elston amendment precludes the deferment, as units or groups of occupations, and that the thought was to defer the individual rather than units? And is it not a fact further that Selective Service has given the authority to industry to defer as units rather than individuals?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; I believe that we have meticulously complied with the Elston amendment. The Elston amendment goes beyond what you stated, sir, as it prohibits induction of men by groups, except for doctors and related medical personnel.

Mr. FENTON. Well, I know that there are certain industrial groups that are deferring their whole outfit as being essential.

Colonel KEESLING. But when it comes up to the local board, sir, it has to be on the basis of the facts of each individual case. Anything

that is put out by way of W. M. C. lists or other lists is merely an expression of opinion that comes down to the boards as evidence so that they can use it when considering the relative essentiality of certain groups. But in the final analysis it is still up to the local board to make individual selections, subject to appeal, sir.

Mr. FENTON. What about the State selective service head? Does he control the heads of all the local boards in his particular State?

Colonel KEESLING. No, sir; only except by appeal, sir. He has no authority to direct their actions in any way whatsoever.

Mr. FENTON. They are doing it, Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you, Colonel. The committee will go into executive session.

(Colonel Keesling submitted the following exhibits for the record:)

On December 1, 1944, the national manpower pool of male registrants, ages 18 through 37, was as follows:

	Total
Total living registrants	22,096,265
Classes IV–F, I–A (L), and I–A–O (L) (rejected for military service)	3,586,311
Classes I–A and I–A–O (includes men being processed for preinduction physical examination, postponed inductions, appeals, etc.)	827,600
Classes II–A and II–B (occupationally deferred, exclusive of farm workers; includes industrial workers, Federal employees, technical men, doctors, medical students, etc.; most of these men have not had a physical examination. When, as, and if, they are physically examined, approximately 50 percent will be rejected)	4,257,639
Classes II–A (L), II–A (F), II–B (L), and II–B (F) (same as II–A and II–B, except these men have been physically examined and have been rejected	846,837
Class II–C (deferred by reason of agricultural work; most of these men have not had a physical examination. When, as, and if, they are physically examined, aproximately 50 percent will be rejected)	1,508,287
Classes II–C (L) and II–C (F) (same as II–C, except they have been physically examined and rejected for military duty)	126,859
Class I–C (registrants 18 through 37 who have become members of the armed forces; does not include registrants 38 years of age or over, women, or nonregistered enlisted men, i. e. men enlisted at age 17, etc. This classification includes approximately 1,500,000 who have been discharged or transferred to the Reserves and have been retained in this classification to identify them as having been members of the armed forces)	10,657,015
Unclassified (18-year-old men who have registered but have not yet been classified)	59,731
All other classifications (includes III–D, hardship cases; IV–B, public officials; IV–C, ineligible aliens; IV–D, ministers and divinity students; IV–E, conscientious objectors)	230,814

In addition to the 22,096,265 registrants 18 through 37 years of age, there are approximately 7,000,000 registrants 38 through 44 years of age, making a total of over 29,000,000 registrants.

Number of registrants deferred in industry and agriculture, by age groups Dec. 1, 1944

[Continental United States]

	Total ages, 18–37	Ages, 18–25	Ages, 26–29	Ages, 30–37
Classes II–A and II–B (deferred in occupations other than agriculture)	4,257,639	107,261	864,469	3,285,909
Classes II–A (L), II–A (F), II–B (L), and II–B (F) (deferred in occupations other than agriculture and not qualified for general military service)	846,837	272,705	200,711	373,421
Class II–C (deferred in agriculture)	1,508,287	363,703	303,625	840,959
Classes II–C (L) and II–C (F) (deferred in agriculture and not qualified for general military service)	126,859	84,613	19,128	23,118

Selective Service classification of group 3 registrants (38 to 45 years of age) Feb. 1, 1945 [1]

Selective Service class:	Number of registrants
Total	7,227,100
I–C	407,000
IV–F, I–A Rem., I–A–O Rem., I–B, I–B–O	403,100
I–A, I–A–O	60,100
II–A (occupationally deferred, other than farm workers)	32,700
II–B (occupationally deferred, other than farm workers)	56,300
II–C (farm deferments)	9,900
III–A (industrial workers, etc., with pre-Pearl Harbor wives or children)	3,096,700
III–B (industrial workers, etc., with pre-Pearl Harbor wives or children)	662,800
III–C (farm workers with pre-Pearl Harbor wives or children)	10,200
Other [2]	2,488,300

[1] Since the induction of registrants over 37 years of age ceased after Dec. 5, 1942, tabulations of the classification status of registrants age 38 to 45 have not been carried out. However, a new tabulation of the classification status of men age 38 to 45 on Jan. 1, 1945, will be completed in a few days.

[2] Includes 1.9 million in IV–H: deferred, age 38 to 45 and not otherwise classified.

The number and percentage of farmers and farm laborers inducted into the United States armed forces November 1940 through September 1944

[Preliminary]

	Number	Percent
Total, all occupations	8,672,169	100.0
Total, farmers and farm laborers	988,100	11.4
18 to 21 [1]	467,340	5.3
22 to 25	136,370	1.6
26 to 29	151,190	1.7
30 to 37 [1]	233,200	2.7

[1] Age groups estimated.

[2] Includes not specified.

68175—45——30

MOBILIZATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18, 1945

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee on Military Affairs met, pursuant to adjournment, at 2 p. m., Hon. Andrew J. May (chairman) presiding.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Gentlemen, in the forenoon, the committee requested that I invite the National Food Administrator, our former colleague, the Honorable Marvin Jones, who for many years was a member of the House, and chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, whom you all know very well, to testify. Mr. Jones is here, and we have under consideration H. R. 1119, a bill to amend the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940.

Now, Mr. Jones, I think the committee would like to have you discuss with them the particular features of this bill relating to agricultural workers and those who may be subject to induction into the armed forces, now engaged in agriculture.

I hardly know how to start you out, other than to say to you that they probably want to ask you some questions. You may make a statement, if you have one to make on such short notice.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARVIN JONES, WAR FOOD ADMINISTRATOR

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I was called here on very short notice, and, while I have hurriedly read the bill, I have not had an opportunity to study it carefully. I believe I should prefer for the committee to ask me any questions that they wish to ask.

The manpower situation is critical, and, from a brief reading of the bill, I would endorse its purpose. I am inclined to think the bill will be helpful to agriculture because it will enable us to hold on the farms registrants who, after being placed in class IV–F after a physical examination, have been leaving agriculture in many instances.

I have several suggestions for changes in the bill which I believe might be helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I wish you would make them now, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. It seems to me that at page 2, beginning with line 7:

> The Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion certifies to Director of Selective Service from time to time, the manpower requirements for war or war supporting plants and activities within each industrial area.

Agriculture might be well included so that its needs might be considered along with the others. At line 10, page 2, I suggest that the words "or agricultural" be inserted after the word "industrial."

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones, I have that very word written in here, after the word "labor", in line 12, to insert "agriculture." So, it reads:

After appropriate consultation with the appropriate officials of labor, management, agriculture, and government.

Mr. JONES. The other suggestion I have would simply be a safeguarding provision. In line 24, I notice that paragraph starts off by saying:

The Director of Selective Service shall maintain an inventory of all deferred registrants by age groups and by status within each age group.

And it says:

Upon receiving such certification, he shall designate the categories of deferred registrants between the ages of 18 and 45, which he estimates contain such number of persons (1) who are capable of performing the work involved, (2) who are not engaged in services designated by the Director of Selective Service as contributing to the war effort.

This provision might give the Director of Selective Service authority to leave out a service which has been designated by law. For instance, the Tydings amendment provides for a deferred classification of men who meet its requirements, and I believe that it should be made clear that this bill does not intend to abrogate a designation already made by law.

The CHAIRMAN. I have inserted after the word "by," in line 25——

Mr. JONES. I suggest that, on page 2, at line 25, after the word "by" there be inserted the words "law or by."

Mr. HARNESS. What do you refer to, Mr. Jones, by "certain designations by law"?

Mr. JONES. Well, I do not know what other designations there may be, but under the Tydings amendment, which the Congress passed, there were certain persons designated by law if they met the requirements of the law.

Mr. HARNESS. This refers to services rather than individuals, does it not?

Mr. JONES. Well, it provides that:

The Director shall maintain an inventory of all deferred registrants.

He has to keep a list—

Upon receiving such certification for a particular area, he shall designate the categories of deferred registrants between the ages of 18 and 45 which he estimates contain sufficient numbers of persons (1) who are capable of performing the work involved, (2) who are not engaged in services designated by the Director of Selective Service as contributing to the war effort or being in support of the war effort—

Mr. JONES. The above quoted provision might authorize the placing of farmers in a nonessential classification, notwithstanding the Tydings amendment.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, does this provision itself not place on the Director of Selective Service the authority to designate services which are contributing to the war effort or in support of the war effort?

Mr. JONES. Perhaps not, but it would be preferable to remove the doubt by not authorizing the designation of something as nonessential which the Congress has already classified as essential.

Mr. HARNESS. In other words, he could, under this authority, say that agriculture was not——

Mr. JONES. To eliminate any question regarding the effect on the Tydings amendment, I suggest that there be inserted as a new sentence on page 3, line 17, after the word "employed" the following: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to modify or repeal section 5 (k) of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended."

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Mr. Brooks?

Mr. BROOKS. Judge, I was just wondering, that proviso might help too, in cases where the statute now provides deferment of officials of Government. Do you think that would come under that question?

Mr. JONES. I am not familiar with the provision about deferment of officials, because that does not come within my jurisdiction, so I would rather not pass judgment on it.

Mr. KILDAY. Of course, what you have in mind, Judge, is that the bill not appear to give the Director of Selective Service and Training the right to abrogate an existing legal deferment?

Mr. JONES. That is correct.

Mr. KILDAY. I think, in that connection, we should put in, right along with this same provision of which you are speaking, "and who are not exempt from training service under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940." That would take care of your ministers and divinity students and so on.

Mr. JONES. Probably so. "Determined by law" might include that, anyway, I think. They are deferred by law, just as the other cases are.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Is that all, Mr. Kilday?

Mr. KILDAY. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Arends.

Mr. ARENDS. Judge, I was one of the members of the committee who was rather anxious that you come up here to answer some questions, and this is primarily a question that I would like to ask you: Do you believe that under this bill, the Tydings amendment will remain as effective as it has been in the past?

Mr. JONES. Although the bill does not directly affect the Tydings amendment, I think it would be well to clarify the matter by the amendment I suggested.

Mr. AREND. This morning, in testimony before the committee. Colonel Keesling said that while the Selective Service had not sent out any order to the various draft boards to have any change in effect upon the deferment of agricultural employees, nevertheless, the President did urge the boards that all boys in agricultural deferment up to the age of 26, should be ready for induction. Since that time, boy after boy has been taken from the farm. Now, in my part of the country, as you know, out in central Illinois, they are in bad straits at this very moment. For instance, I will read you just one line out of an item in the paper yesterday, four farms, over 300 acres near Carlyle, none of which have any help for the coming season. In commenting on the shortage, he stated the sales of livestock will be forced.

You requested the other day that we increase our farm production. The thing that bothers me is, I think the farm boy should go as well

as the rest of them, but I am wondering if we are not going to cause confusion here and upset something unless we keep this Tydings amendment very much in force, and leave it up to the local draft boards as to who is essential on the farm, regardless of age.

I do not think you can replace a boy on a farm, who is under 26 years of age, who goes out to spend 16 or 18 hours a day working on a farm, with a IV–F or a man 45 years old. You are not going to get the work done. I am just wondering if we are not facing a pretty serious situation in view of the request you made for increased production and in view of the possibilities that the draft boards are changing their minds about them.

Mr. JONES. The drafting of men for the armed services is a matter solely in the jurisdiction of the Selective Service. We are facing at this time critical manpower needs all along the line. There are serious labor problems on the farms and in industry, and, of course, the armed forces require additional men. In view of the manpower shortage, I have stated that I would not want the Tydings amendment used as a smoke screen, and that it is proper to carefully screen agricultural registrants to see that those deferred under the amendment are clearly within the terms of the law. Whether any registrant meets the requirements of the law is a matter which is left, as I understand it, to the local selective service boards who are in a better position to pass on it than anyone else.

Mr. ARENDS. They are, and they should have final say in the matter, I think, because they live with the people day in and day out.

That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Sparkman, do you have any questions?

Mr. SPARKMAN. Judge, just this one question: You say that it is left to the local boards?

Mr. JONES. That is the way I understand it. Of course, as I explained, that is a matter that does not fall within my jurisdiction, the administering of that particular act, and I dislike to comment on the mechanics of the handling of it.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, I have always been under that impression, myself, and still am. Yet, just walking over here now, from the House, another Member told me that, as a matter of fact, if the local board granted a deferment to a farm boy under 26, and the field representatives came by and saw that, if that field representative pulled that file out and carried it to the regional office, then that board would notify the local board that this boy's classification had been changed, there would not or could not be any appeal to it or anything else. The case there would be that if he pulled the file and carried it over, arbitrarily ruled on it, and notified the local board, that would be all there was to it.

Do you know where any such thing as that is being done?

Mr. JONES. We have had some letters on this problem, but most of them go to Selective Service. During the past 4 years a great many people have left the farms. As I recall, about one and a half million young men from agriculture have gone into the armed services, and about twice that number have gone to industry. This has created a real problem in trying to replace these workers on the farms.

I do not believe you can entirely eliminate all deferments in agriculture even in the 18 to 25 age groups. Many of these men are skilled

keymen who, in many instances, cannot be replaced. It is an unfortunate fact that the same type of young men needed by the armed forces are also needed in many phases of agricultural work. Men become skilled in farm work, as a rule, earlier than in most other activities because they begin this work at a younger age.

The Tydings amendment provides, in substance, that registrants regularly engaged in an essential agricultural occupation shall be deferred until such time as satisfactory replacements can be obtained. In many instances, it is very difficult to replace skilled men on the farm. We have been able to make a magnificent record in production of food largely because old men, women and children have taken the places of those who have left, and have worked long hours in food production. We have also had people from the cities, including women, boys and girls who have worked part time on the farms.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Certainly you believe that in the determination as to whether or not they are essential to the farm work, the democratic procedures that we set up originally in the Selective Training and Service Act ought to be followed, rather than to have some arbitrary ruling?

Mr. JONES. I will say that I am a great believer in democratic procedure. Again it is not my assignment to determine the relative needs.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I realize that.

Mr. JONES. Because of the serious manpower needs, it is a big responsibility to determine the relative needs between the military services and other essential activities. I am glad it is not my responsibility to determine the relative needs.

Mr. SPARKMAN. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Mr. Clason?

Mr. CLASON. Judge, between now and June 30 do you expect to have greater requirements for food products on American farms placed by the Government, for purposes of feeding people in liberated countries and to supply a greater number of men in our armed services?

Mr. JONES. Well, the needs will not grow less between now and that time, in all probability. As a matter of fact, we need it now, and the production of food is not a thing you can do this year and then quit. Food begins to disappear the minute it is produced. The next year becomes just as important as the previous one. We have been pleased and have been peculiarly fortunate in the weather conditions that have enabled us to produce this great quantity of food that we have produced.

Of course, there are shortages along some lines, but there has been abundant production, and we are the only one of the great Allied Nations that has produced materially more food than we require for our own use. That will be important in this coming year, as the war is going on on so many fronts, which will make the needs greater, not only for the armed forces, but there will be great needs, naturally, of food for any liberated countries.

Mr. CLASON. Well, is there already a drain on our stored-up supplies of food for these purposes?

Mr. JONES. On the whole, the food picture is good, but we have a shortage of certain important commodities, such as meats, sugar, fats, and oils. While we have had an increase in livestock production, we have encountered problems in manpower and limited facilities for getting and distributing an adequate meat supply.

As I have stated, the manpower problem is one that runs clear across the board. If we had the needs of only one war activity to meet, our problem would be simple, but the needs of all must be balanced. It is a serious thing to make an arbitrary or positive remark to the effect that any one need is greater than another.

Mr. JONES. Yes, we shall need more agricultural workers. As stated, the farmers, older people, and farm youth have worked long hours. People everywhere have helped with Victory gardens. We have utilized volunteer workers from the cities and are using prisoners of war. It will be necessary again for us to import farm labor from Mexico, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and perhaps from other countries.

Mr. CLASON. Do you anticipate that you will run short of manpower in the production on the farms?

Mr. JONES. Of course, the manpower question is going to be a serious question through the year, I think, on the farms. However, we hope that the farmers will continue their all-out effort, as they did last year, because food is just as essential as anything else in the carrying on of wartime activities.

Mr. CLASON. The purpose of this bill is, of course, to keep persons in essential industry. That would mean agriculture as well as war production.

Mr. JONES. That is my understanding of it. It would remove the lure for a man to leave the farm when he gets a classification which physically disqualifies him for service in the armed forces. This is surely the time when there should be all-out cooperation in the war effort. It is necessary for us to have a mobilization of our manpower forces in the activities that are essential in winning the war.

Mr. CLASON. Well, I am glad to note that you feel we are on the home stretch.

Mr. JONES. I should say we are certainly putting forth all-out effort on the military front, and I certainly feel that the rest of us should do so at home as the war is getting into full tilt anyway.

Mr. CLASON. Suppose a young man who is on the farm, and should be there, decides he would not obey the demands of the local board. So far as penalties are concerned, which do you think would be more likely to keep him there, a penalty which would lead to his induction into a labor battalion or one which would be induced by a fine and/or imprisonment?

Mr. JONES. I do not think I am qualified to answer that question, but I have found from experience that it is difficult to get enforcement when the penalty is too severe. On the question as to what is the best method of accomplishing the objective, I would rather risk the combined wisdom of you gentlemen than my own opinion.

Mr. ANDREWS. Judge, I am interested in this feature of the care of the farm under the healthy young man of 26. It would appear today to be jumping the gun, on Mr. Byrnes, in intimating, to the draft boards that they shall take these young men off the farms. Now, young men have been taken off the farms in the last week or two and they have not been replaced. I am given to understand certain things, and I would like to make sure when we take a man off somebody's farm, while we may not approve of his replacement, that at least we should offer something.

Mr. JONES. That matter is not for me to determine. I should prefer that you call the gentlemen who have the responsibility of administering that program. I do not believe that there is any provision in this bill which bears on that question.

It seems to me that that is another question. Whether that is being properly administered, I would rather you call the gentlemen who have that responsibility.

Mr. ANDREWS. Well, I want to know whether the draft boards out in your section of the country will go out on a ranch and take its last two men. I want to know how we are going to be sure of getting four IV–F's, if necessary, to replace them. We would not, under this act. Maybe we would under the National Service Act.

Mr. JONES. I understand under the Tydings amendment, if the local board finds he is essential there should be some replacement for the man taken away. But that again is getting into a field that is not my own.

Mr. THOMASON. It is up to the local draft board, is it not?

Mr. JONES. Yes; and they are the best qualified to decide that.

Mr. THOMASON. They are on the grounds and are his neighbor.

Mr. JONES. That is right.

Mr. THOMASON. And they have authority and discretion. It is up to them in the last analysis.

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. CLASON. I would like to add that many of us have important agricultural sections in our district, and you are the first witness who has given us any information with regard to the likelihood of the farmers in these particular agricultural districts gaining any benefit from this law. It almost looks as though they are going to lose and not gain by it, and yet would you not consider this as very essential to an all-out war effort?

Mr. JONES. While I have not closely studied the bill, I regard its purpose as desirable. It would seem to me to be helpful if it will assist in holding on the farms those men who are placed in IV–F classification. The question of which agricultural registrants should be deferred is covered by the act of Congress which, as I understand it, leaves the matter to the discretion of the local selective service boards.

Mr. CLASON. But this is not restricted to IV–F's, you see.

Mr. JONES. I know.

Mr. CLASON. If a person is II–C in the agricultural class——

Mr. JONES. This would tend to hold them there if they are already there, and certainly it would not tend to take them away.

Mr. CLASON. But supposing Selective Service——

Mr. JONES. From the farm or any other essential activity they are engaged in, if I read it correctly, that is.

Mr. CLASON. But this provides nicely for putting people into industry, it seems to me, but it does not look out for the farmer quite as well. That is the only thing I am afraid of.

Mr. JONES. That is the reason I suggested the changes mentioned. I do not know whether you were here or not.

Mr. CLASON. Yes; I was here.

Mr. JONES. I think those safeguarding provisions should be put in, because if I have left any impression that the production of food is

not important, or that the labor problem on the farm is not an important problem, I have left an impression I did not intend to leave.

Mr. CLASON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge, I feel as you do about it. Napoleon said once that his armies moved on their bellies. He meant by that that they had to have food, and they have to have it. Food is just as essential as munitions.

Mr. JONES. We take food for granted sometimes. It is just as essential as the air we breathe. I have had generals who have taken part in the fighting who have told us if it were not for the food that they had, they could not have carried forward as they did.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Martin, do you have any questions?

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Jones, I was one of the members of the committee who was most desirous of having you come before us, because of my views of the great importance of the matter of food production in the war effort, and because of the tremendous responsibility and trust that is placed in your hands as War Food Administrator. I thought your word would go far in keeping us properly oriented here in the matter of food production in the war effort and I am very glad you are here.

I have heard some rumors of men, which I have not been able to name, high in Government circles, who have listed agriculture recently as no longer on the essential war list. Have you heard any such rumors as that?

Mr. JONES. I do not think that has been brought to my attention. I understand the War Manpower Commission has a list of critical activities which take precedence over the essential activities. I have heard of no one who has undertaken to classify agriculture other than as an essential war activity.

Mr. MARTIN. I was a little fearful when I heard these rumors.

Mr. JONES. I have not sat in on all of the conferences. I can only speak for what has been brought to my attention.

Mr. HARNESS. Will the gentleman yield right there?

Mr. MARTIN. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. A new formula has been gotten out placing agriculture, taking it off of the critical list.

Mr. JONES. I do not know that they have ever had it listed on what is termed a critical list. That is a War Manpower classification that I am not all together familiar with, but I have not heard of anyone taking it off the essential list. It may have been done, but, if it has been done, it has been done without consultation with me.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, we have been well aware of the real problem confronting agriculture within recent months, in the matter of shortages of manpower, and, frankly, any legislation that comes out, which looks as thought it may cut more deeply into farm labor, is hitting the agricultural industry rather hard. In view of your appeal to increase food production, knowing, as farmers know, that that is a big order, when you have taken into account the seasons and your unusually good luck of the last few seasons and the uncertainty of looking ahead.

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, will any further draft of farm workers, in your opinion, cut deeply into the prospects of carrying out your appeal for greater food production?

Mr. JONES. Well, of course, just as in any other activity, which includes all activities, any taking of men will make it more difficult to carry on. At the same time the needs of agriculture must be laid alongside of, and measured in connection with, the needs of other industries that we have. I do not know what the number is now, but you are probably familiar with it, twelve or thirteen million men in the armed services, and then we have many wartime-production activities that have created a difficult labor problem all along the line.

We need all the men in agriculture that we can get, and we would not be bringing these men in from the outside if we did not have that need. Any taking of them, of course, will make it more difficult. Yet, the Army and the Navy have to be supplied from somewhere, and we all want to do whatever is the proper thing. On the whole, the wise thing to do is to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to carry on the war.

The policy, though, it seems to me, on the particular thing you are talking about, is pretty well laid out by the Congress and placed in the hands of these local boards. I do not see how this bill could affect that. It may do it, but I do not read it as doing that.

Mr. MARTIN. We have been told here, in the proceedings on this bill, that agriculture must expect some cut into agricultural and farm labor, and that that is to fill the war needs.

I would like to make this point: That as War Food Administrator, you are in a position where agriculture is looking to you to watch that point particularly closely as a matter of enabling agriculture to produce this additional food supply that you have appealed for.

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; and I am very anxious for them to do it. Of course, I think they have reduced the number of deferments in agriculture, in the last 30 to 60 days in rescreening, but I do not know how far they have gone.

It is pretty difficult to sit here and determine just how many should come. I think the local boards will do that job, if it is left to them, and will do it better than any of the rest of us could. I am, of course, very anxious for us to have the food production, and we have no assurance that we will have another favorable year as this was. For that reason, I am making the appeal. We may have some items of food left when it is over, just as we might have some extra planes and tanks and guns, when the war is over, but we cannot slow down for that reason. We will just have to take a chance on having some left. We want the full production, but we do not want to take any chances.

Mr. MARTIN. Agriculture is a little different from industry in this respect, that a farmer, to plan his food production, must know well ahead what his labor supply is, many months ahead.

Mr. JONES. That is correct.

Mr. MARTIN. Because a farmer in my State, for instance, Iowa, cannot be determined as approaching your program rationally if he were to go out this spring and plant 120 acres of corn when he knows that he has no help in sight to harvest that corn crop next fall.

Mr. JONES. That is very correct; it is also the thing that some people do not realize is true. You cannot turn farm production on and off like turning a faucet. It takes a year, it must be planned, and there must be some assurance. I do not think it can be treated in the light of——

Mr. MARTIN. I am very pleased with your suggested amendments to the bill to protect the Tydings amendment, and insofar as this bill, H. R. 1119, will help farmers to keep the farm labor of all classes on the farms, unless they are taken directly in the armed forces, this bill will perform a real service, in which your suggested amendments will help, I think, very materially, in that respect.

Now, there is another problem which has been brought to my attention rather forcibly in the last 2 years, and that is the matter of farm machinery. Up until a year ago, I have been given to understand by many of the governmental agencies in charge of that program, that the shortage of farm machinery was a matter of materials, whereas, starting about a year ago, I was given to understand it was no longer a shortage of materials so much as it was a matter of manpower in the farm-machinery factories. Do you have any observations to make regarding the prospect for catching up on the shortage of farm machinery?

Mr. JONES. Of course, we are simply a claimant agency before the War Production Board which has a tremendous problem of allocating materials, just as the War Manpower Commission is allocating manpower. The production of farm machinery last year was materially increased over the previous year. We have a division which devotes its full time to fighting for the rights of agriculture in that regard. There has been no restriction on the production of repair parts and we had a substantial increase over the previous year in the manufacture of many items of farm machinery. A schedule was provided for the production of farm machinery for the coming year on the same basis as last year, but, on account of greatly increased military needs for many items of equipment, the schedule has been revised somewhat. We are fighting for the rights of agriculture in as full a measure as war conditions will permit us to when its needs are measured alongside other important needs.

Mr. MARTIN. I have been very pleased in the last few days to note in the papers reports that the manufacturer of farm machinery has been placed in the critical category.

Mr. JONES. Yes; that has been done, and the farm machinery companies are in a position, probably, to manufacture as much equipment as they did last year, with the exception noted that they have been compelled to fall behind because of some emergency war needs which threw them behind schedule a little. We get a report every month on that, and are following it closely as we want to get, of course, all the farm machinery we can. It is very vital and in view of the manpower shortage, that question of farm machinery becomes even more vital than it was before.

Mr. MARTIN. That matter of placing manufacture of farm machinery in the critical category and protecting that program, the assurance that that gives the farmers of America, that the supply of farm machinery will be maintained at as high a level as possible, will be a big factor in helping our farmers face this further cut in manpower on the farms.

Mr. JONES. I hope so.

Mr. MARTIN. Now, there is another issue that I have taken up with the War Department many times in the last several years. That is the matter of furloughs home of skilled and experienced farm workers

for meeting an emergency that comes on quite suddenly, in either the planting season or the harvest season. Thus far, I have been totally unable to convince the War Department that they should furlough farm workers home, yet they are doing that for industrial workers. The position of the War Department is that any farm workers assigned to farm work must be assigned as military units.

Now, I just draw that to your attention because there is a fertile field in which you can help me, because I know that you share my views on the matter of trying to do farm labor by any "squads right" method.

Mr. MARTIN. This is a manpower question. Now, thus far, I have not found any military organizations undertaking to farm in Iowa, and I sincerely hope that I do not have to meet them trying to husk corn.

Mr. JONES. The Army, from time to time, has been very cooperative and helpful to agriculture. It permitted the soldiers to assist with the harvest in the Dakotas, and when I was in the Southwest last summer I found that the Army was granting soldiers 3-day passes to enable them to do emergency farm work.

Mr. MARTIN. Farm labor in my section of the country is such that we cannot look forward to importations of Puerto Ricans or Mexicans, due to the heavy farm work of my section. We have only one place to look for adequate and usable, practical, farm labor supply, and that is the man who has been raised in that area, who is reasonably familiar with the job at hand. We canont import Midwest agricultural labor to meet many of these emergency needs.

Mr. JONES. Of course, the extension service does a good deal between counties and States, and they have done a good deal of placement in that area in that regard.

Mr. MARTIN. Oh, yes; that is right, and we are leaning on that very much. But for this reason, I would like to enlist your support to disillusion the War Department in its manner of approach to this question.

Mr. JONES. Well, you might be as good at that as I am, I expect.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Price, do you have any questions?

Mr. PRICE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harness, have you any questions?

Mr. HARNESS. Well, Judge, I have a couple of questions. I want you to get that bill and let us refer again to this section you mentioned on page 2, beginning at line 24. Now, as I read that, that refers to services and not to classifications of individuals.

Mr. JONES. I think if you go back and read the other, the first part of that paragraph:

> The Director of Selective Service shall maintain an inventory of all deferred registrants by age groups and by status within each age group and upon receiving such a certification for a particular area, the Director of Selective Service shall designate the categories of deferred registrants between the ages of 18 and 45 which he estimates contain sufficient numbers of persons (1) who are capable of performing the work involved and (2) who are not engaged in services designated by law or by the Director of Selective Service as contributing to the war effort.

Mr. JONES. I do not know. You may be correct, but I believe the matter should be safeguarded by the changes which I have suggested.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, we say, "The Director of Selective Service shall maintain an inventory of all deferred men."

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS (reading):

Who are not engaged in services designated by the Director of Selective Service as contributing to the war effort.

In other words, he can say what service is contributing to the war effort.

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Notwithstanding any other law or rule or regulation?

Mr. JONES. That is the reason I suggested to put in there "who are not engaged in services designated by law or by the Director"—"as essential to the war effort."

Mr. HARNESS. All right. Now, I am told that the War Manpower Commission has said that the manpower situation on the farm is not critical. In other words, they have not put agriculture on the critical list, and I am advised that you have not been consulted in that. If that be the case, no matter what you write in there, the Director of Selective Service or the law would still leave agriculture in a noncritical situation with respect to manpower?

Mr. JONES. The amendment would leave it as an essential industry with the procedure for deferment set forth in the Tydings amendment.

Mr. HARNESS. Now, here is the problem: We have got 360,000 men between the ages of 18 and 26 on the farms in the deferred classification. Assuming that the War Manpower Commission and the Director of Selective Service say that the manpower situation in agriculture is not critical and we take all we can get of the 360,000 which they assume will be 60 percent, how are we going to replace, if the situation later becomes critical, how are we going to replace those experienced farmers that are taken off the farm?

Mr. JONES. I do not think this bill refers to what the War Manpower Commission has designated as critical or noncritical. My amendment was suggested so that persons who fall within the terms of the Tydings amendment might not be designated in a classification not contributing to the war effort.

Mr. HARNESS. Well, can you point out anything in this bill that would help a farmer replace a loss of an experienced hand?

Mr. JONES. Well, the only thing about it is it might keep people who are there on the farm and who cannot qualify for military services. We have had 3,000,000 people leave the farm and go into industry since 1941, 3,000,000 people. That is a good many people, and they left, naturally, I suppose, because the returns were better or they wanted to learn a trade or the work was more desirable or they wanted to leave the farm; at any rate, we have had a great many leave, and I feel that the time has come when, if people are doing essential work, that it would not be bad to have a way to tell people where they shall work, since we tell the soldier where he shall go.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Will you yield on that point?

Mr. HARNESS. Yes.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. I think you will find on page 3, line 9, authority for the Director of Selective Service, after calling on local boards in such area, to ask those people that have been called upon to enter into such plants or activities; farm labor might well come under the heading of activity.

Again, down in line 23 of the same page, a special service unit is created that could also be designated, or the individuals of which could be designated to work on a farm to replace an able-bodied man.

Mr. JONES. It seems to me that is correct.

Mr. HARNESS. We are not talking so much about able-bodied men as men who have knowledge of farming. You cannot take a man out of the city and put him on a farm and do any good with him.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think they will do that.

Mr. ANDREWS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HARNESS. Yes.

Mr. ANDREWS. On this question of the gentleman from California, why could not we write in there "employed in such plants or agricultural activities"? One of the things in my mind is what the gentleman from Indiana has brought up. We have got 7,000,000 men between 38 and 45; a good many men would derive a lot of good on a farm if they were put on a farm; they would do a lot of good on a farm. They are sitting around within 5 or 10 miles of a farm right now.

Mr. DURHAM. And those that left the farm, we might put them back.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think we ought to specify agriculture in there.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe so. That is a matter for us to consider when we get through.

Mr. HARNESS. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stewart, do you have a question?

Mr. STEWART. You do consider agriculture as essential to the prosecution of the war?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir; I do.

Mr. STEWART. This may be just a little out of this, but are you familiar with the agricultural statistics on the livestock and cattle that we have now?

Mr. JONES. In general, I have those figures. We have about 81,000,000 cattle.

Mr. STEWART. Are the number of head comparable to what they were at the time before we had to slaughter them?

Mr. JONES. Well, at one time we had 127,000,000 hogs in 1943, and we do not have anything comparable to that number now: that is now down to some considerable number because there was a tremendous hog slaughter as you know last winter and spring, and there has not been the number of pigs to replace that, but the cattle are pretty well at a high. We have had as high as 82,000,000 head and they are now estimated at 81,000,000, using round figures. We have a great many cattle in this country. We have more milk cows than we had before. There are a smaller number of sheep; we have more chickens and turkeys except for the last year.

Mr. STEWART. Would it alleviate the feed shortage if meat were put on the market without points?

Mr. JONES. Well, that is a question that has already been settled by an authority that has the right to make a decision and I would rather not go into that particular phase of it. I do not think the question of whether an article is rationed is of supreme importance, because we get the Army and Navy needs now by set-aside orders, and then the civilians get what is left. There are certain items in short supply

and the whole question is whether there is a better distribution through rationing or by letting the local people who handle those things parcel it out among their customers, and that is a matter about which opinions differ sometimes, and especially as to certain items, but the particular point was decided and, after all, there are not many of these questions that you can lav a straightedge to, and find out for certain about results. Someone has to make the decision and when a decision is made, in these times, by the proper authority, I accept the decision and do the best I can to help make it work.

Mr. STEWART. You agree, though, that it does have a tendency to increase the population of cattle other than decrease it by requiring points?

Mr. JONES. Well, I will state this: The question of getting cattle slaughtered is largely a question of slaughtering facilities. We would like to see thirty-seven or thirty-eight million head of cattle slaughtered during the coming year, but it is doubtful if the slaughtering facilities will be sufficient to slaughter more than thirty-three to thirty-five million head. The slaughtering facilities will probably be used to the utmost insofar as the slaughter of cattle is concerned, for the next few months.

Mr. STEWART. I believe that is all, Judge, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, do you have any questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. Judge Jones, county war boards, they are groups that are supposed to interest themselves in protecting the interests of the farmers, are they not?

Mr. JONES. Yes; they are a group that we have in each of the farm counties, which try to be helpful in getting the agencies to work together and in getting food production, and they furnish information on agricultural registrants on request to the selective service boards.

Mr. JOHNSON. In other words, they would be the advisers of the local board on agricultural questions?

Mr. JONES. Selective service boards, you mean?

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; in trying to carry out the matter of deferment of farmers and farm workers, they would be the main advisers of the local boards?

Mr. JONES. They are authorized to furnish information to the selective service boards as to any of these registrants about which question is raised. The selective service board has a right to request the war board to furnish them information on any one on the question of deferment. Then they also have permissive authority, if they see fit, to make a recommendation.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, the point I want to make for the record is, in your opinion that is a friendly group that has the interests of the farmers at heart, who advise the local boards?

Mr. JONES. I think they have the interests of the farmers at heart. We would not keep them, if I did not think so.

Mr. JOHNSON. Now, last year we got 62,000 Mexican workers, you stated?

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Are you contemplating any increase in that this year?

Mr. JONES. Yes; we are going to try to get a few more. Of course, we have a problem there, always. We have to make agreements with the Mexican Government and an effort is being made to get some 20,000 for work in some of the plants and I do not know whether we will get an increased number or not. We hope to.

Mr. JOHNSON. What was your idea of increasing the Mexican laborers as far as agriculture is concerned?

Mr. JONES. We want to be sure that when these crops begin to reach the harvesting point that they will be taken care of, because a lot of food is perishable and, as you know, if it is not gathered at the time, it deteriorates.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I live right in the heart of one of those sections, but what I want to know from you is, Judge, is it contemplated to increase the number of agricultural workers from Mexico over what it was last year?

Mr. JONES. It is our intention to make an effort to do so, yes.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, how much of an increase?

Mr. JONES. We were planning something like 75,000 from Mexico if we can obtain them.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, we had very good luck with the Mexicans last year.

Mr. JONES. Yes; they have been very helpful in many places.

Mr. JOHNSON. One other question: Has there been any appreciable help given by the prisoners of war in agricultural labor?

Mr. JONES. Yes; we have had some pretty good help from some of the prisoners of war. We have not had as many as we thought we would at one time, but we have had pretty good help in places. They have to be guarded, of course.

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes; and is it your plan to increase the number of prisoners of war for agricultural uses?

Mr. JONES. Well, of course, those have to be made available through the corps area commanders, and we expect to ask them, any time when an emergency arises, if there are men available for that type of work.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Philbin, do you have any questions?

Mr. PHILBIN. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Winstead, have you any questions?

Mr. WINSTEAD. Judge Jones, you made a statement that farmers are willing to furnish their share for the Army and Navy. Now, I want to ask you this question: You referred to the favorable season of the past year. How many years have we had a not only favorable season but an unusually good season?

Mr. JONES. I would say we have had above normal for the last 4 years.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Well, now, what is the average? You know about every 3 to 5 years we have an unfavorable season. Do you have any statistics on that to show?

Mr. JONES. No. Of course, we have had severe droughts and floods in the past, and we do not know when we shall have them again.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Well, here is really the thought I am more interested in: Do you feel that the machinery and the manpower that the farmers now have, with a reasonable crop year, that they can meet the demands of the food problems, as they now stand, with the manpower now available?

Mr. JONES. I do not like to make forecasts because there are some elements of uncertainty in forecasting. We are going to do whatever

68175—45——31

we can and the best we can, and I know the farmers and producers all over the country will make every effort to do their job, and if we have favorable weather conditions we have every hope of keeping up full production of food. That is about all I can say. A forecast is pretty difficult to make.

Mr. WINSTEAD. Well, if the farms are stripped for manpower, can we meet those demands unless we can replace those people who are taken off the farms?

Mr. JONES. Well, of course, any further reduction in the number of farm workers will hurt agriculture just as it would hurt any other activity. We have been compelled to use many types of labor on the farms, including old people, women, children, and others. All together, it has been a wonderful accomplishment. We are going to make every effort to do what we can with tools at hand and do not intend to quit, no matter what happens.

Mr. WINSTEAD. That is right. Now, I have observed that witnesses here for labor and for industry, that in some industries they wanted longer hours. But is it not true that the farmers are working about all the farmers that they can work at the present time?

Mr. JONES. Yes; the farmers have worked long hours, especially during the last 4 years.

Mr. WINSTEAD. They do not increase, in many instances, their working hours.

Mr. JONES. That is right, and that is especially true in certain seasons. Take the planting and the harvesting seasons, he works almost regardless of hours.

Mr. WINSTEAD. In other words, if a man is taken from a farm, unless we can get an additional man to take his place to a certain extent that would cut down the farm production?

Mr. JONES. That would handicap to a certain degree; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Roe, do you have any questions?

Mr. ROE. Yes. Judge Jones, many of these liberated countries will be in a better position this year to plant crops and to harvest than in the past, because you have a season coming on, and you have a greater area, and it is all pretty good farm land in certain countries. Will that not tend to relieve the pressure on farm labor in this country? Somewhat, I mean.

Mr. JONES. Well, where they are equipped to do it. One of the difficulties has been that in many of these countries they have been stripped or partly stripped of their equipment. They are handicapped in many ways. For the first few months it will be difficult; of course, they will help some.

Mr. ROE. They will do it in a mediaeval way?

Mr. JONES. Yes; their production will relieve the problem somewhat, but I think we are likely to find that for the first few months following the liberation of any country a great deal of food will be needed. While we did not find the situation in France as bad as was expected, we feel certain that the food needs in countries like Greece and Poland will be very great.

Mr. ROE. They will need food to keep people out of trouble.

It will be something to keep people out of trouble and if they have to work their farms, that will help.

Mr. JONES. That will help some, and undoubtedly it will make a real contribution. It takes a while to get the thing set, and production, as you know, is not an overnight proposition.

Mr. ROE. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Holifield, do you have any questions?

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Judge Jones, I do not wish to detain you very much longer but I want to say that your testimony has been most cooperative of any of the three witnesses we have had. You have shown a realization of the fact that we are facing a military emergency, and I want to comment on that point, that the dietary standards of the American people are much higher than those of any of the Allies engaged in this war, and if it does become necessary to meet the military emergency for the American people to tighten their belts, I am sure you will agree with me they can do it, as far as quantity and quality of food is concerned.

Mr. JONES. That can be done.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Without any degree of danger to their health?

Mr. JONES. The American people, of course, have not had exactly what they wanted all the time, but they have eaten better on the average. That is partially due to their increased purchasing power, but they have eaten better on the average, the average person has, than they did before the war.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Thomason.

Mr. THOMASON. Judge Jones, do not the Tydings amendments affect agriculture, or make, in effect, agriculture an essential industry?

Mr. JONES. I think that is the effect of it as I understand it.

Mr. THOMASON. And you have not found anything in this bill that would either repeal or amend the Tydings amendment, have you?

Mr. JONES. I have not. I have read it rather hurriedly but I have not found that. At the same time, I would suggest that the changes I mentioned be made.

Mr. HARNESS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. THOMASON. Yes.

Mr. HARNESS. Nobody has been able to explain this provision which gives the Director of Selective Service the right to designate what services are contributing to the war effort. Now, if that does not supersede any other part of the act, then I do not know.

Mr. THOMASON. I think Judge Jones has given a very fine and cooperative statement. I think the amendment is in order; it is in order along the lines of his suggestion, to include agriculture which would make it certain.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would like to ask the judge one question: Judge Jones, I have believed all the while that the legal effect of the Tydings amendment was to really freeze, subject to Selective Service action, the essential worker on the farm. Do you agree with that idea?

Mr. JONES. As I understand it, the law requires that essential farm workers be deferred until such time as satisfactory replacements are found.

Mr. THOMASON. And that is up to the local boards?

Mr. JONES. And that is up to the local boards.

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Jones, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank you, sir, for coming over.

Mr. JONES. May I say, sir, that the changes which I have suggested were hurriedly made, and I am not married to any particular wording, but I did want to bring the matter to your attention. I thank you gentlemen for your courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are glad to have had you.

STATEMENT OF W. R. OGG, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE, AMERICAN FARM BUREAU FEDERATION

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ogg, what is your full name?

Mr. OGG. My name is W. R. Ogg. I am in charge of the Washington office of the American Farm Bureau Federation, and have been in that capacity for 7 years and have been with our organization for the past 19 years. I want to apologize for being late, Mr. Chairman, but I did not know until an hour or two ago that the committee had requested me to make a statement.

I would like to explain that Mr. O'Neal is at present out of the city but since receiving the request of the committee, I have conferred with him by telephone and have gone over with him the matters involved. I have a very brief statement which, in order to save your time, I would like to read as representing the views of our organization.

If you will permit me, I would like to present that to the committee and will be glad to answer any questions I can.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead with your statement.

Mr. OGG. Farmers can rightly be proud of their war record. Despite a growing shortage of farm machinery and ever-growing shortages of labor, and many other handicaps, they have produced record-breaking supplies of food, for 4 consecutive years, in order to supply the needs of our armed forces, our allies, and our civilian population. As a result of this all-out effort, our armed forces and our civilian population have been better fed than in any other war in our history.

There have been no strikes on the farm front, and no slow-downs of production. Despite harassing restrictions and impractical regulations, farmers, have gone about their production job trying to do their utmost to meet their food-production goals. They have only been able to accomplish this phenomenal result by working much longer hours and by utilizing large numbers of elderly people, women and children. Farmers do not have a 40-hour week, with time and a half for overtime, and double pay for Sunday and holidays. The farmers' workweek is much longer than the national 48-hour week in war industries. Farmers in general have worked 60, 70, and as high as 80 hours a week to produce the food and fiber needed for the winning of the war.

Congress early recognized that food is just as essential as ammunition for the winning of the war and enacted the so-called Tydings amendment requiring the deferment of all essential workers in agriculture who could not be replaced. No responsible farmer or farm organization seeks any selfish advantage or protection for any worker engaged in agriculture who can be replaced. The lists of agricultural deferments have been repeatedly combed over thoroughly, and it is

our belief that the agricultural deferments have been combed down to the point where, with very limited exceptions, they are the most efficient, particularly in the group 18 to 25, of all of the agricultural workers.

Now farmers are greatly disturbed over the recent directive issued by Justice Byrnes and the regulations issued by the Selective Service directing the reexamination and requiring preinduction physical examination of all deferred registrants in agriculture 18 through 25 years. Apparently the impression has gone out pretty generally to the country that this represents virtual annulment of the Tydings amendment.

We took up this matter with Selective Service headquarters and were assured that this was not the intent of the new regulations. Nevertheless, these regulations are being almost universally interpreted as the first step toward induction.

Again, I want to repeat that I am sure that all responsible leaders in agriculture have never in the past nor are they now interested in protecting the agricultural deferment of any unworthy registrant, but we are convinced that if any large number of the deferred registrants 18 to 25 are removed from farms at this time it will result in a substantial reduction in the over-all production of food, and that it will result in substantial liquidation of livestock and dairy cattle and later in a substantial reduction in the production of soil crops.

We feel that it is our obligation at this time to give to the Congress and to the responsible administrators in Government the best judgment of farm people with respect to this situation. These deferred registrants, particularly in this age group, are keymen; in many instances they are the only able-bodied men on these farms, and the elderly people and children who are supplementing their work would be unable to carry on the farming operations at their present production level if these men are taken and are not replaced.

It should be borne in mind also that on December 1, 1944, according to the report of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, there was the smallest farm employment for that date that has ever been reported on record. The 1944 annual average number of hired workers was 13 percent below the 1935–39 average, and even the number of family workers, despite the increased dependence upon farm labor, was 7 percent less last year than in the pre-war period.

This report further states that the farm operators worked an average of 12.1 hours per day as of September 1, and 10.8 hours per day as of the 1st of December. Hired workers averaged 10 hours and 9.3 hours, respectively, on those dates.

Thus, even in the less busy period of December, this represents, on the average, more than 60 hours a week for the farm operator at a less busy time, and, of course, that does not count any Sunday work, and as every farmer knows, there is always some work that has to be done on the farm Sunday. That means that some farmers, especially dairy farmers, averaged as high as 80 hours per week.

Now, as you are aware, the workweek in industry is far less. In the face of all these conditions, farmers cannot understand why so much emphasis is now being placed upon the induction of these key workers, 18 to 25, in agriculture, who are so vitally needed to produce the food required and enable farmers to meet their food-production goals, espe-

cially when there is so much wastage of manpower in nonagricultural occupations by reason of persons engaging in nonessential activities, by reason of slow-downs, strikes, by reason of the continued production of luxury goods, and other nonessential goods, with corresponding wastage of manpower.

They believe that this wastage of manpower should be corrected, including the causes of excessive absenteeism in these occupations, such as the large patronage of night clubs, just as one example, which is not only an economic waste under present conditions, but results in workers losing much valuable time from their employment.

We, therefore, believe that immediate steps should be taken to clarify or suspend the recent instructions with respect to the induction of key farm workers, so as to enable farmers to meet their production goals and at least until a more accurate determination can be made as to whether these people can be spared.

We also believe in the principle of work or fight, which has been proposed in various bills introduced in Congress, under which workers engaged in essential industries, including agriculture, would be required to stay in these jobs unless they secured the approval of their draft boards or unless the draft boards find they have good cause for leaving, and which also would give authority to bring about the transfer of workers from nonessential occupations to essential occupations.

We believe that such legislation, however, should be properly safeguarded so as to assure that the placement of all such workers will be carried on in the manner now provided by the War Food Administration and its agencies, and the War Manpower Commission. As a further safeguard, we believe that civil penalties should be provided instead of induction under penalty conditions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stewart, do you have any questions?

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Ogg, did your organization and the other farm groups recently have a meeting with agencies of Government having to do with the drafting of farm help? General Hershey and other members?

Mr. OGG. Well, we have had almost daily contact with Selective Service headquarters here since this order was issued in regard to it by phone or otherwise. There has been no general meeting of the farm organizations with General Hershey, so far as I know on that matter. Representatives of the farm organizations did have a conference with Colonel Keesling, at our request, to get information with respect to the May "work-or-fight" bill.

Mr. STEWART. Have you had occasion to study the percentage relation of inductions of farmers comparable to those of men in industry?

Mr. OGG. Yes; I would like, if I may, Mr. Chairman, to offer for the record a copy of a letter which President O'Neal addressed to General Hershey in regard to this order as of January 12, 1945.

Mr. STEWART. Mr. Chairman, if you do not mind, I would like that letter read.

The CHAIRMAN. How long is the letter?

Mr. OGG. Well, Mr. O'Neal's letter is half a page. The other is about a full page, single spaced.

Mr. STEWART. They are short.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, read Mr. O'Neal's letter.

Mr. OGG. I also have a letter here which President O'Neal yesterday forwarded to Justice Byrnes, which I would like to have your permission to insert into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, you may do that.

Mr. OGG. This letter to General Hershey, dated January 12, 1945, reads:

> We are getting telegrams and phone calls from our leaders in various parts of the country inquiring about the status of the Tydings amendment. Apparently there is a very general impression that your recent instructions to draft boards abrogate the provisions of the Tydings amendment, and require immediate reclassification of men who have been deferred as essential workers in agriculture, between the ages of 18 and 25. Farmers believe that any further inroads on efficient agricultural workers will have serious effects upon the volume of agricultural production. We would appreciate it very much if you will give us your official interpretation of your recent instructions to local draft boards, and the present status of the Tydings amendment, in order that we may properly inform our people.
>
> Very truly yours,
>
> EDWARD A. O'NEAL.

This is General Hershey's reply of January 13:

> DEAR MR. O'NEAL: This acknowledges the receipt of your letter—

and so forth.

> The armed forces have strongly indicated that they want their now substantially increased calls filled to the utmost possible extent from the available registrants under 26 years of age. As of the first of this year, out of the total labor pool in all war activities other than agriculture, only 40,000 registrants, under 26 years of age (apart from the merchant marine), were deferred. Out of a total farm labor pool of something over 8,000,000, over 360,000 registrants under 26 years of age were occupationally deferred. The above-mentioned numbers of registrants occupationally deferred in agriculture and in other activities do not include registrants who have been found not qualified for general military service. In other words, a war-production and war-activity group many times as large as the farm-labor group had less than one-ninth as many occupational deferments within the age brackets out of which we must, to the largest possible extent, fill the calls made on us by the armed forces.
>
> Under those circumstances, the Selective Service System received, from the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and transmitted on January 3, 1945, to all State directors of selective service, a letter stating, in part, that the President "has found that the further deferment of all men now deferred in the 18 through 25 age group because of agricultural occupation is not as essential to the best interest of our war effort as is the urgent and more essential need of the Army and Navy for young men. The President feels in view of existing conditions, agriculture, like our other war industries, can, with few exceptions, be carried on by those in the older-age groups."

May I just say parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that I think that language is what has confused the draft boards and made them feel the President has already determined whether they are essential or not, and that they must take them anyway.

Mr. ARENDS. In other words, they are acting on the Presidential communication, the local boards, rather than under the Tydings amendment?

Mr. OGG. I am afraid that is right. They feel he has made that determination. We feel and have been advised by Selective Service headquarters here that the draft board still has the responsibility of determining whether that worker is essential and whether he can be replaced, but I am afraid that they do not understand it out in the country.

Mr. ARENDS. This is a suggestion by the President against the law by the Congress, is that right?

Mr. OGG. Well, it seems to be contrary, as I view it, to what was intended, if it is literally interpreted.

Continuing the quotation:

> The President has authorized me to ask you to take such action in connection with the administration of the Tydings amendment as may be necessary to provide to the full extent permitted by law for the reclassification and induction of the men agriculturally deferred in the age group 18 through 25. In accordance with Justice Byrnes' letter, we have directed all local boards to review the classification of agriculturally deferred registrants ages 18 to 25, inclusive, to make absolutely sure that they fully meet the requirements of the Tydings amendment; that is, that they are necessary to an agricultural occupation or endeavor, that they are regularly engaged in it, that it is essential to the war effort, and that no replacement can be obtained.
>
> Sincerely yours,
>
> LEWIS B. HERSHEY.

In other words, I think the language is clear that they have the authority and responsibility to determine essentiality of workers, but they are apparently not carrying out the instructions in that way locally in many places.

Another thing that has caused a great deal of confusion is the order for reinduction physical examination before the board has determined whether a worker is essential under the Tydings amendment; and, according to information that is coming in to us, that creates a state of mind wherein the boys feel, "Well, I am going to be inducted; hence I might as well leave now."

Now, a lot of these boys do not want to stay on the farm, anyway; they want to get in and fight; but they realize they are needed. But that creates a state of mind which may, in a great many cases, result in a lot of them leaving when they are really needed.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Any further questions, Mr. Stewart?

Mr. STEWART. Do any of the other members wish to ask any questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. You understand why they have preinduction examination? They want to determine whether he is physically capable to go to the Army and save a trip to the induction center and sending him back again.

Mr. OGG. Yes, I understand that; but the point I was bringing out is, if the worker is essential and he is going to be retained, why get him upset in advance? Why not determine whether he is essential first to agriculture? If he is, there is no point in having him have a physical examination.

Mr. JOHNSON. If you find he is not capable of going in the Army, you can leave him right on the farm?

Mr. OGG. Well, I am glad you mentioned that. That raises another question that causes a lot of trouble. After they are called up and are examined physically and are found disqualified because of physical defects, what we are afraid of is that once they are put in IV–F or even in II–C (F), unless those draft boards, and unless that registrant understands clearly that he has got to stay in agriculture, he may be off and gone. That will not help the armed forces any, and it will not help agriculture any.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that is what that bill is for, to hold those fellows right on that ranch.

Mr. OGG. Well, as I say in my statement, we favor the principle of work or fight with these two objectives of retaining the essential workers in essential industries and providing a method of getting workers out of nonessential industry back to essential industry, and we hope that that will be broad enough to cover getting workers back in agriculture, because we have lost several million of them, Mr. Chairman, since the war started, of which a considerable number have gone into industry.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, we have got five fields to supply with manpower, the farms have to operate, the Marine Corps has to operate, all of them.

Mr. OGG. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. We are just trying to fix it here so that we can allocate them properly to the services. There is nobody on this committee that wants to hurt the farmers. Particularly I do not, because I am a farmer myself.

Mr. OGG. I am sure that is true. I hope no one got that impression either, Mr. Chairman, from anything I might have said, and I want to again say that I am sure the farmers want to do their part.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no question about that.

Mr. OGG. I do hope that if legislation is enacted you will see to it that it is worded in such a way as, first, not to disturb the present program of the recruiting and placing labor on the farms.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Mr. OGG. And, secondly, that we can get some of this labor back that we need.

Mr. KILDAY. Then, Mr. Ogg, inasmuch as your organization endorses the first provision of the bill; that is, that the man deferred for occupational reasons be required to stay there unless he secures permission of the draft board to leave; and you also endorse, in effect, the second portion of the bill, which would require men in nonessential industry to go into essential industry, including agriculture; you would endorse the provisions of the bill to prefer civil penalties?

Mr. OGG. I want to make clear, I am not endorsing any particular bill. I am merely endorsing those two principles of legislation.

Mr. KILDAY. Well, that is all this bill contains.

Mr. OGG. Well, there are various bills before you and various provisions, but we are for those two basic principles.

Mr. KILDAY. You are for those two basic principles?

Mr. OGG. Yes, sir.

Mr. KILDAY. If this bill contains machinery to accomplish these two objectives, you are in favor of the adoption of legislation for that purpose?

Mr. OGG. Yes, sir; with the safeguards that I indicated.

Mr. KILDAY. Yes.

Mr. THOMASON. Boiled down, your organization favors this bill if the will and spirit of the Tydings amendment were lived up to?

Mr. OGG. Yes, sir; if it embodies the principles I have stated and the safeguards I have mentioned. I think that is an important qualification, because we cannot do the job we have go to do without it.

Mr. KILDAY. I believe it is clear, Mr. Ogg, that through this bill the Tydings amendment is not emasculated but we will attempt to import

into industry measures that are effective under the Tydings amendment for the benefit of agriculture.

Mr. OGG. We requested General Hershey, and I hope they see fit to do it, to send out further instructions to the draft boards to clarify this, because I honestly believe they do not understand it.

Mr. KILDAY. I think you are correct on that and I asked Colonel Keesling if something could not be issued to make clear that the Tydings amendment was to be observed.

Mr. OGG. Yes; and I want to say I do not mean to imply that there is any intent on their part to circumvent it.

Mr. KILDAY. I understand. Mr. Byrnes' directive is subject to that construction and, as you say, the local boards probably do not understand it.

Mr. OGG. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEWART. Now, Mr. Ogg, do you not believe the fact of being reclassified and that there are many of them who would naturally be IV–F among these farmers that even though Selective Service did not select any of them for induction, that it would weaken the farm program? Many of the IV–F's would then go to industry in search of much better jobs?

Mr. OGG. If what was done?

Mr. STEWART. If they are reclassified; first, they were deferred because they were in agriculture; now if they go ahead and reclassify them and we find 40 percent in IV–F, that that would create trouble with that 40 percent.

Mr. OGG. That is right. That is why we are urging and hope you gentlemen will urge that these workers who are not physically fit, to go in the Army, that they should be retained on the farms, and I think it would be better if that prephysical examination were withheld until they are determined to be essential or not, first, and then after that is determined, there should be clear instructions as to the draft boards that those men, even though they are physically disqualified for military service, certainly should do their part by staying on the farms.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STEWART. Yes.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, Mr. Ogg, you started off with your statement testifying about the Tydings amendment, and the effect of this regulation, or these instructions that have recently been put out. You realize that they are in no way a part of this legislation and that the Tydings amendment is not involved in this legislation? As a matter of fact, what we do say is, in this legislation, that those men who are found to be physically disqualified for armed services, just remain in the essential work they are in, including agriculture, and if they are not in essential work, it gives the right to the Director of War Mobilization to place them in that essential work.

Mr. OGG. Yes, sir; I understand that.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Now, if I understand it correctly, if you will just divorce the Tydings amendment and these regulations from this legislation, it seems to me that your statement is a complete endorsement of the thing we are seeking to do by this bill.

Mr. OGG. Well, as I understand it and I believe I understand it the same way you do, that this does not change in any way the Tydings amendment. The only or the main reason I mentioned that is that

even if legislation of this character passes it is important to clarify the confusion and apparent misunderstanding that now prevails throughout the country with respect to this recent directive relating to the Tydings amendment.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Of course, I am in agreement with you about that. I think it is unfortunate the instructions were sent out in the form in which they were sent, because I think undoubtedly the effect on the local draft board was that just as you have interpreted it here.

Mr. OGG. Well, gentlemen, I thank you for this opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; Mr. Clason has a question.

Mr. CLASON. I think some of the others do, too.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clason.

Mr. CLASON. Do you think it would be wise to put in this legislation a reference to the Tydings amendment which would make it clear that the Tydings amendment was not in any way affected by the passage of this law, which comes later than the Tydings amendment?

Mr. OGG. Well, I think it would help to make it clear that it is not weakened in any way. As we construe it, it would strengthen it, if it was properly interpreted, but I believe it would be helpful to add appropriate language to make certain that the Tydings amendment is fully carried out.

Mr. CLASON. Would you say this bill, if passed, would increase the cost of food products to the consumer?

Mr. OGG. Would increase the cost of food?

Mr. CLASON. Yes; the cost of food. In other words, would you have to bring in and pay higher wages to these persons whom you would take in to replace those leaving the farms?

Mr. OGG. Well, I hope that is not going to be the policy, Congressman, to take these keymen out. That is the thing I am complaining about, that we must not take these keymen, even though they be 18 to 25, if they cannot be replaced; and, bear in mind, there are a lot of farms where he is the only fellow that is able to carry on the hard work on that farm and the skilled work.

Mr. CLASON. Yes; but——

Mr. OGG. And if you are going to rely on getting some fellow who has had little or no experience in agriculture to go out there and take his place, why, it is going to be difficult for the farmer to get his job done, and it may result in increased costs—it will result in increased costs so far as the farm is concerned, if that is done.

Mr. CLASON. Well, if it is the owner of the farm, or the son of the owner, who is not now receiving cash wages, what would be the effect upon the farm?

Mr. OGG. If what?

Mr. CLASON. If the owner or the son of the owner, who is not receiving wages in cash at the present time, is taken and——

Mr. OGG. Well, of course, he must get his wage out of his price, as far as that goes, but it might mean more out-of-pocket cost, that is true, if that policy were to be pursued.

Mr. CLASON. What would you say to the possibility of a reduction of nonessential crops at this time?

Mr. OGG. Well, it is pretty hard to define what is a nonessential crop. There has been something done, though, along that line already. Draft boards have the authority now, as I understand it, to consider

whether he is making a significant contribution to the war effort by producing these necessary crops, but I just want to clarify for a moment further my reply to your other question. Farmers, despite all these difficulties, have produced this record supply of food.

Now, they are going to do their best—I want to again say that. No matter what happens, they are patriotic. All I was trying to do was to point out the practical effect as farmers see it. Now, they don't want any unnecessary person kept out there, but they are pleading that those who are absolutely essential be retained. Then, for seasonal work and where there are shortages of workers, this additional legislation, along the lines I have described, would give some opportunity to fill in the gaps, but it is most essential to keep these key people that cannot be replaced, because agriculture now is a highly skilled proposition, particularly in the areas where the big food supplies are produced.

Mr. CLASON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. DURHAM. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Durham.

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Ogg, Judge Jones testified here a few minutes ago that some 3,000,000 people left the farms. Of course, as the chairman said, we are kind of scraping the bottom of the barrel on these manpower demands, but at the present time, how many people are in agriculture?

Mr. OGG. Well, I have a report here that I will be glad to put in the record.

Mr. DURHAM. What is the total number involved in agriculture?

Mr. OGG. The total farm employment, as of December 1, 1944, was 9,337,000, of which 7,289,000 were family workers and 2,048,000 hired labor, and, as I said a while ago, that is the lowest number of farm workers on record as of that date.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, this 380,000 that we have been talking about and worrying about is rather a small number to be scared to death about, is it not, compared to the total?

Mr. OGG. Well, that is not really a fair comparison, Congressman, for this reason: It is the job that these are doing. In most cases, those lists have been combed over again and again and they have got them down to the point where they are the keymen.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, I was raised on a farm. A man does not become a keyman at the age of 26.

Mr. OGG. Well, I——

Mr. STEWART. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. DURHAM. Yes.

Mr. STEWART. It takes a young man in operating modern machinery that really knows the mechanics of that operation.

Mr. DURHAM. But I do not think that a man becomes a keyman on a farm between the ages of 18 to 26. I think when you get up into the other group, you have got to take him before you take the man from 26 to 38. There you get into your key operators.

Mr. OGG. Well, Mr. Congressman, anybody that has worked on a farm—I have not worked on one for a number of years because of my job here, but I have done a lot of work on farms in my younger days—knows that it is hard work, and a lot of farmers are down to this situation, where there is an elderly man who may have retired, and he has gone back there at the risk of his health to carry on.

Mr. DURHAM. Yes; I understand that.

Mr. OGG. He may use some seasonal labor. If the young man is taken, he cannot do that work.

Mr. DURHAM. Well, of course, I think that is where the Tydings amendment should be used.

Mr. OGG. Yes.

Mr. DURHAM. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

(No response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ogg.

Mr. OGG. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the committee will go into executive session.

(Thereupon the committee proceeded to the consideration of other matters, after which an adjournment was taken until the following day, Friday, January 19, 1945, at 10 a. m.)

(The following was submitted for the record:)

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS,
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM,
Washington, D. C., January 13, 1945.

Mr. EDWARD A. O'NEAL,
President, American Farm Bureau Federation,
Washington, D. C.

Subject: Classification of farmers.

DEAR MR. O'NEAL: This acknowledges the receipt of your letter of January 12, 1945, concerning the classification of farm workers.

The armed forces have strongly indicated that they want their now substantially increased calls filled to the utmost possible extent from the available registrants under 26 years of age. As of the first of this year, out of the total labor pool in all war activities other than agriculture, only 40,000 registrants under 26 years of age (apart from the merchant marine) were deferred. Out of a total farm labor pool of something over 8,000,000, over 360,000 registrants under 26 years of age were occupationally deferred. The above-mentioned numbers of registrants occupationally deferred in agriculture and in other activities do not include registrants who have been found not qualified for general military service. In other words, a war production and war activity group many times as large as the farm labor group had less than one-ninth as many occupational deferments within the age brackets, out of which we must to the largest possible extent fill the calls made on us by the armed forces.

Under those circumstances, the Selective Service System received, from the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and transmitted on January 3, 1945, to all State directors of selective service, a letter stating, in part, that the President—

"has found that the further deferment of all men now deferred in the 18 through 25 age group because of agricultural occupation is not as essential to the best interest of our war effort as is the urgent and more essential need of the Army and Navy for young men. The President feels, in view of existing conditions, agriculture, like our other war industries, can, with few exceptions, be carried on by those in the older age groups.

"The President has authorized me to ask you to take such action in connection with the administration of the Tydings amendment as may be necessary to provide to the full extent permitted by law for the reclassification and induction of the men agriculturally deferred in the age group 18 through 25."

In accordance with Justice Byrnes' letter, we have directed all local boards to review the classification of agriculturally deferred registrants, ages 18 to 25, inclusive, to make absolutely sure that they fully meet the requirements of the Tydings amendment, i. e., that they are necessary to an agricultural occupation or endeavor, that they are regularly engaged in it, that it is essential to the war effort, and that no replacement can be obtained.

Sincerely yours,

LEWIS B. HERSHEY, *Director.*

JANUARY 12, 1945.

Maj. Gen. LEWIS B. HERSHEY,
Director, Selective Service System, Washington, D. C.

DEAR GENERAL HERSHEY: We are getting telegrams and phone calls from our leaders in various parts of the country inquiring about the status of the Tydings amendment. Apparently there is a very general impression that your recent instructions to draft boards abrogate the provisions of the Tydings amendment and require immediate reclassification of men who have been deferred as essential workers in agriculture between the ages of 18 and 25.

Farmers believe that any further inroads on efficient agricultural workers will have serious effects upon the volume of agricultural production.

We would appreciate it very much if you will give us your official interpretation of your recent instructions to local draft boards, and the present status of the Tydings amendment, in order that we may properly inform our people.

Very truly yours,

EDW. A. O'NEAL, *President.*

JANUARY 17, 1945.

Hon. JAMES F. BYRNES,
Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR DIRECTOR BYRNES: The recent instructions sent out by Selective Service System headquarters requiring reexamination and preinduction physical examinations of all deferred registrants in agriculture are causing a lot of confusion.

We are getting many distressing appeals by telephone, telegraph, and letters indicating that a great many farmers are panicky over the situation, as they do not see how they will be able to continue operations at present levels and meet their food-production goals if they lose these trained keymen. Apparently the impression has gone out pretty generally over the country that these regulations mean, for all practical purposes, the nullification of the Tydings amendment requiring the deferment of all essential agricultural workers who cannot be replaced.

Another thing which is very upsetting is the requirement for preinduction physical examination. The mere fact that every man is called up for a physical examination before his essentiality is determined creates such uncertainty that many of these young men will leave the farm, even though they are urgently needed.

As you know, the supply of farm labor now is the lowest on record, and farmers have been able to meet their food-production goals only by working long hours and by utilizing large numbers of elderly people, women, and children. There are a great many cases where the person deferred under the Tydings amendment is the only able-bodied person and is the keyman upon whom the whole farming operations depend, his work being supplemented by an elderly person, and in some cases by children, who could not carry on the farming operations at their present level without this key person.

It is my understanding that these resources of deferred registrants have been pretty thoroughly combed over already. I am convinced that if any large numbers of these key essential workers are taken off the farms it will result in a substantial reduction in production of food.

We understand that it was your intention that the provisions of the Tydings amendment be strictly observed. The reports coming to us indicate that the recent instructions are being interpreted in such a manner that may result in largely nullifying the Tydings amendment.

I wish to respectfully urge that you immediately review this whole situation in the light of the possible effects on food production and take such additional steps as may be necessary to reassure farmers by clarifying the intent and purpose of your recent order with respect to farm deferments and assuring farmers of an adequate supply of dependable labor necessary to meet their food-production goals.

Another phase of the farm manpower problem which we believe needs immediate attention is the holding on the farm of men who are rejected for military duties because of physical disabilities. Under the present interpretation of the regulations, many of these men may be lost to agriculture unless some further instructions are given to draft boards.

I wish to strongly urge that appropriate steps be taken immediately instructing local draft boards to prevent all deferred registrants in agriculture who are rejected for military service because of physical disabilities from leaving essential activities in agriculture unless the draft board determines they have good cause. It is our understanding that orders were issued recently requiring this to be done in the case of industrial workers. We feel that the same protection should certainly be given agriculture.

Sincerely yours,

EDW. A. O'NEAL, *President.*

(From Farm Labor, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C., December 14, 1944)

FARM EMPLOYMENT AT NEW LOW FOR DECEMBER

There were about 9,337,000 persons working on farms on the first of December, 2 percent less than a year earlier, and the smallest farm employment for the date on record, the United States Department of Agriculture reported today. This decline is explained entirely by a drop in the number of hired workers. The 2,048,000 hired workers on farms December 1 was 9 percent below the December 1, 1943, level and the lowest for the month in the last 10 years. Family workers numbered about the same as a year ago. Total farm employment has been at a record low every month since February.

A review of the first-of-month employment estimates for the year indicates a further change in the seasonal pattern of numbers of family workers employed on farms. Relatively greater numbers of family workers were employed during 1944 than in any recent year, particularly during the periods of peak farm activity. This continued increase in the relative numbers of family workers indicates an increasing use of women and children and other members of farm families not ordinarily employed at farm work, and emphasizes the major contribution being made by farm families in sustaining the present high level of agricultural production.

The 1944 annual average number of family workers (including farm operators) was about 7 percent below the 1935–39 average level. The annual average for hired workers was about 13 percent below the 1935–39 average.

Farm operators worked an average of 10.8 hours per day around the first of December, compared with 12.1 hours about September 1. The respective average workday for hired workers was estimated at 9.3 and 10 hours. A slightly shorter workday prevailed in the South and West than in the North and East. Both family and hired workers were reported as working a fraction of an hour less than at this time a year ago.

In New England, farm employment changed very little during November, and the labor situation was reported easing somewhat with the completion of harvesting operations. Farm operators were reported working 11.3 hours per day, an hour less than they were working early in September. The length of workday for hired workers was down fractionally for the same period but remained near the level of a year ago.

Practically all harvesting operations have been completed in the Middle Atlantic States, although some harvesting of corn remained to be done. Farmers in this area, however, continue to report a scarcity of dairy hands.

In the North Central States, hired farm employment continued to show a considerably lower level, but numbers of family workers in most States remained steady or increased slightly compared with a year ago. With the period of peak requirements for hired workers passed, a considerable number of farm workers were accepting industrial work in war plants during the winter months. Farm labor was still in good demand in many localities, and fall plowing and completion of the fall harvesting operations were in progress. In Nebraska, about 35 percent of the record corn crop remained to be husked on December 1.

In the South Atlantic and east South Central States, reports of labor scarcity persisted, despite the seasonal decline in farm activities. The cotton harvest was about completed. In West Virginia, dairymen were reported having some difficulty securing and retaining experienced help. Tobacco stripping was in full swing in Kentucky and Tennessee.

In the west South Central States, farm employment remained relatively high. Harvesting of the cotton crop has been somewhat delayed in much of this area, due to the record production of late fall crops.

Most of the migrant and foreign workers had left the Mountain States with completion of the harvests of sugar beets, potatoes, corn, and vegetable crops. Fall plowing and the care of livestock were major activities.

Employment in the Pacific States showed a sharp decline during November, although on December 1 considerable work remained to be done in completing the harvest of 1944 crops. The citrus and cotton harvests continued, with cotton picking far behind the usual schedule and cotton pickers somewhat short of the demand. Other crops on which some work remained were beans, rice, grain sorghums, sugar beets, walnuts, dates, a few grapes, and olives for oil. Orchard pruning was getting under way and the ground was being prepared for winter and early spring vegetable crops. In Washington, practically all harvesting had been completed. Seeding of fall grains was under way whenever weather and soil conditions permitted. Some labor was being employed in fall plowing, making or repairing irrigation outlets, and other clean-up jobs. The labor situation in regard to regular hands continued to be tight, particularly for milkers.

Foreign workers and war prisoners continued to constitute a small but important segment of the farm-labor force. The table on page 9 shows the number of foreign workers transported by the Office of Labor, that were employed on November 30. These included 29,891 Mexicans, mostly employed in California. Seven thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight foreign workers were employed in Florida.

Farm employment indexes and related data, United States, Dec. 1, 1944, with comparisons

	Annual average, 1910–14	Nov. 1, 1943	Dec. 1, 1943	Nov. 1, 1944	Dec. 1, 1944
FARM EMPLOYMENT INDEXES					
Total:					
Unadjusted	100	89	79	89	77
Seasonally adjusted	100	83	86	83	82
Family labor:					
Unadjusted	100	88	79	89	76
Seasonally adjusted	100	85	87	86	84
Hired labor:					
Unadjusted	100	91	78	87	71
Seasonally adjusted	100	78	84	74	76
FARM EMPLOYMENT [1]					
Total	12,052	10,698	9,519	10,690	9,337
Family labor	9,160	8,064	7,269	8,168	7,289
Hired labor	2,892	2,634	2,250	2,522	2,048

[1] Thousands of persons.

Length of farm workday for operators and hired workers, Dec. 1, 1944, with comparisons

[Source: United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics—Crop Reporting Board]

State and division	Farm operator				Hired help			
	Dec. 1, 1939	Dec. 1, 1943	Sept. 1, 1944	Dec. 1, 1944	Dec. 1, 1939	Dec. 1, 1943	Sept. 1, 1944	Dec. 1, 1944
	Hours	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*
Maine	12.0	12.3	12.8	11.6	9.5	9.5	9.5	9.2
New Hampshire	11.0	11.8	12.2	11.1	9.3	9.6	10.0	9.6
Vermont	12.0	12.3	12.5	12.6	10.7	10.7	11.1	10.7
Massachusetts	11.0	11.5	12.2	10.4	9.9	9.3	9.5	9.3
Rhode Island	11.0	11.9	12.2	11.6	10.0	10.5	9.7	9.4
Connecticut	11.0	10.8	11.7	10.7	10.0	9.6	9.7	9.4
New England	11.5	11.8	12.3	11.3	9.9	9.7	9.9	9.6
New York	11.0	11.9	12.6	11.6	10.0	10.6	10.7	10.3
New Jersey	11.0	11.2	12.1	10.8	9.8	9.8	10.0	9.8
Pennsylvania	11.3	12.0	12.8	11.7	9.7	10.2	10.3	9.9
Middle Atlantic	11.1	11.9	12.7	11.6	9.8	10.3	10.4	10.1

Length of farm workday for operators and hired workers, Dec. 1, 1944, with comparisons—Continued

State and division	Farm operator				Hired help			
	Dec. 1, 1939	Dec. 1, 1943	Sept. 1, 1944	Dec. 1, 1944	Dec. 1, 1939	Dec. 1, 1943	Sept. 1, 1944	Dec. 1, 1944
	Hours	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*	*Hours*
Ohio	11.3	11.7	12.4	11.2	9.5	9.7	10.1	9.5
Indiana	10.5	11.5	12.1	10.8	9.2	9.7	10.1	9.3
Illinois	10.0	11.3	11.9	10.9	10.0	10.2	10.8	9.9
Michigan	11.3	12.0	12.7	11.5	10.1	10.3	10.4	10.0
Wisconsin	11.8	12.5	13.0	12.2	10.8	11.3	11.6	11.2
East North Central	11.0	11.8	12.4	11.3	10.0	[1] 10.3	10.7	10.1
Minnesota	11.0	12.0	13.0	11.6	10.0	10.8	11.0	10.5
Iowa	11.0	11.8	12.6	11.3	10.0	10.6	11.0	10.2
Missouri	10.7	11.3	12.3	11.0	9.1	9.3	10.0	9.0
North Dakota	10.1	10.9	13.5	10.4	9.7	10.0	11.1	10.0
South Dakota	10.0	11.3	13.3	11.3	10.0	10.1	11.1	10.1
Nebraska	10.0	11.8	12.7	11.8	10.0	9.9	10.6	9.8
Kansas	10.0	11.4	12.7	11.1	9.0	9.6	10.5	9.3
West North Central	10.5	11.6	12.7	11.3	9.7	10.1	10.8	9.9
Delaware	10.6	11.0	12.8	11.6	9.2	9.5	10.1	9.6
Maryland	11.0	11.7	12.8	11.5	9.5	9.8	10.0	9.8
Virginia	10.0	11.0	12.2	11.1	9.0	9.3	9.8	9.0
West Virginia	10.0	10.9	11.9	10.6	9.0	8.8	9.3	8.9
North Carolina	10.0	10.5	11.9	10.5	9.0	8.6	9.7	8.7
South Carolina	10.0	10.2	11.6	10.1	9.0	8.7	9.8	9.5
Georgia	9.8	10.3	11.6	10.3	8.8	8.8	10.1	8.9
Florida	10.0	10.4	10.7	10.1	9.0	9.0	9.0	8.8
South Atlantic	10.0	10.6	11.8	10.5	9.0	8.9	9.8	9.1
Kentucky	10.0	10.9	11.8	10.7	9.0	9.2	10.0	9.0
Tennessee	9.8	11.0	11.7	10.6	8.9	9.1	10.1	9.1
Alabama	10.0	10.3	11.1	10.1	9.0	8.7	9.7	8.8
Mississippi	9.3	10.2	11.2	10.2	8.8	8.9	9.5	8.9
East South Central	9.8	10.6	11.4	10.4	8.9	9.0	9.8	8.9
Arkansas	9.6	10.5	11.4	10.1	8.9	8.8	9.6	8.7
Louisiana	10.0	10.6	10.9	9.9	9.0	8.9	9.5	8.7
Oklahoma	10.0	10.8	11.7	11.0	9.0	9.1	10.1	8.9
Texas	10.0	11.0	11.8	10.7	9.0	9.3	10.0	9.0
West South Central	9.9	10.8	11.5	10.5	9.0	9.1	9.9	8.9
Montana	10.0	10.5	12.9	10.1	9.0	9.1	10.9	9.3
Idaho	10.0	10.7	12.9	10.3	9.0	9.0	9.9	8.7
Wyoming	10.0	11.0	12.9	10.7	9.0	9.2	10.0	9.3
Colorado	10.0	11.0	12.7	10.7	9.0	9.7	10.0	8.9
New Mexico	10.0	10.8	12.5	10.9	9.0	8.5	10.2	8.8
Arizona	10.0	11.2	11.9	10.7	9.0	8.9	9.0	8.6
Utah	10.6	11.2	12.7	10.3	8.6	8.6	8.7	8.0
Nevada	10.4	11.2	12.3	10.9	8.6	8.8	9.0	8.5
Mountain	10.1	10.9	12.7	10.5	9.0	9.1	9.9	8.8
Washington	10.0	11.2	12.1	10.2	9.0	9.3	9.8	9.0
Oregon	10.0	10.9	12.1	10.7	9.0	8.8	9.2	8.7
California	9.9	10.7	11.3	10.1	8.9	8.8	9.1	8.9
Pacific	10.0	10.9	11.7	10.3	8.9	8.9	9.3	8.9
United States	10.3	11.1	12.1	10.8	9.3	9.4	10.0	9.3

[1] Revised.

×

68175—45——32

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES

This book is due on the date indicated below, or at the expiration of a definite period after the date of borrowing, as provided by the library rules or by special arrangement with the Librarian in charge.

DATE BORROWED	DATE DUE	DATE BORROWED	DATE DUE
	FEB 22 1950 3/8		
	MAR 10 1951 3/24		
C28(842)M50			

D264 Un3874

U.S. Cong. House. Committee on military affairs.
Mobilization of civilian manpower. Hearings on H. R. 1119.

Geo D Hughes 149 Fairview W. Englewood N.J.
FEB 22 1950 3/8 Conrad Taft Jan 1918
MAR 10 1951 3/24

D264 UN 3874 MSH 02435
NEH JUL 19 1994

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
0041393279

JUL 2 1946

END OF
TITLE